Phillips v. Eastern Railroad

138 Mass. 122, 1884 Mass. LEXIS 37
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedNovember 3, 1884
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 138 Mass. 122 (Phillips v. Eastern Railroad) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Phillips v. Eastern Railroad, 138 Mass. 122, 1884 Mass. LEXIS 37 (Mass. 1884).

Opinion

C. Allen, J.

The plaintiff contends, in the first place, that, though a lease is in terms authorized by St: 1880, c. 205, the execution of the proposed lease should be restrained, on the general ground that the virtual union of the two railroad companies in the manner contemplated is inconsistent with the mortgage, and with the St. of 1876, c. 236, by which the mortgage was authorized. The argument is, in substance, that under the mortgage and statute the net earnings of the Eastern Railroad Company [124]*124are to be ascertained in a carefully specified manner, which must be substantially followed; that under the proposed lease there can be no such ascertainment of the net earnings; and that, if ascertainable, they are not to be paid over to the sinking-fund, but are to be mingled with the earnings of the Boston and Maine Railroad, and to be devoted with such earnings to various purposes; that is to say, that the earnings of the two roads and also their operating expenses and certain other disbursements are to be blended, so that the scheme of the mortgage and of the statute is departed from, and something else substituted which is not identical or substantially equivalent. The provision of the mortgage upon which this argument rests is, that the corporation may and shall apply “ the net earnings of said property in the manner provided in the thirteenth and fourteenth sections of said act, and shall make therefrom the payments therein provided to the sinking-fund therein established.” The fourteenth section of the act provides that “ all the annual net earnings of said road as therein defined [i. e. as defined in the thirteenth section] shall be paid into a sinking-fund, to be held by said trustees for the redemption or purchase of the certificates of indebtedness issued under said mortgage,” according to further provisions, not necessary at this moment to be repeated. The thirteenth section provides that during the term of six years from and after September 1, 1876, the corporation may, with the assent of the trustees, “ apply to the satisfaction and discharge of such liens, mortgages, or other incumbrances, any portion of its net earnings over and above its operating expenses, including therein its necessary expenditures for construction, insurance, taxes, renewals and repairs needful to maintain its road and equipment in good condition, and its rentals, interest on certificates of indebtedness, and such payments as shall be required under its liabilities as determined under the ninth section of this act.” The argument is, that this requirement upon the corporation to apply its net earnings can only be satisfied by ascertaining the net earnings in the manner, or substantially in the manner, defined in the thirteenth section of the act; and it becomes a question to be determined whether such was the intention of the Legislature, and of the parties to the mortgage, as expressed by its terms.

[125]*125It is to be borne in mind that the language to be construed is the language of a legislative act. The Eastern Railroad Company was insolvent. The Legislature was authorizing it to execute to trustees a mortgage upon its franchise and property, for the purpose of securing certificates of indebtedness which were to be issued to its creditors, payable thirty years from date. If the plaintiff’s construction is the true one, the Legislature was cutting itself off from the power of passing any enactment thereafter, within thirty years, in regard to the operation of the Eastern Railroad which would interfere with ascertaining its net earnings substantially in that mannner. It would prevent the corporation from giving a lease of its own road, or taking a lease of another; certainly, unless with articles carefully providing for a separate ascertainment of its net earnings. Prior legislation had recognized the possible advantages which might arise from a lease of one railroad to another, and had authorized such leases by a general law applicable to all railroads alike, except in the case of railroads each of which had a terminus in Boston. St. 1874, c. 372, § 170. Under this existing statute, the Eastern Railroad might have been leased to any company whose railroad had no terminus in Boston; but special legislative sanction would have been required for the lease now proposed to be made. There is nothing in the statute authorizing the mortgage which declares in express terms that no such lease shall be given during the continuance of the mortgage, or that no succeeding Legislature shall have power to authorize such lease. And there is a certain antecedent improbability that the Legislature would intend by implication to make so stringent a provision for the method in which the property should be managed, and to cut itself off from the power to sanction any such modification as the public convenience or the advantage of the creditors themselves might be found to require. Cases might be imagined where, by reason of competition, or of accidents, robbery, or other untoward circumstances, a change in the method of operating or managing the road might be vital to its success, if not to its existence. By combination, expenses might be cut off, competition avoided, and business promoted. There is certainly no antecedent reason to think the Legislature would mean to prevent such an advantageous combination, or a [126]*126lease clearly favorable, if sanctioned alike by the Legislature itself and by those entrusted with the management of the property on behalf of the creditors, and if open to no valid objection which could be taken advantage of in a court of equity to prevent the execution of a lease which the court could see to be detrimental to the interests of creditors. It is natural that the framers of a statute should be less careful and minute in providing in express terms and in detail for possible contingencies, than parties to an important contract usually are. A construction is not to be favored which would have the effect to cut off the Legislature from the exercise of its usual powers, or to put the operation of a particular railroad beyond the reach of ordinary legislation. Opinion of Justices, 9 Cush. 604, 611, 612.

It is important, also, to consider the purposes for which the act was passed. The company being insolvent, the general object was to devise a scheme by which the creditors should be primarily secured, without cutting off the stockholders from the ultimate enjoyment of whatever value there might be in the property of the company, after satisfying the creditors; a scheme which would be accepted by both of these classes of persons interested in the property. To this end it was provided that the creditors should have the right to elect two thirds of the directors who were to manage the property and apply the net earnings to a sinking-fund for the extinguishment of the debt, until the whole debt should be reduced to an amount not exceeding ten millions of dollars, after which time the stockholders should be reinstated in their right to elect the whole board of directors, and, as a probable consequence, to receive dividends if the earnings should be sufficient, after paying the specified sum of $100,000 a year into the sinking-fund.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
138 Mass. 122, 1884 Mass. LEXIS 37, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/phillips-v-eastern-railroad-mass-1884.