Philip Hanes v. Luis Martinez

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 8, 2024
• Docket: 21-56360
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 8 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PHILIP HANES, No. 21-56360

Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:20-cv-05472-SB-KS v. MEMORANDUM* LUIS MARTINEZ; JEFF MACOMBER, Warden, Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,

Respondents-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 4, 2024** Pasadena, California

Before: R. NELSON, VANDYKE, and SANCHEZ Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Philip Hanes appeals from the district court’s order denying his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). and we affirm.

“We review de novo the district court’s denial of a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus.” Stanley v. Schriro, 598 F.3d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(AEDPA), we can only grant habeas relief when a state court’s adjudication of the

claim was either (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,”

or (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In reviewing a

habeas claim under AEDPA, state court factual findings are “presumed to be

correct” unless rebutted “by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1). And

where the higher state courts denied habeas relief in unexplained orders, we “‘look

through’ the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does

provide a relevant rationale.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). Here,

we examine the rationale of the California Superior Court decision.

The California Superior Court reasonably determined that Petitioner’s

allegations were not credible. Petitioner alleges that the foreperson in Petitioner’s

jury trial worked with Petitioner, harassed him, and harbored animosity towards him.

His primary evidence in support of these serious allegations was his own declaration.

But neither Petitioner nor his counsel raised these allegations at the original trial, in

2 the motion for a new trial, or on direct appeal. Trial counsel does not recall Petitioner

telling him this information, nor is it in counsel’s notes, which according to counsel

“likely would” be the case if Petitioner had told him. Petitioner’s claims about the

foreperson are serious enough that it would be strange indeed for counsel to have

simply disregarded (and forgotten) them if Petitioner had actually told him. Because

of the belated timing, the lack of corroborating evidence, and counsel’s evidence

supporting that Petitioner did not tell him the story, it was not unreasonable for the

state court to determine that the allegations were not credible. See Perez v. Rosario,

459 F.3d 943, 951–53 (9th Cir. 2006).

This reasonable credibility determination defeats Petitioner’s claims of juror

bias and ineffective assistance of counsel. To succeed on his juror bias claim,

Petitioner must “first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material

question on voir dire.” McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S.

548, 556 (1984). Petitioner alleges that the foreperson was dishonest because he

“did not indicate he knew [Petitioner].” But the only evidence that the foreperson

actually knew Petitioner to the extent alleged was Petitioner’s declaration. And the

state court reasonably deemed that declaration not credible. As for Petitioner’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Petitioner must first show that “counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). Petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective

3 because he failed to challenge the foreperson who had allegedly harassed Petitioner

in the workplace for years. But again, the only evidence that Petitioner told his

counsel was Petitioner’s declaration. Because the state court reasonably rejected it

as not credible, Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim also fails.

Because the state court reasonably found Petitioner’s factual allegations to be

not credible, the district court did not err in denying his habeas petition.

AFFIRMED.