Petroleum Rectifying Co. of California v. Reward Oil Co.

260 F. 183
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedJune 15, 1918
DocketNo. 302
StatusPublished

This text of 260 F. 183 (Petroleum Rectifying Co. of California v. Reward Oil Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Petroleum Rectifying Co. of California v. Reward Oil Co., 260 F. 183 (N.D. Cal. 1918).

Opinion

NETERER, District Judge.

Complainant seeks to enjoin the use by the defendant of a process and apparatus for dehydrating oil, claiming it to be an infringement of claims 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7 of process patent No. 987,115, and of claim 1 of apparatus patent No. 987,116, owned by complainant.

The defendant denies infringement; denies that the patents are valid; and alleges affirmatively that annihilation of emulsive condition by means of electric current is old in the art.

A claim does not seem to be asserted that the application of electric current to emulsive, condition is new in the art. The Davis and Parrett patent of prior- issue is an application of electric current to emulsive condition, but for a different purpose.

[1] Every patent should be construed, if it may be, so as to preserve to the patentee the privilege which the law grants to an inventor. Justice Brown, in Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U. S. 156, 171, 12 Sup. Ct. 825, 831 (36 L. Ed. 658), said:

“The object of the patent law is to secure to inventors a monopoly of what they have actually invented or discovered, and it ought not to be defeated by a too strict and technical adherence to the letter of the statute, or by the application of artificial rules of interpretation.”

And mere rigid technicalities are not to be resorted to by courts to avoid inventions. Brush Electric Co. v. Electric Imp. Co. (C. C.) 52 Fed. 965, 974.

[184]*184[2] In the consideration of a charge of infringement it must not be forgotten that the burden of establishing infringement is upon the party charging infringement. It is a question of fact, and must be established by clear and convincing testimony, and proof of the fact may not be met solely by expert speculation. As was said by Judge Buffington in Fried. Krupp Aktien-Gesellschaft v. Midvale Steel Co., 191 Fed. 588, 591, 112 C. C. A. 194, 197:

“The absence of actual fact proof is not met by the presence of expert speculations, no matter how voluminous.”

Nor can a theory which has not been reduced to an operative relation support claim for patent. As was well said by Judge Coxe in Lovell v. Seybold Mach. Co., 169 Fed. 288, 290, 94 C. C. A. 578, 580:

“Claims should cover what the patentee has invented and not what he imagines he has invented.”

[3] Nor earn infringement be predicated on results obtained irrespective of process or apparatus employed. As was said in Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. Kilbourne & Clark Mfg. Co. (D. C.) 239 Fed. 328, 354:

“The mere fact that the same result is obtained by the operation of an apparatus is not conclusive of infringement. Infringement cannot be predicated on results obtained, irrespective of the apparatus employed. The fact that the apparatus of the plaintiff, by ‘broad tuning,’ and the apparatus of the defendant in normal operation, secure the same result, does not signify infringement. * * * Results accomplished by mode of operation or function, separate from the means of mechanical devices, do not constitute infringement. * * * ”

[4] The issue here is not complicated. The testimony consumed less than a week. The treaters operated under the patents of the respective parties at the several plants were visited by court and counsel, and the operation of the respective treaters observed. The treaters in operation were not identical with the apparatus described in the several patents. The testimony, however, related to the respective treaters in the present condition of operation, and it seemed to me the issue upon the trial was between the process and apparatus as employed. It was apparent upon the trial and there still' is a certain mystery which does not seem to have yielded to scientific explanation with relation to just what does take place in the emulsion when the surface tension that keeps the individual particles of water apart is disrupted.

The plaintiff contends that the emulsion is subjected to the action of a powerful electric field, whereby the particles constituting the inner phase of the emulsion are caused to coalesce into larger masses, whereby they are easily separated from the oil. “The action is believed to be electrostatic or thermal.” The defendant contends that the surface tension which keeps the individual particles of water apart are disrupted by electrolytic action in the electrostatic field.

The treater of both parties is cylindrical in shape, about nine or ten feet deep, and perhaps three feet in diameter. In the plaintiff’s, treater, mounted upon a shaft in the center, is a rotating electrode,! [185]*185designed to prevent short-circuiting between the electrodes, due to the formation of chains of water globules, by agitating or stirring the emulsion, and thereby limit, retard, or break up the formation of the chains of water globules. The electrode in the defendant’s treater consists of a number of discs of like size placed in the center of the treater, mounted upon a stationary shaft, which is suspended near the top of the treater upon insulated supports. These supports are immersed within the body of the oil under treatment. These electrodes are nonadjustable; are 19 inches in diameter; the opening of the annular length of the outer electrode is 18 inches in diameter. The distance from one outer electrode to the next is 18 inches. The electrode is so placed as to be one-half the distance, the spacing being uniform between each électrode.

Both treaters use the same high-tension current, apply apparently the same kind of treatment, differing in the mechanical formation of the electrodes. The emulsified material enters the plaintiff’s treater at the top, through a pipe, and the downflow of the material operated upon by the rotating electrodes prevents the formation of chains of water globules, preventing short-circuiting between the electrodes; the first action of the emulsion, free from other influences, being the alignment of the water particles without coalescence, and the alignment of these various water particles into a chain makes a path of less resistance, short-circuiting the electric current.

The mode of operation of defendant’s apparatus provides for an upward flow of the emulsion through the treater for the purpose of encouraging short-circuiting; a quiet flow, without churning action, being conducive of a coalescence of the water globules in the electrostatic field, inducing electrolytic action.

Much was said in the trial and upon argument as to what is meant by the term “short-circuiting.” Without going into an extended discussion, I do not think that there can be any doubt, from the histpry of the patents, the language employed in the several patents, and the operation of the treaters, that the patentees meant electrolytically conducting chains without regard to the permanency of such chains or o E the short circuits formed thereby. There is no doubt in my mind, from the evidence and observation of the several treaters, and the language employed in the patents, that it was the purpose and intent of the patentees of complainant’s patents, and considered an essential step, to prevent the formation of complete chains connecting the electrodes, and thereby create a short circuit. In other words, the plaintiff’s process was to obviate electrolytic conduction and to maintain the electrostatic field.

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Related

Topliff v. Topliff
145 U.S. 156 (Supreme Court, 1892)
Lovell v. Seybold Mach. Co.
169 F. 288 (Second Circuit, 1909)
Brush Electric Co. v. Electric Imp. Co.
52 F. 965 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern California, 1892)

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Bluebook (online)
260 F. 183, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/petroleum-rectifying-co-of-california-v-reward-oil-co-cand-1918.