1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PHUONG VAN PHAN, Case No.: 3:25-cv-2997-JES-KSC 12 Petitioner, ORDER: 13 v. (1) GRANTING COUNT ONE OF 14 KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S. THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF Department of Homeland Security; 15 HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of 28 U.S.C. § 2241; 16 the United States; TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs 17 (2) DENYING AS MOOT COUNT Enforcement; JESUS ROCHA, Acting TWO OF THE PETITION AND 18 Field Office Director, San Diego Field MOTION FOR TEMPORARY Office; and CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, 19 RESTRAINING ORDER; AND Senior Warden, Otay Mesa Detention 20 Center, San Diego, California. (3) DENYING CLAIM THREE OF 21 Respondents. THE PETITION FOR LACK OF STANDING AND MOOTNESS 22 23 [ECF Nos. 1, 3] 24 25 26 Before the Court is Petitioner Phuong Van Phan’s (“Petitioner” or “Van Phan”) 27 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and Motion for a 28 Temporary Restraining Order. ECF No. 1, (“Pet.”); ECF No. 3, (“TRO”). The Petition and 1 TRO were filed on November 4, 2025. Id. On that same day, Petitioner also filed a Motion 2 for Appointment of Counsel pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2). ECF No. 2. On 3 November 6, 2025, the Court granted the Motion for Appointment of Counsel and set the 4 briefing schedule for the Petition and TRO. ECF No. 4. Respondents filed their Response 5 on November 12, 2025. ECF No. 7, (“Res.”). Petitioner filed his Traverse on November 6 13, 2025. ECF No. 9, (“Trav.”). Thereafter, the Court took the matter under submission. 7 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Claim One of the Petition for 8 Writ of Habeas Corpus, DENIES AS MOOT Claim Two of the Petition and Motion for 9 Temporary Restraining Order, and DENIES Claim Three of the Petition for lack of 10 standing and mootness. 11 I. BACKGROUND 12 Petitioner is a Vietnamese national and citizen that is currently detained in the Otay 13 Mesa Detention Center. Pet. Ex. A (“Pet. Dec.”) ¶ 1. In 1984, Petitioner came to the United 14 States and, soon after, became a lawful permanent resident. Id. From 1990 to 2001, 15 Petitioner was convicted of several various criminal charges. Id. ¶ 2; Res. at 2. This resulted 16 in the initiation of removal proceedings against Petitioner and an immigration judge 17 ordering him removed on May 6, 2002. Pet. Dec ¶ 2; Res. at 2. In 2014, Petitioner 18 voluntarily removed himself to Mexico. Res. at 2. On June 19, 2014, Petitioner re-entered 19 the United States and attempted to pursue a claim for asylum. Id. Petitioner was again 20 placed into removal proceedings and ordered removed by an immigration judge again on 21 September 4, 2014. Id.; Pet. Dec. ¶ 3. After Respondents were unsuccessful in obtaining a 22 travel document to Vietnam, for months, Petitioner was released from immigration custody 23 on an order of supervision on December 8, 2014. Res. at 2. Since then, Petition has not 24 violated any conditions of his supervised release. Pet. Dec. ¶ 5. 25 On September 4, 2025, Petitioner went to the Immigration and Customs 26 Enforcement (“ICE”) office for his annual check in and was arrested by ICE. Id. ¶ 6. On 27 the same day of his arrest, ICE provided Petitioner with a Notice of Revocation of Release 28 (“Notice 1”). See ECF No 7-5 at 1. Then on November 10, 2025, Respondents provided 1 Petitioner with an amended Notice of Revocation of Release (“Notice 2”). Res. Dec. ¶ 6; 2 see ECF No 7-6 at 1. Later that same day, Respondents conducted Petitioner’s informal 3 interview pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4 & 241.13. Res. Dec. ¶ 7; ECF No. 7-6 at 3; see 8 4 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l) & 241.13(i). 5 Petitioner seeks habeas and injunctive relief from the Court by asserting the 6 following claims: (1) In revoking Petitioner’s release, Respondents have failed to comply 7 with their own regulations, which violates the APA and the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 8 Constitution; (2) Petitioner’s re-detention violates Zadvydas v. Davis because for the last 9 eleven years, the Government has been unable to remove him and cannot show that there 10 is a "significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." 533 U.S. 678, 11 701 (2001); and (3) Respondents’ practice of removing noncitizens, such as Petitioner, to 12 a third country without providing an opportunity to assert fear of persecution or torture 13 before an immigration judge also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 14 Pet. at 3-4. 15 II. LEGAL STANDARD 16 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 17 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). 18 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 19 custody, and ... the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 20 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus 21 to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal 22 law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means 23 of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections 24 have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, challenges 25 to immigration-related detention are within the purview of a district court's habeas 26 jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 27 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 28 // 1 Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law 2 ... affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or 3 confinement.” Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963). “The application for the writ usurps 4 the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives 5 prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” Yong v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 6 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 7 III. DISCUSSION 8 The Court finds that the Parties’ arguments with respect to whether: (1) the Court 9 has jurisdiction to hear this petition; (2) the Government failed to comply with its own 10 regulations when it revoked Petitioner’s release; and (3) Petitioner’s detention comports 11 with Zadvydas, are analogous—if not identical—to those raised in the Court’s recent 12 decision in Saengphet v. Noem, et al., No: 25-cv-2909-JES-BLM, 2025 WL 3240808, at 13 *2-9 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025). The Court, therefore, elects to follow the reasoning it stated 14 in Saengphet and incorporates it by reference. Id. 15 A. Jurisdiction 16 The Court finds that 8 U.S.C.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PHUONG VAN PHAN, Case No.: 3:25-cv-2997-JES-KSC 12 Petitioner, ORDER: 13 v. (1) GRANTING COUNT ONE OF 14 KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S. THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF Department of Homeland Security; 15 HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of 28 U.S.C. § 2241; 16 the United States; TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs 17 (2) DENYING AS MOOT COUNT Enforcement; JESUS ROCHA, Acting TWO OF THE PETITION AND 18 Field Office Director, San Diego Field MOTION FOR TEMPORARY Office; and CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, 19 RESTRAINING ORDER; AND Senior Warden, Otay Mesa Detention 20 Center, San Diego, California. (3) DENYING CLAIM THREE OF 21 Respondents. THE PETITION FOR LACK OF STANDING AND MOOTNESS 22 23 [ECF Nos. 1, 3] 24 25 26 Before the Court is Petitioner Phuong Van Phan’s (“Petitioner” or “Van Phan”) 27 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and Motion for a 28 Temporary Restraining Order. ECF No. 1, (“Pet.”); ECF No. 3, (“TRO”). The Petition and 1 TRO were filed on November 4, 2025. Id. On that same day, Petitioner also filed a Motion 2 for Appointment of Counsel pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2). ECF No. 2. On 3 November 6, 2025, the Court granted the Motion for Appointment of Counsel and set the 4 briefing schedule for the Petition and TRO. ECF No. 4. Respondents filed their Response 5 on November 12, 2025. ECF No. 7, (“Res.”). Petitioner filed his Traverse on November 6 13, 2025. ECF No. 9, (“Trav.”). Thereafter, the Court took the matter under submission. 7 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Claim One of the Petition for 8 Writ of Habeas Corpus, DENIES AS MOOT Claim Two of the Petition and Motion for 9 Temporary Restraining Order, and DENIES Claim Three of the Petition for lack of 10 standing and mootness. 11 I. BACKGROUND 12 Petitioner is a Vietnamese national and citizen that is currently detained in the Otay 13 Mesa Detention Center. Pet. Ex. A (“Pet. Dec.”) ¶ 1. In 1984, Petitioner came to the United 14 States and, soon after, became a lawful permanent resident. Id. From 1990 to 2001, 15 Petitioner was convicted of several various criminal charges. Id. ¶ 2; Res. at 2. This resulted 16 in the initiation of removal proceedings against Petitioner and an immigration judge 17 ordering him removed on May 6, 2002. Pet. Dec ¶ 2; Res. at 2. In 2014, Petitioner 18 voluntarily removed himself to Mexico. Res. at 2. On June 19, 2014, Petitioner re-entered 19 the United States and attempted to pursue a claim for asylum. Id. Petitioner was again 20 placed into removal proceedings and ordered removed by an immigration judge again on 21 September 4, 2014. Id.; Pet. Dec. ¶ 3. After Respondents were unsuccessful in obtaining a 22 travel document to Vietnam, for months, Petitioner was released from immigration custody 23 on an order of supervision on December 8, 2014. Res. at 2. Since then, Petition has not 24 violated any conditions of his supervised release. Pet. Dec. ¶ 5. 25 On September 4, 2025, Petitioner went to the Immigration and Customs 26 Enforcement (“ICE”) office for his annual check in and was arrested by ICE. Id. ¶ 6. On 27 the same day of his arrest, ICE provided Petitioner with a Notice of Revocation of Release 28 (“Notice 1”). See ECF No 7-5 at 1. Then on November 10, 2025, Respondents provided 1 Petitioner with an amended Notice of Revocation of Release (“Notice 2”). Res. Dec. ¶ 6; 2 see ECF No 7-6 at 1. Later that same day, Respondents conducted Petitioner’s informal 3 interview pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4 & 241.13. Res. Dec. ¶ 7; ECF No. 7-6 at 3; see 8 4 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l) & 241.13(i). 5 Petitioner seeks habeas and injunctive relief from the Court by asserting the 6 following claims: (1) In revoking Petitioner’s release, Respondents have failed to comply 7 with their own regulations, which violates the APA and the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 8 Constitution; (2) Petitioner’s re-detention violates Zadvydas v. Davis because for the last 9 eleven years, the Government has been unable to remove him and cannot show that there 10 is a "significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." 533 U.S. 678, 11 701 (2001); and (3) Respondents’ practice of removing noncitizens, such as Petitioner, to 12 a third country without providing an opportunity to assert fear of persecution or torture 13 before an immigration judge also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 14 Pet. at 3-4. 15 II. LEGAL STANDARD 16 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 17 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). 18 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 19 custody, and ... the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 20 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus 21 to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal 22 law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means 23 of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections 24 have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, challenges 25 to immigration-related detention are within the purview of a district court's habeas 26 jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 27 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 28 // 1 Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law 2 ... affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or 3 confinement.” Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963). “The application for the writ usurps 4 the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives 5 prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” Yong v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 6 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 7 III. DISCUSSION 8 The Court finds that the Parties’ arguments with respect to whether: (1) the Court 9 has jurisdiction to hear this petition; (2) the Government failed to comply with its own 10 regulations when it revoked Petitioner’s release; and (3) Petitioner’s detention comports 11 with Zadvydas, are analogous—if not identical—to those raised in the Court’s recent 12 decision in Saengphet v. Noem, et al., No: 25-cv-2909-JES-BLM, 2025 WL 3240808, at 13 *2-9 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025). The Court, therefore, elects to follow the reasoning it stated 14 in Saengphet and incorporates it by reference. Id. 15 A. Jurisdiction 16 The Court finds that 8 U.S.C. § 1252's jurisdiction stripping provisions do not bar 17 this Court from considering Petitioner's habeas petition. Therefore, the Court has 18 jurisdiction to hear Claims One and Two of the Petition. 19 Turning to Claim Three of the Petition, the Government does not intend to deport 20 Petitioner to a Third Country. Res. Dec. ¶ 8. As a result, the Court finds that Petitioner 21 cannot show the threat of imminent harm or the existence of an active case or controversy 22 with respect to him being removed to a third country. Thus, Petitioner lacks standing to 23 bring his third claim, which the Court also finds is moot. Accordingly, the Court dismisses 24 Claim Three of the Petition. 25 B. Respondents’ Regulatory Noncompliance Violates Due Process 26 The Court finds that the Government failed to comply with its regulations that 27 govern the revocation of noncitizen’s release, which resulted in a violation of the Due 28 Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As a result, Claim One of the Petition will be 1 granted, and Respondents will be ordered to release Petitioner. This holding is based on 2 the following findings: 3 (1) Notice 1 is defective as its reasonings for revoking Petitioner’s release 4 fail to articulate what facts, specific to Petitioner, constitute changed 5 circumstances in support of ICE’s determination that there is “significant 6 likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable 7 future.” 8 C.F.R § 241.13(2). Thus, its justifications are conclusory and, 8 therefore, fall short of what the regulation requires See id.; see Sarail A. v. 9 Bondi, ---F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2533673, at *10 (D. Minn. 2025). 10 (2) Although Notice 2 provides more information to Petitioner, it is also 11 defective. It is defective because the notice merely states that circumstances 12 have changed, and that Petitioner can be removed expeditiously. See ECF No 13 7-6 at 1. This too is overly conclusory and fails to provide Petitioner with 14 adequate notice of the Government’s reasons for revoking his release, which 15 he must overcome in the informal interview to regain his freedom. See Sarail, 16 2025 WL 2533673, at *10; see 8 C.F.R §§ 241.13(2)-(3). 17 Also, Notice 2 was provided on the same day that ICE conducted 18 Petitioner’s informal interview. The provision of inadequate notice to a 19 Petitioner who seeks to regain his freedom is untenable. To provide such 20 notice immediately before the proceeding in which, pursuant to the regulatory 21 scheme, Petitioner may challenge his detention by overcoming the stated 22 reasons in the notice, is an egregious violation of due process. See 8 C.F.R §§ 23 241.13(2)-(3); see also See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 24 (3) The Government failed to “promptly” provide Petitioner with an 25 informal interview as required under 8 C.F.R § 241.13(3). ICE arrested 26 Petitioner on September 4, 2025, but did not conduct his informal interview 27 until November 10, 2025. That is sixty-seven days after he was arrested—and 28 more interestingly—six days after the filing of this Petition. 1 The Court cannot help but contemplate, whether, but for, Petitioner 2 filing this action, would he have ever received an informal interview, which 3 he is entitled to under federal law. See 8 C.F.R § 241.13(3). Regardless, a 4 sixty-seven day delay may never be construed as “promptly,” especially 5 within the context of the Government’s regulatory compliance with 6 procedural safeguards that protect the Constitutional rights of detained 7 persons. Id. 8 C. Petitioner’s Zadvydas Claim and Temporary Restraining Order 9 Having ruled on the Petition on the merits, the Court declines to address Claim Two 10 or apply the Winter factors to determine whether to issue a TRO. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. 11 Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The Court, therefore, DENIES AS MOOT Claim 12 Two of the Petition and the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. 13 IV. CONCLUSION 14 In sum, the Government failed to follow its own regulations when it: (1) revoked 15 Petitioner’s release because it failed to provide him with adequate notice of its reasons for 16 doing so; (2) provided Petitioner with such notice in an untimely manner, resulting in 17 substantial prejudice when he challenged the revocation of his release; and (3) allowed for 18 sixty-seven days to pass before conducting Petitioner’s informal interview, despite being 19 required to do so promptly after his re-detention. The Government’s noncompliance 20 resulted in a violation of Petitioner's Constitutional due process rights. Accordingly, 21 Petitioner's habeas Petition is GRANTED and Petitioner is ordered RELEASED. 22 Based on the foregoing: 23 (1) The Court GRANTS Claim One of the Petition; 24 (2) The Court DENIES Claim Three of the Petition for lack of standing 25 and mootness; 26 (3) As Petitioner’s sought after relief was granted with respect to Claim 27 One, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Claim Two of the Petition and the 28 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order; 1 (4) Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from 2 custody, under the same conditions as previously imposed, and to FILE 3 a Notice of Compliance to confirm when the Petitioner has been 4 released; 5 (5) In the event Petitioner seeks further habeas relief arising from the 6 Government’s conduct related to its future execution of the removal 7 order, Petitioner must FILE a new Petition; and 8 (6) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this suit. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 || Dated: November 25, 2025 i Sa— Sin, 12 Honorable James E. Sunmons Jr. B United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28