Pfaff v. Terre Haute & Indianapolis Railroad

9 N.E. 93, 108 Ind. 144, 1886 Ind. LEXIS 201
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 5, 1886
DocketNo. 11,258
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 9 N.E. 93 (Pfaff v. Terre Haute & Indianapolis Railroad) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pfaff v. Terre Haute & Indianapolis Railroad, 9 N.E. 93, 108 Ind. 144, 1886 Ind. LEXIS 201 (Ind. 1886).

Opinion

Zollars, J.

Appellee owns, and for a number of years has owned, so'me small tracts of land, and some lots and parts of lots in the city of Indianapolis, aggregating about twelve acres. The purposes for, and the manner in which those lands and lots are and have been used, are stated in.the complaint as follows:

“ Plaintiff shows, that upon the above described portion of block 94, is situated its freight house, through which two tracks run, and on each side of which there are tracks belonging to plaintiffj connected with its main line of track situate on Louisiana street in said city of Indianapolis; that upon said part of out-lot 1.35, plaintiff has constructed a round-house for its locomotives, a small shop for repairing locomotives, a coal shed, a wood shed, and some water-tanks; that the balance of said out-lot 135, together with all the other real estate above described, except a portion of block 94, is occupied by the ’main track, and side tracks of this plaintiff, and is used exclusively for track purposes.”

It is further alleged in the complaint, that in 1880 and 1881, the railroad company made return of its main track, and all of said side tracks upon the said lands and lots, to the State board of equalization, and that that board valued and assessed the same for taxation, consisting of of a mile of main, and eight miles of side tracks, including the lands and lots upon which they were situated, and all the improvements thereon, as “railroad track;” that upon the valuation thus made by' the State board, the respective [146]*146officers of Marion county, and of the city of Indianapolis,, extended all taxes levied by the county and city respectively, and that the taxes so levied had been paid.

It is still further alleged, that notwithstanding the assessment as above stated, and the payment of the taxes, the-county and city, by their local assessors and officers in each of said years, made an assessment of the above described lots and lands, together with the improvements, and levied taxes thereon, claiming that they are not included in the term “ railroad track,” and that, therefore, they may be assessed . and taxed by the county and city authorities as other lands-are assessed.

The railroad company having refused to pay the taxes so-assessed by the local authorities, the lots and lands were sold-by those authorities. This action against the proper city and county officers, and the purchaser at the tax sale, is to enjoin the execution of a deed to the purchasei’, to enjoin any further attempt to collect such taxes, and to quiet its title to the lots and lands.

The question presented by,the record is, are the lots and lands so occupied with tracks, side tracks, and buildings, to be valued and assessed by the State board of equalization as railroad track,” or may they be valued and assessed by the county and city authorities as other lands are assessed?

The answer to this question is dependent upon the construction to be given to our revenue -laws. As there is no material, difference between the revenue acts of 1872 and 1881, so far as they affect the question under examination, we shall make reference only to the act of 1881, and to the sections as numbered in R. S. 1881.

■ It is very plain, that under the revenue acts, the State board of equalization alone has authority to value and assess the railroad property, denominated “ railroad track ” and se rolling stock.” Section 6410.

The important question here is, what is included in the term “ railroad track ? ” Does that term include the lands-[147]*147described in the complaint, being small tracts of land and lots which are occupied by the side tracks, turnouts, roundhouse, a small repair shop, coal and wood sheds, water-tanks and turn-tables, etc. ?

Section 6362 provides, that “ Such right of way, including the superstructures, main track, side or second tracks, and turnouts, turn-tables, telegraph poles, wires, instruments, and other appliances, and the stations and improvements of the railroad company on such right of way (except machinery, stationary engines, and other fixtures, which shall be considered personal property), shall be held to be real estate for the purpose of taxation, and denominated f railroad track/ and shall be so listed and valued, and shall be described in the assessment thereof as a strip of land extending on each side of such railroad track,’and embracing the same, together with all the stations and improvements thereon, commencing at a point where such railroad track crosses a boundary line in entering the county, township, city, or town, tending to the point where such track crosses the boundary line leaving such county, township, city, or town to the point of termination in the same, as the case may be, containing-acres, more or less (inserting name of county, township, city, or town, or boundary line of same, and number of acres and length in feet); and when advertised or sold for taxes, no other description shall be necessary to convey a good title to the purchaser.”

This section provides, that the right of way, with whatever is upon it in the way of improvements, is to be valued and assessed as “ railroad track.”

If a depot building, round-house, machine shop, coal or wood sheds, or water-tank, is upon the right of way, they become a part of the railroad track,” and are to be valued and assessed by the State board of equalization, and can not be valued and assessed by the county or city authorities, as separate and apart from the railroad track.”

The more specific inquiry here is,, do the lots and lands-[148]*148described in the complaint, and occupied as therein described, constitute a part of the right of way ?

The term “ right of way ” is not limited by any statutory definition, nor by any statutory provision, to a strip of land of any particular and definite width at all points on the line of the railroad. As applied to a railroad company, it means a way over which the company has the right to pass in the operation of its trains. Williams v. Western, etc., R. W. Co., 50 Wis. 71, 76.

A railroad can not be operated with anything like success with a single'track. It is necessary to have either a double track, or turnouts and side tracks, in order that trains going in opposite directions may pass. It is just as necessary that there shall be turnouts and side tracks for the making up of trains, the changing of engines, the replenishing of them with water and fuel, and the loading and unloading of freight.

With many of the more important lines, it is often necessary to have many of such turnouts and side tracks, in order that the business may be done with dispatch, in obedience to the demands of commerce and traffic. These side tracks, such as are required at commercial centers, and the larger cities and towns, could not be crowded upon a narrow strip of land, such as may be sufficient between stations. In order that the company may have the requisite amount of such side tracks at such points, it is necessary that it shall have a right of way over a sufficient amount of land upon which to lay and operate them. This right of way the company may acquire by condemnation proceedings, if necessary, R. S. 1881, section 3907.

When such right of way is acquired, by whatever means, the land thus acquired becomes a part of the company’s right of way, and thus a part of the

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Bluebook (online)
9 N.E. 93, 108 Ind. 144, 1886 Ind. LEXIS 201, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pfaff-v-terre-haute-indianapolis-railroad-ind-1886.