Peterson Outdoor Advertising v. City of Myrtle Beach

489 S.E.2d 630, 327 S.C. 230, 1997 S.C. LEXIS 159
Supreme Court of South Carolina·Decided August 11, 1997·No. 24672·Published·Cited by 19 cases

Opinion

*233 BURNETT, Justice:

City of Myrtle Beach (City) appeals the master-in-equity’s order approving Peterson Outdoor Advertising’s (Respondent’s) proposal for the placement of two billboards. We reverse.

FACTS

The Myrtle Beach Zoning Code, Article VI, §§ 601-607, establishes a Community Appearance Board (CAB) charged with the responsibility of reviewing proposed development in the City, including signage, to discourage unsightly and inharmonious development, to assure structures are properly related to their sites and surrounding sites and structures, and proposed structures do not detract from the surrounding properties. The CAB is authorized to deny an applicant a building permit if the proposed construction does not satisfy the criteria of § 604 of the CAB Ordinance even though the applicant is technically in compliance with other zoning and building requirements. The Ordinance provides for appeal de novo to the City Council from a decision of the CAB.

Respondent, an outdoor advertising business, sought building permits from the City for four proposed billboards within the municipal limits. 1 Respondent’s applications were approved by all appropriate departments of the City and the proposed billboards were in compliance with municipal zoning ordinances. However, while approving two of the applications, CAB denied the permit applications for construction of two of the billboards because it found the billboards created excessive “clutter” in the proposed areas and “did not look good.” After a de novo hearing, City Council upheld CAB’s decision to deny the permits. City Council concluded the proposed sites for the billboards were part of the City in need of aesthetic attention and the billboards at issue would not enhance the appeal of the City and would not serve to foster sightly and harmonious development.

The appeal to the circuit court was referred with finality to the master-in-equity who reversed City Council’s decision and *234 ordered the City to issue respondent the permits. The master found the CAB Ordinance to be valid and constitutional. Further, the master found City Council had failed to apply the criteria provided by § 604 of the CAB Ordinance in denying the permits and held a decision based solely on the CAB Ordinance’s objectives, § 601.2, resulted in an unconstitutional application of the ordinance, thus rendering City Council’s decision arbitrary.

ISSUES

I. In denying the applications did the CAB and City Council fail to apply the criteria of the CAB Ordinance, thereby rendering arbitrary and capricious decisions constituting an abuse of discretion and rendering the CAB Ordinance unconstitutional as applied?
II. Did the master-in-equity abuse his discretion in refusing to remand the billboard applications to the City Council for further consideration?

DISCUSSION

I.

Ordinances, such as the CAB Ordinance, are a valid exercise of a municipality’s authority. Municipalities are granted broad police powers to enact ordinances with respect to any subject which appears necessary and proper for the security, general welfare and convenience of the municipality. S.C.Code Ann. § 5-7-30 (Supp.1996). This authority includes the power to enact regulations based on aesthetic considerations. Town of Hilton Head Island v. Fine Liquors, Ltd., 302 S.C. 550, 397 S.E.2d 662 (1990); 6A McQuillen Municipal Corporations § 24.15 (3d ed.1997) (it is a valid exercise of a municipality’s police power to enact regulations that promote aesthetic considerations provided the regulation contains clear standards to limit the subjective exercise of discretion by the enforcing authorities). Municipalities are also granted broad zoning and planning powers. S.C.Code Ann. §§ 5-23-10 to - 740 (1976); S.C.Code Ann. §§ 6-29-310 to -1200 (Supp.1996). Further, a municipality may delegate the administration of its ordinances to a board provided the board’s discretion is suffi *235 ciently limited by clear rules and standards. 8A McQuillen Municipal Corporations §§ 25.214 & 25.215 (3d ed.1994); 8 McQuillen Municipal Corporations § 25.147 (3d ed.1991) (issuance of permits under zoning laws may rest in the discretion of a board provided the board’s discretion is restricted). Thus, the City validly exercised its authority in enacting the CAB Ordinance and in delegating the enforcement of this ordinance to the CAB.

The City claims both the CAB and City Council based their decisions on the criteria set forth in the CAB Ordinance; therefore, their decisions were not arbitrary and an abuse of discretion. We disagree.

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Peterson Outdoor Advertising v. City of Myrtle Beach, 489 S.E.2d 630, 327 S.C. 230, 1997 S.C. LEXIS 159 (S.C. 1997).

489 S.E.2d 630 (Peterson Outdoor Advertising v. City of Myrtle Beach) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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