Petrin v. Town of Scarborough

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: February 18, 2015
• Docket: CUMap-14-03
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

£NT E I< ED FEB 2 7 2015

STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT

Cumberland, ss. 4/VtH- CM Wl- o~--1~-15 DONALD PETRIN, et al.

Plaintiffs-Appellants v. Docket No. BCD-AP-14-03 / THE TOWN OF SCARBOROUGH

Defendant-Appellee.

DECISION AND JUDGMENT

This is an appeal, pursuant to Rule soB of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, from a

decision of the Town of Scarborough's Board of Assessment Review, denying the Appellants'

requests for tax abatement on their properties. The Appellants in their brief advance three

distinct grounds on which the Board's denial oftheir abatement requests should be reversed:

1) the Assessor's partial revaluation of 2012 resulted in unjust discrimination as it was improper in its scope and relied on flawed data;

2) the Assessor's "excess land" program is discriminatory; and

3) the Town's 2012 assessment program resulted in an unequal and thus unlawful apportionment of the overall tax burden, disfavoring properties located on or near the ocean in favor of other residential properties in Scarborough

Based on these arguments, the Appellants contend that the 2012 assessments of their

properties were manifestly wrong, and that the Board's denial of their abatement requests

should be reversed.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Appellant taxpayers own properties on or near the Atlantic Ocean in the Higgins Beach,

Pine Point, and Pillsbury Shores neighborhoods ofScarborough.

1 The Town of Scarborough Assessor last conducted a town-wide valuation of residential

property in 2005. In 2012, after analyzing sales data for the period after the town-wide

valuation, Assessor Paul Lesperance (who has since retired) undertook a partial revaluation of

Town residential properties, focusing on specific neighborhoods on or near the ocean, and

omitting interior neighborhoods.

As a result of the partial revaluation, the Assessor increased the assessed value of the

residential properties in the targeted neighborhoods, including the properties owned by the

Appellants. (R. 307.) The assessed value of properties in other Scarborough neighborhoods

remained the same. Id. The overall result of the 2012 partial valuation is that water-

influenced property 1 in Scarborough bears a higher proportion of the Town property tax

burden than it did before the partial revaluation.

The Appellants appealed their increased assessments to the Board of Assessment

Review (the "Board"), which consolidated the appeals, held hearings, and unanimously denied

the appeals on December 1S, 2013. (R. 309.)

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1. Rule soB Generally

In a Rule soB appeal, the Superior Court reviews findings made by the municipal

decision maker to determine whether those findings were based upon an "erroneous

interpretation of the law" or based upon conclusions of fact not "supported by substantial

evidence on the record as a whole." Bruk v. Town cifGeorgetown, 436 A.2d S94, S97 (Me. 19S1).

"Substantial evidence is 'evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as sufficient to support a

conclusion."' York v. Town cif Ogunquit, 2001 ME 53, ~ 6, 769 A.2d 172 (quoting Sproul v.

1 This Decision and Judgment uses the term "water-influenced property" to encompass real property on or near the ocean or another water body, including waterfront property, waterview property, and other property near water.

2 Town ofBoothbay Harbor, 2000 ME SO, ~ 6, 746 A.2d S68). The court must affirm the decision

of the [Board] unless that decision was unlawful, arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable."

Driscoll v. Gheewalla, 441 A.2d 1025, 1026 (Me. 1982). Procedural unfairness is reversible error

and a "decision can be 'arbitrary and capricious' if it was not the product of the requisite

processes." Hopkins v. Dep't of Human Servs., 2002 ME 129, ~ 12, 802 A.2d 999 (citations

omitted). "That the record contains evidence inconsistent with the result, or that inconsistent

conclusions could be drawn from the evidence, does not render the [Board's] findings invalid if

a reasonable mind might accept the relevant evidence as adequate to support the [Board's]

conclusion." Town of Vienna v. Kokernak, 612 A.2d 870, 872 (Me. 1992). The party seeking to

overturn the decision bears the burden of persuasion on appeal. Town of Sw. Harbor v.

Harwood, 2000 ME 21S, ~ 6, 76S A.2d 115, 117 (citing Sawyer Envtl. Recovery Facilities, Inc. v.

Town ofHampden, 2000 ME 179, ~ IS 760 A.2d 257).

2. Municipal Tax Assessments

The court presumes tax assessments are valid. Ram's Head Partners, LLC v. Town of

Cape Elizabeth, 2003 ME IS 1, ~ 9, 8S4 A.2d 916. "A taxpayer who seeks a tax abatement must

prove that the assessed valuation is 'manifestly wrong."' Terjloth v. Town of Scarborough, 2014

ME 57, ~ 12, 90 A.sd liS 1. A taxpayer can prove an assessment is manifestly wrong by

showing:

1) the judgment of the assessor was irrational or so unreasonable in light of the circumstances that the property was substantially overvalued and an injustice resulted;

2) there was unjust discrimination; or

S) the assessment was fraudulent, dishonest, or illegal.

Yusem v. Town of Raymond, 2001 ME 61, ~ 9, 769 A.2d 865. To prevail on a claim of unjust

discrimination, taxpayers must demonstrate "that the assessor's system necessarily results in

3 unequal apportionment." Ram's Head, 200S ME lSI, ~ 10, 8S4 A.2d 916 (quoting City of

Biddeford v. Adams, 1999 ME 49, ~ 14, 727 A.2d S46). Because the Board concluded that the

Appellants failed to meet their burden of proof, this court will vacate the Board's decision

denying tax abatement "only if the record compels a contrary conclusion to the exclusion of any

other inference." Terfloth, 2014 ME 57, ~ IS, 90 A.sd liS 1.

III. DISCUSSION

The legal backdrop for the analysis was summarized by the Law Court in Weekley v.

Town ofScarborough:

The Maine Constitution requires that "[a]ll taxes upon real and personal estate, assessed by authority of this State, shall be apportioned and assessed equally according to the just value thereof" Me. Const. art. IX, § 8. "Just value" means market value. Alfred J. Sweet, Inc. v. City ofAuburn, 1S4 Me. 28, S 1, 180 A. 80S (19S5). "The sale price of property is evidence of market value, which is used in determining property value for tax assessment purposes." Wesson v. Town of Bremen, 667 A.2d 596, 599 n. 5 (Me.1995). See also Shawmut Inn v. Town ofKennebunkport, 428 A.2d S84, S94-95 (Me.l981) ("market value" is "the price a willing buyer would pay a willing seller at a fair public sale ... in a free and open market."); Arnold v. Maine State Highway Comm'n, 28S A.2d 655, 658 (Me.1971) ("evidence of what the property sold for in a bona fide sale is most significant.") (citation omitted).

676 A._2d 932, 934 (Me. 1996).

By statute, municipalities are required to maintain property assessments within a range

of assessment ratios (ratio of assessed value to market value)-a minimum of 70% and a

maximum of 110%. See S6 M.R.S. § S27(1). Thus, ongoing review and adjustment of

assessments are necessary to assure that appropriate assessment ratios and, ultimately, equal

apportionment of the overall tax burden, are maintained.

The Law Court has noted that, although "[t]ownwide revaluations are perhaps the best

method of maintaining equal apportionment of the tax burden ... assessors are not precluded

from undertaking adjustments designed to maintain equal distribution of the tax burden in the

time period between townwide revaluations." Moser v. Town ofPhippsburg, 55S A.2d 1249, 1250

4 (Me. 1989). 2 In Moser, the Law Court held that such partial revaluations are an acceptable

means of maintaining an equal distribution of the tax burden. Id.

The first of the three grounds advanced by the Appellants focuses on the method by

which Town conducted the partial revaluation that resulted in the increased assessments of

Appellants' properties.

1. The Appellants' Challenge to the Town's Partial Revaluation

In this case, the Appellants' parcels are located in three discrete neighborhoods within

the Town of Scarborough: the Higgins Beach shorefront, the Pine Point shorefront, and the

interior part of the subdivision known as Pillsbury Shores. (R. 307.) The last townwide

revaluation in Scarborough took place in 2005. (R. 1259-60.) The objective of the 2005

revaluation was to assess all taxable real properties in the Town at or as close as possible to

100% of their market value. Id.

As did the municipality in Moser, the Town of Scarborough has monitored property

sales each year and, based on its analysis of qualifying sales, made upward or downward

adjustments in the assessment of specific properties. The purpose of such partial revaluations is

' to maintain assessments in line with the Town's overall ratio verified by Maine Revenue

Services during the agency's annual audit.

2 The facts of Moser are summarized in the opinion as follows:

The assessors increased the valuation of all properties by SO percent in 1982. Then in 1985 the assessors identified certain large-lot subdivisions in close proximity to the Kennebec River as having substantially increased in fair market value (largely due to the cleanup of the Kennebec River) and increased their valuation by fifty percent. Not every structure in the area was included. In addition, certain properties outside the area were included ("unusual architecturally-designed structures designed to fit a specific lot and structures that gain in value from their unique combination of land and buildings"). The plaintiff taxpayers, owners of real estate in the singled out area, challenged the increase.

555 A.2d at 1249-50.

5 In determining the 2012 land assessments, the Town assessor at the time, Paul

Lesperance 3 ("Mr. Lesperance" or the "Assessor"), determined that, though residential

properties were following a sales ratio close to 100%, waterfront and water-influenced

neighborhoods were tracking significantly lower at 70-80% ratios of assessed value to value on

sale. (R. 1263.) Thus, in accordance with the Town's method of assessment mentioned above,

Mr. Lesperance focused on the neighborhoods in which he determined that property

assessments were at significant variance from the Town average. In total, Mr. Lesperance

adjusted the land valuations of 754 parcels, including those owned by the Appellants.

The revaluation resulted in a 20% increase in assessed value for the Higgins Beach

waterfront, a 25% increase for the Pine Point waterfront, and a 17% increase to the interior

parcels in the Pillsbury Shores neighborhood. The Appellants argue that there was no

evidence in the record before the Board that would allow it to conclude that these increases

tended to equalize apportionment of the tax burden within the town. However, as noted

previously, "assessors are not precluded from undertaking adjustments designed to maintain

equal distribution of the tax burden in the time period between townwide revaluations." Moser,

553 A.2d at 1250. Rather, only a "rough equality" in tax treatment of similarly situated

property owners is constitutionally required. Id. (quoting Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County

Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 343 (1989)).

Before the Board, the Town offered several exhibits to rebut Appellants' claims of unfair

treatment. These exhibits compared the pre-revaluation assessments for interior

neighbor-hoods with the pre-revaluation assessments for the water-influenced neighborhoods

that were subject to the partial revaluation. See, e.g., (R. 1224-25.) The exhibits indicated that,

~ Paul Lesperance has since retired as the Town's Assessor. However, he previously held the position since 1984 and was responsible for the 2012 valuation. Mr. William Healey is the current Assessor as of the spring of201.'l. before the partial revaluation, the assessments for interior, non-water-influenced properties

were tracking much closer to 100% of the property's value based on sales than those for the

water-influenced properties in the revalued neighborhoods. Pre-valuation assessments in the

water-influenced neighborhoods were significantly lower than market sale prices in those

neighborhoods. Thus, the assessor's decision to limit the partial revaluation to water-

influenced properties, and the Board's denial of the Appellants' challenge to that decision, are

both supported by substantial evidence.

Another basis on which the Appellants challenge the revised values assigned to their

properties is that the Assessor relied on old sales dating back to 2006, the year after the last

townwide valuation. They argue that such reliance is wrong as a matter oflaw and also wrong

because it ignores the impact on property values of the downturn in the national economy that

began in 2008 ("the Great Recession"). 4

Their legal argument against the Assessor's reliance on older sales data rests on an

advisory opinion from the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine regarding a bill in the Maine State

Legislature that would have altered the method for property tax valuation. See opinion ofthe

Justices, 2004 ME 54, 850 A.2d 1145. The Justices were asked to advise the Legislature on the

constitutionality of a bill that, on its face, would have created "two different bases for tax value

purposes: one for property acquired before the 1996-97 assessment and one for all property

acquired after that assessment." !d. ~ IS. Taxpayers who purchased their property before the

1996-97 assessment would be assessed at a value based on the assessment from the 1996-97 tax

+Appellants initially argued that relying on the old sales was improper regardless of external conditions, but in their reply brief they appear to abandon this argument. Compare Pls.' SOB Brief at 7 ("Appellants respectfully submit that there is no situation in which such a reliance [on old sales] would be reasonable ....") with Pis.' Reply Brief at 1 ("Appellants take no position as to whether a reliance on old sales might be proper in cases where there has not been a sea change in the market in intervening years.'').

7 year, while those who acquired their property since that year would be assessed at a more

recent appraisal value. Id.

A majority of the Justices concluded that such a system was unconstitutional for two

reasons: 1) because it "runs afoul of the requirement that a valid property tax must be based on

market value", id. ~ 16, and 2) because it would lead to "the disparate taxation of two similar or

identical properties"'resulting in unjust discrimination. Id. ~ 18.

The present case is readily distinguishable from the bill at issue in the Opinion of the

Justices. The Assessor relied on sales dating back to 2006, but also relied on sales from

subsequent years forward to 2012. The Town's partial revaluation also applied the same

methodology to all properties subject to the revaluation in determining whether adjusted

assessments were warranted, whereas the proposal disapproved in Opinion of the Justices

involved a two-tier system. The court concludes that the Appellants have not shown that the

Assessor's use of some sales from 2006 is unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful. See Shawmut

Inn v. Inhabitants ofTown ofKennebunkport, 428 A.2d 384, 390 (Me. 1981).

Appellants' alternative basis for objecting to the Assessor's reliance on older sales data

IS that the Great Recession had such a significant negative effect on property valued as to

render sales predating the downtown unreliable and irrelevant to current market values.

Appellants rely on their expert George Koutalakis, who testified that the Great Recession had

an impact on property values in Scarborough, including Appellants' properties. Koutalakis

explained that he performed a paired sales analysis 5 for 22 properties throughout Scarborough

that sold before and after the Great Recession. (R. 887-88; 1389.) According to his findings,

all 22 of the properties sold for less after the Great Recession than before it. Id. Next,

Koutalakis found paired sales for three properties, one each in Higgins Beach, Pine Point, and

5 A paired sales analysis looks at sales of the same property at two different times. (R. 1589.)

8 Prouts Neck showing that the properties sold for less after the recession. (R. 811-16; 1390-91.)

Finally, Koutalakis prepared a report on property values in Prouts Neck, which looked at four

sales and four listings of property that have not sold. Id.

Appellants' reliance on the Koutalakis analysis is misplaced for several reasons. First,

Koutalakis's paired sales study was not limited to water-influenced properties, but included

interior properties. (R. 1407-08.) Thus, what it showed was that the Great Recession caused a

decline in property values town-wide. It did not analyze separately the effect of the Great

Recession on the water-influenced properties that were revalued. Second, the Koutalakis study

did not establish that the market values of water-influenced properties fell below their assessed

values as a result of the Great Recession. In some of Koutalakis' s paired sales properties, both

the prior sale price and the later, lower sale price were above the pre-valuation assessed value,

(R. 1144-45.) The fact that real property market values fell during the Great Recession does

not, in itself, mean that they fell to below assessed value.

Finally, the Koutalakis analysis included data that the Assessor has shown should not be

relied on as evidence of market value. For example, the Koutalakis analysis did not consider

whether the assessment was based in part on changes to a structure on the land, whether the

sale was an estate sale, or whether the taxpayer already received an abatement. (R. 1146-1202.)

In fact, with such data excluded, the Koutalakis analysis indicates that the Great Recession

affected the value of water-influenced properties less than the values of other property, and thus

supports the Assessor's decision to focus the partial revaluation on water-influenced properties.

(R. 1442-46.)

2. The Appellants' Challenge to The Town's "Excess Land" Program

Appellants' second ground for contesting their assessments is that the Town of

Scarborough undervalues what the Town defines as "excess land" and thereby renders the

9 Town's assessment program as being discriminatory on its face. During the Board hearing, the

Assessor described the Town's "excess land program" as follows:

ATTORNEY SHUMADINE: Let me see if I have this correct, the way that the excess land works is that you treat the first acre as the home lot and then everything above an acre you treat as excess land. Correct?

PAUL LESPERANCE: Yes.

ATTORNEY SHUMADINE: So everything above one acre is not taxed at market value because it is taxed as excess land which is considerably less than market value, is that correct?

PAUL LESPERANCE: Yes, Town wide.

(R. IS 19-20.)

As an example to prove their point, the Appellants cite to the Town's valuation of two

abutting lots in the same ownership, a 1.27-acre lot on Massacre Lane assessed at $18,000, and

a 1-acre lot assessed at $1.8 million on Black Point Road. (R. 1423-24.) Mr. Lesperance

acknowledged that the Massacre Lane lot was buildable and could be sold separately, and that,

viewed as a separate parcel, it has a market value much higher than its $18,000 assessed value.

Id. However, he defended the low assessment on the ground that "as they are assessed as

abutting owners they are treated as one parcel for assessment purposes." (R. 1424.)

The Appellants point out that the tax statute allowing abutting lots in the same

ownership to be treated as one parcel for assessment purposes requires each lot to be at least

five acres in area, see .36 M.R.S. § 701-A, meaning that the two lots at issue would not qualify.

The Town contends that the Appellants have failed to provide any market evidence to

demonstrate that the assessment practices for large lots or lots combined for assessment

purposes are undervalued, or if they were undervalued, what the measure or impact would be or

that any purported impact is unique to the appellants. However, the record indicates that the

10 Town has established a practice of valuing excess property, that is property beyond the first

acre, at a rate inconsistent with market value. Paul Lesperance testified to this practice.

In Maine, "[l]ocal assessors have been given considerable leeway in choosing the

method or combinations of methods to achieve just valuations." Shawmut Inn, 428 A.2d at 390.

Further, it is clear that "tax assessors have a reasonable degree of discretion in determining

where individual parcels exist, and if the assessors have acted reasonably in the discharge of

their statutory responsibility to place a separate assessment on each parcel of real estate, the

assessment will be upheld." City of Augusta v. Allen, 438 A.2d 472, 476 (Me. 1981 ). It is also

undisputed that contiguous lots may be assessed as one parcel, depending on the circumstances.

Fickett v. Hohlfeld, 390 A.2d 469, 471 (Me. 1978); see also Allen, 438 A.2d at 476 (rejecting

argument "that a single parcel for tax assessment purposes may never be divided by a public

road").

However, it is clear under Maine law that:

[T]he very idea of taxation implies an equal apportionment and assessment upon all property, real and personal, according to its just value. The Court has recognized in the past, and now recognizes and decides, that all property should be considered and treated for purposes of taxation on an equal basis, and according to just value.

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Inhabitants of City of Presque Isle, 150 Me. 181, 185, 107 A.2d 475, 477

(1954) (citing Brewer Brick Co. v. Inhabitants ofBrewer, 62 Me. 62, 73 (1873)) (internal quotation

marks omitted); Sa'W)'er v. Gilmore, 109 Me. 169, 171, 83 A. 673; Hamilton v. Portland Pier Site

District, 120 Me. 15, 112 A. 836; Opinion of the Justices, 97 Me. 595, 597, 55 A. 827. Under the

Maine Constitution, "all taxes upon real and personal estate ... shall be apportioned and

assessed equally according to the just value thereof." Me. Const. art. IX,§ 8. "Just value" is the

equivalent of "market value." Shawmut Inn v. Town of Kennebunkpor~ 428 A.2d 384, 389 (Me.

1981 ). In determining 'just value," assessors must "consider all relevant factors, including

without limitation, the effect upon value of any enforceable restrictions to which the use of the

11 land may be subjected, current use, physical depredation, sales in the secondary market,

functional obsolescence and economic obsolescence." S6 M.R.S.A. § 701-A.

Though Appellants have raised a valid question as to the legality of the Town's "excess

land" program, for the following reasons, the court will not answer that question here.

Because the "excess land" program does not affect any of the Appellants' properties

differently than it affects all residential property in Scarborough, the issue of standing arises.

In the court's view, if the Appellants have standing to challenge the "excess land" program, 6 it

is as taxpayers challenging a prospective assessment. In Maine, courts have adopted the

preventive-remedial doctrine to determine whether a taxpayer has standing in a suit against a

municipality. The doctrine recognizes the right of taxpayers to apply to the court for

preventive relief in the case of threatened unlawful action by municipal officers, while denying

standing to taxpayers seeking remedial relief for a wrong that has already occurred. McCorkle

v. Town of Falmouth, 529 A.2d SS7, SS8 (Me. 1987); Buck v. Town of Yarmouth, 402 A.2d 860,

861-862 (Me.l979); Cohen v. Ketchum, 344 A.2d 387, S90-S92 (Me.l975).

Maine taxpayers have no right to apply for remedial relief after the commission of an

illegal municipal act affecting taxation where the act is one that affects the entire community

and there is no particularized harm to the plaintiffs bringing the suit. Tuscan v. Smith, ISO Me.

S6, 153 A. 289, 293 ( 1931 ); see Tiling v. City ofPortland, 268 A.2d 888, 890 (Me. 1970). Thus, in

the municipal setting, "taxpayers who do not allege and prove special injury have standing to

seek only "preventive" relief from illegal actions by municipal officers." Common Cause v. State,

455 A.2d 1, 10 (Me. 1983). "Application of this doctrine is largely a definitional undertaking. If

6 There is a question as to whether, even were preventive relief sought with respect to the Town's "excess land" program, only the Attorney General has standing here. See Buck v. Town of Yarmouth, 402 A.sd 860, 861 (Me. 1979) ("[A]n individual citizen who suffers no particularized injury from a public wrong can not seek relieffrom the courts; relief vindicating public rights must be sought by ... the Attorney General of the State of Maine.") See also Blodgett v. School Admin. Dist. No, 73, 289 A.2d 407, 411 (Me. 1972). Whether only the Attorney General could maintain a preventive challenge to the Town's "excess land" program need not be decided now.

12 the relief sought by municipal taxpayers lacking special injury is deemed 'preven[]tive,' the

courthouse door stands open; if the relief is deemed 'remedial,' that door swings shut." Lehigh

v. Pittston Co., 456 A.2d 355, 358 (Me. 1983).

In this case, the Appellants lack standing to achieve any form of remedial relief

concerning the "excess land" program. The only relationship the Appellants have to the

program is that they are taxpayers. The Appellants have failed to demonstrate in the

administrative record that they have suffered particularized harm or loss as a result of the

excess land program. Thus, if appellants are to have relief at all, they must demonstrate that

they are entitled to preventive relief See Blodgett v. School Administrative District 73, Me., 289

A.2d 407 (1972). Here, the Appellants have not challenged the prospective application of the

program. Because the Appellants are not seeking preventive relief, the court finds they lack

standing to challenge the Town's application of the "excess land" program.

3. The Appellants' Claim that the Town's Assessment Results in An Unequal and Discriminatory Apportionment of the Tax Burden

The third and final argument that the Appellants make in their Rule SOB brief is that, as

a result of the partial revaluation, the Town has allocated the tax burden in an unequal,

disproportionate manner that unlawfully discriminates against water-influenced properties.

The Appellants' burden to prove discrimination requires more than proof that the

Town's assessment program does not allocate the tax burden with mathematical precision.

"Neither the constitution nor the statutes expect that a Board of Assessors could make an

assessment with all values so exact that no 'expert' could disagree with them." Sears, Roebuck &

Co. v. Inhabitants ofCity of Presque Isle, 150 Me. 181, 189, 107 A.2d 475, 480 (1954). Rather,

"[t]he constitutional requirement is the seasonable attainment of a rough equality in tax

13 treatment of similarly situated property owners." 7 Ram's Head Partners, LLC v. Town of Cape

Elizabeth, 2003 ME 131, ~ 10, 834 A.2d 916 (citing Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co., v. County

Comm'n of Webster Cnty, 488 U.S. 3S6, S4S).

For example, the Law Court has said:

The undervaluation of one set of similarly situated properties· can support a finding of unjust discrimination, even when there is no undervaluation of the general mass of property. On the other hand ... "[s]poradic differences in valuations," or "mere errors of judgment on the part of the assessors" do not necessarily establish unjust discrimination.

/d.~ 11, 8S4 A.2d 916 (quoting KitteryElec. Light Co. v. Assessors ojthe Town ofKittery, 219 A.2d

728, 740 (Me. 1966)) (internal citations omitted); see also Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of

Wakeji'eld, 247 U.S. S50, S5S, (1918) ("[M]ere errors ofjudgment by officials will not support a

claim of discrimination. There must be something more-something which in effect amounts ·to

an intentional violation of the essential principle of practical uniformity.").

Appellants in this case contend that the Town's 2012 assessment scheme was manifestly

wrong in that it unjustly discriminates against owners of waterfront and water-influenced

properties. To prevail on such claim, the Appellants must demonstrate "that the assessor's

system necessarily results in unequal apportionment." Rams Head, 200S ME IS 1, ~ 10, 8S4

A.2d 916 (quoting City ofBiddifOrd v. Adams, 1999 ME 49, ~ 14, 727 A.2d S46). As mentioned

above, the court will vacate the Board's decision denying tax abatement "only if the record

compels a contrary conclusion to the exclusion of any other inference." Terjloth, 2014 ME 57,

~ 1s, 90 A.sd us 1.

7 Article IX Section 8 of the Constitution of the State of Maine reads as follows:

All taxes upon real and personal estate, assessed by authority of this state, shall be apportioned and assessed equally, according to the just value thereof ... [but] the Legislature shall have power to levy a tax upon intangible personal property at such rate as it deems wise and equitable without regard to the rate applied to other classes ofproperty.

14 Under State law, as noted above a municipality is required to meet certain minimum

assessing standards. The municipality's ratio of assessment to sale price must be between 70%

and 110% of just value. S6 M.R.S. § 327(1). Assessments must also meet a quality rating 8 of20

or less. Id. § S27(2). These standards, however, do not apply to each individual assessment;

they apply to the municipality or assessing area as a whole. (R. 1440-41.)

The evidence before the Board showed that the partial revaluation improved the

assessment ratios and quality ratings in the areas targeted by the partial revaluation. (R. 1224-

28.) As the Town pointed out in its brief, the neighborhood increases in the Higgins Beach,

Pine Point and Pillsbury Shores areas where the Appellants own property resulted in

assessment ratios closer to 100% and improved (or in the case of Higgins Beach, maintained)

quality ratings. See Appellee's Brief at 8-9. Thus, the evidence indicates the partial revaluation

brought the overall allocation of the tax burden closer to equality. Thus, the Appellants have

failed to show that the assessor's methodology "necessarily results" in unjust discrimination

against water-influenced properties in the Town-wide allocation of the tax burden.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Appellants' appeal is denied. The decision of the Town of

Scarborough's Board of Assessment Review is affirmed. Judgment is hereby awarded to the

Appellee, together with its costs as the prevailing party.

Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79, the clerk is hereby directed to incorporate this order into

the docket by reference. ~ Dated February 16, 2015 ~ Business & Consumer Court

8Quality rating is obtained by dividing the average deviation by the average ratio. 18-125 C.M.R. ch. 201, § 1(X) (2013). Deviation refers to the difference between an individual ratio and the average ratio. Id. § 1(M).

15 Entered on the Docket: ~- f t·· ts-Z"' Copies sent via Mail _ rectronically Donald Petrin, et al. v. Town of Scarborough BCD-AP-14-03

Donald Petrin, et al. Plaintiffs

Counsel: John Shumandine, Esq. PO Box 9785 Portland, ME 04104

Town of Scarborough Defendant

Counsel: Robert Crawford, Esq. Joel Moser PO Box 9729 Portland, ME 04104