Phillip Martin v. State of Arkansas

2024 Ark. App. 426, 698 S.W.3d 398

• Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas
• Decided: September 18, 2024
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 426 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION IV No. CR-24-136

PHILLIP MARTIN Opinion Delivered September 18, 2024 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE ASHLEY V. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 02CR-23-82] STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE ROBERT B. GIBSON III, APPELLEE JUDGE

AFFIRMED

N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, Judge

Appellant, Phillip Martin, appeals his convictions of three counts of second-degree

battery for having caused physical injury to three law enforcement officers acting in the line

of duty in violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-202(a)(4)(A) (Supp. 2021). Appellant

challenges the sufficiency of the State’s evidence supporting the circuit court’s finding that

he injured the officers “knowingly” and “without legal justification.” We affirm.

This case involves officers responding to a domestic-disturbance call at the Levee Inn

motel. Deputy Derek Hill reported to the motel office where he found Lynsi Scarlett with a

bloody cut lip and bruising all over her face. Scarlett did not want to press charges against

appellant for beating her up, but she “want[ed] him gone.” Hill told her that, given the

circumstances, he had to make an arrest. Deputy Levette Whitfield arrived in her patrol vehicle and found appellant sitting in

a chair outside a motel room. Hill informed Whitfield about the situation and told

Whitfield to handcuff appellant. Appellant got up from his chair and backed into the motel

room repeatedly saying, “I’m not going to jail.” Appellant sat on the bed. Hill told appellant

to stand up so that he could be handcuffed, and appellant punched Hill in the face, causing

Hill to fall backward. Appellant shoved Whitfield into the wall, which caused her to sustain

a knot in her shoulder and swelling in her knee. Appellant returned to Hill, jumping on

him on the floor where they struggled, and appellant attempted to take Hill’s gun. Appellant

caused cuts and bruises to Hill’s face. With Whitfield’s assistance, Hill was able to pepper

spray appellant and get out from under him. Hill held appellant at gunpoint until other

officers arrived to assist.

Crossett police officer Jacob Meeks responded as backup. Appellant lunged at him,

struck Meeks with his shoulder, and knocked Meeks off his feet. Meeks sustained a knee

injury from the fall. A fourth law enforcement officer arrived, and they were finally able to

subdue appellant and take him into custody. The State presented videotape of the inside of

the motel room, which showed the damage to the Sheetrock where Whitfield had been

shoved into the wall and showed blood in the room from Hill’s injuries.

Appellant did not challenge whether he knew Hill, Whitfield, and Meeks were law

enforcement officers. Appellant did not challenge the evidence proving that he caused

physical injury to each of them. Appellant’s attorney argued that appellant reacted because

he did not think he was being legally arrested, so he did not cause injuries to the officers

2 knowingly and without legal justification. The circuit court rejected the argument, sending

the case to the jury, which found appellant guilty on all three battery charges. This appeal

followed.

When the sufficiency of the evidence is properly challenged on appeal, we must

decide whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict; substantial evidence is

evidence that is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel

a conclusion one way or another. Hall v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 49. In determining whether

the evidence is substantial, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,

considering only the evidence that supports the verdict. Id. Since intent can rarely be proved

by direct evidence, members of the jury are allowed to draw upon their common knowledge

and experience to infer it from the circumstances. Id. Because of the difficulty in

ascertaining a defendant’s intent or state of mind, a presumption exists that a person intends

the natural and probable consequences of his or her acts. Smith v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 57,

660 S.W.3d 622. A person acts “knowingly” with respect to: (A) The person’s conduct or

the attendant circumstances when he or she is aware that his or her conduct is of that nature

or that the attendant circumstances exist; or (B) A result of the person’s conduct when he or

she is aware that it is practically certain that his or her conduct will cause the result. Ark.

Code Ann. § 5-2-202(2) (Repl. 2013).

Appellant’s first argument rests on the notion that he did not believe he was being

legally arrested, thus “justifying” his actions in causing physical injury to the officers. We

reject that argument. Resisting or refusing to submit to arrest is a crime, and it is no defense

3 to a prosecution for that crime that the law enforcement officer lacked legal authority to

make the arrest if the law enforcement officer was acting under color of his or her official

authority. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-103(a) (Repl. 2016). Appellant had declared to the officers

that he was not going to jail for allegedly having beat up Ms. Scarlett, and he attacked and

injured three officers in his attempt to make good on that declaration.

Appellant next argues that it was improper for the officers to attempt to arrest or

handcuff him when he had retreated into the motel room where he maintained

constitutionally protected privacy rights. This argument is raised for the first time on appeal,

and we do not address such arguments. Hicks v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 316.

We hold that the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain the three convictions

for second-degree battery in this case.

Affirmed.

ABRAMSON and BROWN, JJ., agree.

Dusti Standridge, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Kent G. Holt, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.