Philip Cannata v. Blackmon Mooring of Austin, Inc.

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJune 20, 2012
Docket03-10-00672-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Philip Cannata v. Blackmon Mooring of Austin, Inc. (Philip Cannata v. Blackmon Mooring of Austin, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Philip Cannata v. Blackmon Mooring of Austin, Inc., (Tex. Ct. App. 2012).

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN




NO. 03-10-00672-CV

Philip Cannata, Appellant



v.



Blackmon Mooring of Austin, Inc., Appellee



FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF TRAVIS COUNTY,

NO. C-1-CV-09-007603, HONORABLE ERIC SHEPPERD, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N



Appellant Philip Cannata appeals a take-nothing summary judgment on his negligence claim against appellee Blackmon Mooring of Austin, Inc. Cannata sought damages for injuries resulting from his alleged exposure to a harmful chemical that Blackmon Mooring used during mold remediation of Cannata's workplace. We will affirm the trial court's summary judgment.



FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

St. John Neumann Catholic Church of Austin, Texas, hired Blackmon Mooring to remediate mold in its music room and sacristy in August of 2007. As part of the remediation process, Blackmon Mooring injected a biocide called Sporicidin into the building's air system to kill mold, mildew, dust mites, bacteria, and viruses. At the same time or soon after Blackmon Mooring used Sporicidin in the church, Cannata, who asserts that he was not warned to stay away, entered the music room and stayed there for approximately twenty minutes until he learned from another employee that the building was off limits at that time. He discovered later that the church's facilities manager had sent Cannata and the other church employees an email warning of the situation at approximately the same time Blackmon Mooring applied the Sporicidin.

Later that same day, Cannata began to feel "uncomfortable and exhausted" and starting experiencing headaches, chest tightness, shortness of breath, itchy burning skin, diarrhea, and a bitter, metallic taste in his mouth. Cannata went to see his family doctor, who noted that Cannata was "very ill" from the exposure and prescribed an inhaler and other medication. Cannata's doctor also suggested that he see an allergist, which Cannata did shortly thereafter. Although not clear from the record, it appears that Cannata experienced many of these same symptoms for at least several days after his exposure.

Cannata filed this suit against Blackmon Mooring, alleging that Blackmon Mooring had negligently exposed him to the "harmful and toxic" substance glutaraldehyde (1) on August 6, 2007, by using the glutaraldehyde-containing product Sporicidin in the music room's ventilation system immediately before Cannata entered that room. Cannata complained that Blackmon Mooring was negligent in failing to (1) place proper and adequate warning signs in the exposure area; (2) block access to the exposure area; and (3) maintain a company presence at the remediation site while the Sporicidin was being released. Cannata requested as damages his medical expenses, pain and suffering, mental anguish, and physical impairment.

After generally denying Cannata's claim, Blackmon Mooring filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that it was entitled to summary judgment because its evidence conclusively established that it did not use glutaraldehyde or a product containing glutaraldehyde at the St. John Neumann Catholic Church on August 6, 2007. Specifically, Blackmon Mooring asserted that its evidence conclusively showed that Blackmon Mooring used Sporicidin brand disinfectant solution in the church that day and that Sporicidin does not contain glutaraldehyde. In the alternative, Blackmon Mooring asserted that Cannata could produce no evidence that Blackmon Mooring applied any dangerous chemicals, including glutaraldehyde, to the church, that Blackmon Mooring applied any chemicals to the church that would present any inhalation hazards, or that the chemicals used by Blackmon Mooring at the church caused Cannata any personal injuries. The trial court, without specifying the grounds on which it was relying, granted Blackmon Mooring's summary judgment and ordered that Cannata take nothing on his negligence claim. It is from this summary judgment that Cannata now appeals.



ANALYSIS

On appeal, Cannata asserts that the trial court erred in granting Blackmon Mooring's motion for summary judgment because Blackmon Mooring failed to submit competent summary-judgment evidence conclusively proving that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding the existence of glutaraldehyde in the biocide. More specifically, Cannata asserts that the trial court based its judgment on the alleged oral testimony it heard from Blackmon Mooring's counsel at the summary-judgment hearing. Cannata also argues that he submitted competent summary-judgment evidence in response to Blackmon Mooring's motion that raised a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat Blackmon Mooring's motion for summary judgment.



Standard of review

Usually, when a party moves for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment, as Blackmon Mooring did here, we first review the trial court's judgment under the no-evidence standard. See Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 166(a)(i). Here, however, we will review the traditional summary-judgment grounds first because they are dispositive of Cannata's appeal. See Poag v. Flories, 317 S.W.3d 820, 825 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied); see also Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (requiring "written opinion that is as brief as practicable," addressing all issues that are raised and necessary to final disposition).

The standards for reviewing a motion for summary judgment are well established. We review the trial court's summary judgment rulings de novo. See Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). To prevail on a motion for traditional summary judgment, the movant must show that there are no disputed issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215-16 (Tex. 2003). In deciding whether there is a disputed material- fact issue precluding summary judgment, we take as true proof favorable to the non-movant, and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubt in favor of the non-movant. Randall's Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995). A defendant can establish his entitlement to summary judgment as to a cause of action asserted against him by conclusively negating at least one essential element of the cause of action or conclusively establishing each element of an affirmative defense to the cause of action. American Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997).

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Philip Cannata v. Blackmon Mooring of Austin, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/philip-cannata-v-blackmon-mooring-of-austin-inc-texapp-2012.