Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc.

347 A.2d 140, 1975 Del. Ch. LEXIS 178
CourtCourt of Chancery of Delaware
DecidedJuly 29, 1975
StatusPublished
Cited by30 cases

This text of 347 A.2d 140 (Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Chancery of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140, 1975 Del. Ch. LEXIS 178 (Del. Ct. App. 1975).

Opinion

BROWN, Vice Chancellor.

Plaintiff is the owner of 11,500 shares of the common stock of the defendant Penn-tech Papers, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“Penntech”). Individually and derivatively, he seeks a temporary restraining order to prevent the redemption by the corporation on July 31, 1975 of 19,000 shares of Series A Preferred stock. Ultimately, he seeks a permanent injunction against the present plan to redeem these preferred shares. I deal here with the temporary restraining order application only, without proposing to adjudicate the final merits of the action.

The requisites for granting temporary injunctive relief in corporate litigation, as well as in other matters, was ably reviewed by the Chancellor in Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc., Del.Ch., 316 A. 2d 599 (1974), aff'd., Del.Supr., 316 A.2d 619 (1974). As there pointed out, the *141 power to enjoin challenged conduct prior to a full evidentiary hearing constitutes the strong arm of equity jurisdiction, and should never be utilized unless a clear case of imminent, irreparable injury is presented and the applicant satisfies the Court that he has at least a reasonable probability of ultimate success on final hearing. In addition, it is imperative to a proper exercise of discretion that the court balance the conveniences of the parties and the possible injuries to them that may be affected by either the granting or witholding of in-junctive relief. I will therefore weigh the present arguments and undisputed facts of record against these standards.

As presently constituted, Penntech came into being in 1969. Its principle business is the manufacture of paper at a pulp and paper mill located in Johnsonburg, Pennsylvania. In 1974 it had net sales of $44,-488,000 and net income of $6,513,000. Penntech has 250,000 shares of authorized common stock of which 77,949 were outstanding as of December 31, 1974. It is also authorized to issue 30,000 shares of Series A Preferred stock, of which 26,000 shares were outstanding as of December 31, 1974. The Series A Preferred stock has an annual, noncumulative dividend rate of $5 per share, as and when declared by the Board of Directors. No dividend has ever been paid on this stock. Each holder of the Series A Preferred stock is entitled to 10 votes for each share held and, as a class, the holders of such preferred stock are entitled to elect a majority of the Board of Directors. The Series A Preferred is redeemable at $100 per share, and, pursuant to the corporate charter, may be redeemed selectively and at such times as decided upon by the Board of Directors.

The defendant John Leslie (“Leslie”) is Penntech’s Chief Executive officer and Chairman of its Board of Directors, having replaced the plaintiff in this capacity in 1972. Defendant Allen J. Nadeau (“Na-deau”) is vice-president and also a Director. The other two named individual defendants, Peter M. Leslie and Richard H. Tatlow, IV, comprise the balance of Penn-tech’s four-member Board of Directors.

Defendants John Leslie and Nadeau together own some 7,000 shares of the Series A Preferred stock. However, notice of redemption was sent to all holders of the preferred stock except Leslie and Nadeau and it is without question at this time that there is no intention to redeem the preferred shares of these two defendants. No reason for redemption was stated in the notice, nor is it stated that the Series A Preferred stock held by Leslie and Nadeau is not being redeemed.

The cost to the corporation to redeem all oustanding Series A shares except those owned by Leslie and Nadeau will be approximately $1,900,000. Once redemption is accomplished Leslie and Nad’e’auj’~as-sble remaining owners of the Series A Preferred, will have the exclusive right to elect a majority of Penntech’s Board of Directors. In addition, they will have the right to cast 70,000 votes by virtue of their ownership of 7,000 shares of the Series A Preferred and those votes, coupled with some 9,500 votes incident to their ownership of that number of shares of Penn-tech’s common stock, will give them the right to cast 53 per cent of the votes with respect to any matter submitted to a vote of Penntech’s shareholders. In short, the selective redemption by the present Board of Directors will give Leslie and Nadeau full control of Penntech hereafter, and this will be accomplished by the expenditure of $1,900,000 of corporate funds to redeem preferred stock on which no dividend is accumulating and on which none has ever been declared.

Turning from these undisputed facts to the area of argument, plaintiff asserts that at present all Series A shares are held in a voting trust which Leslie controls. It is said that the voting trust will expire by its terms on December 31, 1975, thus presumably returning the right to vote to the owners of the shares. Plaintiff thus sug *142 gests that it is no coincidence that present management has elected to redeem all shares other than their own and thereby cancel some 190,000 votes before the voting trust terminates.

Also, plaintiff points to the long-term debt commitments of Penntech in the sum of $7,500,000 secured by 9 per cent first mortgage notes, given to Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America (“Teachers”). The underlying mortgage contains prepayment provisions which, if met, would cancel Teachers’ present right to convert $500,000 worth of the 9 per cent notes into Penntech common stock and would also cancel certain stock warrants held by Teachers for the purchase of Penn-tech common at $1 per share. Thus, plaintiff suggests that the corporation would be better served by prepaying on these obligations with the $1,900,000 since, due to the noncumulative dividend status of the preferred, the corporation will be deriving no immediate benefit from the selective redemption of the 19,000 shares. Plaintiff also suggests that the proposed redemption may well work a default in the terms of the obligation to Teachers, although defendants vigorously dispute this.

From the defendants’ standpoint it is argued that the certificate of incorporation provides that the corporation may “at any time or from time to time redeem the whole or any part of the Series A Preferred,” and that consequently they have express authority to make the selective redemption of all shares except those of Leslie and Nadeau. Defendants say that the preferred shares were issued to the original investors in what was then a high risk venture so as to give them a senior equity position and repose control in them in order that they might obtain the return of their investment at the earliest practical time if the venture proved successful. They further allege that when the venture appeared to be foundering under the then management of the plaintiff, he was removed in favor of Leslie and Nadeau, who later were allowed to purchase their 7,000 shares from the original preferred shareholders at \‡ per share as an incentive to themselves and thus the corporation. They say that since the corporation is now prospering under their management, it is only proper to redeem the preferred stock and return the investment to all other preferred shareholders as originally contemplated.

The reason given for not redeeming the shares of Leslie and Nadeau is twofold. First, in view of the spirit in which they were allowed to purchase their shares, i.

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Bluebook (online)
347 A.2d 140, 1975 Del. Ch. LEXIS 178, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/petty-v-penntech-papers-inc-delch-1975.