Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians v. Unite Here Local 19

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedJuly 14, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-00846
StatusUnknown

This text of Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians v. Unite Here Local 19 (Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians v. Unite Here Local 19) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians v. Unite Here Local 19, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 PICAYUNE RANCHERIA OF No. 1:25-cv-00846-KES-SKO CHUKCHANSI INDIANS dba 11 CHUKCHANSI GOLD RESORT & CASINO, INC. ORDER REGARDING MOTION FOR 12 TEMPORARY RESTRANING ORDER Plaintiff, 13 Doc. 3 v. 14 UNITE HERE LOCAL # 19, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Plaintiff Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians (“Tribe”) dba Chukchansi Gold 19 Resort & Casino, Inc. (“Chukchansi”) brings a motion for temporary restraining order against 20 defendant Unite Here Local #19 (“Union”), seeking to enjoin Union represented employees of 21 Chukchansi from striking and from picketing at the entrances of Chukchansi. The Tribe alleges 22 that the Union’s strike violates the Tribe’s Tribal Labor Relations Ordinance (“TLRO”) 23 provisions that provide a right to strike only if collective bargaining negotiations have resulted in 24 an “impasse,” and that prohibit strike-related picketing on the Tribe’s Indian lands. Because the 25 Tribe has not met its burden to demonstrate why this Court has jurisdiction to issue an injunction 26 in a case “involving or growing out of a labor dispute,” 29 U.S.C. § 101, the Court declines to 27 grant the Tribe’s motion at this time, and instead sets this matter for a hearing and sets a briefing 28 schedule for the parties to adequately brief the matter. 1 I. Background 2 The Tribe is a federally recognized Indian tribe and operates Chukchansi in Coarsegold, 3 California.1 Doc. 2 ¶ 1. Chukchansi employs members of the Union, which represents over 4 8,500 workers employed at hotels, restaurants, airports, sports arenas, and convention centers 5 throughout Northern California. Id. ¶ 2. The Union represents roughly half of Chukchansi’s 6 employees. Id. According to the Tribe, negotiations between the Union and the Tribe were held 7 on June 23, 2025 and July 1-2, 2025. Doc. 3-2, Declaration of Adam P. Bailey, ¶ 12. The parties 8 remained divided over the extent of wage increases. Id. ¶ 13–14. Progress was made on some 9 issues, but on July 2, the Union’s representative halted negotiations due to a disagreement on 10 Chukchansi’s offer to increase wages. Id. ¶ 15. The Union threatened to strike beginning at 5:00 11 p.m. on July 3, should it not receive an offer on wages that the Union deemed acceptable by that 12 time. Id. The Union did not ultimately go on strike on July 3. 13 The Tribe alleges that, on July 11, following Chukchansi’s request that the Union provide 14 a counteroffer as to wages, the Union indicated that it was available to continue negotiations on 15 July 15, 16, or July 26-29, 2025. Id. ¶ 19. At 2:42 a.m. on July 12, 2025, the Union contacted 16 Chukchansi and informed it that the Union’s represented employees would go on strike at 3:00 17 a.m. that day, and that the strike would continue until midnight on July 15, 2025. Id. ¶ 20. The 18 Tribe asserts that employees represented by the Union “walked out of work” at 3:00 a.m. on July 19 12. Id. ¶ 21. By 6:30 a.m. on July 12, approximately fifty employees began picketing at 20 Chukchansi. Id. ¶ 22. The Tribe alleges that striking employees have gathered at the entrance to 21 Chukchansi casino and hotel, at the team-member entrance along the side of the casino, and near 22 the casino’s shipping receiving entrance. Id. According to the Tribe, on July 12 it requested that 23 the Union (1) cease its strike as the Tribe claimed the parties had not reached an impasse in 24 negotiations, (2) cease strike-related protests on the Tribe’s Indian lands, and (3) comply with the 25 Tribe’s ordinance requiring a prior application for permits and for public assemblies. Id. ¶ 40. 26 1 This background section sets forth allegations from the complaint, Doc. 2, and the declaration of 27 Adam P. Bailey, counsel for the Tribe, Doc. 3-2, in support of the Tribe’s motion for temporary restraining order. Doc. 3. 28 1 The Tribe asserts that the Union did not respond to its request. Id. ¶ 41. 2 The Tribe’s counsel indicates that, on July 13, he informed the Union’s counsel via email 3 of the Tribe’s intention to seek a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief, and followed 4 up thereafter with a call to the Union’s office and left a voicemail with that information. Id. ¶ 42. 5 On July 13, the Tribe filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, along with the 6 present motion for temporary restraining order, seeking to enjoin the Union’s strike. Docs. 2, 3. 7 II. Legal Standard 8 The standards for issuing a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction are 9 “substantially identical.” See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Bush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 10 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of 11 right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 12 U.S. 674, 689–90 (2008)). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is 13 likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 14 preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the 15 public interest.” Id. at 20 (citing Munaf, 553 U.S. at 689–90; Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of 16 Gambell, AK, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–12 17 (1982)). “Likelihood of success on the merits is a threshold inquiry and is the most important 18 factor.” Simon v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 135 F.4th 784, 797 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting 19 Env’t Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Carlson, 968 F.3d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 2020)).2 20 III. Discussion 21 Pursuant to the Norris-LaGuardia Act (“NLA”), federal courts generally lack jurisdiction 22 to issue injunctions in cases involving labor disputes. See 29 U.S.C. § 101. “The Norris- 23 LaGuardia Act [“NLA”] contains severe strictures against the issuance of injunctions in cases 24 involving or growing out of labor disputes.” Matson Plastering Co., Inc. v. Operative Plasterers 25 and Cement Masons Int’l Ass’n, AFL-CIO, Plasterers Local Union No. 295, 633 F.2d 1307, 1308 26 (9th Cir. 1980). It provides that “[n]o court of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction to 27 2 The Tribe cites California state law in arguing the legal standard for the issuance of a temporary 28 restraining order. See Doc. 3 at 23–26. The Federal standard applies on this motion. 1 issue any . . . temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor 2 dispute, except in strict conformity with the provisions of this Act.” 29 U.S.C. § 101. Section 3 113(c) defines “labor dispute” to include “any controversy concerning terms or conditions of 4 employment” 29 U.S.C. § 113(c). Injunctions of labor strikes are the quintessential type of 5 “dispute” that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was intended to limit. See Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians v. Unite Here Local 19, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/picayune-rancheria-of-chukchansi-indians-v-unite-here-local-19-caed-2025.