Pharilyn Chhang v. West Coast USA Properties LLC, et al.

Opinion

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 10 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 PHARILYN CHHANG, Case No. 1:23-cv-01335-SAB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S PARTIAL 13 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. AND DEFENDANTS WEST COAST USA 14 PROPERTIES LLC AND SERGIO WEST COAST USA PROPERTIES LLC, et MADRIGAL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 15 al., JUDGMENT

16 Defendants. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT DIBUDUO & DEFENDIS INSURANCE 17 BROKERS LLC’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 18 (ECF Nos. 121, 122, 145) 19 I. 20 INTRODUCTION 21 22 Pending before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment by Plaintiff Pharilyn 23 Chhang, Defendants West Coast USA Properties LLC (“West Coast”) and Sergio Madrigal 24 (“Mr. Madrigal”), and Defendant Dibuduo & Defendis Insurance Brokers LLC (“D&D”).1 The 25 Court heard oral argument on December 17, 2025. Counsel Liza Cristol-Deman appeared on 26 behalf of Plaintiff, counsel James Peel appeared on behalf of Defendants West Coast and Mr. 27 1 This case proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) for all purposes, pursuant to the consent 1 Madrigal, and counsel Mark Szyntar appeared on behalf of Defendant D&D. Having considered 2 the parties’ papers, the evidence proffered, the arguments presented at the December 17, 2025 3 hearing, as well as the Court’s file, the Court issues the following order DENYING Plaintiff’s 4 partial motion for summary judgment, DENYING Defendants West Coast and Mr. Madrigal’s 5 motion for summary judgment, and GRANTING Defendant D&D’s motion for summary 6 judgment for the reasons set forth below. 7 II. 8 RELEVANT BACKGROUND 9 On September 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative second amended complaint against 10 Defendants West Coast, Mr. Madrigal, and D&D, alleging causes of action under the Fair 11 Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.; California Fair Employment and Housing Act 12 (FEHA), Cal. Govt. Code §§ 12927, 12955 et seq.; wrongful eviction; invasion of private right to 13 occupancy; and breach of duty. (ECF No. 65.) On October 31, 2025, the parties filed cross- 14 motions for summary judgment and partial summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 121-124.)2 The 15 parties filed their respective oppositions on November 21, 2025 (ECF Nos. 130, 131, 133, 135), 16 and the parties replied on December 3, 2025. (ECF Nos. 137-139.) The Court heard oral 17 arguments on December 17, 2025. 18 III. 19 LEGAL STANDARD 20 “One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of 21 factually unsupported claims or defenses.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 22 (1986). Summary judgment is proper only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 23 as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 56(a). A material fact is one that may affect the outcome of the case under the applicable law. 25 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine if the evidence 26 is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. 27 2 Plaintiff subsequently filed two notices of errata, revising tables and correcting citations. (See ECF Nos. 129, 1 The party seeking summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of 2 informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the 3 pleadings and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate 4 the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (cleaned up). Where 5 the moving party will not bear the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it “must either produce 6 evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that 7 the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate 8 burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 9 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party meets that burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving 10 party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita 11 Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The non-moving party “must 12 do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Id. at 13 588. Rather, the nonmoving party must “identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that 14 precludes summary judgment.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). 15 In resolving a summary judgment motion, “the court does not make credibility 16 determinations or weigh conflicting evidence.” Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 17 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). Instead, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to 18 the non-moving party, drawing all justifiable inferences in that party’s favor. AXIS Reinsurance 19 Co. v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 975 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 2020). When resolving cross- 20 motions for summary judgment, the court has an “independent duty to review each cross-motion 21 and its supporting evidence . . . to determine whether that evidence demonstrates a genuine issue 22 of material fact.” Fair Hous. Council of Riverside Cnty, Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 23 1137 (9th Cir. 2001). Therefore, each motion is evaluated separately, “giving the nonmoving 24 party in each instance the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 25 815 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). 26 / / / 27 / / / 1 IV. 2 EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS AND JUDICIAL NOTICE 3 The Court has reviewed each of the evidentiary objections submitted by the parties and 4 the responses thereto. (ECF Nos. 130-134, 137, 140-141.) Many of the objections are based on 5 hearsay and relevance. 6 “[A]t the summary judgment stage, we do not focus on the admissibility of the evidence’s 7 form. We instead focus on the admissibility of its contents.” Sandoval v. Cnty. of San Diego, 8 985 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir. 2021). That is, though such objections could prove cognizable at 9 trial, only the admissibility of the relevant facts at trial, not the form of these facts as presented in 10 the motion, matters for the purposes of a motion for summary judgment. See id. Where “the 11 contents of a document can be presented in a form that would be admissible at trial—for 12 example, through live testimony by the author of the document—the mere fact that the document 13 itself might be excludable hearsay provides no basis for refusing to consider it on summary 14 judgment.” Id. (citations omitted). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a district court 15 must address evidentiary objections only to the extent they are material to its ruling. Norse v. 16 City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 973 (9th Cir. 2010). Further, a court “cannot rely on irrelevant 17 facts, and thus relevance objections are redundant.” Burch v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 433 F. 18 Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 19 Accordingly, to the extent that the Court relied on facts supported by evidence to which 20 objections for hearsay or relevance were raised, those objections are OVERRULED. Likewise, 21 the Court OVERRULES D&D’s objection to Plaintiff’s reply evidence authenticating a medical 22 record. The Court need not rule on evidentiary objections of expert opinions Robert S. Griswold 23 and Kevin J. Valine because it did not consider that evidence. 24 With respect to judicial notice, a court may take judicial notice of facts that are “not 25 subject to reasonable dispute” because they are “generally known” or “can be accurately and 26 readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. 27 Evid. 201(b). Defendants West Coast and Mr. Madrigal request judicial notice of the fact that 1 the many ways people’s dogs can provide comfort, calm frazzled nerves, be good listeners, and 2 provide other forms of valuable support to the population in general.” (ECF No. 134.) The 3 Court declines to take judicial notice of these assertions. 4 V. 5 DISCUSSION 6 Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment in her favor on the liability of Defendants 7 West Coast and Mr. Madrigal under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), the California Fair 8 Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), and wrongful eviction. Plaintiff also seeks partial 9 summary judgment in her favor on the liability of D&D under the FHA and the FEHA. In turn, 10 West Coast and Mr. Madrigal move for summary judgment in their favor on all five claims 11 addressed in the complaint, and D&D moves for summary judgment in its favor on the two 12 claims. The Court will address each claim in turn. 13 A. Plaintiff’s Claims Against D&D 14 1. Facts 15 D&D is a California licensed insurance broker. (ECF No. 132, Fact 1.) D&D procured a 16 policy from Mercury Casualty Company on behalf of West Coast which provided coverage for 17 apartments owned and managed by West Coast. (Id., Fact 2.) On October 18, 2022, West Coast 18 contacted D&D, its insurance broker, to inquire whether its insurance policy prohibited pit bulls. 19 (ECF No. 126, Fact 115.) West Coast did not mention that the pit bull was an emotional support 20 animal or that a tenant had a disability. (Id., Fact 135.) Forty minutes later, D&D responded 21 that, “[West Coast’s] insurance policy would not provide coverage as a landlord if there were to 22 be something that happens with the dog, AND knowingly allowing animals of the listed breeds 23 could result in cancellation of the policy, or the denial of claims based on misrepresentation of 24 how the apartments are run.” (Id., Fact 116; ECF No. 124, Ex. 14.) D&D attached one page of 25 an untitled document listing “ineligible risks,” which included pit bulls and various other breeds 26 of dogs. (Id.) D&D added that it was an “industry standard exclusion/guideline,” and that “we 27 would likely not be able to find coverage with a carrier that provided similar pricing or 1 accommodation request on October 25, 2022. (ECF No. 132, Fact 20.) On November 1, 2022, 2 West Coast emailed D&D with the headline “Cypress Apt., Madera – Service Animal Request.” 3 (ECF No. 122-4, Ex. E; ECF No. 124, Ex. 22.) The email included West Coast’s letter to 4 Plaintiff formally denying her accommodation, stating that it had contacted its insurance carrier 5 and attorney. (Id.) 6 2. Parties’ Positions 7 Plaintiff alleges that D&D is liable for violating the FHA and FEHA because D&D failed 8 to take prompt, corrective action against West Coast upon learning of her disability-related need 9 for an emotional support animal. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that D&D is liable for aiding and 10 abetting West Coast’s decision to deny her accommodation request. (ECF No. 145, pp. 33-36.) 11 D&D claims that it did not violate the FHA or the FEHA because it could not transact 12 insurance business in California as an insurer. (ECF No. 122, pp. 5-7.) D&D further asserts that 13 it had no knowledge of Plaintiff, her alleged disability, or any request for accommodation, and 14 that it did not advise or assist West Coast in denying such a request. (ECF No. 130, pp. 6-10; 15 ECF No. 137, pp. 6-10.) 16 3. Analysis 17 a. Failing to Take Prompt Action 18 FHA regulations provide that an individual or entity is directly liable for “failing to take 19 prompt action to correct and end a discriminatory housing practice by a third-party, where the 20 [individual or entity] knew or should have known of the discriminatory conduct and had the 21 power to correct it.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.7(a)(1)(iii). “The power to take prompt action to correct 22 and end a discriminatory housing practice by a third-party depends upon the extent of the 23 [individual’s or entity’s] control or any other legal responsibility the person may have with 24 respect to the conduct of such third-party.” Id. FEHA regulations are similar. 2 C.C.R. 25 § 12010 (a)(1)(C). “In federal court, the standards for FHA and FEHA housing discrimination 26 causes of action are the generally same.” Mengistu v. Forestview Apartments, LLC, No. 2:19- 27 cv-05118-ODW-JCX, 2022 WL 2159257, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2022) (citing Walker v. City 1 The record reflects that D&D did not know or have reason to know about Plaintiff’s 2 alleged disability or her accommodation request until November 1, 2022. By that date, West 3 Coast had already denied Plaintiff’s accommodation request, stating that it had contacted its 4 insurance carrier and its attorney. Plaintiff presents no evidence that D&D, as an insurance 5 broker, had control or power to take corrective actions against West Coast. D&D’s involvement 6 consisted of providing insurance related information and later receiving a copy of the denial. 7 That conduct does not, without more, establish direct liability under 24 C.F.R. § 100.7(a)(1)(iii) 8 or 2 C.C.R. § 12010(a)(1)(C). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED, and D&D’s motion 9 is GRANTED with respect to this claim. 10 b. Aiding and Abetting 11 California Government Code section 12955(g) prohibits “aid[ing], abet[ting], incit[ing], 12 compel[ling], or coerc[ing] the doing of any of the acts or practices declared unlawful in FEHA, 13 or to attempt to do so.” Cal. Govt. Code § 12955(g). “The FEHA does not provide a definition 14 of ‘aiding and abetting,’” Fiol v. Doellstedt, 50 Cal. App. 4th 1318, 1325 (1996), but it is a 15 concept “closely allied” with conspiracy. Janken v. GM Hughes Elecs., 46 Cal. App. 4th 55, 78 16 (1996). 17 As discussed above, D&D’s involvement was limited to providing insurance related 18 information. At the time it responded to West Coast’s inquiry about whether its insurance policy 19 prohibited pit bulls, D&D was unaware of Plaintiff’s alleged disability or accommodation 20 request. Plaintiff has produced no evidence that D&D assisted, encouraged, or otherwise 21 participated in the denial of her accommodation. Therefore, there is no basis to conclude that 22 D&D aided or abetted any unlawful act under FEHA. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for 23 summary judgment is DENIED, and D&D’s motion for summary judgment on this claim is 24 GRANTED. 25 c. Remaining Claims Against D&D under the FHA and FEHA 26 In addition to the claims addressed above, D&D moves for summary judgment on the 27 remaining FHA and FEHA claims alleged in the complaint. D&D argues that Plaintiff’s causes 1 showing that D&D denied or otherwise made a dwelling unavailable to Plaintiff. (ECF No. 122.) 2 Specifically, D&D contends that it lacked the capacity to engage in prohibited acts under the 3 FHA because it is not an insurer and therefore could not issue, deny, or refuse insurance in any 4 capacity. (Id.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that because D&D’s conduct affected the rental of 5 housing, D&D is liable under the FHA and FEHA. (ECF No. 131.) 6 The Court examines the following remaining alleged violations against D&D: 1) making 7 a dwelling unavailable based on disability discrimination; 2) refusing to provide property or 8 hazard insurance for dwellings, or providing such insurance differently because of disability; 3) 9 making statements, with respect to the rental of a dwelling, that indicate any preference, 10 limitation, or discrimination based on disability, or an intention to make any such preference, 11 limitation, or discrimination; and 4) interfering with the exercise or enjoyment of state fair 12 housing rights. (ECF No. 65.) 13 Because FEHA largely mirrors its federal counterpart, liability under the FHA would also 14 support liability under the FEHA. See, e.g., Auburn Wood I Homeowners Ass’n v. Fair Emp. 15 and Hous. Comm’n, 121 Cal. App. 4th 1578, 1591 (2004). Accordingly, the Court conducts its 16 analysis under the FHA and does not separately reexamine the claims under the FEHA. See 17 SoCal Recovery, LLC v. City of Costa Mesa, 56 F.4th 802, 811 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Federal courts 18 analyze FEHA claims under the same standard as FHA claims.”). 19 i. Making Unavailable a Dwelling and Providing Insurance Differently 20 The FHA provides that it is unlawful to “otherwise make unavailable or deny” a dwelling 21 because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). The 22 United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) makes clear that this 23 prohibition also extends to practices that make housing unavailable because of handicap. 24 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(b). Additionally, HUD promulgated a list of specific activities that are 25 covered by section 3604(a) that make housing otherwise unavailable to persons protected by the 26 FHA. One prohibited activity is to refuse to provide property or hazard insurance for dwellings 27 or to provide insurance differently because of handicap. 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4); see also Ojo 1 reasonable construction of the FHA); Hous. Rts. Ctr. v. Sterline, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1190 2 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (noting section 3604(a) “prohibits actions that make apartments effectively 3 unavailable,” which includes refusing to provide insurance or provide insurance differently 4 because of prohibited grounds pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4)). 5 The facts establish that D&D is a licensed insurance broker, not an insurer. Therefore, 6 D&D could not issue, deny, or refuse insurance in any capacity, nevertheless provide insurance 7 differently on the basis of disability. D&D merely communicated general insurance related 8 information to West Coast without knowledge of Plaintiff’s alleged disability or accommodation 9 request. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate as to Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 10 § 3604(a). 11 ii. Making a Statement 12 It is unlawful under the FHA “[t]o make, print, publish, or cause to be made, printed, or 13 published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the . . . rental of a dwelling that 14 indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on . . . handicap . . . , or an intention 15 to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). The Ninth 16 Circuit has adopted an “objective ordinary reader” standard for determining whether a statement 17 violates § 3604(c). Ohio House, LLC v. City of Costa Mesa, 122 F.4th 645, 669 (9th Cir. 2025) 18 (quoting Morris v. W. Hayden Ests. First Addition Homeowners Ass’n, 104 F.4th 1128, 1148 19 (9th Cir. 2024)). Thus, a “plaintiff must prove that ‘an ordinary listener would believe that the 20 challenged statement suggests a preference, limitation, or discrimination based on a protected 21 status.” Id. (citation omitted). 22 Here, the statement at issue is D&D’s email to West Coast, which stated that “[West 23 Coast’s] insurance policy would not provide coverage as a landlord if there were to be something 24 that happens with the dog, AND knowingly allowing animals of the listed breeds could result in 25 cancellation of the policy, or the denial of claims based on misrepresentation of how the 26 apartments are run . . . [t]his is an industry standard exclusion/guideline, and we would likely not 27 be able to find coverage with a carrier that provided similar pricing or coverage.” On its face, 1 consequences of allowing certain dog breeds under the policy. An ordinary reader would 2 understand the statement as conveying information about insurance risk, not as expressing a 3 discriminatory preference or limitation based on handicap. Even if the statement were later 4 factored into a housing decision, section 3604(c) focuses on the content of the statement itself, 5 not its downstream effects. Because the statement does not, under an objective reading, indicate 6 a preference, limitation, or discrimination based on handicap, Plaintiff cannot establish a 7 violation of section 3604(c). Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute of material fact, and D&D 8 is entitled to summary judgment as to this claim. 9 iii. Interference 10 Section 3617 states that it is unlawful to “coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with 11 any person . . . on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or 12 enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by [the FHA].” 42 U.S.C. § 3617. “Section 3617 13 reach[es] all practices which have the effect of interfering with the exercise of rights under the 14 federal fair housing laws.” Morris, 104 F.4th at 1142 (citation and quotations omitted). While 15 section 3617 is interpreted broadly, “the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s actions affected 16 the ‘exercise or enjoyment of . . . any right granted or protected’ by the FHA.” Ohio House, 122 17 F.4th at 1124 (quoting Morris, 104 F.4th at 1143.) In addition, the plaintiff must prove that a 18 defendant interfered with protected activity because of discriminatory intent or motive. See 19 Morris, 104 F.4th at 1143-44. 20 As discussed above, at the time D&D responded to West Coast’s inquiry about whether 21 its insurance policy prohibited pit bulls, D&D was unaware of Plaintiff’s alleged disability or 22 accommodation request. D&D’s communication consisted of providing insurance information in 23 response to a general inquiry, and Plaintiff has not presented evidence from which a reasonable 24 jury could conclude that D&D interfered with the exercise of FHA rights because of 25 discriminatory intent or motive. Accordingly, D&D’s motion for summary judgment on this 26 claim is GRANTED. 27 In sum, the Court finds there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether 1 summary judgment, and DENIES Plaintiff’s partial motion for summary judgment against D&D. 2 B. Plaintiff’s Claims Against West Coast and Mr. Madrigal 3 1. Facts 4 West Coast is a California limited liability company that owns the subject rental property, 5 117-121 Cypress Street in Madera, a 14-unit complex. (ECF No. 134, Fact 93.) In total, West 6 Coast owns approximately 103 residential rental units and does not use outside management 7 companies. (Id., Fact 94.) Mr. Madrigal is the owner, managing member, and “boss” at West 8 Coast. (Id., Fact 92.) 9 Plaintiff received a Housing Choice Voucher from the Housing Authority of the City of 10 Madera (“HACM”). (ECF No. 126, Fact 114.) Plaintiff and Mr. Madrigal signed a one-year 11 lease running from August 1, 2022 to July 31, 2023. (ECF No. 133, Fact 1.) When Plaintiff 12 signed the lease, she met with West Coast office/property manager Christina Quijano. (Id., Fact 13 2.) At that time, Plaintiff asked if she could keep her emotional support animal (“ESA”) named 14 Onyx in her unit. (Id.) Ms. Quijano stated that she would speak with Mr. Madrigal about it, 15 wrote “no pets” on the application, and gave Plaintiff the keys to the apartment. (Id.) 16 Shortly after signing the lease, Plaintiff and Mr. Madrigal communicated by phone and 17 text. (ECF No. 134, Fact 20.) Plaintiff informed him that she had a dog and identified it as an 18 ESA. (Id.) Mr. Madrigal inquired about dog’s breed, and Plaintiff replied that Onyx was a pit 19 bull. (Id.) Mr. Madrigal then informed Plaintiff that she could not keep the dog because of his 20 insurance. (ECF No. 124, Ex. 3, Sergio Madrigal Deposition at 93:16-20.) On October 16, 21 2022, Plaintiff texted Mr. Madrigal asking if he would reconsider her request for an ESA. (Id., 22 Ex. 10.) Plaintiff wrote that her depression had gotten worse without him, she needed him, and 23 that she had a signed letter from a doctor to prove her conditions. (Id.) In response, Mr. 24 Madrigal replied, “Sorry we cannot modify the lease… [p]lease search for an apartment that will 25 accommodate.” (Id.) Plaintiff responded by text that she would email Mr. Madrigal her doctor’s 26 letter. (Id.) Mr. Madrigal texted back, “Please include pictures of the dog and breed. But please 27 keep in mind you cannot have the dog there.” (Id.) 1 an accommodation and attaching her physician’s verification letter. (ECF No. 134, Fact 30; ECF 2 No. 124, Ex. 11.) On October 18, 2022, Plaintiff also texted Madrigal a PDF version of her 3 physician’s verification letter. (Id., Fact 31; Id., Ex. 10.) Mr. Madrigal responded to Plaintiff via 4 text: “We’re [sic] going to also include pictures of the dog and the breed? Please text me 5 pictures of the dog and [l]et me know what breed it is.” (Id., Fact 32; Id.) Plaintiff responded 6 with two photos of Onyx and said, “American Pit bull Terrier.” (Id.; Id.) 7 On October 18, 2022, at Mr. Madrigal’s direction, Ms. Quijano emailed Andrew Shaffer, 8 an insurance broker employed at D&D, asking if the insurance covering West Coast’s rental 9 properties restricted pit bulls. (ECF No. 134, Fact 34; ECF No. 124, Ex. 13.) Ms. Quijano did 10 not mention that the dog was an ESA or that the tenant had a disability. (Id.; Id.) Forty minutes 11 later, D&D responded that, “[West Coast’s] insurance policy would not provide coverage as a 12 landlord if there were to be something that happens with the dog, AND knowingly allowing 13 animals of the listed breeds could result in cancellation of the policy, or the denial of claims 14 based on misrepresentation of how the apartments are run.” (ECF No. 126, Fact 116; Id., Ex. 15 14.) D&D attached one page of an untitled document listing “ineligible risks,” which included 16 pit bulls and various other breeds of dogs. (Id.) D&D added that it was an “industry standard 17 exclusion/guideline,” and that “we would likely not be able to find coverage with a carrier that 18 provided similar pricing or coverage.” (Id.) 19 On October 25, 2022, West Coast sent written correspondence to Plaintiff and denied her 20 accommodation request, stating that its insurance carrier informed them that they would lose 21 coverage if they allowed a pit bull on the property, and that pit bulls were excluded from the 22 policy. (ECF No. 134, Fact 60; ECF No. 124, Ex. 15.) Ms. Quijano emailed the letter to 23 Plaintiff on October 26, 2022, copying Mr. Madrigal. (Id, Fact 63; Id., Ex. 15.) Three days later, 24 on October 28, 2022, Plaintiff emailed Ms. Quijano and Mr. Madrigal, informing them that they 25 could not deny her animal based on stereotypes, that even breed restrictions imposed by 26 insurance were not permitted, and that she would file a complaint with HUD. (Id, Fact 64; Id., 27 Ex. 16.) Plaintiff included a photo of Onyx sitting on grass surrounded by a group of teenage 1 One week later, on November 2, 2022, Ms. Quijano emailed Plaintiff at Mr. Madrigal’s 2 request, stating, “[w]e are doing our best to accommodate your request…for the service animal”, 3 and asked for proof of renter’s insurance, vaccines and registry, and proof of therapy training. 4 (Id., Fact. 68; ECF No. 124, Ex. 17.) That same day, Plaintiff responded that ESAs do not 5 require renter’s insurance, registry, or specific training, and attached Onyx’s City of Madera dog 6 license and proof of vaccinations. (Id., Fact. 69; Id., Ex. 17.) The license for Onyx listed 7 Plaintiff’s apartment as the location where Onyx was kept. (ECF No. 133, Fact 19.) 8 On November 5, 2022, West Coast served a 60-day notice terminating her tenancy. (Id., 9 Fact. 70; ECF No. 124, Ex. 19.) Three days later, on November 8, 2022, West Coast served a 10 30-day notice and posted it on her door. (Id., Fact. 71; Id., Ex. 20.) Under the terms of the 11 Housing Assistance Payment contract signed by Mr. Madrigal, Plaintiff’s lease could only be 12 terminated for specific reasons. (Id., Fact. 73.) Also on November 8, 2022, West Coast received 13 a phone call stating that the 60-day notice was improper and that a 90-day notice could be issued. 14 (Id., Fact. 74.) West Coast believed the caller to be Plaintiff’s HUD case worker at HACM. (Id., 15 Fact. 75.) In response, Ms. Quijano prepared a letter to Plaintiff on behalf of West Coast 16 advising her of the call and attaching a new, 90-day notice terminating her tenancy. (Id., Fact 17 76; ECF No. 124, Ex. 21.) The letter and notice were dated November 8, 2022, and stated, 18 “during this time you will be allowed to have your service animal.” (Id; Id.) The 90-day notice 19 was titled, “Notice of Termination of Tenancy due to Owner Move-in” and checked a box for 20 “non-renewal of a fixed term lease.” (Id., Fact 77; Id.) Plaintiff move-out of her unit on 21 February 8, 2023. (ECF No. 124, Ex. 1 Chhang Deposition 46:9-23.) 22 West Coast executed a lease for the unit to Mr. Madrigal’s son and wife, with a term 23 commencing the day after Plaintiff vacated. (ECF No. 134, Fact 89.) Mr. Madrigal’s son never 24 moved into the unit. (Id., Fact 90.) 25 2. Parties’ Positions 26 Plaintiff argues Defendants West Coast and Mr. Madrigal are liable for violating five 27 discriminatory housing practices under both the FHA and FEHA: (1) denying a reasonable 1 unavailable because of handicap in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1); (3) applying different 2 terms, conditions, and privileges because of handicap in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2); 3 making a facially discriminatory statement in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c); and interfering 4 with or retaliating against any person in the exercise or enjoyment of any of the rights protected 5 by the FHA in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3617. (ECF No. 145, p. 17-31.) Additionally, Plaintiff 6 argues that West Coast and Mr. Madrigal are liable for wrongfully evicting Plaintiff under both 7 common law and California Civil Code § 1942.5. (Id. at pp. 31-33.) 8 Defendants assert that Plaintiff as a matter of law has failed to prove that she had a 9 disability, that her disability affected a major life activity, or that Defendants would not suffer an 10 undue hardship or expense or alter its business practices by granting her accommodation request. 11 (ECF No. 121.) Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s eviction was proper because her lease 12 was terminated because of the “no pets” provision in the lease agreement, that the 13 accommodation would have created an undue burden, and that no-fault termination was proper 14 under California Civil Code section 1946.2. (Id.) 15 3. Analysis 16 a. FHA Claims 17 The Court first addresses whether Plaintiff has established that she is handicap within the 18 meaning of the FHA. Each of the statutory provisions on which Plaintiff relies prohibits 19 discrimination “because of handicap.” See 42 U.S.C. § 3604. Accordingly, whether Plaintiff has 20 a handicap is a threshold issue for her FHA claims. 21 The FHA defines “handicap” as: (1) “a physical or mental impairment which 22 substantially limits one or more of such person’s major life activities, (2) a record of having such 23 an impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). 24 Under the FHA, a “physical or mental impairment” is any mental or psychological disorder, 25 including emotional or mental illness. 24 C.F.R. § 100.201(a)(2). “Major life activities” means 26 functions that are of central importance to daily life, such as caring for one’s self, performing 27 manual tasks, speaking, breathing, and working. 24 C.F.R. § 100.201(b). “The term 1 Statement of the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of Justice, 2 Reasonable Accommodations under the Fair Housing Act, HUD (May 17, 2004), 3 https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/huddojstatement.pdf. 4 Reviewing the record, the Court finds there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff 5 is handicapped within the meaning of the FHA. Plaintiff attests that she suffers from and was 6 diagnosed with depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). (ECF No. 124, 7 Ex. 34, Pharilyn Chhang Decl., ¶ 2; Id., Ex. 1, Pharilyn Chhang Depo., 22:24-25; 23:1-7; ECF 8 No. 124, Exs. 31, 35.) Plaintiff submits a letter from her physician stating that these conditions 9 cause “certain limitations” with respect to social interactions, coping with stress, and anxiety. 10 (ECF No. 124, Ex. 11; Pharilyn Chhang Decl., ¶ 2.) She further testified that she experiences 11 difficulty sleeping and engaging in social interactions as a result of these conditions. (ECF No. 12 127, Pharilyn Chhang Decl., ¶ 3; Chhang Depo. 90:6-7.) 13 At the same time, the record provides limited detail regarding the nature and extent of 14 Plaintiff’s alleged limitations. The physician’s letter does not specify the degree to which 15 Plaintiff is limited because of her conditions. (See ECF No. 124, Ex. 11.) The progress notes 16 and letter from her therapist similarly do not describe how her conditions affect her daily life. 17 (See id. Exs. 31, 25.) Additionally, Plaintiff has not provided information regarding the 18 frequency, duration, or intensity of her impairments. 19 The Court finds that a genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding whether Plaintiff 20 is handicapped. Accordingly, the Court does address Plaintiff’s claims under the FHA. 21 b. FEHA Claims 22 The threshold question in a FEHA action is whether the plaintiff’s mental disability 23 “limits a major life activity.” Cal. Govt. Code § 12926(j)(1). The term “mental disability” 24 includes emotional or mental illnesses. Id. “Major life activities” are broadly construed and 25 include social activities. Id. § 12926(j)(1)(C). A limitation of a major life activity occurs “if it 26 makes the achievement of the major life activity difficult.” Id. § 12926(j)(1)(B). 27 As stated above, Plaintiff declared that she has difficulty sleeping and finds it challenging 1 stating that her conditions cause “certain limitations” with respect to social interactions, coping 2 with stress, and anxiety. However, the parties dispute whether the physician’s letter reflects the 3 physician’s own independent evaluation or is based primarily on information provided by 4 Plaintiff’s therapist. Plaintiff states that her therapist wrote a letter for her to take to her 5 physician. (See ECF No. 124, Ex. 34, Pharilyn Chhang Decl., ¶¶ 8-9; Id., Ex. 35.) The 6 physician’s letter states that he is familiar with Plaintiff’s medical history regarding “Neck Pain, 7 Headache, Back Ache, Stomach Pain, Cough [,] and Allergic Rhinitis”, but then discusses 8 Plaintiff’s mental illnesses and associated limitations. 9 Accordingly, because a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether Plaintiff is 10 limited in major life activities because of her mental disabilities, neither party is entitled to 11 summary judgment with respect to claims under the FEHA. 12 c. Wrongful Eviction 13 Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment asserts that West Coast and Mr. Madrigal are 14 liable for wrongfully evicting Plaintiff under both common law and California Civil Code 15 Section 1942.5. (ECF No. 145, pp. 24-26.) The Court observes, however, that Plaintiff’s 16 complaint limits its wrongful eviction claims to California Civil Code sections 1927 and 1940.2.3 17 (See ECF No. 65, pp. 17-18.) Accordingly, the Court declines to address these new theories on 18 summary judgment. See La Asociacion de Trabajadores de Lake Forest v. City of Lake Forest, 19 624 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that a plaintiff may not raise a new legal theory on 20 a motion for summary judgment). 21 Defendants’ motion for summary judgment asserts that Plaintiff violated the lease’s “no 22 pets” provision and that her requested accommodation would have created an undue burden. 23 (ECF No. 121, p. 12.) However, because there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether 24 Plaintiff is disabled or handicapped, the Court cannot determine whether as a matter of law 25 Defendants denied a reasonable accommodation. 26 Defendants also argue that eviction was proper as a no-fault termination under California 27 3 The Court notes that while Plaintiff’s notice of her motion states that she is moving for wrongful eviction under 1 | Civil Code section 1946.2 because Mr. Madrigal’s son qualifies as a close relative under the 2 | statute. (Id.) California Civil Code section 1946.2 applies to “tenants who have continuously 3 | and lawfully occupied a residential real property for 12 months[.]” Here, it is undisputed that 4 | Plaintiff and Mr. Madrigal entered into a one-year lease running from August 1, 2022 to July 31, 5 | 2023, and that Plaintiff moved out of her unit on February 8, 2023. Accordingly, because 6 | Plaintiff occupied her unit for less than 12 months, California Civil Code section 1946.2 does not 7 | apply. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is therefore DENIED. 8 In sum, the Court has carefully reviewed the record, briefs, and parties’ arguments in this 9 | matter and finds genuine disputes of material fact related to each parties’ claims that cannot be 10 | resolved on summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court DENIES both Plaintiff's and 11 | Defendants West Coast and Mr. Madrigal’s motion for summary judgment. 12 VI. 13 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 14 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 15 1. Defendant Dibuduo & Defendis Insurance Brokers, LLC’s motion for summary 16 judgment (ECF No. 122) is GRANTED; 17 2. Plaintiffs partial motion for summary judgment (ECF Nos. 123, 145) is DENIED; 18 3. Defendants West Coast Properties LLC and Sergio Madrigal’s motion for 19 summary judgment (ECF No. 121) is DENIED; and 20 4. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Dibuduo & 21 Defendis Insurance Brokers, LLC, and against Plaintiff Pharilyn Chhang. 22 73 IT IS SO ORDERED. DAA Le 24 | Dated: _March 20, 2026 _ eee STANLEY A. BOONE 25 United States Magistrate Judge 26 27 28