Phang v. Blanche

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: June 25, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2026-1417
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KATIE PHANG,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 26-1417 (EGS)

TODD BLANCHE, in his official capacity as Acting Attorney General of the United States,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Responding to public demands for information, Congress with

near unanimity passed the Epstein Files Transparency Act (the

“Epstein Act”), Pub. L. No. 119-38 on November 18 and 19, 2025,

which President Trump signed into law on November 19, 2025. The

Epstein Act is an unprecedented disclosure law requiring the

Attorney General, with few exceptions, to make publicly

available in a searchable and downloadable database all

unclassified Department of Justice (“Department”) files related

to its investigation of the notorious sexual predator and child

sex trafficker Jeffrey Epstein, the child sex trafficker

Ghislaine Maxwell, and their associates. The Epstein Act

required extremely timely compliance: the Attorney General was

required to make the information publicly available by December

1 19, 2025. The Attorney General made productions on December 19,

20, 22, and 23, 2025, and January 30, 2026. Following the

production of approximately 3.5 million pages of documents, the

Attorney General announced that the Department had complied with

its production obligations under the Epstein Act on January 30,

2026.

Katie Phang (“Ms. Phang”) brings this action against Todd

Blanche in his official capacity as Acting Attorney General of

the United States (the “Attorney General”), claiming that he has

improperly withheld information and failed to comply with other

requirements in violation of the Epstein Act. Pending before the

Court is Ms. Phang’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction in which

she seeks relief for a limited list of violations of the Epstein

Act. See Application for Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 9; and Mem. of

Points and Auths. in Support of Application for a Prelim. Inj.

(collectively “Mot.”), ECF No. 9-1. Upon careful consideration

of Ms. Phang’s motion, the Attorney General’s opposition, the

reply, the applicable law; and for the reasons discussed below,

the Court GRANTS Ms. Phang’s motion.

I. Background

A. Statutory and Factual Background

1. The Epstein Act

The Epstein Act was passed with near unanimity by the House

of Representatives on November 18, 2025; by unanimous consent in

2 the Senate on November 19, 2025; and signed into law by

President Trump on the same day. See Clerk, United States House

of Representatives, Roll Call 289 | Bill Number: H.R. 4405,

https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2025289 (last accessed June 22,

2026) (reporting that the roll call vote in the House of

Representatives was 427 ayes, 1 no, and 5 not voting); 171 119

Cong. Rec. S8211 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2025) (reporting passage in

the Senate by unanimous consent). It requires the release of

documents relating to Mr. Epstein, subject to five permitted

grounds for withholding, requires any redactions to be

accompanied by a written justification published in the Federal

Register, and a report to Congress upon the completion of the

release of records.

Section 2(a) of the Act requires the Attorney General,

within 30 days after enactment, and subject to the prohibited

and permitted grounds for withholding, to “make publicly

available in a searchable and downloadable format all

unclassified records, documents, communications, and

investigative materials in the possession of the Department of

Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and

United States Attorneys’ Offices, that relate to[:]”

(1) Jeffrey Epstein including all investigations, prosecutions, or custodial matters.

(2) Ghislaine Maxwell.

3 (3) Flight logs or travel records, including but not limited to manifests, itineraries, pilot records, and customs or immigration documentation, for any aircraft, vessel, or vehicle owned, operated, or used by Jeffrey Epstein or any related entity.

(4) Individuals, including government officials, named or referenced in connection with Epstein’s criminal activities, civil settlements, immunity or plea agreements, or investigatory proceedings.

(5) Entities (corporate, nonprofit, academic, or governmental) with known or alleged ties to Epstein’s trafficking or financial networks.

(6) Any immunity deals, non-prosecution agreements, plea bargains, or sealed settlements involving Epstein or his associates.

(7) Internal DOJ communications, including emails, memos, meeting notes, concerning decisions to charge, not charge, investigate, or decline to investigate Epstein or his associates.

(8) All communications, memoranda, directives, logs, or metadata concerning the destruction, deletion, alteration, misplacement, or concealment of documents, recordings, or electronic data related to Epstein, his associates, his detention and death, or any investigative files.

(9) Documentation of Epstein’s detention or death, including incident reports, witness interviews, medical examiner files, autopsy reports, and written records detailing the circumstances and cause of death.

4 Epstein Act § 2(a)(1)-(9).

Section 2(b), entitled “Prohibited Grounds for Withholding”

provides that “[n]o record shall be withheld, delayed or

redacted on the basis of embarrassment, reputational harm, or

political sensitivity, including to any government official,

public figure, or foreign dignitary.” Epstein Act § 2(a)(1)-(9).

Section 2(c), entitled “Permitted Withholdings” identifies

five categories of records for which the Attorney General “may

withhold or redact the segregable portions,” and requires all

redactions to “be accompanied by a written justification

published in the Federal Register and submitted to Congress.”

Epstein Act § 2(c)(1), (2). The five categories of permitted

withholdings are records that:

(A) contain personally identifiable information of victims or victims’ personal and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;

(B) depict or contain child sexual abuse materials (CSAM) as defined under 18 U.S.C. 2256 and prohibited under 18 U.S.C. 2252–2252A;

(C) would jeopardize an active federal investigation or ongoing prosecution, provided that such withholding is narrowly tailored and temporary;

(D) depict or contain images of death, physical abuse, or injury of any person; or

5 (E) contain information specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.

Epstein Act § 2(c)(1)(A)-(E).

Section 2(c) also addresses classified information and

requires the Attorney General to declassify such information “to

the maximum extent possible.” Epstein Act § 2(c)(3). For

information that cannot be declassified, the Attorney General is

required to “release an unclassified summary for each of the

redacted or withheld classified information.” Epstein Act §

2(c)(3)(A). Decisions to classify information covered by the

Epstein Act after July 1, 2025 “shall be published in the

Federal Register and submitted to Congress, including the date

of classification, the identity of the classifying authority,

and an unclassified summary of the justification.” Epstein Act §

2(c)(4).

Section 3, entitled “Report to Congress,” provides that

within fifteen days of the public release of the materials

required by the Act, “the Attorney General shall submit to the

House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary a report listing:”

(1) All categories of records released and withheld.

(2) A summary of redactions made, including legal basis.

6 (3) A list of all government officials and politically exposed persons named or referenced in the released materials, with no redactions permitted under subsection (b)(1).

Epstein Act § 3.

2. The Attorney General’s Efforts to Comply with the Epstein Act

The Epstein Act required the government to comply with its

requirements by December 19, 2025. See Epstein Act § 2(a). On

that date, the Attorney General issued a letter to Congress

stating that the Department was “producing hundreds of thousands

of pages of responsive materials in compliance with the [Epstein

Act].” Letter from Todd Blanche, Deputy U.S. Att’y Gen., to

Members of Congress at 1 (Dec. 19, 2025), Exhibit D to Ward-

Packard Decl., ECF No. 9-3. 1 The letter stated that “the

Department is continuing to review additional documents and

other items for potential responsiveness,” noting that

responsive documents are being provided to the Department by the

Department’s components on an ongoing basis. Id. The letter

1 Except for citations to the Attorney General’s letters of December 19, 2025; January 30, 2026; February 2, 2026; and February 14, 2026; and the Department’s letters of April 23, 2026, and May 8, 2026; where the citation to the original page number of the respective letter is provided, the Court cites to the ECF header page number of electronic filings throughout this Memorandum Opinion, not the original page number of the filed document.

7 stated that in addition to withholdings and redactions permitted

under section 2(c) of the Epstein Act, the Department “withheld

and redacted a limited amount of information otherwise covered

by various privileges, including deliberative-process privilege,

work-product privilege, and attorney-client privilege.” Id. at

2. The letter stated that “[a] privilege log will be produced in

due course,” and that “the Department will provide an

explanation for any redacted and withheld materials as part of

this production” as required by section 2(c)(2) of the Epstein

Act. Id. at 3, 4. The letter acknowledged that the Department

did not publicly produce all responsive material by the

deadline, stating that “the volume of materials to be reviewed—

many of which continue to be produced to [the Justice Management

Division]—means that the Department must publicly produce

responsive documents on a rolling basis.” Id. at 5.

The Attorney General made further productions on December

20, 22, and 23, 2025, and on January 30, 2026. Mot., ECF No. 9-1

at 14. No production was accompanied by a privilege log. Id.

On January 30, 2026, the Attorney General issued a second

letter, stating that that day’s production “mark[ed] the

Department’s compliance with its production obligations under

the [Epstein] Act.” Letter from Todd Blanche, Deputy U.S. Att’y

Gen., Re: Epstein Files Transparency Act – Production of

Department Materials at 1 (Jan. 30, 2026), Exhibit E to Ward-

8 Packard Decl., ECF No. 9-3 (“January 30, 2026 Letter”). The

letter stated that “approximately 200,000 pages have been

redacted or withheld based on various privileges” and that a

“formal report with a summary of redactions made and list of all

government officials and politically exposed persons named or

referenced in the released materials will be submitted to the

House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary within 15 days of

today’s release.” Id. at 4. The letter stated that foreign

language materials had not been reviewed or produced “[b]ecause

it was not practicable for a first-level reviewer to determine

the responsiveness of a foreign-language document.” Id. at 5.

The letter also stated that some documents were not produced

because of technical issues with the files. Id. The letter

concluded that “[a]fter submitting the formal report to Congress

required under the [Epstein] Act and publishing the written

justifications in the Federal Register, the Department's

obligations under the [Epstein] Act will be completed.” Id. at

6.

On February 2, 2026, the Attorney General acknowledged that

“several thousands of documents and media that may [sic] have

inadvertently included victim-identifying information” were

disclosed in the January 30, 2026 production and were therefore

subsequently removed. See Letter from Todd Blanche, Deputy U.S.

Att’y Gen. to the Hon. Richard M. Berman & the Hon. Paul A.

9 Engelmayer, United States v. Maxwell, ECF No. 848, 1:20-cr-

00330-PAE (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2026). Attorneys representing Mr.

Epstein’s victims informed the Maxwell court that the Attorney

General’s disclosure of victim-identifying information began

with the December 20, 2025 production, that the impact to Mr.

Epstein’s victims from the disclosure had “escalated from

concern to suffering and fear for personal safety,” and that the

harm was “irreversible.” United States v. Maxwell, 20 Cr. 330,

2026 WL 279487, at *4, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2026). On April 23,

2026, the Department’s Inspector General announced that it had

initiated an audit of the Attorney General’s compliance with the

Epstein Act. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DOJ OIG Announces Initiation

of Audit (April 23, 2026), https://oig.justice.gov/news/doj-oig-

announces-initiation-audit. 2

On February 14, 2026, the Attorney General issued the

report required in section 3 of the Epstein Act in the form of a

letter to the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Senate

Judiciary Committee and House Judiciary Committee. See Letter

from Todd Blanche, Deputy U.S. Att’y Gen. to Chairman Chuck

Grassley, Ranking Member Dick Durbin, Chairman Jim Jordan,

Ranking Member Jamie Raskin (Feb. 14, 2026), Exhibit F to Ward-

2 The Court may take judicial notice of information posted on official public websites of government agencies. See Cannon v. District of Columbia, 717 F.3d 200, 205 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 10 Packard Decl., ECF No. 9-3. With regard to withheld records, the

letter stated that “[t]he only category of records withheld were

those records where permitted withholdings under section 2(c)

and privileged materials were not segregable from material

responsive under section 2(a),” and that “the privileges that

applied to the withheld records were deliberative-process

privilege, work-product privilege, and attorney-client

privilege.” Id. at 2. The letter stated that “[no] records were

withheld or redacted ‘on the basis of embarrassment,

reputational harm, or political sensitivity, including to any

government official, public figure, or foreign dignitary’”

pursuant to section 2(b)(l) of the Epstein Act. Id.

The letter included a four-paragraph “Summary of Redactions

Made and Legal Basis.” Id. at 2-3. The first category in the

summary was the withholdings permitted under section 2(c) of the

Epstein Act. Id. at 2. For the second category, the letter

stated that “[a]lthough permitted by [section 2(c)(1)(E) of] the

[Epstein] Act, no materials were redacted or withheld on th[e]

basis that a record ‘contain[ed] information specifically

authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to

be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign

policy and are in fact properly classified pursuant to such

Executive order.’” Id. at 3. The third category were redactions

based on “various privileges, including deliberative-process

11 privilege, work-product privilege, and attorney-client

privilege.” Id. The letter cited Supreme Court precedent for

these withholdings. Id.

The letter concluded with a “List of All Government

Officials and Politically Exposed Persons” named or referenced

in the released materials. Id. at 3-6.

3. Plaintiff Katie Phang

Plaintiff Katie Phang is an “attorney and independent

journalist based in Miami, Florida.” Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 15;

see also Phang Decl., ECF No. 9-2 ¶ 2. She has worked as a legal

analyst for a variety of media outlets, including hosting “The

Katie Phang Show” on MSNOW (then MSNBC). Phang Decl., ECF No. 9-

2 ¶¶ 5, 6. Since April 2025, she has reported on “major domestic

and international events, with a focus on legal and political

news” on her YouTube channel and other platforms. Id. ¶ 7. She

has “extensively covered the crimes of Jeffrey Epstein,

Ghislaine Maxwell, and others in the ‘Epstein elite,’” including

publishing seventy-two videos about the subject in the last

year. Id. ¶¶ 8, 9. Her reporting on the Epstein files has

“realized more than 9.7 million views on [her] YouTube channel.”

Id. ¶ 10.

To conduct her reporting, Ms. Phang has “personally

reviewed many of the documents produced . . . pursuant to the

[Epstein Act],” and she has “relied and continue[s] to rely on

12 materials disclosed under the [Epstein] Act to develop [her]

reporting and to prepare and execute [her] reporting.” Id. ¶ 12.

Ms. Phang argues that “[the Attorney General’s] violations of

the [Epstein] Act have interfered with [her] ability to perform

[her] job as an investigative journalist.” Id. ¶ 13.

Specifically, the relief she seeks in her motion are

“particularly time-sensitive[] because they are preventing [her]

from moving forward with reporting [she] would otherwise conduct

over the coming weeks and months.” Id. ¶ 14.

Ms. Phang seeks the information that she claims has been

illegally withheld “because, as a journalist covering the

Epstein story, [she owes her] audience, the public, and the

victims of Epstein, Maxwell, and others the most accurate and

comprehensive reporting possible.” Id. ¶¶ 32, 33. “[The Attorney

General’s] illegal conduct has injured and continues to injure

[her] by preventing [her] from conducting the comprehensive

reporting [she] would otherwise conduct” about the specific

information she seeks to obtain through her motion. Id. ¶ 34.

Additionally, she states that “[the Attorney General’s] illegal

conduct has [] caused and continues to cause [her] to suffer

direct financial losses,” by “constraining [her] ability to

report” on the Epstein files. Id. ¶¶ 35, 42.

13 B. Procedural Background

Ms. Phang filed the Complaint on April 27, 2026, alleging

four claims: (1) Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act -

Contrary to Law and in Excess of Statutory Authority; (2)

Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act - Arbitrary,

Capricious, and an Abuse of Agency Discretion; (3) Ultra Vires

Agency Action; 3 and (4) Declaratory Judgment Act. See Compl., ECF

No. 1 at 12-14. She asks the Court to provide the following

relief: (1) declare that the Attorney General has failed to

comply with the Act; (2) enjoin the Attorney General’s ongoing

violations of the Epstein Act and require him to: (a) remove all

unlawful redactions, (b) explain the bases for any remaining

lawful redactions, (c) re-produce all materials that were

produced but unlawfully redacted, and (d) produce all materials

that have not been produced but should be; (3) appoint a special

master to oversee the Attorney General’s compliance with the

law; (4) award attorneys’ fees and costs; and (5) grant any

other relief the Court deems just and proper. Id. at 14–15.

On May 28, 2026, Ms. Phang filed a motion for preliminary

injunction, seeking relief for a specific list of violations of

3 The Court does not address Ms. Phang’s likelihood of success on her ultra vires claim in this Memorandum Opinion because she does not invoke ultra vires in the pending motion.

14 the Epstein Act and requesting that the Court enter an order

requiring the Attorney General to:

(1) show cause why the redactions of sender and recipient names in the emails bearing Bates numbers EFTA00749245, EFTA01187999, EFTA01930501, ETFA01928255, EFTA00628112, EFTA02648868, EFTA02504630, and EFTA01022356 should not be removed;

(2) show cause why the redactions of potential co-conspirator names in the DOJ documents bearing Bates numbers EFTA01703108 and EFTA00038227 should not be removed;

(3) show cause why the underlying FBI interview notes that formed the basis for the FD-302 interview reports bearing Bates numbers EFTA01245620, EFTA02858481, EFTA02858491, and EFTA02858495 should not be produced (with appropriate redactions to protect victims’ information);

(4) immediately initiate review and production of foreign-language materials that may be subject to production under the Epstein Files Transparency Act; and

(5) immediately publish in the Federal Register the redaction log required under Epstein Files Transparency Act § 2(C)(2), and update it concurrently with each future release of redacted materials.

Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 35-36. The Attorney General filed his

opposition to the motion on June 5, 2026, see Opp’n, ECF No. 12;

and Ms. Phang filed her reply on June 8, 2026. See Reply, ECF

No. 13. The motion is ripe and ready for the Court’s

adjudication.

15 II. Standard of Review

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never

awarded as of right,” and only “upon a clear showing that the

plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.

Council Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 24 (2008). The moving party “must

establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is

likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary

relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that

an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20. “[T]he

first and most important factor” is likelihood of success on the

merits. Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

Where the federal government is the opposing party, the balance

of equities and public interest factors merge. See Nken v.

Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).

In this Circuit, the four factors have typically been

evaluated on a “sliding scale,” such that if “the movant makes

an unusually strong showing on one of the factors, then it does

not necessarily have to make as strong a showing on another

factor.” Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288,

1291–92 (D.C. Cir. 2009). In the wake of the Supreme Court’s

decision in Winter, 555 U.S. at 7; “the D.C. Circuit has

suggested that a positive showing on all four preliminary

injunction factors may be required.” Holmes v. FEC, 71 F. Supp.

3d 178, 183 n.4 (D.D.C. 2014); see also Sherley v. Sebelius, 644

16 F.3d 388, 393 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e read Winter at least to

suggest if not to hold that a likelihood of success is an

independent, freestanding requirement for a preliminary

injunction.” (quotation marks omitted)). Nonetheless, “the

Circuit has had no occasion to decide this question because it

has not yet encountered a post-Winter case where a preliminary

injunction motion survived the less rigorous sliding-scale

analysis.” ConverDyn v. Moniz, 68 F. Supp. 3d 34, 46 n.2 (D.D.C.

2014); see also Changji Esquel Textile Co. v. Raimondo, 40 F.4th

716, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“In the past, we have . . . reserved

the question whether the sliding-scale approach remains valid.

We follow the same approach here because, even under the

sliding-scale approach, the movant must raise at least a serious

legal question on the merits.” (internal quotations and

citations omitted)); cf. Hanson v. District of Columbia, 120

F.4th 223, 243 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (citations omitted).

For the reasons explained below, all factors weigh in Ms.

Phang’s favor.

III. Analysis

A. The Court Likely Has Jurisdiction Over Ms. Phang’s Claims

The Attorney General argues that the Court lacks

jurisdiction over Ms. Phang’s claims because: (1) the Epstein

Act does not provide for a private right of action; (2) Ms.

17 Phang lacks Article III standing; and (3) the Administrative

Procedure Act’s (“APA”) 4 waiver of sovereign immunity does not

apply here because Ms. Phang has an adequate remedy under the

Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) 5. Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 15.

For the reasons explained below, each of the Attorney General’s

arguments is without merit.

1. The APA Provides Ms. Phang With a Right of Action

The Attorney General argues that “[b]y its own terms,

nowhere does [the Epstein Act] expressly authorize private

individuals to sue for alleged violations, nor does the

statutory scheme indicate that Congress intended to create an

implied right of action,” and therefore “any claim premised on

an alleged violation of the Epstein Act fails as a matter of

law.” Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 16–17.

However, Ms. Phang sues under the APA, not under the

Epstein Act. “The APA, by its terms, provides a right to

judicial review of all final agency action for which there is no

other adequate remedy in a court, § 704, and applies universally

except to the extent that—(1) statutes preclude judicial review;

or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law, §

701(a).” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 175 (1997) (citation

4 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). 5 5 U.S.C. § 552. 18 modified). The Attorney General has conceded that the production

of documents was final agency action. Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 23.

Ms. Phang alleges that the Attorney General’s violations of

the Act are “not in accordance with law” pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §

706(2)(A) because they are contrary to the requirements of the

Epstein Act. Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 48-51. Ms. Phang also alleges

that the Attorney General’s violations of the Act are arbitrary

and capricious under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) because the Attorney

General’s production of materials “lacks a lawful basis and

because [the Attorney General] has not articulated an adequate,

reasoned, or lawful basis for redacting documents in whole or in

part, retracting documents, and failing to produce others.” Id.

¶¶ 52-55. For all these reasons, the Court rejects the Attorney

General’s argument that Ms. Phang’s claims fail because the

Epstein Act does not provide a private right of action. Ms.

Phang has a right of action under the APA.

2. Ms. Phang Likely Has Article III Standing

a. Legal Standard

“Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of

federal courts to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Susan B. Anthony

List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157 (2014) (quoting U.S. CONST.

art. III, § 2). “‘One element of the case-or-controversy

requirement’ is that plaintiffs ‘must establish that they have

standing to sue.’” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398,

19 408 (2013) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997));

see Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1990)

(calling standing “the irreducible constitutional minimum”); see

also Jibril v. Mayorkas, No. 19-cv-2457, 2023 WL 2240271, at *4

(D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2023) (“One way a court might lack subject-

matter jurisdiction is if a plaintiff lacks Article III

standing.” (citing Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C.

Cir. 1987))).

To establish standing, “a plaintiff must show (1) an

‘injury in fact,’ (2) a sufficient ‘causal connection between

the injury and the conduct complained of,’ and (3) a

‘likel[ihood]’ that the injury ‘will be redressed by a favorable

decision.’” Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 157-58

(alteration in original) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61).

“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of

establishing these elements.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (citing

FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)).

“Since they are not mere pleading requirements but rather an

indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case, each element must be

supported in the same way as any other matter on which the

plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and

degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the

litigation.” Id.

20 Courts have recognized that plaintiffs can establish

standing based on an informational injury. See Am. Soc’y for the

Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Ent., Inc., 659 F.3d

13, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2011). And an “actual economic loss” is “a

classic form of concrete and particularized harm” that suffices

by itself to ground Article III standing. Humane Soc’y of the

U.S. v. Vilsack, 797 F.3d 4, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

b. Analysis

Ms. Phang argues that she has two redressable injuries:

first, she has suffered cognizable informational injuries, see

Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 18–21; and second, she has suffered

cognizable economic injuries. Id. at 21. The Attorney General

responds that Ms. Phang is not suffering a cognizable

informational injury, and that her economic injury is not

redressable. See Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 18–19. For the reasons

explained below, the Court concludes that Ms. Phang likely

suffers from informational injuries and her economic injury

Likely is redressable.

i. Ms. Phang Likely Has Suffered a Cognizable Informational Injury

It is well-settled that “a denial of access to information

qualifies as an injury in fact where a statute (on the

claimants’ reading) requires that the information be publicly

disclosed and there is no reason to doubt their claim that the

21 information would help them.” Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 31

F.4th 781, 783 (D.C. Cir. 2022). To demonstrate that they have

an actionable informational injury, a plaintiff must show that:

“(1) it has been deprived of information that, on its

interpretation, a statute requires the government or a third

party to disclose to it, and (2) it suffers, by being denied

access to that information, the type of harm Congress sought to

prevent by requiring disclosure.” Friends of Animals v. Jewell,

828 F.3d 989, 992 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing FEC v. Akins, 524

U.S. 11, 21-22 (1998)).

“[T]he fact that a number of people could be similarly

injured does not render the claim an impermissible generalized

grievance[.]” Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety

Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2007). And “[t]he fact

that other citizens or groups of citizens” are also deprived of

the information a plaintiff seeks “does not lessen [a

plaintiff’s] asserted injury, any more than the fact that

numerous citizens might request the same information under the

[FOIA] entails that those who have been denied access do not

possess a sufficient basis to sue.” Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t

of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1989). Even if the statute

“entitles the public generally to the disclosure of” the

information, “that does not mean that the informational injury .

. . is not particular to Plaintiff.” Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v.

22 Presidential Advisory Comm’n on Election Integrity, 266 F. Supp.

3d 297, 311 (D.D.C. 2017).

Ms. Phang argues that she satisfies the first part of the

test because she “reads the statute to require a host of

disclosures that have not occurred” and because disclosure is

owed to the “public at large.” Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 19 (quoting

Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget,

791 F. Supp. 3d 29, 46 (D.D.C. 2025)). The Attorney General

disagrees, arguing that: (1) Ms. Phang does not “allege any harm

or individualized interests separate from ‘the interests of the

public at large,’” Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 17 (quoting Hein v.

Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 600 (2007));

(2) she does not have a “personal ‘statutory right to seek the

information’ at issue,” id. at 18 (quoting Ctr. for Biological

Diversity v. U.S. Int’l Dev. Fin. Corp., 77 F.4th 679, 686 (D.C.

Cir. 2023)); and (3) because the statute is directed at the

government, she has no legally protected interest to assert. Id.

(citing Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 77. F.4th at 686).

The Attorney General’s arguments are unpersuasive. As to

his first argument, his reliance on Hein is inapposite since it

is not an informational injury case.

As to his second and third arguments, Center for Biological

Diversity supports Ms. Phang’s argument rather than his. There,

plaintiffs sued the U.S. International Development Finance

23 Corporation (“DFC”) under the APA and the Sunshine Act, a

statute directed at the government, after the DFC published a

rule exempting itself from the Sunshine Act. “Congress enacted

the Sunshine Act to open the deliberations of multi-member

federal agencies to public view.” Common Cause v. Nuclear Reg.

Comm'n, 674 F.2d 921, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1982). It requires, among

other things, a public announcement of meetings and logistical

information about them, and the right to a transcript,

recording, or minutes of any closed portion of a meeting. Cnt.

for Biological Diversity, 77 F.4th at 686. The court held that

Center for Biological Diversity (“CBD”) had informational

standing with regard to the first part of the test, because

“[o]n its interpretation of the Sunshine Act, CBD claims that it

was denied notice about certain meetings, preventing it from

attending and engaging with DFC.” Id. The court explained that

“[g]iven Congress’s clear command for any agency subject to the

Sunshine Act to provide robust public information, there can be

no doubt that these provisions create a right to information

sufficient for [the plaintiff’s] injury.” Id. As this Court has

explained, “[e]ven if the statute ‘entitles the public generally

to the disclosure of’ the information [from the government],

‘that does not mean that the informational injury ... is not

particular to Plaintiff.’” Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash.,

791 F. Supp. 3d at 46 (citing Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr., 266 F.

24 Supp. 3d at 311). The Epstein Act requires “robust” disclosure

of information by the government to the public.

The Court concludes that Ms. Phang satisfies the first part

of the test: on her interpretation of the Epstein Act, it

requires the information to be disclosed to her as part of the

public at large, and the Attorney General’s alleged failure to

comply with the law deprives her of this information. See e.g.,

Akins, 524 U.S. at 20–25 (emphasizing that an “inability to

obtain information” that Congress required to make public

constitutes an injury in fact for Article III).

Ms. Phang argues that she satisfies the second part of the

test because she is suffering the type of harm that Congress

sought to prevent in enacting the Act. Ms. Phang argues first

that “Congress enacted the Act to provide ‘complete truth’ for

survivors;” Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 19 (quoting 171 Cong. Rec.

H4726 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2025) (statement of Rep. Raskin)); and

to “achieve ‘maximum possible level of transparency when it

comes to the heinous crimes of Jeffrey Epstein.’” Id. (quoting

171 Cong. Rec. H4727 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2025) (statement of

Rep. Kiley)); see also id. at 19 n.7 (listing more statements

from congressional representatives noting the purpose of the Act

is transparency for the American public). Ms. Phang then argues

that to realize these goals, journalists “through their

25 reporting are able to mediate the contents of the Epstein Files

for the general public.” Id. at 20.

The Attorney General disagrees, arguing that Ms. Phang

cannot demonstrate “downstream harm—some concrete consequences

of not receiving the information,” but that “[a]t best, [Ms.

Phang] asserts generalized grievances of seeking ‘complete

truth’ and ‘transparency.’” Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 18–19.

The Attorney General’s arguments are unpersuasive. First,

Ms. Phang has identified “some concrete consequences of not

receiving the information.” Id. at 18. She has identified “half

a dozen stories she is currently unable to report” because the

Attorney General has not disclosed the information. See Reply,

ECF No. 13 at 8-9 (citing Phang Decl., ECF No. 9-2 ¶¶ 14–31).

She has identified harms to victims and the public who are being

denied the benefit of her reporting. Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 20.

She also cited authority that supports her assertion that

journalists, and herself in particular, have suffered the type

of harm that the Epstein Act was meant to prevent. See Mot., ECF

No. 9-1 at 20–21 (citing Seife v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human

Servs., 440 F. Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) and Pub. Citizen v.

Carlin, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1997), rev’d on other grounds,

184 F.3d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). The Attorney General does not

address this authority. See generally Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 18.

Second, “the fact that a number of people could be similarly

26 injured does not render the claim an impermissible generalized

grievance: ‘where a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the

Court has found injury in fact.’” Pub. Citizen, Inc., 489 F.3d

at 1292 (quoting Akins, 524 U.S. at 24).

The Court concludes that Ms. Phang satisfies the second

part of the test: she is suffering the type of harm—lack of

transparency—that Congress sought to prevent by requiring

disclosure of the information and the disclosure of the

information that Ms. Phang seeks would help her in her work. See

e.g., Jewell, 828 F.3d at 992 (“[T]he existence and scope of an

injury for informational standing purposes is defined by

Congress: a plaintiff seeking to demonstrate that it has

informational standing, generally ‘need not allege any

additional harm beyond the one Congress identified.’” (quoting

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, 578 U.S. 330, 342 (2016))).

For all these reasons, Ms. Phang has established that she

likely is suffering from an informational injury.

ii. Ms. Phang’s Economic Injuries Are Likely Redressable

Ms. Phang also argues that she has suffered an economic

injury based on the Attorney General’s failure to disclose

materials in violation of the Epstein Act, which has caused her

“actual economic loss” because she has been unable to publish

additional videos about the Epstein files and consequently has

27 lost revenue. Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 21. An “actual economic loss”

is “a classic form of concrete and particularized harm” that

suffices by itself to ground Article III standing. Humane Soc’y

of the U.S., 797 F.3d at 9. The Attorney General responds that

any alleged economic “injury cannot establish standing because

it is not redressable” since “monetary relief is not available

under the APA.” Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 19 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702).

The Attorney General’s argument is without merit. “A

‘plaintiff satisfies the redressability requirement’ by showing

‘that a favorable decision will relieve a discrete injury’ to

the plaintiff,” and “[t]he plaintiff ‘need not show that a

favorable decision will relieve’ his or her ‘every injury.’”

Energy Future Coal. v. E.P.A., 793 F.3d 141, 145–46 (D.C. Cir.

2015) (quoting Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 525

(2007)) (emphasis in original). Rather, the plaintiff needs to

show that her injury would be redressed by removing a “hurdle.”

Id. at 144.

Ms. Phang is not seeking monetary damages. See generally

Compl., ECF No. 1. Rather, she is requesting that the “hurdle”—

the violations of the Act—be removed so she can continue to

publish her work and so she does not experience further economic

loss caused by the hurdle. Accordingly, her economy injury is

redressable by the relief she requests.

28 iii. Ms. Phang Likely Has Established the Requisite Causal Connection, and Her Informational Injury Likely Is Redressable

The Attorney General does not contest causal connection,

which is easily met here. See generally Opp’n, ECF No. 12. Ms.

Phang’s injuries are directly traceable to her claims that the

Attorney General has violated the Epstein Act. The Attorney

General also does not dispute that Ms. Phang’s informational

injuries are redressable by the relief she is seeking. See

generally id. A favorable ruling by the Court would resolve her

informational injuries, as she would be able to obtain and

report on the information she is seeking.

For all the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes

that Ms. Phang has established Article III standing.

3. FOIA Does Not Provide an Adequate Remedy

The Attorney General argues that Ms. Phang invoked the

APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity when she brought this action

under the APA, but because FOIA provides Ms. Phang with another

adequate remedy, there was no waiver of sovereign immunity and

so the Court lacks jurisdiction over her claims. See Opp’n, ECF

No. 12 at 19–21.

For a remedy to constitute an adequate remedy precluding

APA review, the remedy must not be “doubtful.” El Rio Santa Cruz

Neighborhood Health Ctr., Inc. v. DHS, 396 F.3d 1265, 1270 (D.C.

Cir. 2005). The disclosure mandate in the Epstein Act is

29 “strikingly broad.” United States v. Maxwell, 811 F. Supp. 3d

667, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 2025). The Court concludes that FOIA, a

fundamentally different disclosure law, does not provide Ms.

Phang with an adequate remedy for the reasons explained below.

First, Ms. Phang likely would not be able to obtain the

unredacted names of senders and recipients in email exchanges

with Mr. Epstein because such information would likely be

redacted under FOIA Exemption 6—information that, if disclosed,

would invade another individual’s personal privacy; and FOIA

Exemption 7—information compiled for law enforcement purposes.

See Clemente v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. 1:20-cv-1527,

2022 WL 17092585, at *3–9 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2022) (holding that

the FBI properly asserted Exemptions 1, 3, 5, 6, 7(A), 7(C),

7(D), and 7(E) for records withheld in response to a broad FOIA

request for records related to Mr. Epstein and his alleged

criminal activities). Second, she would not be able to obtain

unredacted DOJ internal charging documents or the notes of the

interview with the person who accused Mr. Trump of assault

because they would likely be subject to the same exemptions, as

well as potentially being exempted as grand jury records under 5

U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e).

See id. Third, she likely would not be able to compel the review

of foreign-language documents because such a request likely

would be denied as “unduly burdensome.” FOIA “protects agencies

30 from undue burdens.” Inst. for Just. v. IRS, 941 F.3d 567, 570

(D.C. Cir. 2019). The Attorney General stated that foreign

language materials were not reviewed or produced because it was

“not practicable for a first-level reviewer to determine the

responsiveness of a foreign-language document,” January 30, 2026

Letter at 5; and provided no indication that there was any plan

to review and produce them. Id. And fourth, she would not be

able to obtain the redaction log because FOIA does not require

agencies “to create new records” that do not yet exist. Nat’l

Sec. Couns. v. CIA, 969 F.3d 406, 409 (D.C. Cir. 2020).

The Department’s own post-Epstein Act responses to FOIA

requests for the Mr. Epstein and Ms. Maxwell files refute the

Attorney General’s argument that FOIA provides an adequate

remedy. In responses to two FOIA requests for the files, the

Department stated that “the [Epstein Act] directed a much

broader and less redacted release of the files than would have

been made under the FOIA. Certain exemptions which may have been

made under FOIA were not made in the [Epstein Act] release.”

Letter from Andrew D. Fiorillo, Chief, Initial Request Staff,

U.S. Dep’t of Just. Off. of Info. Pol’y, to Joseph Elfelt at 2

(Apr. 23, 2026), Exhibit H to Ballou Decl., ECF No. 14-1; Letter

from Andrew D. Fiorillo, Chief, Initial Request Staff, U.S.

31 Dep’t of Just. Off. of Info. Pol’y, to Joseph Elfelt at 2 (May

8, 2026), Exhibit I to Ballou Decl., ECF No. 14-1. 6

The Attorney General relies on a string cite to assert that

FOIA provides an adequate remedy here. Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 20-

21. But the Attorney General does not even attempt to explain

why the cases cited are analogous to this case, where the

Epstein Act mandates broad disclosures that would be exempted

under FOIA and requires the publication of a redaction log that

the Attorney General has not yet published.

The Attorney General argues that the Epstein Act and FOIA

“must be construed as a whole and, indeed, they operate in

harmony.” Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 22. But he provides no authority

for these propositions. He contends that the Epstein Act

“supplements FOIA by imposing additional disclosure obligations

with respect to a specific set of records; it does not supplant

FOIA or create a parallel enforcement framework.” Id. He

provides no authority for these propositions either. The Epstein

Act is a standalone piece of legislation. It does not reference

6 Ms. Phang filed a Notice of Supplemental Materials (“Notice”) containing the Ballou Declaration and the letters responding to the FOIA requests at 6:45 pm on June 24, 2026. See Notice of Suppl. Materials, ECF No. 14. The next morning, the Court posted a Minute Order directing the government to file a response to the Notice by no later than 1:00 pm the same day— June 25, 2026. The Attorney General neither filed a response nor requested additional time to respond as of the posting of this Memorandum Opinion. 32 FOIA or modify the FOIA provisions of the United States Code.

When enacting the Epstein Act, Congress was well aware of FOIA

and its requirements, “thereby indicating that [it] did not view

the alternatives [to the same information] as adequate.”

Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. 791 F. Supp. 3d at 51

(discussing that FOIA requests were not an adequate source for

the information sought by the plaintiff, as the plaintiff sought

to enforce the disclosure statute at issue through the APA).

The Attorney General asserts that since Ms. Phang “alleges

that the Department’s public disclosures violated the law by

failing to produce required records, improperly withholding

information, and neglecting to provide adequate justification

for any redactions applied,” which is similar to what a

plaintiff would contest under FOIA, “FOIA’s remedial scheme is

not merely adequate, but is substantively identical to the

relief Plaintiff seeks.” Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 22. The Attorney

General cites Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in

Washington (“CREW”) v. Dep’t of Just. to support this argument.

846 F.3d 1235, 1245–46 (D.C. Cir. 2017). CREW sued under section

704 of the APA to compel the Department of Justice’s Office of

Legal Counsel to disclose its opinions under the “reading-room”

provision of the FOIA. Id. at 1238. That provision “requires

agencies to ‘make [certain records] available for public

inspection in an electronic format[,]’ including ‘statements of

33 policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the agency

and are not published in the Federal Register.’” Id. at 1240

(quoting 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(2), (a)(2)(B)). FOIA provides for

judicial review of an agency’s decision to withhold records

under this provision. Id. The court held that that FOIA offered

an adequate remedy to CREW because “a plaintiff in CREW's

position may bring a FOIA claim to enforce the reading-room

provision” and therefore, CREW’s APA claim was barred. Id. at

1246. The Attorney General’s reliance on this case is misplaced

since, as explained above, it is doubtful that Ms. Phang could

obtain the information she seeks here with a FOIA claim. And

FOIA’s remedial scheme is clearly not “substantively identical”

to the relief sought here for the reasons explained above.

The Attorney General also points to the Department’s “Cross

Walk” that correlates the exemptions under the Epstein Act to

FOIA exemptions. Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 22 (citing Department of

Justice, Off. Of Info. Pol’y, EFTA-FOIA Crosswalk (2026),

https://www.justice.gov/oip/media/1438931/dl?inline. 7 The

Attorney General argues that “the redactions and withholding

decisions [Ms. Phang] challenges align with FOIA’s exemption

framework.” Id. at 22. What the Cross Walk in fact shows is that

7 The Court may take judicial notice of information posted on official public websites of government agencies. See Cannon, 717 F.3d at 205 n.2. 34 the five very specific permitted grounds for withholding under

the Epstein Act simply correlate to certain broader FOIA

exemptions. There is nothing in the Epstein Act that required

the Attorney General to create the Cross Walk, and the Attorney

General ignores the fact that the Epstein Act requires

disclosures that would be exempt under FOIA, as explained above.

For all these reasons, it is highly “doubtful” that FOIA

would provide an adequate remedy. Therefore, Ms. Phang’s suit

under the APA is proper and is not barred by sovereign immunity.

B. Ms. Phang Is Likely to Prevail on Her Administrative Procedure Act Claims Relevant to the Pending Motion

Ms. Phang argues that she is likely to succeed on the

merits of her APA claims relevant to the instant motion. Mot.,

ECF No. 9-1 at 23-26. Ms. Phang identifies five categories of

violations of the Epstein Act. First, the Attorney General has

violated the Epstein Act by redacting the names of senders and

recipients in at least eight email exchanges with Mr. Epstein

regarding a “torture video” and sexual activity with young

women, including minors. Id. at 23-26. Second, the Attorney

General has violated the Epstein Act by redacting the names of

co-defendants in a draft indictment, the names of individuals

identified as “co-conspirators,” and the sender and recipients

in a Department briefing email. Id. at 26. Third, the Attorney

General has violated the Epstein Act by withholding certain

35 materials mentioning President Trump, specifically, “notes from

FBI interviews with a victim who has alleged that in the 1980s,

when she was about 13 years old, Epstein introduced her to

Trump, who in turn assaulted her.” Id. at 27. Fourth, the

Attorney General has violated the Epstein Act by not reviewing

or producing any foreign language materials. Id. at 28-30.

Fifth, the Attorney General has violated the Epstein Act by

failing to publish any redaction logs. Id. at 30-31.

The Attorney General does not respond substantively to any

of these arguments. Rather, he states that based on his

jurisdictional arguments, “[Ms. Phang’s] APA claims fail as a

matter of law.” Id. at 14. By not responding substantively, the

Attorney General has conceded Ms. Phang’s merits arguments in

the pending motion. Texas v. United States, 798 F.3d 1108, 1110

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (stating that D.D.C. Local Rule 7(b) is

“understood to mean that if a party files an opposition to a

motion and therein addresses only some of the movant's

arguments, the court may treat the unaddressed arguments as

conceded”). Accordingly, Ms. Phang is likely to succeed on the

merits of her APA claims relevant to the pending motion.

C. Ms. Phang Likely Has Established That She Faces Irreparable Harm

“[T]he basis of injunctive relief in the federal courts has

always been irreparable harm;” thus “[a] movant's failure to

36 show any irreparable harm is . . . grounds for refusing to issue

a preliminary injunction, even if the other three factors

entering the calculus merit such relief.” Chaplaincy of Full

Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

The D.C. Circuit “has set a high standard for irreparable

injury.” Id. “First, the injury must be both certain and great;

it must be actual and not theoretical.” Wis. Gas Co. v. Fed.

Energy Regul. Comm’n, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per

curiam). The movant must show that “[t]he injury complained of

is of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for

equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.” Id. (internal

citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted). “Second, the

injury must be beyond remediation.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel

Churches, 454 F.3d at 297.

Ms. Phang argues that she “is suffering two kinds of

irreparable harm: an informational harm (because Blanche refuses

to produce time-sensitive information she is entitled to) and an

economic harm (because she cannot publish time-sensitive

reporting based on that information).” Reply, ECF No. 13 at 14-

15; Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 18–21, 32–34. The Attorney General

argues that her purported information injury is speculative and

conjectural, Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 26-27; and that her economic

injury alone does not constitute irreparable harm. Id. at 27-28.

37 The Court concludes that Ms. Phang has demonstrated irreparable

injury for the reasons explained below.

1. Ms. Phang’s Informational Injury Is Neither Speculative Nor Conjectural

Ms. Phang argues that the information she seeks is time-

sensitive because Congress has said so by requiring compliance

with the Epstein Act within thirty days of its enactment. Mot.,

ECF No. 9-1 at 31. Ms. Phang argues that the information is

time-sensitive “in fact” because if she is able to report on the

names of the co-conspirators whose names have been redacted,

judicial redress for victims may be possible. Id. at 32. Ms.

Phang argues that the foreign language materials “are likely to

be a fruitful source of information about the identities of

those complicit in Epstein’s crimes.” Id. Ms. Phang argues that

materials related to President Trump are particularly time-

sensitive “because of the ongoing midterm elections” and the

fact that “[m]any candidates have highlighted the Epstein Files

as part of their campaigns.” Id. Finally, Ms. Phang argues that

the “redaction log is time-sensitive as a structural matter”

because without it, there is “no systematic way to evaluate the

productions that have occurred to date.” Id. at 34.

The Attorney General argues that Ms. Phang has not provided

adequate evidence “that any records are presently at risk of

destruction, that any relevant evidence is likely to be lost

38 during the pendency of this litigation, or that any witness

possesses information that is in imminent danger of becoming

unavailable.” Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 26. 8 This argument is beside

the point. Ms. Phang does not argue that she faces irreparable

harm because the records are at risk of destruction, that

evidence will be lost during the litigation, or that a witness

unavailable; rather she points out that these are concerns with

any potential judicial redress for victims. The Attorney General

also argues that the fact that many of the “records at issue

concern alleged events that occurred decades ago” undermines her

“claim of urgency.” Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 18. However, the

urgency is based on the fact that the Epstein Act required

disclosure within 30 days of enactment; not based on when the

underlying events occurred.

Finally, the Attorney General argues that Ms. Phang’s

argument regarding public interest fading after the upcoming

mid-term elections is speculative. Id. However, “the non-

disclosure of information to which a plaintiff is entitled,

under certain circumstances itself constitutes an irreparable

8 The Attorney General also argues that injury from delay in obtaining these materials is speculative because Ms. Phang only states that delay “may impair” the search for truth. Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 26 (citing Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 32.) The Attorney General has taken this reference out of context and so the Court does not address the argument. 39 harm; specifically, where the information is highly relevant to

an ongoing and highly public matter.” Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr.,

266 F. Supp. 3d at 319. One example of such a circumstance is

when a plaintiff was “precluded, absent a preliminary

injunction, from obtaining in a timely fashion information vital

to the current and ongoing debate surrounding the legality of

the Administration's warrantless surveillance Program.” Elec.

Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Dep't of Just., 416 F. Supp. 2d 30, 41

(D.D.C. 2006). Another example was “because the urgency with

which the plaintiff makes its FOIA request is predicated on a

matter of current national debate, due to the impending

election, a likelihood for irreparable harm exists if the

plaintiff's FOIA request does not receive expedited treatment.”

Washington Post v.DHS, 459 F. Supp. 2d 61, 75 (D.D.C. 2006).

Here, the current high level of interest in the Epstein Files

combined with the upcoming mid-term elections amounts to a

circumstance that itself constitutes irreparable harm,

especially where the Attorney General has not disputed that he

is in violation of the Epstein Act.

2. Ms. Phang’s Economic Injury Likely Is Irreparable

sensitive to her business interests because she “derives income

from each video and story she publishes,” and to maximize her

40 revenue, her reporting needs to be “about topics that are timely

and newsworthy.” Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 34. She notes that public

interest in the Epstein files is “extraordinarily high” now but

will diminish over time. Id.

As an initial matter, the Attorney General’s contention

that “economic loss does not, in and of itself, constitute

irreparable harm” misunderstands the applicable law. Opp’n, ECF

No. 13 at 16 (quoting Wis. Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674). Rather,

where, as here, Ms. Phang cannot receive damages under the APA,

economic harm can be considered irreparable. See, e.g., Chef

Time 1520 LLC v. Small Bus. Admin., 646 F. Supp. 3d 101, 115–16

(D.D.C. 2022) (“[B]ecause [plaintiff] will not be able to seek

damages under the APA for any possibly unlawful agency action

once the fund has fully expired the Court concludes that

[plaintiff] is likely to suffer irreparable economic harm absent

a temporary restraining order.” (internal citations omitted));

Nat’l Mining Ass'n v. Jackson, 768 F. Supp. 2d 34, 52 (D.D.C.

2011) (“[I]f a movant seeking a preliminary injunction will be

unable to sue to recover any monetary damages against a

government agency in the future because of, among other things,

sovereign immunity, financial loss can constitute irreparable

injury.” (internal quotations omitted)); E. Bay Sanctuary

Covenant v. Biden, 993 F.3d 640, 677 (9th Cir. 2021) (although

“economic harm is not generally considered irreparable . . .

41 where parties cannot typically recover monetary damages flowing

from their injury—as is often the case in APA cases—economic

harm can be considered irreparable”).

The Attorney General argues that Ms. Phang has acknowledged

that she “has continued to publish on her YouTube channel and

has not been prevented from covering the Epstein matter

generally.” Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 28. He also argues that the

fact that “Plaintiff released an episode just two months ago

that recorded over 315,000 views to date, and another three

months ago that recorded over 841,000 views to date” has shown

that the absence of these records “has not silenced her.” Id.

However, that Ms. Phang has continued to work does not mean that

the economic harm is irreparable for the reasons explained above

and because she would do additional reporting based on the

information she seeks.

3. Ms. Phang Did Not Delay Seeking Preliminary Injunctive Relief

“[A] party requesting a preliminary injunction must

generally show reasonable diligence.” Benisek v. Lamone, 585

U.S. 155, 159 (2018). While “a late filing, on its own, is [not]

a permissible basis for denying a preliminary injunction,”

“untimely filings may support a conclusion that the plaintiff

cannot satisfy the irreparable harm prong.” Gordon v. Holder,

632 F.3d 722, 724-25 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

42 The Attorney General argues that Ms. Phang’s “delay in

seeking injunctive relief further undermines any claim of

irreparable harm.” Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 28. He argues that she

had the information that forms the basis of her claims in early

February 2026 but did not file suit until April 27, 2026, and

then did not file her motion for preliminary injunction until

May 28, 2026. Id. at 29. Ms. Phang responds that there was no

delay because the scope of the production meant that it “took

weeks” to discover the gaps in the productions and that not

having the redaction log complicated that task. Reply, ECF No.

13 at 17.

On January 30, 2026, the Department announced that as of

that date, it had published approximately 3.5 million pages in

response to the Epstein Act. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Department

of Justice Publishes 3.5 Million Responsive Pages in Compliance

with the Epstein Files Transparency Act (Jan. 30, 2026),

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-publishes-35-

million-responsive-pages-compliance-epstein-files. 9 Ms. Phang

states that she “promptly filed this lawsuit after discovering

and confirming the scope of [the Attorney General’s]

noncompliance, but she delayed motion practice in the hope that

9 The Court may take judicial notice of information posted on official public websites of government agencies. See Cannon, 717 F.3d at 205 n.2. 43 DOJ would quickly cure its most blatant errors (or at least

negotiate over them). But a month into the case, the government

had not . . . entered a notice of appearance” and so she filed

the motion. Reply, ECF No. 13 at 17. Ms. Phang filed suit

approximately four months after the Attorney General completed

the disclosure of 3.5 million pages of documents, and she filed

the pending motion approximately one month later. In view of the

volume of documents and the failure of the Attorney General to

publish the redaction log, Ms. Phang’s conduct does not

constitute delay.

D. The Balance of the Equities and the Public Interest Favor an Injunction

“A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show that

‘the balance of equities favors preliminary relief’ and that ‘an

injunction is in the public interest.’” Hanson, 120 F.4th at 246

(quoting Singh v. Berger, 56 F.4th 88, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2022)). The

Court “must carefully balance the equities by weighing the harm

to the moving party and the public if there is no injunction

against the harm to the government and the public if there is.”

Id. The balance of the equities and the public interest “merge

when the Government is the opposing party.” Nken, 556 U.S. at

435.

Ms. Phang argues that because “[t]here is generally no

public interest in the perpetuation of unlawful agency action,”

44 Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 34 (quoting League of Women Voters of U.S.

v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016)); granting the relief

she seeks is in the public interest. Id. She also argues that

granting relief is in the public interest because it is the

first step towards the “reckoning for America” that the Epstein

Act was meant to bring about. See Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 35. The

Attorney General agrees that “there is public interest in

transparency and the disclosure of the information concerning

[Mr.] Epstein” but argues that the public interest is “not

served by compelling the Department to redirect personnel and

resources away from competing public interest and safety

priorities to address [Ms. Phang’s] preference for expedited

treatment.” Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 29.

However, “there is no competing harm to the government with

the issuance of preliminary relief that orders compliance with .

. . statutes and the Constitution, while ‘[t]here is a

substantial public interest in having governmental agencies

abide by the federal laws that govern their existence and

operations.’” Widakuswara v. Lake, 779 F. Supp. 3d 10, 40

(D.D.C. 2025) (citing Newby, 838 F.3d at 12 (internal citation

omitted)). The Epstein Act requires the Attorney General to

publicly disclose the documents that are covered by it;

complying with the law does not harm the Attorney General.

Moreover, Ms. Phang is not seeking “expedited treatment.” Opp’n,

45 ECF No. 12 at 29. The Act required the production of the covered

documents and the redaction log by December 19, 2025. The

Attorney General conceded that he is in violation of the Act.

See generally id. And Ms. Phang is not seeking full relief on

the merits in the pending motion. For all these reasons, the

Court concludes that the balance of the equities weighs in favor

of entering a preliminary injunction.

E. The Court Imposes a Nominal Bond on Ms. Phang

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “the

court may issue a preliminary injunction . . . only if the

movant gives security in an amount that the court considers

proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found

to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

65(c). Courts in this district have found this rule “vest[s]

broad discretion in the district court to determine the

appropriate amount of an injunction bond.” DSE, Inc. v. United

States, 169 F.3d 21, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1999). “[F]ederal courts

typically require substantial bonds only in suits between

private parties with significant monetary interests at stake.”

League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Exec. Off. of the

President, 780 F. Supp. 3d 135, 224 (D.D.C. 2025). “A bond ‘is

not necessary where requiring [one] would have the effect of

denying the plaintiffs their right to judicial review of

administrative action.’” Nat’l Council of Nonprofits v. Off. of

46 Mgmt. & Budget, No. 25-239, 2025 WL 597959, at *19 (D.D.C. Feb.

25, 2025) (quoting Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 337

F. Supp. 167, 168 (D.D.C. 1971)).

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

(“D.C. Circuit”) recently clarified that injunction bonds are

“generally required” under Rule 65(c). Nat’l Treasury Emps.

Union v. Trump, No. 25-5157, 2025 WL 1441563, at *3 n.4 (D.C.

Cir. May 16, 2025) (per curiam). To ensure that the imposition

of a bond does not “unduly burden [p]laintiffs, impair [the]

ability to seek judicial relief, and chill access to justice,”

courts in this district “routinely require only nominal bonds

from parties obtaining preliminary relief against the Government

when the awarded relief will not impose an undue monetary burden

on the enjoined parties.” Se. Fisheries Ass’n v. Lutnick, Civil

Action No. 26-1533, 2026 WL 1430499, at *13 (D.D.C. May 21,

2026).

The Court agrees that anything more than a nominal bond

would prejudice Ms. Phang and potentially create a chilling

effect on other public-law plaintiffs. See Reply, ECF No. 13 at

20. Furthermore, the Attorney General has not shown that if the

Court grants preliminary relief the Department will incur any

significant costs or damages. Therefore, the Court joins other

judges in this district and imposes a nominal $1.00 bond. See,

47 e.g., Beatty v. Trump, No. 25-cv-4480, 2026 WL 1505646, at *44

(D.D.C. May 29, 2026).

F. The Court Will Not Issue a Stay

The Attorney General requests a stay of seven days to

determine whether to seek emergency appellate review. Opp’n, ECF

No. 12 at 30. The Attorney General also requests a stay of sixty

days to determine whether further appellate review is warranted.

Id. The Court will not issue a stay for the reasons stated in

this Memorandum Opinion. The Attorney General has conceded that

he is in violation of the Act. Ms. Phang is not requesting the

immediate production of documents, but rather that the Attorney

General show cause if he declines to do so. As to the requests

to review of foreign language documents and publish the

redaction log, the Act required the Attorney General to produce

the documents and publish the log by December 19, 2025—more than

six months ago.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Ms. Phang’s

Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 9-1. An appropriate

Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Judge June 25, 2025