Philadelphia, G. & N. R. Co. v. Commissioner

6 T.C. 789, 1946 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 223
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedApril 22, 1946
DocketDocket No. 7107
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 6 T.C. 789 (Philadelphia, G. & N. R. Co. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Philadelphia, G. & N. R. Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 789, 1946 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 223 (tax 1946).

Opinion

OPINION.

Hill, Judge:

The petitioner contends that the. facts in this case bring it squarely within the intent, purpose, and letter of the provisions of section 722, and in particular section 722 (a) and (b) (5), of the Internal Revenue Code.1 It designates the lease entered into on November 10, 1870, between it and Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Co. as the “factor affecting taxpayer’s business” which makes its excess profits tax “excessive and discriminatory.”

To be entitled to relief under section 722 petitioner must establish not only that its “base period net income is not a fair measure of normal earnings,” (Committee on Finance Report No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d sess., p. 196) but it must also establish that the “average base period net income is an inadequate standard of normal earnings, because of the factor affecting the taxpayer’s business.” (Emphasis supplied.) See section 722 (b) (5), which is the provision relied upon by petitioner in this case.

The term “an inadequate standard of normal earnings” is not defined in the statute. In Monarch Cap Screw & Manufacturing Co., 5 T. C. 1220, it is stated:

The word “normal” is susceptible of different, or varying meanings. * * * In relation to its context we think that the whole phrase of “an inadequate standard of normal earnings” refers to a standard or measure of earnings which falls below that established over a reasonable length of time and under normal conditions by the taxpayer or by other taxpayers engaged in the same or a similar business under comparable conditions. It is such a standard as would result in “an abnormally low excess profits credit.” Senate Finance Committee Report, supra. [No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d sess., p. 197.2 See also p. 35 of same report.3]

After 1870 and throughout the base period years and the excess profits tax years, petitioner’s sole activities were the owning and holding, of properties and the distribution of their avails. The petitioner’s largest item of income was $269,623.34, designated as the “yearly rent” in the lease made in 1870 covering all of its railroad properties. In addition the lessee paid to petitioner $8,000 for the maintenance of its corporate existence. The lessee also paid each year $414, the ground rent charged on the real estate demised. These three items were the same in the excess profits tax years 1940, 1941, and 1942. Petitioner’s income, exclusive of the above enumerated items and exclusive of the item of additional rental in 1936 of $5,918.34, a small item of other income in 1941 of $32.42, and its income and excess profits taxes paid by lessee, consisted of dividends and interest. During the base period years, 1936 to 1939, inclusive, such income aggregated $2,131.80, $2,007.84, $2,189.11, and $1,841.81, or an average of $2,042.64 per year. The average amount of such dividend and interest income for the three excess profits tax years was $2,314.14. An additional item of income which petitioner was required to include in its gross income for tax purposes was the Federal income tax paid by the lessee. The amount so included in gross income and the amount of tax actually paid by the lessee in each of the base period years and the excess profits tax years are as follows:

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Obviously, the only change of any consequence between petitioner’s gross income in its base period years and its gross income in the excess profits tax years occurred in the amount of taxes paid by the lessee and included in petitioner’s gross income.

Petitioner contends that “the addition to its income of the constantly increasing income and excess profits taxes gave rise to conditions affecting it, resulting in an average base period net income which is not an adequate measurement for the determination of excess profits.” It states on brief that its excess profits tax is excessive and discriminatory because its excess profits net income resulted solely from:

(a) The imposition upon petitioner in 1941 and 1942 of Federal income tames at increased rates and their payment by the lessee under a lease and contract entered into in 1870, and
(b) The inclusion in petitioner’s 1941 and 1942 income of greater amounts of Federal income tames paid by the lessee, than were included in its base period income. [Emphasis supplied.]

From such statement it clearly appears that it is the taxes at increased rates or increased taxes of petitioner paid by the lessee and included in petitioner’s gross income for 1941 and 1942 which, it is claimed by petitioner, make its average base period net income an inadequate standard of normal earnings. That this is petitioner’s contention also appears from petitioner’s suggested alternative method for the computation of a constructive average base period net income. It states that, since the “factor affecting the petitioner’s business which may reasonably be considered as resulting in the petitioner’s average base period net income being an inadequate standard for measuring its excess profits is the fact that the Federal income tax rates in effect in the base period were less than the Federal income tax rates in effect in 1941 and 1942,” an “appropriate adjustment for this factor would be to recompute petitioner’s average base period net income on the basis of 1941 and 1942 rates having been in effect throughout the base period.” For the purpose of computing its 1941 excess profits credit petitioner suggests the exclusion of the amount included in the excess profits net income for each of the base period years and the inclusion therein in lieu thereof of the amount of $83,383.23, the amount of taxes paid by the lessee included in 1941 gross income, and for the credit for 1942 it suggests the inclusion in excess profits net income for each of the base period years of $107,849.33, the amount included in 1942 gross income.

Section 722 (a) expressly provides:

In determining such constructive average base period net income, no regard shall be had to events or conditions affecting the taxpayer, the industry of which it is a member, or taxpayer generally occurring or existing after December 31,1939.

Obviously, if events or conditions occurring or existing after December 31,1939, may not be considered in determining constructive average base period net income which is to be used in lieu of the average base period net income otherwise determined under subchapter E, it follows that such events or conditions may not be regarded as “any other factor affecting the taxpayer’s business which may reasonably be considered as resulting in an inadequate standard of normal earnings during the base period,” for to do so would nullify the above quoted provision.

Furthermore, the requirement that the lessee pay petitioner’s taxes' arose in 1870, upon the execution of the lease, and it has been in existence ever since. All taxes assessed against the petitioner since that year have been paid by the lessee.

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Philadelphia, G. & N. R. Co. v. Commissioner
6 T.C. 789 (U.S. Tax Court, 1946)

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Bluebook (online)
6 T.C. 789, 1946 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 223, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/philadelphia-g-n-r-co-v-commissioner-tax-1946.