Phipps v. Experian

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided June 15, 2020·No. 7:20-cv-03368·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DERRICK PHIPPS, Plaintiff, 20-CV-3368 (LLS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND EXPERIAN, Defendant. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff brings this pro se action, for which the filing fee has been paid, under the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, alleging that Defendant Experian, a consumer reporting agency, violated his rights under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fee, if it determines that the action is frivolous, Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that Court of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss frivolous appeal)), or that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s

favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). But the Court need not accept “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff asserts that Experian “intentionally, willfully, and knowingly” violated the FCRA when it “ignored several certified letters to remove fraudulent names, addresses, information, and inquiries” that appeared on his credit report. (ECF No. 1, at 1.) The following allegations are taken from the complaint, which is not a model of clarity:

On November 10, 2017, Plaintiff sent a letter to Experian requesting that it remove “false and negative information” that appeared on his credit report. (Id.) He received a report from Experian on November 29, 2017, stating that the information had been removed, but he maintains that Experian “updated name not addresses.” (Id.) On December 18, 2017, Plaintiff sent another letter to Experian that included his “[driver’s] license, social security card, electric bill and Affidavit with name and address.” (Id.) On January 5, 2018, he received a report from Experian that “still show[ed] false information.” (Id.) On February 6, 2020, Plaintiff sent a third letter to Experian, and attached “[p]olice and [i]dentity theft reports” in addition to his driver’s license, Social Security card, and affidavit. (Id.) On February 27, 2020, he received a report from Experian that included the “same false and negative information” that he had requested it to remove. (Id.) Plaintiff sent a fourth letter on March 13, 2020, “stating false and fraudulent accounts and inquiries,” and included an identity theft report and the same identifying information that he included in his previous letters. (Id.) In a letter dated March 28, 2020, Experian “acknowledg[ed]” the identity theft report and stated that

it had “removed negative accounts” from Plaintiff’s report. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts, however, that Experian’s last report still contained “negative and false accounts” and that “previously removed names and addresses have reappeared with wrong birth date.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 2.) DISCUSSION Congress enacted the FCRA to ensure that consumer reporting agencies “follow fair and equitable procedures in regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of consumer credit information.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b). The FCRA therefore imposes a variety of requirements on consumer reporting agencies to verify the accuracy of credit information in general and in response to consumer disputes. See id. §§ 1681b–1681p. And it creates a private

right of action against consumer reporting agencies for “negligent or willful violation of any duty imposed by the statute.” Casella v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., 56 F.3d 469, 473 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o). Plaintiff’s complaint implicates the FCRA’s requirements that consumer reporting agencies follow reasonable procedures to assure accuracy in a consumer’s credit report, § 1681e(b), investigate disputed information, §§ 1681i(a)(1)(A), 1681i(a)(5)(B), and block any information identified as resulting from identity theft, § 1681c-2(a)(1). A. Accuracy of Information The FCRA requires that consumer reporting agencies “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information” in a consumer’s credit report. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). To succeed on claim that a consumer reporting agency failed to follow proper compliance procedures under § 1681e(b), a plaintiff must show that:

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