IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-0076 Filed December 17, 2025
PHILIP BAXTER WEST JR., Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
SOPHIA LYN STAFFORD, Defendant-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, David Faith, Judge.
A pedestrian injured in a car accident appeals the denial of his motion for
new trial or additur. AFFIRMED.
Robert L. Stuyvesant and Nicholas A. Carda of Stuyvesant, Strong, Krapfl
& Carda P.L.L.C., Carlisle, for appellant.
Mark W. Thomas of Grefe & Sidney, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Buller, JJ. 2
TABOR, Chief Judge.
Philip West Jr. sued Sophia Stafford after suffering injuries when she struck
him and his dog with her car. A jury returned a verdict in West’s favor. But West
moved for a new trial or additur, arguing the damage award was inadequate. The
district court allowed the verdict to stand. West now appeals, arguing the evidence
supported a higher award for future damages and the value of his pet. After
reviewing the record, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying West’s motion and affirm.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
One morning in June 2021, West was walking in Indianola with his dog, a
Boston Terrier named Bolt. During the walk, West approached the intersection of
Salem Avenue and Highway 65/69. He crossed the street when the traffic light
turned in his favor. Meanwhile Stafford was turning left and struck West and Bolt
while they were in the crosswalk. Stafford testified the sun was in her eyes so she
did not see West and Bolt before hitting them.
Likewise, West testified he did not see Stafford’s car coming: “One minute,
I was walking, and the next minute I was face down on the concrete with a tire by
my face.” Emergency services rushed to the scene and examined West, but his
main concern was finding Bolt. Tragically, Bolt had been killed, so West left the
scene to take his pet to a veterinarian for end-of-life needs. After arriving home
from the veterinarian, West sought medical attention for his own injuries. West
testified that he had pain in his chest along with scrapes on his arms, hands, and
feet. West also testified he had damage to several teeth. After the accident, West
began meeting with a therapist to address his anxiety and depression. 3
In June 2023, West sought damages from Stafford for her negligence. After
a three-day trial in November 2024, the jury awarded him $19,347.12 in damages. 1
The jury awarded $11,127.24 in past medical expenses, $6,000 for past physical
and mental pain and suffering, and $2,219.88 for the loss of a pet. The jury did
not award any damages for future medical expenses. West moved for a new trial
or additur,2 arguing the jury should have awarded future medical expenses and
should have awarded more for his lost pet. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1004(4). Stafford
resisted. After a hearing, the district court rejected West’s motion and allowed the
jury’s verdict to stand. West appeals.
II. Scope and Standard of Review
“We review the trial court’s ruling on a challenge to the adequacy of a
damage award for an abuse of discretion.” Kerndt v. Rolling Hills Nat’l Bank, 558
N.W.2d 410, 414 (Iowa 1997). “An inadequate damage award merits a new trial
as much as an excessive one.” McHose v. Physician & Clinic Servs., Inc., 548
N.W.2d 158, 162 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). But we are mindful that “[t]he determination
of damages is traditionally a jury function.” Est. of Pearson ex rel. Latta v.
Interstate Power & Light Co., 700 N.W.2d 333, 345 (Iowa 2005). “Neither the
district court, nor this court, should disturb the jury’s verdict unless it is flagrantly
excessive or inadequate or so out of reason so as to shock the conscience.” Vagts
v. N. Nat. Gas Co., 8 N.W.3d 501, 520 (Iowa 2024). Put another way, we will “not
1 Stafford admitted she was at fault for the accident, and thus West’s damages were the only issue for the jury to determine. 2 Additur is a judicial remedy that “increases the jury’s award of damages to avoid
a new trial on grounds of inadequate damages.” Additur, Black’s Law Dictionary 48 (12th ed. 2024). 4
interfere with an award when it is within a reasonable range of the evidence.”
Stender v. Blessum, 897 N.W.2d 491, 517 (Iowa 2017) (citation omitted). The test
we apply is “whether the verdict fairly and reasonably compensates the injury the
party sustained.” Baker v. City of Ottumwa, 560 N.W.2d 578, 583 (Iowa 1997)
(citation omitted).
III. Analysis
A. Future Damages
West argues it “defies logic” for the jury to have awarded him past but not
future medical expenses. West claims the future damages for dental work and
ongoing mental-health therapy could exceed $64,000.
On dental treatment, West asserts the verdict was insufficient because it did
not cover the cost of repairing several teeth broken in the accident. “To recover
the cost of future medical treatment, a plaintiff must furnish substantial proof of the
necessity for future treatment and the cost thereof.” Mossman v. Amana Soc’y,
494 N.W.2d 676, 679 (Iowa 1993). Granted, West presented a dentist’s estimate
that it would cost $5,160 to repair his teeth. But West had not scheduled that
treatment. West testified he would have to have his teeth fixed sooner or later, but
he was “terrified” to do so.3
And the record left questions about the cause of his dental problems. On
cross-examination, West testified that he could not remember if he hit his head
during the accident or if he suffered a concussion. West also testified that he did
not know why his medical records did not mention any scratches, bruises, or cuts
3 West admitted his fear of dental treatment despite being a retired dentist. 5
to his face. According to Stafford, “[a]lthough [West] claimed that the damaged
teeth occurred in the accident, he did not explain how such damage could have
occurred in the absence of a blow to the head.” Thus, Stafford contends: “The jury
correctly concluded that the objective medical records and [West’s] own admission
completely undermined the claim for dental expense.”
Given the uncertainty in West’s testimony and the fact he had not sought
treatment for his teeth despite three years between the accident and trial, we will
not disturb the jury’s verdict here.
West also argues the verdict was insufficient because the jury did not award
him damages for future therapy visits. West asserts that as of trial, he had been
seeing a therapist for roughly three years to treat his depression and anxiety which
was due, in part, to the accident and Bolt’s death. According to West, if he
continued to attend therapy every week for the rest of his life at $175 per session,
it would cost $59,150. But while West’s therapist recommended weekly sessions,
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-0076 Filed December 17, 2025
PHILIP BAXTER WEST JR., Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
SOPHIA LYN STAFFORD, Defendant-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, David Faith, Judge.
A pedestrian injured in a car accident appeals the denial of his motion for
new trial or additur. AFFIRMED.
Robert L. Stuyvesant and Nicholas A. Carda of Stuyvesant, Strong, Krapfl
& Carda P.L.L.C., Carlisle, for appellant.
Mark W. Thomas of Grefe & Sidney, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Buller, JJ. 2
TABOR, Chief Judge.
Philip West Jr. sued Sophia Stafford after suffering injuries when she struck
him and his dog with her car. A jury returned a verdict in West’s favor. But West
moved for a new trial or additur, arguing the damage award was inadequate. The
district court allowed the verdict to stand. West now appeals, arguing the evidence
supported a higher award for future damages and the value of his pet. After
reviewing the record, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying West’s motion and affirm.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
One morning in June 2021, West was walking in Indianola with his dog, a
Boston Terrier named Bolt. During the walk, West approached the intersection of
Salem Avenue and Highway 65/69. He crossed the street when the traffic light
turned in his favor. Meanwhile Stafford was turning left and struck West and Bolt
while they were in the crosswalk. Stafford testified the sun was in her eyes so she
did not see West and Bolt before hitting them.
Likewise, West testified he did not see Stafford’s car coming: “One minute,
I was walking, and the next minute I was face down on the concrete with a tire by
my face.” Emergency services rushed to the scene and examined West, but his
main concern was finding Bolt. Tragically, Bolt had been killed, so West left the
scene to take his pet to a veterinarian for end-of-life needs. After arriving home
from the veterinarian, West sought medical attention for his own injuries. West
testified that he had pain in his chest along with scrapes on his arms, hands, and
feet. West also testified he had damage to several teeth. After the accident, West
began meeting with a therapist to address his anxiety and depression. 3
In June 2023, West sought damages from Stafford for her negligence. After
a three-day trial in November 2024, the jury awarded him $19,347.12 in damages. 1
The jury awarded $11,127.24 in past medical expenses, $6,000 for past physical
and mental pain and suffering, and $2,219.88 for the loss of a pet. The jury did
not award any damages for future medical expenses. West moved for a new trial
or additur,2 arguing the jury should have awarded future medical expenses and
should have awarded more for his lost pet. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1004(4). Stafford
resisted. After a hearing, the district court rejected West’s motion and allowed the
jury’s verdict to stand. West appeals.
II. Scope and Standard of Review
“We review the trial court’s ruling on a challenge to the adequacy of a
damage award for an abuse of discretion.” Kerndt v. Rolling Hills Nat’l Bank, 558
N.W.2d 410, 414 (Iowa 1997). “An inadequate damage award merits a new trial
as much as an excessive one.” McHose v. Physician & Clinic Servs., Inc., 548
N.W.2d 158, 162 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). But we are mindful that “[t]he determination
of damages is traditionally a jury function.” Est. of Pearson ex rel. Latta v.
Interstate Power & Light Co., 700 N.W.2d 333, 345 (Iowa 2005). “Neither the
district court, nor this court, should disturb the jury’s verdict unless it is flagrantly
excessive or inadequate or so out of reason so as to shock the conscience.” Vagts
v. N. Nat. Gas Co., 8 N.W.3d 501, 520 (Iowa 2024). Put another way, we will “not
1 Stafford admitted she was at fault for the accident, and thus West’s damages were the only issue for the jury to determine. 2 Additur is a judicial remedy that “increases the jury’s award of damages to avoid
a new trial on grounds of inadequate damages.” Additur, Black’s Law Dictionary 48 (12th ed. 2024). 4
interfere with an award when it is within a reasonable range of the evidence.”
Stender v. Blessum, 897 N.W.2d 491, 517 (Iowa 2017) (citation omitted). The test
we apply is “whether the verdict fairly and reasonably compensates the injury the
party sustained.” Baker v. City of Ottumwa, 560 N.W.2d 578, 583 (Iowa 1997)
(citation omitted).
III. Analysis
A. Future Damages
West argues it “defies logic” for the jury to have awarded him past but not
future medical expenses. West claims the future damages for dental work and
ongoing mental-health therapy could exceed $64,000.
On dental treatment, West asserts the verdict was insufficient because it did
not cover the cost of repairing several teeth broken in the accident. “To recover
the cost of future medical treatment, a plaintiff must furnish substantial proof of the
necessity for future treatment and the cost thereof.” Mossman v. Amana Soc’y,
494 N.W.2d 676, 679 (Iowa 1993). Granted, West presented a dentist’s estimate
that it would cost $5,160 to repair his teeth. But West had not scheduled that
treatment. West testified he would have to have his teeth fixed sooner or later, but
he was “terrified” to do so.3
And the record left questions about the cause of his dental problems. On
cross-examination, West testified that he could not remember if he hit his head
during the accident or if he suffered a concussion. West also testified that he did
not know why his medical records did not mention any scratches, bruises, or cuts
3 West admitted his fear of dental treatment despite being a retired dentist. 5
to his face. According to Stafford, “[a]lthough [West] claimed that the damaged
teeth occurred in the accident, he did not explain how such damage could have
occurred in the absence of a blow to the head.” Thus, Stafford contends: “The jury
correctly concluded that the objective medical records and [West’s] own admission
completely undermined the claim for dental expense.”
Given the uncertainty in West’s testimony and the fact he had not sought
treatment for his teeth despite three years between the accident and trial, we will
not disturb the jury’s verdict here.
West also argues the verdict was insufficient because the jury did not award
him damages for future therapy visits. West asserts that as of trial, he had been
seeing a therapist for roughly three years to treat his depression and anxiety which
was due, in part, to the accident and Bolt’s death. According to West, if he
continued to attend therapy every week for the rest of his life at $175 per session,
it would cost $59,150. But while West’s therapist recommended weekly sessions,
he had seen her less than once a month after the accident. Indeed, in the year
before trial, their only meeting was the day before trial. What’s more, the jury heard
evidence that some of West’s mental health issues predated the accident. Under
these facts, we will not interfere with the jury’s award of damages.
B. Loss of Pet Damages
West argues the jury’s award of $2,219.88 was inadequate compensation
for the loss of Bolt. The jury was instructed:
The plaintiff is entitled to receive the value of his pet prior to the accident. In determining damages related to the loss of the dog, the jury must determine the fair market value of the dog, which is based on the purchase price, life span, training, usefulness, and desirable traits. You may also include the veterinary cost related to 6
the cremation of the dog. You may not consider emotional distress, loss of consortium, mental anguish, or any other related claim from the loss of the dog.
Bolt’s cremation costs were $219.88, meaning the jury valued Bolt at $2,000.
West points out that at the time of his death, Bolt was nine years old, a
licensed therapy dog, had won awards as a show dog, and had value for breeding.
After the accident, West bought a Boston Terrier puppy for $4,000; the bill of sale
stated that dog’s value would be no less than $9,500 once he won a championship.
West argues the jury failed to follow the instruction because “[t]hough Bolt
was over 9 years old, he was indeed, a champion.” The court instructed the jury
to consider Bolt’s fair market value, which included his purchase price, not the price
of the puppy that West purchased after Bolt’s death. See Nichols v. Sukaro
Kennels, 555 N.W.2d 689, 691–92 (Iowa 1996) (per curiam) (declining to award
damages for replacement costs or intrinsic value of pet). Furthermore, when asked
if West had arranged to market Bolt as a stud, he testified that he had not. After
hearing testimony regarding Bolt’s age, his training, and his usefulness, the jury
set Bolt’s fair market value at $2,000. That determination was within the
reasonable range of evidence and fairly compensated West for his damages.
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying West’s
motion for new trial or additur, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
Greer, J., concurs; Buller, J., specially concurs. 7
BULLER, Judge (specially concurring).
Given existing law and the jury instructions that are law of the case, I join
the majority opinion in full. I write separately to address how the legal system
values pets because I believe the law has fallen far behind society on this issue.
Under existing Iowa supreme court precedent, pets are treated as personal
property—the same as a toaster, a toothbrush, or a trashcan. E.g., Nichols v.
Sukaro Kennels, 555 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Iowa 1996) (per curiam). I think most pet
owners would bristle at that notion. Almost two thirds of Americans own a pet, and
97% of pet owners consider pets part of their family. See Anna Brown, About Half
of U.S. Pet Owners Say Their Pets Are as Much a Part of Their Family as a Human
Member, Pew Research Center (July 7, 2023), https://perma.cc/9FVU-SE9C. Just
over half of pet owners consider their pets “as much a part of their family as a
human member.” See id.
Despite the importance of pets in modern society, the law has lagged far
behind. And Iowa is hardly alone in its “pets are just property” approach. “Most
courts . . . still value animals according to their fair market value,” not considering
their value as companions or the emotional distress and anguish humans
experience when a pet is injured or killed. See Margit Livingston, The Calculus of
Animal Valuation: Crafting a Viable Remedy, 82 Neb. L. Rev. 783, 785 (2004).
Law review pieces from our neighbors to the north succinctly summarize the
criticism of this approach in their titles: Morgan Phelps, Note, Damages for Tortious
Harm to Pets: Minnesota’s Market Value Approach Severely Undercompensates
Plaintiffs, 49 Mitchell Hamline L. Rev. 778 (2023); Janice M. Pintar, Comment,
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and the Fair Market Value Approach in 8
Wisconsin: The Case for Extending Tort Protection to Companion Animals and
Their Owners, 2002 Wis. L. Rev. 735.
Even a cursory search reveals that an avalanche of academic writings—as
well as some courts and state legislatures—urge the law should recognize pets
are part of the family unit, not lifeless personal property. See generally Debra D.
Burke, A Clarion Call for Emotional Damages in Loss of Companion Pet Cases,
15 Tenn. J.L. & Pol’y 250 (2021); David Favre & Thomas Dickinson, Animal
Consortium, 84 Tenn. L. Rev. 893 (2017); Jade McKenzie, Comment, Em“bark”ing
on the Journey to Expand Recovery of Damages for the Loss of a Companion
Animal, 19 Chap. L. Rev. 659 (2016); Sabrina DeFabritiis, Barking Up the Wrong
Tree: Companion Animals, Emotional Damages and the Judiciary’s Failure to
Keep Pace, 32 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 237 (2012); Logan Martin, Comment, Dog
Damages: The Case for Expanding the Available Remedies for the Owners of
Wrongfully Killed Pets in Colorado, 82 U. Colo. L. Rev. 921 (2011); Kelly Wilson,
Note, Catching the Unique Rabbit: Why Pets Should Be Reclassified as Inimitable
Property Under the Law, 57 Clev. St. L. Rev. 167 (2009); Jason R. Scott, Note,
Death to Poochy: A Comparison of Historical and Modern Frustrations Faced by
Owners of Injured or Killed Pet Dogs, 75 UMKC L. Rev. 569 (2006); Elaine T.
Byszewski, Valuing Companion Animals in Wrongful Death Cases: A Survey of
Current Court and Legislative Action and a Suggestion for Valuing Pecuniary Loss
of Companionship, 9 Animal L. 215 (2003); William C. Root, Note, “Man’s Best
Friend”: Property or Family Member? An Examination of the Legal Classification
of Companion Animals and Its Impact on Damages Recoverable for Their Wrongful
Death or Injury, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 423 (2002); Sonia S. Waisman & Barbara R. 9
Newell, Recovery of “Non-Economic” Damages for Wrongful Killing or Injury of
Companion Animals: A Judicial and Legislative Trend, 7 Animal L. 45 (2001);
Steven M. Wise, Recovery of Common Law Damages for Emotional Distress, Loss
of Society, and Loss of Companionship for the Wrongful Death of a Companion
Animal, 4 Animal L. 33 (1998).
In reviewing the record and briefs in this case, it is clear Philip West feels
the jury dramatically undervalued Bolt, who was West’s companion for nearly a
decade. West described how they visited “handicapped kids” and “the local
nursing home” together, where Bolt acted as a therapy dog. And they went to dog
shows, where Bolt earned awards. Even reading the black-and-white text of the
transcript, West’s love for Bolt is clear. I understand why West feels like neither
he nor Bolt received justice in this case. But our court’s role in the legal system is
to correct errors at law. Iowa Code § 602.5103(1) (2025). And under present law,
I agree with the majority opinion there is no basis to disturb the verdict.