Phuc V. Bui v. Warden, Golden State Annex Detention Facility

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 Case No. 1:26-cv-3993-DC-JDP 11 PHUC V. BUI (A-Number: 027-997-878),

12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 v. 14 WARDEN, GOLDEN STATE ANNEX DETENTION FACILITY, 15 Respondent. 16 17 Petitioner Phuc V. Bui, a citizen of Vietnam, has been a legal permanent United States 18 resident since September 24, 1987. He was detained by ICE in January 2026, upon his return 19 from a trip abroad. Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the 20 following reasons, I recommend that the petition be granted and that petitioner be immediately 21 released. 22 Background 23 Petitioner has been a legal permanent resident (“LPR”) of the United States since 24 September 25, 1987, when he arrived as an 18-year-old refugee from Vietnam. ECF No. 1 at 20; 25 ECF No. 7-1 at 4. He has a valid permanent resident card. ECF No. 1 at 20. Petitioner’s Form I- 26 213 indicates that he had an immigration hearing on January 28, 2008, where he received some 27 kind of relief. Id. Similarly, his FBI rap sheet indicates that removal proceedings were initiated 28 in 2007 and dismissed in 2008. ECF No. 7-1 at 8. 1 On January 21, 2026, when he was returning from a trip abroad, petitioner was detained 2 by the Department of Homeland Security at the airport point of entry. ECF No. 7-1 at 4. The 3 examining immigration officer “determined that Petitioner was not clearly and beyond a doubt 4 entitled to be admitted because his criminal convictions rendered him inadmissible.” ECF No. 7 5 at 2. The notice to appear, issued on January 26, 2026, lists prior misdemeanor convictions 6 sustained between 2000 and 2015 that ICE alleges are crimes of moral turpitude or controlled 7 substance offenses rendering petitioner inadmissible. ECF No. 7-1 at 4. Petitioner has been in 8 ICE custody since January 2026 without any opportunity for a bond hearing. ECF No. 1 at 2. 9 Legal Standard 10 A federal court may grant habeas relief when a petitioner shows that his custody violates 11 federal law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3), 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 374-75 12 (2000). “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of 13 that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 14 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a 15 petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 16 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of 17 reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have 18 been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction 19 includes challenges to immigration detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 20 Analysis 21 Petitioner claims that his detention without a bond hearing violates due process. ECF 22 No. 1 at 10, 16-17. Respondent counters that petitioner’s detention is mandatory under 8 U.S.C. 23 § 1225(b)(2). ECF No. 7 at 2. I address respondent’s argument before turning to petitioner’s due 24 process claim. 25 Section 1225(b)(2) provides that “if the examining immigration officer determines that an 26 alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall 27 be detained.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Petitioner’s Notice to Appear charges him as 28 inadmissible on two separate grounds under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). ECF No. 7-1 at 4-5. 1 First, ICE asserted that petitioner has been convicted of “a crime involving moral turpitude.” Id. 2 at 4. Second, ICE charged petitioner with having been convicted of a crime “relating to a 3 controlled substance.” Id. at 5. However, the Notice to Appear does not identify which crimes 4 allegedly render petitioner inadmissible; instead, it provides a summary of petitioner’s criminal 5 history—consisting only of misdemeanors—before asserting that he is inadmissible. See id. at 4. 6 Notably, in its answer to the petition, respondent offers no argument supporting either of 7 these charges. See ECF No. 7 at 2. Indeed, respondent does not reference the underlying 8 charges—a crime involving moral turpitude and a crime relating to a controlled substance—and it 9 instead asserts that because the examining immigration officer determined that petitioner’s 10 “criminal convictions rendered him inadmissible,” petitioner’s detention is “statutorily 11 mandated.” See id. 12 What is more, as petitioner points out, “[t]he government provides no judgments, charging 13 documents, plea transcripts, or other reliable records establishing [petitioner’s] actual offense of 14 conviction.” See ECF No. 10 at 4. Instead, respondent has provided petitioner’s RAP sheet 15 without any explanation as to how his misdemeanor convictions render him inadmissible under 16 section 1182(a)(2)(A)(i).1 See ECF No. 7-1 at 6-40. Petitioner argues that none of his 17 misdemeanor convictions render him inadmissible. ECF No. 10 at 4-6. 18 Respondent has failed to establish that petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 19 section 1225(b)(2). Respondent offers no other argument in response to the petition. See ECF 20 No. 7 at 1-2. I therefore turn to petitioner’s uncontested due process claim. 21 Courts analyze procedural due process claims in two steps: first, we consider whether 22 there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and, second, we evaluate 23 what procedures are necessary to ensure that any deprivation of that protected liberty interest 24 accords with the Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 25 (1989). I consider each in turn. 26 1 As petitioner recognizes, the RAP sheet also does not corroborate “the NTA in key 27 respects—for example, it does not identify cocaine for the 2014 ‘under the influence’ conviction nor methamphetamine for the 2015 possession conviction.” See ECF No. 10 at 4 (citing ECF No. 28 7-1 at 32-33, 35-36). 1 The parties agree that petitioner came to the United States in September 1987 as an 18- 2 year-old refugee and was granted legal permanent residency. ECF No. 1 at 20; ECF No. 7 at 1. 3 Thus, it is undisputed that petitioner has lived in the United States as an LPR for nearly forty 4 years. Courts in this Circuit, including this one, have held that an LPR has a protected liberty 5 interest in not being detained by ICE. See Burton v. Larose, No. 3:26-cv-2627-JES-BJW, 2026 6 WL 1256875, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. May 7, 2026); B.R. v. Warden, No. 1:26-cv-0810-TLN-CSK, 7 2026 WL 1091489, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2026); Amezcua v. Noem, No. 5:26-cv-1070-SRM- 8 AGR, 2026 WL 1048212, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2026); Galvan Maldonado v. Andrews, No. 9 1:26-cv-1451-DJC-JDP, 2026 WL 1864622 (E.D. Cal. June 29, 2026). 10 Courts have come to these conclusions based on the breadth of case law finding that LPRs 11 have protected liberty interests in maintaining ties with their community and remaining free from 12 governmental restraint. See Amezcua, 2026 WL 1048212, at *6 (collecting cases). For example, 13 the Supreme Court has held that LPR status “carries several important privileges: he may remain 14 in the United States indefinitely; he is free to work in this country; he may return to this country 15 after a temporary absence abroad; and he has the privilege of establishing a permanent residence 16 in the United States.” Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 72 (1974). Notably, LPRs “do not lose their 17 due process protections and liberty interest merely because they are subject to removal.” 18 Amezcua, 2026 WL 1048212. On the contrary, LPRs are “lawfully present in the United States 19 until a final deportation or removal order is entered.” Kyong Ho Shin v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1213, 20 1217 (9th Cir. 2010). 21 I agree with other courts that have addressed this issue and find that petitioner has a 22 protected liberty interest that accrued over his almost forty years of legal permanent residency in 23 the United States.2 Respondent does not argue to the contrary. See ECF No. 7. 24 Once a court has found that a noncitizen has a liberty interest in continued release, the 25

2 In addition, it appears that ICE arrested petitioner in 2007 in connection with removal 26 proceedings that were ultimately dismissed. ECF No. 1 at 20; ECF No. 7-1 at 8. This prior 27 release from immigration custody would also have given rise to a protected liberty interest. See, e.g., Labrador-Prato v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1598-DC-SCR, 2025 WL 3458802, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 28 Dec. 2, 2025); Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025). 1 court must next determine what procedural protections the government must afford the noncitizen 2 before depriving him of that liberty interest. This requires balancing the factors laid out in 3 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 4 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying Mathews factors in immigration detention context). 5 The Mathews test requires courts to consider: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 6 second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 7 through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 8 Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 9 procedural requirement would entail. 10 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 11 First, petitioner has a significant private interest in his freedom. “Freedom from 12 imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at 13 the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. 14 Petitioner has a private interest in his continued release that developed over the four decades since 15 he was admitted to the United States as an LPR. See Noori v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC- 16 MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025) (“Petitioner has a private interest in 17 remaining free, which developed over the year he resided in the United States.”). 18 Turning to the second Mathews factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation without a bond 19 hearing is high. Prior to giving petitioner permission to live and work in the United States as an 20 LPR, respondent determined that he presented neither a danger to the community nor a risk of 21 flight. Absent a pre-deprivation bond hearing in front of a neutral arbiter, the risk of erroneous 22 deprivation is high given the possibility that petitioner’s detention was not pursuant to a valid 23 state interest. See Omer G.G. v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-cv-1471-KES-SAB, 2025 WL 3254999, at *7 24 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2025) (“Civil immigration detention, which is ‘nonpunitive in purpose and 25 effect[,]’ is justified when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community.”) 26 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690). 27 “Where, as here, ‘[the petitioner] has not received any bond or custody . . . hearing,’ ‘the 28 risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high’ because neither the government nor [the 1 petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for her detention.” 2 Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-0801, 2025 WL 3 1918679, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025)). Respondent offers no evidence or argument indicating 4 that any procedural safeguards have been employed following petitioner’s detention; more 5 generally, it gives the court no reason to believe that any efforts have been made to prevent 6 erroneous deprivation of petitioner’s liberty. See id. On the contrary, the fact that the 7 government maintains that petitioner is subject to mandatory detention indicates that it has not 8 made sufficient efforts to prevent an erroneous deprivation of his liberty. Accordingly, “the 9 probable value of additional procedural safeguards, i.e., a bond hearing, is high.” See A.E. v. 10 Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-0107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025), 11 report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 1808676 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2025). 12 “Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without . . . a hearing is ‘low.’” 13 Salazar v. Casey, No. 25-cv-2784-JLS, 2025 WL 3063629, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025) 14 (citation omitted). “In immigration court, custody hearings are routine and impose a ‘minimal’ 15 cost.” Carballo v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-0978-KES-EPG, 2025 WL 2381464, at *8 (E.D. Cal. 16 Aug. 15, 2025) (quoting Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. 2025)). 17 Respondent has not provided any information about the additional burden it would bear as a result 18 of being required to provide a bond hearing. See ECF No. 7. 19 Accordingly, a consideration of the Mathews factors demonstrates that petitioner’s 20 detention without a bond hearing violates his due process rights. Given this finding, I must 21 determine the appropriate remedy. Petitioner seeks immediate release or, alternatively, a bond 22 hearing. ECF No. 1 at 17. Respondent does not address the issue. See ECF No. 7. Although 23 petitioner has been convicted of several misdemeanors, they range from 11 to 26 years old. ECF 24 No. 7-1 at 4. It appears from petitioner’s rap sheet that, in 2007 to 2008, ICE tried and failed to 25 remove petitioner for the 2000 misdemeanor. ECF No. 7-1 at 8. Petitioner was stopped by 26 immigration authorities when he flew back from a trip abroad and presented his immigration 27 documents at the airport. Respondent does not argue that petitioner is a flight risk or a danger. 28 1 ECF No. 7. 2 The Supreme Court has recognized that “[h]abeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful 3 executive detention,” and the “typical remedy for such detention is, of course, release.” Munaf v. 4 Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008); see also Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 5 103, 107 (2020) (“Habeas has traditionally been a means to secure release from unlawful 6 detention.”). To satisfy due process, “the Court usually has held that the Constitution requires 7 some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. 8 Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) (emphasis in original). In some circumstances, however, the 9 Court has held that a post-deprivation hearing satisfies due process, such as where there is “the 10 necessity of quick action by the State or the impracticality of providing any predeprivation 11 process.” Id. at 128 (cleaned up). Where a petitioner is entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing, 12 courts have found that “[t]he appropriate relief . . . is their immediate release from custody, and to 13 be provided with relief returning them to status quo ante, i.e., the last uncontested status which 14 preceded the pending controversy.” Cardin Alvarez v. Rivas, No. 25-cv-2943-PHX-GMS, 2025 15 WL 2898389, at *21 (D. Ariz. Oct. 7, 2025), report and recommendation adopted in part, 16 rejected in part on other grounds, 2025 WL 2899092 (D. Ariz. Oct. 10, 2025). 17 Here, there is no evidence, nor has respondent presented any argument, suggesting that 18 there was “the necessity of quick action” by ICE such that petitioner could not have been 19 provided a pre-deprivation hearing. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 128. Petitioner was at the airport 20 coming home from a trip abroad when ICE issued him a notice to appear and detained him. The 21 most recent misdemeanor conviction alleged in the Notice to Appear dates from 2015, over ten 22 years prior to his detention in January 2026. ECF No. 7-1 at 4. 23 Under these circumstances, I find that the “typical remedy” of release is appropriate 24 because the government has not provided a lawful justification for re-detaining petitioner without 25 a pre-deprivation hearing. See Munaf, 553 U.S. at 693. Petitioner’s due process rights have been 26 violated such that the appropriate relief is immediate release from custody, thereby returning him 27 to the “status quo ante.” See Cardin Alvarez, 2025 WL 2898389, at *21. 28 Accordingly, I recommend that petitioner be released. 1 Conclusion 2 Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: 3 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 1, be GRANTED. 4 2. Respondent be ordered to immediately release petitioner (A-Number: 027-997-878) 5 | from its custody. Respondent shall not impose any additional restrictions on petitioner, unless 6 | that is determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation hearing. If the government seeks to 7 || re-detain petitioner, it must provide no less than seven days’ notice to petitioner and must hold a 8 | constitutionally compliant pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter at which the 9 | government bears the burden of proving flight risk or danger by clear and convincing evidence. 10 | This order does not address the circumstances in which respondent may detain petitioner in the 11 || event petitioner becomes subject to an executable final order of removal. 12 3. The Clerk of Court be directed to serve Golden State Annex Detention Facility with a 13 | copy of this order. 14 4. The Clerk of Court be ordered to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 15 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 16 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven days of 17 | service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the 18 | court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to 19 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed 20 | within seven days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 21 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See 22 | Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 23 | 1991). IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _ July 10, 2026 _———— 26 JEREMY D. PETERSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE