Mr. Justice Griffin
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Phillips Chemical Company, petitioner herein and plaintiff in the trial court, uses and occupies, as Lessee, a chemical plant owned by the United States Government known as “Cactus Ordnance Works” in Moore County, Texas. Phillips went into possession on August 16, 1948 under and by virtue of a lease contract between the Secretary of the Army, representing the United States of America, as Lessor, and Phillips Petroleum Company, as Lessee. The lease was for a primary term of 15 years with option on the part of Phillips Petroleum Company for renewal of two five year terms, and a further provision that any additional holding over would be on a year to year basis. The Government had certain options for termination of the lease after notice and happening of certain contingencies. This lease was immediately assigned by Phillips Petroleum Company to Phillips Chemical Company and the Chemical Company has operated the plant at all times since possession was taken under the lease.
The Government plant is located within the limits of Dumas Independent School District and that body has sought to collect school taxes thereon for the years 1949 through 1954, inclusive. Chemical Company, as plaintiff in the trial court, brought this suit in the District Court of Moore County, Texas, to (1) enjoin the School District from attempting to collect ad valorem taxes from it on the “Cactus Ordnance Works;” and (2) to cancel the taxes on the tax rolls of the School District on said property for the years 1949 through 1954. The trial court severed the question of the right to tax from the question of valuation, and upon trial before the court, without a jury, judgment was rendered cancelling all taxes through March 16, 1950, and permanently enjoining the collection of taxes for such period upon either the property or the leasehold estate, but validated all taxes after such date and as to these taxes refused the relief sought. Chemical Company appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 307 S.W. 2d 605. Each party applied- for a writ of error and both applications were granted. We affirm the judgment of the courts below.
[119]*119We first consider and discuss the application of the Chemical Company. It has assigned 13 points of error. These points attack the judgments of the courts below; first, on the basis that there exists no lawful authority authorizing taxation to the Chemical Company of either the Government-owned “Cactus Ordnance Works,” or the leasehold estate therein; and, second, on the basis of whether the leasehold estate of the Chemical Company was assessed by the School District, as distinguished from the assessment of the property itself ,or as a fee interest. After the end of World War II the United States Government had on hand a number of plants which it had constructed for the production of material and supplies needed to effectually wage that war. In order to keep these plants and equipment in working condition and available to the Government in case of another emergency it was decided, after careful study, to sell some of the plants to private operators with a “recapture” clause for the plants to be returned to the Government for a consideration; and to be operated by the purchaser solely under Government direction and control for the exclusive use of the Government in the event of another war or the declaration of an emergency. Certain other plants and equipment, which included “Cactus Ordnance Works” were to be leased by the Government to private operators with like provisions for Government control and operation in the event of another war or existence of an emergency; also provision was made in the leases authorizing the delivery of possession to the purchaser in the event the Government exercised its option to sell. Adequate legislation enabling the Government, through its proper officers, to make these sales or leases was passed by Congress. This plant was leased to the Chemical Company under the provisions of “Public Law 364-80th Congress,” codified in part as 10 U.S.C.A. 1270, et seq. 1270d provides in part that, “the lessee’s interest, made or created pursuant to the provisions of Sections 1270-1270b, 1270d of this title, shall be made subject to State or local taxation * * This Act was passed in 1947. This was a specific consent of Congress that such government property was subject to state or local taxation.
In the lease to this plant, the Chemical Company agreed “that the Lessee shall pay to the proper authority, when and as the same becomes due and payable, all taxes, assessments, and similar charges which, at any time during the term of this lease, may he taxed, assessed or imposed.upon the Government or upon the Lessee with respect to or upon the Leased Property. * * *”
Thus we see the matter of local taxes was taken into considera[120]*120tion by both parties in arriving at the amount of rental to be paid to the Government by the Chemical Company for the use and occupation of “Cactus Ordnance Works.”
The School District relied mainly upon Article 5248, Vernon’s Annotated Texas Civil Statutes, as amended, effective March 17, 1850, to sustain the validity of their taxes. Chemical Company attacks this statute as being unconstitutional and void on a number of grounds. The principal ground is that such statute attempts to tax property belonging to the United States of America and is therefore unconstitutional. Prior to 1950, Article 5248 read:
■ “The United States shall be secure in their possession and enjoyment of all lands acquired under the provisions of this title; [Federal Use] and such land and all improvements thereon shall be exempt from any taxation under the authority of this State so long as the same are held, owned, used and occupied by the United States for the purposes expressed in this title and not otherwise.”
Article 7150, Section 4, Vernon’s Annotated Texas Civil Statutes, provides an exemption from taxation of “all property whether real or personal, belonging exclusively to this State * * *, or the United States, * *
The Legistlature of the State of Texas being of the opinion that there were “no adequate provisions” for the taxation of the lands and improvements owned by the United States of America, which are used and occupied in the conduct of private businesses and enterprises by persons, firms, associations of persons, and corporations, and that funds badly needed by the State and its political subdivisions were being lost by reason of these properties escaping taxation, amended Article 5248, (Sec. 1, Acts 51st Leg., 1st. C.S., p. 105, ch. 37, effective March 17, 1950). There was added a proviso for the taxation of personal property belonging to the user and operator of these plants located on the land owned by the Government and a further proviso” * * * that any portion of said lands and improvements which is used and occupied by any person, firm, association of persons or corporation in its private capacity, or which is being used or occupied in the conduct of any private business or enterprise, shall be subject to taxation by this State and its political subdivisions.” The captic. ;f the amended act specifically covers this part of the amendnc- -t. Section 2 of the Article is the [121]*121severability clause and Section 3 repeals all laws and parts of law in conflict with the Act to the extent of the conflict.
In its application for writ of error, the Chemical Company admits that this language is clear and plain and could refer to nothing other than the property itself. Further it says, “this Honorable Court would certainly be justified if not compelled to find, from the words of the second proviso, [the one immediately quoted above] that it is the entire property interest which the statute says shall be subject to taxation.” This is followed by the contention that such construction of the statute would violate both the Constitution of the United States and of Texas. We agree that it was the intention of the Legislature, in amending Article 5248 to make the value of the entire property belonging to the United States Government, if used and occupied by private business and operated for profit, taxable to such user and operator. Article 8, Section 1 of our State Constitution provides for taxation of all property within the State in proportion to its value. Article 7145, Vernon’s Annotated Texas Civil Statutes, is to the same effect. Article 7146, Vernon’s Annotated Texas Civil Statutes, provides in part that “real property for the purposes of taxation, shall be construed to include the land itself, * * * all buildings, structures and improvements, or other fixtures of whatsoever kind thereon, and all of the rights and privileges belonging or in anywise appertaining thereto * *
“The rule is generally accepted in this State that all property rights acquired and held, and all contracts made, are subject to the authority of the State to levy its taxes and collect its revenues for the support of the government. State for Use of Delta County Levee Im. Dist. No. 1 v. Bank of Mineral Wells, Texas Civ. App., 251 S.W. 1107, writ refused; Preston v. Anderson County Levee Imp. Dist. No. 2, Texas Civ. App., 261 S.W. 1077, writ refused; 9 Texas Jur., pp. 549, 550, Sec. 114.” State v. Wynne, 134 Texas 455, 133 S.W. 2d 951, 956.
Article 8, Section 17, Constitution of the State of Texas, Vernon’s Annotated, provides:
“The specification of the objects and subjects of taxation shall not deprive the Legislature of the power to require other subjects or objects to be taxed in such manner as may be consistent with the principles of taxation fixed in this Constitution.”
Article 7150, Section 4, Vernon’s Annotated Texas Civil Sta-: [122]*122tutes, exempts from taxation propertly belonging exclusively to this State or the United States. With the Chemical Company operating and using “Cactus Ordnance Works,” it ceases to belong exclusively to the United States. Whatever exemptions, if any, enjoyed by the United States Government-owned property in the hands of private business operators prior to March 17, 1950 were put to an end by virtue of the Acts of Congress, 1948 permitting state and local taxation, and the amendment of Article 5248 making this property subject to taxation. The tax sought to be collected does not violate our State Constitution.
The Chemical Company’s objections to Article 5248 as being unconstitutional have been effectively disposed of by the Supreme Court of the United States in its opinions in the cases discussed below. The case of U. S. of America and Borg-Warner Corporation (Detroit Gear Division) v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 78 Sup. Ct. 474, 2 L.Ed. 2d 424, 479, is directly in point. In 1953 the Legislature of the State of Michigan passed Public Act 189 providing that when tax-exempt property is used by a private party in a business conducted for profit, the private party is subject to taxation to the same extent as though he owned the property. The pertinent parts of that Act are “when any real property which for any reason is exempt from taxation is leased, loaned, or otherwise made available to and used by a private individual, * * * in connection with a business conducted for profit, [it] * * * shall be subject to taxation in the same amount and to the same extent as though the lessee or user were the owner of such property * * The United States was owner of an industrial plant in Detroit, Michigan. It leased a portion of that plant to Borg-Warner Corporation at a stipulated annual rental for use in the latter’s private manufacturing business. The lease provided that Borg-Warner could deduct from the agreed rental any taxes paid by it under Public Act 189 or similar state statutes enacted during the term of the lease, but the Government reserved the right to contest the validity of such taxes. On January 1, 1954, a tax was assessed against Borg-Warner under Public Act 189. The tax was based on the value of the property leased and computed at the rate used for calculating real property taxes. Under protest Borg-Warner paid part of the assessment. Subsequently the United States and Borg-Warner filed this suit in a state court for refund of the amount paid. They charged that the tax was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States because it imposed a levy upon government property and discriminated against those using such property. The lower court however upheld the tax and the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed. 345 Mich. 601, 77 N.W. 2d 79. [123]*123The Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the tax was neither discriminatory nor was it on property of the United States, but instead was a tax on the lessee’s privilege of using the property in a private business conducted for profit. After stating that a state cannot constitutionally levy a tax directly against the Government of the United States or its property without consent of Congress, and that the private parties with whom the Government does business cannot escape state taxation, the United States Supreme Court says:
“The Michigan statute challenged here imposes a tax on private lessees and users of tax-exempt property who use such property in a business conducted for profit. Any taxes due under the statute are the personal obligation of the private lessee or user. The owner is not liable for their payment nor is the property itself subject to any lien if they remain unpaid. So far as the United States is concerned as the owner of the exempt property used in this case it seems clear that there was no attempt to levy against its property or treasury.”
The Court upholds the validity of the assessed taxes saying:
“* * * A tax for the beneficial use of property, as distinguished from a tax on the property itself has long been a commonplace in this country. See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 582-583 [57 Sup. Ct. 524, 526, 527; 81 L.Ed. 814]. In measuring such a use tax it seems neither irregular nor extravagant to resort to the value of the property used; indeed no more so than measuring a sales tax by the value of the property sold. Public Act 189 was apparently designed to equalize the annual tax burden carried by private businesses using exempt property with that of similar businesses using nonexempt property. Other things being the same, it seems obvious enough that use of exempt property is worth as much as use of comparable taxed property during the same interval. In our judgment it was not an impermissible subterfuge but a permissible exercise of its taxing power for Michigan to compute its tax by the value of the property used.”
The Court finally concludes:
“Today the United States does business with a vast number of private parties. In this Court the trend has been to reject immunizing these private parties from nondiscriminatory state taxes as a matter of constitutional law. Cf. Penn. Dairies v. Milk Control System, 318 U.S. 261, 270, 63 Sup. Ct. 617, 621, 87'L.Ed. [124]*124748. Of course this is not to say that Congress, acting within the proper scope of its power, cannot confer immunity by statute where it does not exist constitutionally. Wise and flexible adjustment of intergovernmental tax immunity calls for political and economic considerations of the greatest difficulty and delicacy. Such complex problems are ones which Congress is best qualified to resolve. As the Government points out Congress has already extensively legislated in this area by permitting States to tax what would have otherwise been immune. To hold that the tax imposed here on a private business violates the Government's constitutional tax immunity would improperly impair the taxing power of the State. Affirmed.”
To the same effect are the companion cases decided the same day, (March 3, 1958), City of Detroit v. The Murray Corporation of America, (City of Detroit v. The Murray Corporation of America), 355 U.S. 489, 78 Sup. Ct. 458, 2 L.Ed. 2d 441; United States of America v. Township of Muskegon, (Continental Motors Corporation v. Township of Muskegon), 355 U.S. 484, 78 Sup. Ct. 483, 2 L.Ed. 2d 436. These cases clearly uphold the validity of the taxes assessed by the School District against the Chemical Company since March 17, 1950 insofar as the Federal Constitution and laws are concerned.
The Supreme Court of Michigan in its opinion — which was affirmed by the U. S. Supreme Court above — takes up and disposes of the objections made by the Government and Borg-Warner to the taxes assessed against them. Much of what is said by that Court is applicable to our case. Particularly applicable is the following quotation (United States and Borg-Warner Corporation v. City of Detroit, (1956), 345 Mich. 601, 77 N.W. 2d 79, 83:
“As defendant in the instant case properly points out, lessees of private nontax-exempt real estate ordinarily bear the tax burden thereon, either by direct payment thereof under lease requirements or by payment of rent sufficient to include the tax; and defendant reasons that the legislative intent here was to put such lessees of private property used by them in business conducted for profit on an equal footing with users of tax-exempt Government property used by them in business conducted for profit, thus avoiding- discrimination against the former and eliminating an element of unfair competition between them by requiring an equal tax burden as to both; and defendant urges that this does not evidence an intent on the part of the legisla[125]*125ture to aim at or reach United States property for taxation but only to treat both classes of users equally.”
On the question of unjust discrimination the case of Township of Muskegon v. Continental Motors Corporation, 1956, 346 Mich. 218, 77 N.W. 2d 799, 801, affirmed, 355 U.S. 484, 78 Sup. Ct. 483, 2 L.Ed. 2d 436, is applicable:
“The contention [of discrimination] is without merit. Indeed, when it is searchingly examined in light of the companion records that are before us, we should in my view conclude that the legislature by Act 189 has wisely effectuated its continuing duty of providing equal burdens and equal privileges for those of corresponding or similar situation. Without Act 189 a lessee or user for profit of Federally-owned tax-immune realty becomes specially privileged and notably favored over his local classmates, and I refer to that class which directly shares the burdens as well as the benefits of local Government.”
Other cases upholding a similar tax are Trimble v. City of Seattle, 1914, 231 U.S. 683, 58 L.Ed. 435, 34 Sup. Ct. 218; Board of Supervisors of Leflore County v. Whittington, 1918, 118 Miss. 799, 80 So. 8; Gay v. Jemison, Fla., 1951, 52 So. 2d 137; Meade Heights, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 1953, 202 Md. 20, 95 A. 2d 280; Sheridanville, Inc. v. Borough of Wrightstown, D.N.J. 1954, 125 Fed. Supp. 743 aff.; Fort Dix Apartments Corporation v. Borough of Wrightstown, 3rd Cir. 1955, 225 F. 2d 473, cert, denied, 1956, 351 U.S. 962, 76 Sup. Ct. 1024, 100 L.Ed. 1483; Conley Housing Corporation v. Coleman, 1955, 211 Ga. 835, 89 S.E. 2d 482; Offut Housing Company v. County of Sarpy, 160 Neb. 320, 70 N.W. 2d 382, aff., 1956, 351 U.S. 253, 76 Sup. Ct. 814; State of Missouri, ex rel Benson v. Personnel Housing, Inc., Mo., 1957, 300 S.W. 2d 506; Bragg Investment Company, Inc. v. Cumberland County, 245 N.C. 492, 96 S.E. 2d 341, 1957.
Chemical Company contends that if Article 5248 is given the construction we have given it, it would be unconstitutional as being discriminatory between lessees of United States government property and lessees of State-owned and other exempt proprties. United States government property may not be taxes by a state except by consent of the Government. McCullough v. State of Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L.Ed. 579; Van Brocklin v. Anderson, 117 U.S. 151, 6 Sup. Ct. 670, 29 L.Ed. 845. The State of Texas recognizes this exemption of United States government property. Article 5248, Vernon’s Annotated Texas Civil Statutes to first proviso added by the amendment of 1950; Section 4 of Article 7150, Vernon’s Annotated Texas Civil Statutes. [126]*126The various provisions' of Article 7150 setting forth what property is exempt contain language to the effect that such exemption from taxation shall apply only if the exempt property is “* * * not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit other than for the purpose of maintaining the building, * * *” (Secs. 1, 2, 2a, 3, 7, 16). Thus we see that all property owned by private individuals is subject to taxation when not used for a purpose covered by the exemption statutes, and is taxable for the full value of the property.
Chemical Company relies upon the cases of Daugherty v. Thompson, 1888, 71 Texas 192, 9 S.W. 99; Taylor v. Robinson, 1888, 72 Texas 364, 10 S.W. 245; State v. Taylor, 1888, 72 Texas 297, 12 S.W. 176; Bashara v. Saratoga Independent School Dist., 1942, 139 Texas 532, 163 S.W. 2d 631, 633; and Articles 7173 and 7174, Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes, to support their contentions that the taxes are illegal and void. The cases of Daugherty v. Thompson, supra; Taylor v. Robinson, supra; State v. Taylor, supra, all have to do with an attempt to tax public school lands, or some interest therein. The Court held that under the Constitution of Texas as it existed at that time these school lands or any interest therein, were not subject to taxation. The case of Daugherty v. Thompson discusses the applicability of Articles 4691, 4692 (1888-1889) and now Articles 7173 and 7174 in connection with the right of the Legislature to exempt property from taxation under Article 4673 and now Article 7150. The Court said:
“* * * q^at section of the constitution [Article 8, Sec. 2] seems to apply to property owned by persons or corporations in private right,' but which, from the use to which it is applied, is, in a qualified sense, deemed public property. Leases of such property for a purpose not carrying the exemption from taxation would doubtless be embraced in article 4691 [now Art. 7173] Rev. St., and therefore subject to taxation against the holder of the leasehold, if it be for a term of three or more years. Such property, if leased for a term of less than three years for a purpose not carrying the exemption, would be subject to taxation; but, in the absence of a statute so directing, such a leasehold would not be taxable against the lessee. * * *” (Emphasis added).
In our case the Legislature in amending Article 5248 has “so directed” the taxation of the property against the user and occupier thereof. Again the Court says: “* * * property exempted from' taxation in the hands of its owner while used for the pur[127]*127poses on account of which the exemption is given, will doubtless become subject to taxation if leased, for any period, to be used for a purpose which does not itself give the exemption, unless in cases in which the exemption is given by the Constitution, or under a contract that would be impaired by taxation, * *
While it is true the Legislature has included what are now Articles 7173 and 7174, Vernon’s Annotated Texas Civil Statutes, in each revision made since the Daugherty v. Thompson case, it is also true that in 1927 the people of this State adopted an amendment to Article 7 of our State Constitution, known as Article 6a, which makes the State school lands subject to taxation. The Legislature passed Article 7150a in 1927 and Article 7150c in 1931 so as to take away the exemption theretofore enjoyed by the public school lands. Since the above Articles were passed, public school lands have been subject to taxation by the political subdivisions of the State. The above cases are no longer controlling. Neither are Articles 7173 and 7174.
The interest of a lessee in an oil or gas lease is taxable upon the value of such interest. Hager v. Stakes, 1927, 116 Texas 453, 294 S.W. 835; Tennant v. Dunn, 1937, 130 Texas 285, 110 S.W. 2d 53; Big Lake Oil Co. v. Reagan County, Texas Civ. App., 1948, 217 S.W. 2d 171, 174, (10, 11) wr. ref. The taxes levied against Chemical Company are levied under Article 5248 which covers any interest that Chemical Company has in the property composing “Cactus Ordnance Works” — whether by leasehold or in any other manner. It is not a tax levied only on a leasehold. It is a tax levied against the user and occupier of such property and is based on the value of the property used and occupied by it.
“The burden of levying taxes rests on the Legislature, and that body has plenary power of prescribing the mode of taxation to raise revenue; and the specification of certain objects and subjects of taxation in the Constitution does not prevent it from passing laws requiring other subjects and objects to be taxed, unless expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Section 17 of Article 8, Constitution, Vernon’s Ann. St.” State v. Wynne, 134 Texas 455, 133 S.W. 2d 951, 958.
And further from Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 40 Sup. Ct. 499, 64 L. Ed. 878:
“* * * The tax power of the State is primarily vested in their legislatures, deriving their authority from the people. When a [128]*128state legislature acts within the scope of its authority it is responsible to the people, and their right to change the agents to whom they have entrusted the power is ordinarily deemed a sufficient check upon its abuse. When the constituted authority of the State undertakes to exert the taxing power, and the question of the validity of its action is brought before this court, every presumption in its favor is indulged, and only clear and demonstrated ursurpation of power will authorize judicial interference with legislative action.”
See also Southwestern Oil Co. v. State of Texas, 217 U.S. 114, 120-124, 54 L. Ed. 688, 30 Sup. Ct. 496. We hold that Article 5248 is not in violation of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution; that it is not discriminatory and that it is valid legislation and authorized the taxation of Chemical Company’s property by the school district.
In the case of Bashara v. Saratoga Independent School Dist., 139 Texas 532, 163 S.W. 2d 631, the School District sought to collect taxes from Bashara on all of the interest and estate in a 136-acre tract of land. Bashara did not own all the tnineral estate thereunder and was not in control of, using, or occupying, or enjoying any part of a 2/3rds of l/8th royalty interest in all oil, gas, or other minerals, which had been expressly reserved by a Mrs. Baker, Bashar a’s grantor, in the deed whereby Bashara received title to his interest in the 136 acres. This Court held the reserved interest was not taxable to Bashara; that it was an estate in land which Bashara did not own, and, therefore, there was no personal liability on Bashara for the taxes. In the case at bar the tax sought to be enjoined was levied by virtue of specific legislative authority that the user and occupier of United States Government property should pay taxes assessed on the basis of the value of the property it was using, occupying and enjoying.
We overrule the School District’s contention in its application that taxes for 1949 through March 16, 1950 are a valid charge against the Chemical Company. The assent given by Congress to taxation of this plant was not effective in this State until the amendment of Article 5248 March 17, 1950, and it is only from and after this date that this property may be lawfully taxed.
Judgments of both Courts below are affirmed.
Opinion delivered June 18, 1958.