Riddick J.,
(after stating the facts.) This is an action upon a fire insurance policy to recover the value of property insured which had been destroyed by fire. The property is described in the written portion of the policy as a “stock of merchandise, consisting of drugs, stationery, liquors, tobacco, toys, and fancy articles, paints, oils, chemicals and such other goods, not more hazardous, such as is usually kept for sale in a drug store.” The printed portion of the policy stipulated that the policy should be void if benzine or fir.eworks were kept, unless by agreement indorsed on the policy. No such agreement was indorsed upon the policy, and the evidence showed that both benzine and fireworks were kept in the store of plaintiffs. The insurance company contends that this avoided the policy.
As to the benzine, only a small quantity was kept in the store. This was put up in bottles containing from two to six ounces each, to be sold to ladies for the purpose of cleansing gloves. It amounted to about a gallon in all. The testimony showed that it was customary for druggists to keep benzine bottled in small quantities to be sold for such purposes, and that, as one witness stated, “a drug store without it would be incomplete.” The question arises whether this benzine was not included in the written description of the property insured; for, if it was a part of the property insured, it follows as a matter of course that its presence in the store did not avoid the policy. The written portion of the policy insuring the benzine as a part of the stock of merchandise would override the printed portion forbidding it to be kept. To hold otherwise would make the contract mean in effect that the company contracted to take pay and insure the owner of this benzine against its destruction by fire, but only on condition that no benzine was kept. The courts will not presume that the parties intended to make such an absurd agreement, but in such a case will presume that the intention was that the printed portions of the policy forbidding the keeping of benzine should not apply to the keeping of it bottled in small quantities as customary with druggists, but only to storing or keeping it in lárge quantities. Faust v. Am. Ins. Co., 91 Wis. 158; Mears v. Humboldt Ins. Co., 92 Pa. St. 15; Hall v. Insurance Co., 58 N. J. 292; Pindar v. Insurance Co., 36 N. J. 648; Harper v. Albany Ins. Co., 17 N. Y. 197; Archer v. Merchants Ins. Co., 43 Mo. 434; Cushman v. Ins. Co., 34 Me. 487.
Now, the property insured is described as a stock of merchandise consisting, among other things, of “drugs” and “chemicals.” The word “drug” is defined as any animal or mineral substance used in the composition of -medicines; any stuff used in dyeing or in chemical operations; any ingredient used in chemical preparations employed in the arts. Webster’s Diet., The Century Diet. The term “chemical” is defined as a substance used for producing a chemical effect, or one produced by a chemical process; a chemical agent prepared for scientific or economic use. Webster’s Diet. The Century Diet. The definition of benzine given in Webster’s International Dictionary is “a liquid consisting mainly of the lighter and more volatile hydro-carbons of petroleum or kerosene oil, used as a solvent and for cleansing soiled fabrics.” It is used in the arts as a solvent for fats, resins and certain alkaloids. Century Diet.
Without going into a discussion of the scientific or exact meaning of these terms, we will say that, in our opinion, the evidence shows that benzine kept in the quantities and for the purposes that the proof shows that it was kept by plaintiffs was included in the terms “drugs” and “chemicals,” used in describing the property insured, and that the company intended to insure such benzine.
As the company writes the policy, the rule is to resolve doubts arising as to its meaning in favor of the assured. Jones v. Ins. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 19. Benzine put up in small quantities was a part of the stock asked to be insured. Bottled and corked in such quantities, it was probably not more dangerous than other chemicals. It was not necessary to give the particular name of each drug or chemical, or other article that went to make up the entire stock, and the company, in describing the property insured, has chosen to use general terms, which we think fairly include the benzine in the stock. For these reasons we are of the opinion that the policy was not avoided by the fact that benzine was kept bottled in small quantities as a part of the stock of drugs and chemicals. The agents of the appellant company seems to have been of this opinion also, for, after the fire, when they had examined the books, and knew the facts, they- stated to plaintiffs that their policy was void because they kept fireworks, but said nothing of the benzine.
Was the policy avoided by the fact that fireworks were kept in plaintiff’s store? We will first notice the contention made by plaintiffs that the forfeiture, if any existed, was waived by a demand, made on the part of the company after knowledge that fireworks were kept in the store, that plaintiffs should exhibit their books, and make out proof of loss. The policy provided that, in ease of loss, the company should have the right to make an examination of the books of account kept by the assured, and that such examination should not be treated or considered as a waiver of any condition of the policy, or of any forfeiture thereof. For this reason the demand for the oooks and the examination thereof cannot we think be treated as a waiver of the conditions of the policy.
After finding from an examination of the books that fireworks had been kept, the adjuster of the company stated to plaintiffs that their policy was void because fireworks were kept; but he offered to settle by compromise, and they made an agreement to appraise the goods, it being stipulated therein that such agreement and appraisement should not waive any of the conditions of the policy. After the appraisement, the adjuster again told the plaintiffs that their policy was void, and that the company would resist any effort to collect it by action at law, but offered to pay another sum in compromise. This offer being refused, the adjuster said that he would leave on the first boat for Memphis. He was thereupon interrogated by one of the counsel for plaintiffs as follows: “Mr. Boyd, in behalf of these companies you represent, you have had the books, and have gone through' them. Do you require any further proofs of loss, or are. you satisfied with everything!” To which Boyd replied: “We shall insist upon strict proof of loss, under the terms of the policy.” Plaintiffs assert that this answer of Boyd waived all forfeitures.
Now, the positive denial of liability and assertion of the agent that the policy was void because fireworks were kept may have been a waiver of proof of loss,' but we do not think that the forfeiture, if any had occurred, was waived by the reply of the agent quoted above. By the terms of the policy, the assured agreed to furnish proof of loss, and agreed that the loss should not be payable until such proof was furnished. Unless proof of loss was waived, the assured had no right of action against the company until the same was furnished, and, in order to determine whether the company would waive such proof, or for some other reason, the attorney for appellee propounded the above question.
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Riddick J.,
(after stating the facts.) This is an action upon a fire insurance policy to recover the value of property insured which had been destroyed by fire. The property is described in the written portion of the policy as a “stock of merchandise, consisting of drugs, stationery, liquors, tobacco, toys, and fancy articles, paints, oils, chemicals and such other goods, not more hazardous, such as is usually kept for sale in a drug store.” The printed portion of the policy stipulated that the policy should be void if benzine or fir.eworks were kept, unless by agreement indorsed on the policy. No such agreement was indorsed upon the policy, and the evidence showed that both benzine and fireworks were kept in the store of plaintiffs. The insurance company contends that this avoided the policy.
As to the benzine, only a small quantity was kept in the store. This was put up in bottles containing from two to six ounces each, to be sold to ladies for the purpose of cleansing gloves. It amounted to about a gallon in all. The testimony showed that it was customary for druggists to keep benzine bottled in small quantities to be sold for such purposes, and that, as one witness stated, “a drug store without it would be incomplete.” The question arises whether this benzine was not included in the written description of the property insured; for, if it was a part of the property insured, it follows as a matter of course that its presence in the store did not avoid the policy. The written portion of the policy insuring the benzine as a part of the stock of merchandise would override the printed portion forbidding it to be kept. To hold otherwise would make the contract mean in effect that the company contracted to take pay and insure the owner of this benzine against its destruction by fire, but only on condition that no benzine was kept. The courts will not presume that the parties intended to make such an absurd agreement, but in such a case will presume that the intention was that the printed portions of the policy forbidding the keeping of benzine should not apply to the keeping of it bottled in small quantities as customary with druggists, but only to storing or keeping it in lárge quantities. Faust v. Am. Ins. Co., 91 Wis. 158; Mears v. Humboldt Ins. Co., 92 Pa. St. 15; Hall v. Insurance Co., 58 N. J. 292; Pindar v. Insurance Co., 36 N. J. 648; Harper v. Albany Ins. Co., 17 N. Y. 197; Archer v. Merchants Ins. Co., 43 Mo. 434; Cushman v. Ins. Co., 34 Me. 487.
Now, the property insured is described as a stock of merchandise consisting, among other things, of “drugs” and “chemicals.” The word “drug” is defined as any animal or mineral substance used in the composition of -medicines; any stuff used in dyeing or in chemical operations; any ingredient used in chemical preparations employed in the arts. Webster’s Diet., The Century Diet. The term “chemical” is defined as a substance used for producing a chemical effect, or one produced by a chemical process; a chemical agent prepared for scientific or economic use. Webster’s Diet. The Century Diet. The definition of benzine given in Webster’s International Dictionary is “a liquid consisting mainly of the lighter and more volatile hydro-carbons of petroleum or kerosene oil, used as a solvent and for cleansing soiled fabrics.” It is used in the arts as a solvent for fats, resins and certain alkaloids. Century Diet.
Without going into a discussion of the scientific or exact meaning of these terms, we will say that, in our opinion, the evidence shows that benzine kept in the quantities and for the purposes that the proof shows that it was kept by plaintiffs was included in the terms “drugs” and “chemicals,” used in describing the property insured, and that the company intended to insure such benzine.
As the company writes the policy, the rule is to resolve doubts arising as to its meaning in favor of the assured. Jones v. Ins. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 19. Benzine put up in small quantities was a part of the stock asked to be insured. Bottled and corked in such quantities, it was probably not more dangerous than other chemicals. It was not necessary to give the particular name of each drug or chemical, or other article that went to make up the entire stock, and the company, in describing the property insured, has chosen to use general terms, which we think fairly include the benzine in the stock. For these reasons we are of the opinion that the policy was not avoided by the fact that benzine was kept bottled in small quantities as a part of the stock of drugs and chemicals. The agents of the appellant company seems to have been of this opinion also, for, after the fire, when they had examined the books, and knew the facts, they- stated to plaintiffs that their policy was void because they kept fireworks, but said nothing of the benzine.
Was the policy avoided by the fact that fireworks were kept in plaintiff’s store? We will first notice the contention made by plaintiffs that the forfeiture, if any existed, was waived by a demand, made on the part of the company after knowledge that fireworks were kept in the store, that plaintiffs should exhibit their books, and make out proof of loss. The policy provided that, in ease of loss, the company should have the right to make an examination of the books of account kept by the assured, and that such examination should not be treated or considered as a waiver of any condition of the policy, or of any forfeiture thereof. For this reason the demand for the oooks and the examination thereof cannot we think be treated as a waiver of the conditions of the policy.
After finding from an examination of the books that fireworks had been kept, the adjuster of the company stated to plaintiffs that their policy was void because fireworks were kept; but he offered to settle by compromise, and they made an agreement to appraise the goods, it being stipulated therein that such agreement and appraisement should not waive any of the conditions of the policy. After the appraisement, the adjuster again told the plaintiffs that their policy was void, and that the company would resist any effort to collect it by action at law, but offered to pay another sum in compromise. This offer being refused, the adjuster said that he would leave on the first boat for Memphis. He was thereupon interrogated by one of the counsel for plaintiffs as follows: “Mr. Boyd, in behalf of these companies you represent, you have had the books, and have gone through' them. Do you require any further proofs of loss, or are. you satisfied with everything!” To which Boyd replied: “We shall insist upon strict proof of loss, under the terms of the policy.” Plaintiffs assert that this answer of Boyd waived all forfeitures.
Now, the positive denial of liability and assertion of the agent that the policy was void because fireworks were kept may have been a waiver of proof of loss,' but we do not think that the forfeiture, if any had occurred, was waived by the reply of the agent quoted above. By the terms of the policy, the assured agreed to furnish proof of loss, and agreed that the loss should not be payable until such proof was furnished. Unless proof of loss was waived, the assured had no right of action against the company until the same was furnished, and, in order to determine whether the company would waive such proof, or for some other reason, the attorney for appellee propounded the above question. What the agent said was in reply to this question, and, when taken in connection with his previous assertion that the policy was void, and that the company would resist its enforcement, meant, in our opinion, nothing more than that the company did not intend to waive proof, of loss.
In a recent case decided by the court of appeals of New York it was said that “the rule is now established that if, in any negotiations or transactions with the assured after knowledge of the forfeiture, the company recognized the continued validity of the policy, or does acts based thereon, or requires the insured to do some act or incur some trouble or expense, the forfeiture is waived.” The court further said that “while the later decisions all hold that such waiver need not be based upon a technical estoppel, in all cases where this question is presented, when there has been no express waiver, the fact is recognized that there exists the elements of an estoppel.” Armstrong v. A. Ins. Co., 130 N. Y. 560.
This seems to be a correct statement of the law upon this question. German Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 53 Ark. 494. Now, it will be noticed that the agent here made no demand or request that the assured should furnish proof of loss. He said nothing from which the assured could infer that if such proof was furnished the loss would be paid. It cannot be legitimately inferred from his reply, above quoted, that he intended to recognize the validity of the policy, for he had previously stated that the policy was void; nor was such reply calculated to mislead the assured in any way, and it cannot be taken as a waiver of the forfeiture, if any existed. We are therefore of the opinion that it was improper for the presiding judge to submit the question arising on this point to the jury, as he did in the third instruction given on the trial. While such an instruction might be properly given under a different state of facts, yet in this case there was no evidence upon which to base such an instruction, and it was calculated to mislead and was prejudicial to appellants.
But it is further contended by plaintiffs that there could have been no forfeiture of the policy on the ground that fireworks were kept, for the reason, as they contend, that the agent of the company .who issued the policy knew at the time it was issued that fireworks were kept in stock by plaintiffs, and that the issuance of the policy under such circumstances was a waiver of the condition forbidding fireworks to be kept. We will proceed to consider the evidence bearing on that point, for, if the proof was conclusive that the agent of appellant knew at the time he issued the policy that fireworks were kept in the store of assured, it would be presumed that tbe condition forbidding the keeping of such fireworks was waived, and the error above noticed would be harmless. It is now too well settled to require discussion that the issuance of a policy of insurance with knowledge of facts which by the terms of the policy render it void will be [treated as a waiver of such ground of forfeiture Insurance Co. v. Brodie, 52 Ark. 11.
And this is true, even though the policy contains a stipulation that the conditions of the policy shall not be waived by any officer or agent of the company unless such waiver be indorsed upon the policy. It is a general rule of law that the parties to a written contract may afterwards change or alter such contract by a parol agreement to that effect, and contracts with insurance companies furnish no exception to this rule. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Public Parks Am. Co., 63 Ark. 187; Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Earle, 33 Mich. 143; 2 Beach, Insurance, § 787.
The facts beariug on this point are as follows: The policy in question was issued by R. H. Crutcher & Go., a firm composed of R. H. Crutcher and one Friborg. This firm was the agent of the defendant company; and, in order to show that these agents knew at the time the policy was issued that fireworks were kept in the store, J. H. Flemming, one of the plaintiffs, was sworn as a witness. After stating that the policy was issued by Crutcher & Go., he was asked the following question: “Please state whether, at the time they issued this policy of insurance, they had notice and knew the fact that you kept fireworks for sale and on hand in that store?” To which he replied: “This policy was issued on the 24th day of December, I believe, at a time when our stock of fireworks was very large, and on exhibition, and Mr. Friborg bought fireworks from me during that Christmas, and knew we had them for sale.”
Now, no express waiver of the condition forbidding the keeping of fireworks is claimed, and in order that a waiver of such condition may be implied from the issuance of the policy, it must be shown that it was issued with knowledge on the part of the agent that fireworks were kept, and the burden of proof to show this is on the plaintiff. But the witness in the answer above quoted, wbieb was all the testimony on this point, does not show that the agent had such knowledge at the time the policy was issued. It does not necessarily follow from the fact that fireworks were on exhibition, or that one of the agents, after the policy was issued, purchased fireworks at the store that the agent issuing the policy knew of the presence of such fireworks. The fact that one of the agents went to the store shortly after the policy was issued to purchase fireworks is a circumstance tending to show that he knew that fireworks were kept there, but the witness does not say that this member of the firm issued the policy. The agent of the insurance company was a partnership, and each member of the firm could act for the firm, and issue the policy. If, in the course of the negotiations for this policy, and before it was issued, plaintiffs had notified either member .of the firm that they kept fireworks in their store, this would have been notice to the company, and it would have been bound; but no such notice was given. The knowledge of the fireworks shown here was acquired by the agent, not while acting for the company or his firm, but casually while attending to his own affairs. To make this knowledge affect the company, it must be shown that the agent afterwards, with this information present in his mind, issued the policy, or consented to its issuance, or did some act in the course of his duties as agent recognizing the continuing validity of the policy. Distilled Spirits Case, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 356. But this was not shown, or at least it was not so conclusively shown as to justify us in saying as a matter of law that the knowledge of the agent was established. We cannot, therefore, say that the error heretofore noticed was harmless, for the jury may not have found that the agent issuing the policy had notice of the fireworks, and may have based their verdict upon a belief that the forfeiture was waived by the statement of the adjuster that the company would insist upon strict proof of loss under the terms of the policy.
Several other rulings of the court have been called to our attention and considered, but, except as above stated, we do not discover that the court committed any material error.
We agree with counsel for appellant that instruction No. 2 given by tbe presiding judge is slightly defective in form, and it is possible that it might be misunderstood. We feel sure that if the attention of the judge had been called to the defect, it would have been corrected. It does not appear that his attention was called to it, or that appellant, during the trial in the circuit court, objected to the instruction on that ground, and a general objection is not sufficient to raise such a question in this court.
For the error indicated, the judgment is reversed, and a new trial ordered.