Petties v. District of Columbia

291 F.R.D. 1, 2013 WL 1450926, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51267
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedApril 10, 2013
DocketCivil Action No. 95-0148 (PLF)
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 291 F.R.D. 1 (Petties v. District of Columbia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Petties v. District of Columbia, 291 F.R.D. 1, 2013 WL 1450926, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51267 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendations of the Special Master, filed on November 11, 2011, regarding an invoice dispute between Diagnostic Consultants, LLC (“DiCon”) and defendants, the District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”) and the Office of the State Superintendent of Education (“OSSE”).1 On December 5, 2011, DCPS filed objections to certain portions of the Report and Recommendations. Class plaintiffs responded and requested that the Report and Recommendations be adopted in full, and DiCon requested that the Court disregard DCPS’ objections as untimely. Upon review of the Report and Recommendations, the parties’ papers, and the entire record in this case, the Court will consider the objections on their merits and [2]*2adopt and affirm the Report and Recommendations in its entirety.2

I. BACKGROUND

At the time that the disputed invoices were issued, payments by the defendants to private providers of special education services such as DiCon were made pursuant to this Court’s August 5, 2009 Payment Order. See Order Regarding Payment for Services to Class Members (“Payment Order”) [Dkt. No. 1676].3 The Payment Order details a highly structured payment scheme and delineates resolution procedures for disputes that arise concerning submitted invoices. After a provider submits an invoice, if the defendants dispute any charges, “defendants shall ... provide a written dispute notice ... to the provider no later than twenty (20) calendar days after the invoice was received,” containing a “detailed description of the basis for the dispute, including any and all policies relied upon[.]” Payment Order ¶ V(a). The dispute notice must also include “sufficient documentation to support the reasons for disputing any outstanding amount(s).” Id.

If a provider disagrees with the amount disputed by the defendants, it must submit written objections with supporting documentation to DCPS’ Office of Special Education or to OSSE. Payment Order HV(b). After the provider supplies its response, if defendants continue to dispute the invoices, defendants must issue a written rejection. Id. HV(c). That written rejection constitutes a final administrative decision. Id. HV(d). If a provider is not satisfied with this decision, it may file a request for review by the Office of the Special Master. Id. ¶ VI(a). Upon a timely request by a provider, the Special Master shall hold a hearing on the matter, see id. HVI(b), and issue a report with findings and recommendations for resolving the dispute. Id. ¶ VI(e).

After the Special Master issues her report and recommendation, the defendants and plaintiffs are permitted under the Payment Order and Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to raise with the Court “any objections or defenses [to the Special Master’s written report] that are warranted.” Payment Order HVI(d); see also Fed. R.Civ.P. 53(f)(2). Upon review of any such objections, “the Court will decide whether ... to affirm the Special Master’s recommendations or take some other action.” Payment Order ¶ VI(d).

The Report and Recommendations in this case examines the following disputed invoices for services provided by DiCon: 29P, 30P, 33P, 36P, 36NP, 37P, 38P, 39P, 40P, 41P, 43P, 45P, 48P, 49P, 50P and 51P. Report and Recommendations at 1. On February 24, 2011, the Special Master conducted an evi-dentiary hearing relating to the following three issues: (1) whether the fees invoiced by DiCon for Vocational Evaluations (“VEs”) and Functional Behavioral Assessments (“FBAs”) were unreasonably high; (2) whether DCPS’ objections to invoices 37P and 50P complied with the timeline set forth in the Payment Order;4 and (3) whether [3]*3social history assessments were part of comprehensive psychological evaluations, and thus could not be billed as separate assessments when performed contemporaneously with comprehensive evaluations. Id. at 5-11. On November 11, 2011, the Special Master issued her Report and Recommendations. On the first issue, she found in favor of DiCon, concluding that DCPS did not properly invoke the dispute mechanism outlined in the Payment Order to contest the VE and FBA invoices and therefore was obligated to pay the amount charged by DiCon. Id. at 15-16. She found in favor of DCPS on the second and third issues, concluding that DCPS’ objection to invoice 50P was timely, id. at 18, and that social history assessments and comprehensive psychological evaluations constituted one billable evaluation when performed contemporaneously. Id. at 13.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Whether DCPS Properly Objected to Rates Charged by DiCon

DCPS objects to the Special Master’s recommendation that DiCon be awarded the disputed amount of the invoices for VEs and FBAs. Def.’s Objections at 1. As a threshold matter, DiCon asks the Court to disregard DCPS’ objections as untimely. DiCon Response at 1. DiCon points out that DCPS’ objections, filed on December 5, 2011, were filed 24 days after the Report and Recommendations was issued. Id. at 1. Rule 53(f) provides that “[a] party may file objections to — or a motion to adopt or modify — the master’s order, report, or recommendations no later than 21 days after a copy is served, unless the court sets a different time.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 53(f)(2) (emphasis added). The timeliness requirement, however, is not absolute, as the Court retains discretion to excuse a party’s failure to seek timely review. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 53 advisory committee’s note (2003 amendments to Subdivision (g)).

Although DCPS contends that its objections were timely filed, see DCPS’ Reply to DiCon Response, the Court concludes that the objections were filed three days after the deadline. As the Special Master points out, it appears that this tardiness resulted from DCPS’ confusion of the Report and Recommendation, filed on November 11, 2011, with a report relating to a separate DiCon matter, filed three days later on November 14, 2011. See Second DiCon Report and Recommendation; Supplemental Report at 2 (“Though the filing referenced document 1953, its substance addressed document 1951.”) DCPS’ three day delay seems to have stemmed from administrative error, rather than bad faith or neglect. The Court therefore will excuse DCPS’ failure and consider its objections on the merits.

The Special Master concluded that the amount invoiced by DiCon for VEs and FBAs must be paid because DCPS failed to comply with the dispute procedures provided in the August 5, 2009 Payment Order. Report and Recommendations at 15-16. In its objections, DCPS does not meaningfully address this conclusion; it instead argues that DiCon failed to carry its burden of establishing or documenting the reasonableness of its fees associated with the VEs and FBAs authorized by DCPS. Def.’s Objections at 1.

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291 F.R.D. 1, 2013 WL 1450926, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51267, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/petties-v-district-of-columbia-cadc-2013.