Phan v. ANDRE & BLAUSTEIN, LLP

709 S.E.2d 863, 309 Ga. App. 191, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 1102, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 279
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedMarch 25, 2011
DocketA10A2155
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 709 S.E.2d 863 (Phan v. ANDRE & BLAUSTEIN, LLP) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Phan v. ANDRE & BLAUSTEIN, LLP, 709 S.E.2d 863, 309 Ga. App. 191, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 1102, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 279 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).

Opinion

PHIPPS, Presiding Judge.

Fonzie Phan and his company, International Farmers Market 1, LLR (collectively, hereinafter, Appellants) seek reversal of the judgment entered by the superior court upon its order confirming an arbitration award. While the Appellants have failed to demonstrate merit in their contentions asserting that the superior court erred by *192 refusing to vacate the arbitration award, 1 it does appear that the court erred in giving effect to that award. Accordingly, we vacate the court’s confirmation order and judgment thereupon; the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

The underlying dispute between the Appellants and a law firm, Andre & Blaustein, LLP (hereinafter, A&B) was initially being litigated in superior court. In August 2009, the parties agreed by consent order to resolve by arbitration their dispute, which concerned whether and to what extent the Appellants owed monies to A&B in connection with legal services performed. In the consent order, the parties agreed that a certain individual would serve as arbitrator. The consent order further provided, “The arbitration shall proceed under the rules set by Henning Mediation & Arbitration Service and consistent with the Georgia Arbitration Code.” 2 After an arbitration hearing, the named arbitrator ruled in favor of A&B and against the Appellants.

A&B filed an application with the superior court to confirm the arbitration award. The Appellants filed an application with the superior court to vacate that award, alleging that the arbitrator should have recused himself from the arbitration proceedings because he had not disclosed certain of his prior associations. Specifically, the Appellants alleged that the arbitrator had once, on behalf of a client, sued one of the lawyers of A&B. 3 That lawyer had performed some of the legal services at issue in the arbitrated dispute. In addition, the Appellants alleged that, “in the 1980’s,” the arbitrator had been a partner at the same law firm as another lawyer who had testified by affidavit in the arbitrated dispute. The superior court summarily concluded that the Appellants had demonstrated no basis to vacate the arbitration award and thus denied their application; the superior court granted A&B’s application to confirm the award, entering judgment thereupon.

1. The Appellants contend that the superior court erred in denying their motion to vacate the arbitration award, complaining that the arbitrator did not disclose to them the alleged associations. The Appellants assert that the alleged prior associations amounted to the arbitrator having “potential conflicts in this case” which he was required to disclose. According to the Appellants, “The Henning Rules, which [the arbitrator] agreed to abide by, require[d]” the arbitrator to disclose the “potential conflicts.” Moreover, the Appellants urge that arbitrators be held to the standards set forth in the *193 Code of Judicial Conduct such that an arbitrator be required to “disqualify [himself] in any proceeding in which [his] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 4

The Georgia Arbitration Code sets forth five exclusive grounds for vacating an arbitration award. 5 Specifically, an arbitration award shall be vacated on application of a party if the court finds that the rights of that party were prejudiced by:

(1) Corruption, fraud, or misconduct in procuring the award;
(2) Partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral;
(3) An overstepping by the arbitrators of their authority or such imperfect execution of it that a final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made;
(4) A failure to follow the procedure of this part, unless the party applying to vacate the award continued with the arbitration with notice of this failure and without objection; or
(5) The arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law. 6

The Appellants claim that the record evidenced that the arbitrator was partial and that he failed to follow procedure, overstepped his authority, and engaged in misconduct.

As to the degree of partiality required in order to vitiate the award, it has been held sufficient that the relationship between the arbitrator[ ] and one of the parties is of such a nature as to give clear grounds for suspicion of their proceedings and render it unlikely that they constituted the fair and impartial tribunal to which the other party is entitled. 7

However, the Appellants have cited this court to no competent *194 evidence of the alleged prior associations. 8 Consequently, we cannot conclude that the superior court abused its discretion in rejecting the Appellants’ claim that the arbitrator should have recused for partiality. 9 Furthermore, the Appellants have not placed in the record “The Henning Rules,” upon which they rely. 10 Nor have they cited any authority that the arbitrator fell within the ambit of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Given these circumstances, the Appellants have shown no merit in their contention that the superior court erred in denying their application to vacate the arbitration award. 11

2. The Appellants make two additional arguments concerning the arbitration award against Phan, individually. First, citing OCGA § 9-9-13 (b) (5), the Appellants re-assert their claim that the arbitrator “disregarded and violated Henning’s Rules regarding disclosure of potential conflicts.” Under that Code provision, an arbitration award may be vacated if it can be shown that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the proper law applicable to the case before him. 12 For reasons discussed above, 13 the Appellants have failed to demonstrate that the superior court erred in refusing to vacate the arbitration award on that ground. 14

Second, the Appellants contend that the evidence was insufficient to support the arbitration award against Phan, individually. However, “a reviewing court is prohibited from weighing the evidence submitted before the arbitrator, regardless of whether the court believes there to be sufficient evidence, or even any evidence, to support the award.” 15

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
709 S.E.2d 863, 309 Ga. App. 191, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 1102, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 279, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/phan-v-andre-blaustein-llp-gactapp-2011.