Petersen Ex Rel. Petersen v. City & County of Honolulu

496 P.2d 4, 53 Haw. 440, 1972 Haw. LEXIS 132

• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court
• Decided: April 17, 1972
• Docket: 5113
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION OF THE COURT BY

ABE, J.

This suit, brought on behalf of Jill Petersen, a minor, arises from an accident which occurred at Hanauma Bay, a park near Honolulu owned and managed by the City and County of Honolulu. The accident occurred when plaintiff, who was just under two years of age at the time, stepped on coals in or near an open barbecue pit and was badly burned.

In her suit against the county, the jury returned a verdict for the county, specifically finding that it had not been negligent. After the verdict was returned, plaintiff moved for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Plaintiff appeals from the court’s denial of that motion.

Both of the parties assume that the plaintiff s failure to move for a directed verdict at the close of the case precludes her from arguing on appeal that a new trial should have been granted. We do not agree.

Though the plaintiff failed to move for a directed verdict she did not waive her right to move for a new trial, because the two motions raise separate issues. The motion for a directed verdict asks the trial court to rule that the movant’s opponent has introduced so little evidence to support a verdict in his favor that the case does not raise a jury question. The motion tests the sufficiency of the evidence to create a jury question. If there is any substantial evidence which might support a verdict for each side, the case should be submitted to the jury. Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir. 1969).

A motion for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, makes a more limited claim. The movant need not convince the court to rule that no substantial evidence supports his opponent’s case, but only that the verdict rendered for his opponent is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Thus, if each party has introduced enough evidence to make a jury case, but one party’s evidence clearly outweighs the other party’s evidence, a motion for a new trial could be granted even though a motion for-a directed verdict would have to be denied. Since the motions for a directed verdict and for a new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence raise different issues, a party’s failure to move for a directed Verdict cannot be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal from the trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial. Oliveras v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 431 F.2d 814, 816-17 (2d Cir. 1970), Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States, 264 F.2d 161, 165-66 (5th Cir. 1959).¹

Nor do we believe that a trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial is essentially unreviewable, as has been indicated in some cases. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuurn Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 247-48 (1940); Portman v. American Home Products Corp., 201 F.2d 847, 848 (2d Cir. 1953). We are, of course, extremely reluctant to reverse a trial judge’s assessment of the evidence. His conclusion that a verdict is not against the weight of the evidence is sustained unless “[w]e are of the opinion that . . . the undisputed evidence results in a verdict that is . . . without legal support [such that] justice requires a new trial despite counsel’s failure to move for a directed verdict prior to submission of the case to the jury.” Oliveras v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., supra at 817. Thus, in the proper case we have both the power and the duty to order a new trial either where the evidence is insufficient to support a verdict or where a verdict is clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence. Eastern Airlines v. Union Trust Co., 239 F.2d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 942 (1957); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States, 264 F.2d 161, 165-66 (5th Cir. 1959); Hatfield v. Seaboard Airline R.R. Co., 396 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1968);Oliveras v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 431 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1970).

The jury’s task was to determine whether the county, in the face of the reasonably foreseen risks, acted as would a reasonable man. Our task on review is to determine whether their decision on that issue was clearly erroneous. We believe that the evidence presented below was evenly balanced. The pit which resulted in the injury consisted of a half dozen concrete blocks lying directly on the ground and arranged in the shape of a “U.” Fires could be built in the center of the “U.” Some of the blocks may have been chipped in some places. The pits were completely open in front, and pictures taken after the accident showed ashes spilled onto the ground. Obviously the pits were not of the safest design possible.

Myer C. Symonds (Bouslog &- Symonds of counsel) for plaintiffs-appellants. Harold Hu, Deputy Corporation Counsel (JVilfred Iwai, Deputy Corporation Counsél, and Paul Devens, Corporation Counsel, on the brief, for defendant-appellee.

Despite this evidence, the jury found that the county had not been negligent in maintaining the pits. Though the case is a-close one, we hold that the verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The county’s evidence showed that the pits were frequently inspected and cleaned. The pits were completely visible. The jury might reasonably have concluded that chjldre'n who were incapable of recognizing the dangers presented by the pits would be closely supervised by their parents so that the risk would not have been foreseen by a reasonable man.²

Finally, we do not believe that this is a proper case for the application of the doctrine of strict liability. Apart from the technical issue raised by the fact that no instruction on strict liability was requested below, and that the plaintiff s attorney failed to brief and argue this question on appeal, we do not believe that the barbecue pits were so dangerous that the county should be strictly liable for plaintiff s injuries.

Affirmed.

1 Pooler v. Stewarts’ Pharmacies, Ltd., 42 Haw. 618 (1958), and Sheraton Hawaii Corp. v. Poston, 51 Haw. 142, 454 P.2d 369 (1969), do not warrant a different conclusion. In those cases we held that we would not enter a judgment in favor of a party who had not moved for a directed verdict. While the failure to move for a directed verdict might be considered a waiver of the right to ask for entry of a judgment, it cannot be considered a waiver of the right to request a new trial.

2 We are not invoking the doctrine of contributory negligence. We are merely stating that it was not clearly erroneous for the jury to find that the county is not required to foresee that children incapable of recognizing the dangers posed by a completely visible barbecue pit would be in the park without close supervision by their parents.