Picard v. Charron

2000 DNH 003

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: January 4, 2000
• Docket: CV-98-434-M
• Status: Published

Opinion

Picard v . Charron CV-98-434-M 01/04/00 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Warren Picard, Plaintiff

v. Civil N o . 98-434-M Opinion N o . 2000 DNH 003 Gene Charron, Superintendent Rockingham County Department of Corrections, Defendant

O R D E R

Plaintiff claims that defendant, acting in his official

capacity, violated his First Amendment right to religious freedom

and his Fourth Amendment right to procedural due process when he

was placed into disciplinary lockup (without a hearing) after he

refused to allow correctional officials to cut his hair. See 42

U.S.C. § 1983. He says that he is a Native American, for whom

long hair is religiously and culturally significant.

Defendant has moved for summary judgment, asserting that

plaintiff has failed to establish that any of his constitutional rights were violated o r , even assuming such a violation, that it

was the product of any unconstitutional municipal custom or

policy. See generally Monell v . New York City Dep’t of Social

Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Although he has responded to other

(more recent) filings by defendant, see Plaintiff’s letter dated

November 1 , 1999 (document n o . 2 2 ) , plaintiff has not objected to

defendant’s motion for summary judgment (which has been pending

for over three months). Consequently, the court takes as

admitted defendant’s statement of material facts. See

Defendant’s memorandum (document n o . 20) at 2-4.

Discussion

Claims against individuals in their “official capacity” in §

1983 suits “generally represent only another way of pleading an

action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”

Kentucky v . Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)(quoting Monell v .

New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55

(1978)). In order to prevail against defendant with regard to

his § 1983 claim, plaintiff must establish that: (a) defendant

2 violated his constitutionally protected rights; and (b) the

defendant’s conduct either implemented or was undertaken pursuant

to an unconstitutional “policy statement, ordinance, regulation,

or decision officially adopted and promulgated by [the County’s]

officers.” Monell v . New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436

U.S. 658, 690 (1978). To carry his burden with regard to the

second element, plaintiff must establish that:

through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the “moving force” behind the injury alleged. That i s , a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.

Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v . Brown, 520 U.S.

397, 404 (1997) (emphasis in original). See also Roma

Construction C o . v . aRusso, 96 F.3d 566, 575 (1st Cir. 1996).

A. Plaintiff’s First Amendment Claim.

The Supreme Court has made clear that inmates’ First

Amendment rights necessarily yield when they can reasonably be

viewed as conflicting with legitimate penological goals. And, in

3 considering the constitutionality of the defendant’s policy of

placing into disciplinary lockup those inmates who refuse to

submit themselves for a hair cut, the court necessarily employs a

deferential standard of review.

[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. In our view, such a standard is necessary if prison administrators . . . , and not the courts, are to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.

Turner v . Safley, 482 U.S. at 89 (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted).

By neglecting to object to defendant’s motion for summary

judgment, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of

any genuine issues of material fact which would preclude the

entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant. He has, for

example, failed to refute defendant’s contention that the state

has a compelling security interest in mandating that all inmates

wear short hair. See generally O’Lone v . Estate of Shabazz 482

4 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). See also Affidavit of defendant Gene

Charron, Exhibit 3 to defendant’s memorandum. Nor has plaintiff

demonstrated that his First Amendment rights were actually

violated by defendant’s alleged conduct. See, e.g., Harris v .

Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 503-04 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that

prison regulation governing length of inmates’ hair did not

violate either the First Amendment or the Religious Freedom

Restoration Act of 1993); Hamilton v . Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1551

(“We have previously applied the Turner factors to an American

Indian prisoner’s claim that hair length regulations violated his

constitutionally guaranteed right to free exercise of religion

and concluded that such a regulation passes constitutional

muster.”) (8th Cir. 1996); Scott v . Mississippi Dept. of

Corrections, 961 F.2d 7 7 , 80-82 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that

prison’s hair grooming regulations did not unlawfully violate

inmates’ First Amendment rights).

B. Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment Claim.

Finally, as to his due process claim, plaintiff has failed

5 to demonstrate that any state-created or constitutionally

protected liberty interest was violated when, after refusing to

submit himself for a hair cut, he was denied the privilege of

walking about freely in the dayroom (without being denied any

other privileges). See generally, Sandin v . Conner, 515 U.S. 472

(1995). See also Dominique v . Weld, 73 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (1st

Cir. 1996)(holding that prisoner transferred from work-release to

a medium security facility had no liberty interest which would

entitle him to due process before the work-release privilege was

revoked).

Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, defendant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. His motion for summary judgment (document

no. 20) i s , therefore, granted. The Clerk of the Court shall

enter judgment in accordance with the terms of this order and

close the case.

SO ORDERED.

6 Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

January 4 , 2000

cc: Warren Picard Donald E . Gardner, Esq.