Petition of Risdal & Anderson, Inc.

291 F. Supp. 353, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10130
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedOctober 18, 1968
Docket63-26
StatusPublished
Cited by36 cases

This text of 291 F. Supp. 353 (Petition of Risdal & Anderson, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Petition of Risdal & Anderson, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 353, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10130 (D. Mass. 1968).

Opinion

OPINION

GARRITY, District Judge.

This case arises out of the loss at sea with all hands on board of the commercial fishing vessel MIDNIGHT SUN on November 14, 1962. The MIDNIGHT SUN was owned by Risdal &' Anderson, Inc., which filed a petition for exoneration from or limitation of liability with respect to the loss of the vessel. Personal representatives of each of the deceased crew members filed answers challenging the petition of Risdal & Anderson, Inc. and claims asserting that the petitioner was liable for all provable damages, under the provisions of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, and the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761 et seq. The petition for exoneration from or limitation of liability was heard by Caffrey, J. and was denied upon the court’s finding that the negligence of the captain, imputable to the petitioner, was the proximate cause of the loss of the vessel and that the vessel was unseaworthy. The case was ordered to stand for hearing on assessment of damages. Petition of Risdal & Anderson, Inc., D.Mass., 1966, 248 F. Supp. 928.

Since a majority of the statutory beneficiaries of the decedents were residents of Norway, letters rogatory issued on motions of Risdal & Anderson, Inc. and several claimants. Depositions of the Norwegian beneficiaries and other witnesses were taken in Norway and admitted in evidence at a hearing.

In reaching the separate findings relating to each claimant, the court has been guided by the following principles of law of general applicability.

(1) The personal representatives of the claimants herein are entitled to recover under either the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, which provides jurisdiction “in case of the death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury [suffered ‘in the course of his employment’]”; or the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761, which provides jurisdiction “whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any State * * 1

(2) The relationship between the Jones Act and the Death on the High Seas Act is not simply one of alternative remedies, but rather the Death on the High Seas Act provides a remedy for an additional class of beneficiaries. The Four Sisters, D.Mass., 1947, 75 F.Supp. 399, 400-401. The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, incorporating the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51, provides for recovery “for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children * * * and, if none, then of such employee’s parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee, * * Suit under the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761, is “for the exclusive benefit of the decedent’s wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative * Thus a surviving spouse, parent or child of a decedent need not show dependency upon the decedent for recovery under either Act. The only claimants who must prove dependency are “next of kin” and “relative(s).”

(3) The claimants of the decedent alien seamen have the same rights *357 under both the Jones Act and the Death on the High Seas Act as they would have if their decedents were citizens of the United States, since Risdal & Anderson, Inc., is a United States corporation and the MIDNIGHT SUN was registered in the United States and flew the American flag. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 1953, 345 U.S. 571, 585, 73 S.Ct. 921, 97 L.Ed. 1254; Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty, 1957 ed., § 6-64, p. 388.

(4) The measure of recovery for the claimants is the same under both Acts — pecuniary loss sustained by the beneficiaries. This measure of recovery is established under the Death on the High Seas Act by statute, 46 U.S.C. § 762, and under the Jones Act by a long line of cases, e. g., Grantham v. Quinn Menhaden Fisheries, 4 Cir., 1965, 344 F.2d 590. Although the measure of recovery is well settled, by its very nature the amount of money that a beneficiary might reasonably have expected to receive if the decedent had lived cannot be determined with perfect accuracy. “Insistence on mathematical precision would be illusory and the judge or juror must be allowed a fair latitude to make reasonable approximations guided by judgment and practical experience.” Whitaker v. Blidberg Rothchild Company, 4 Cir., 1961, 296 F.2d 554, 555.

(5) The basic questions to be considered in each case are how much money would the decedent have had available for contribution to his beneficiaries and how much of that amount would he have contributed to them. Of primary importance is decedent’s earning capacity, which may be estimated from such factors as decedent’s actual earnings during the period before his death, his health, diligence and work habits in general, his prospects for advancement, and the economic conditions of the industry in which he was employed. Petition of Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., S.D.N.Y., 1965, 248 F.Supp. 15, 26-27, aff’d 364 F.2d 118. Earning capacity is obviously related to life expectancy and work expectancy. As stated by Judge Day in Petition of Gulf Oil Corporation, D.R.I., 1963, 221 F.Supp. 1000, 1002:

“Life expectancy is not synonymous with work expectancy. It is not to be presumed that the decedent would be able or disposed to follow his usual occupation until the hour of his death even though he continued to enjoy good health and live for the maximum period accorded by said mortality table.”

In the instant case, the court has considered that the rigorous physical demands and hazards of commercial scallop fishing would compel a typical crew member, especially one domiciled in a foreign land, to retire at age 65. Except where stated, decedents’ earning capacity has been calculated on that basis. 2 With further reference to lost earning capacity, decedents’ earnings were derived from shares of the catch of scallops or other fish by the fishing vessels on which they worked. The MIDNIGHT SUN was less than three years old when she sank and was commanded by an experienced captain. Fishermen like the decedents customarily work on several vessels during their careers and the trend of earnings in the ports of Gloucester and New Bedford is an important consideration in estimating earning capacity. Considerable evidence was introduced of annual shares from 1961 to 1966 on vessels more or less comparable to the MIDNIGHT SUN.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
291 F. Supp. 353, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10130, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/petition-of-risdal-anderson-inc-mad-1968.