[J-71-2020] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT
BAER, C.J., SAYLOR, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.
JONATHAN PETERS, : No. 1 MAP 2020 : Appellant : Appeal from the Order of the : Commonwealth Court at No. 1835 : CD 2017 dated July 18, 2019 v. : Affirming the decision of the Workers : Compensation Appeal Board at No. : A16-1263 dated November 16, WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEAL : 2017. BOARD (CINTAS CORPORATION), : : ARGUED: September 16, 2020 Appellees :
OPINION
JUSTICE MUNDY DECIDED: November 17, 2021 Pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act),1 employers are liable to their
employees for injuries arising in the course of employment. Whether an injured employee
was in the course of his or her employment at the time of injury is a frequently litigated
question of law. The intermediate appellate courts of this Commonwealth have long
examined “course of employment” cases in two distinct ways, depending on whether the
employee in question is a stationary or traveling employee. See Rana v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeal Bd. (Asha Corp.), 170 A.3d 1279, 1284 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). With respect to
traveling employees, these courts have consistently applied the following presumption:
“[w]hen a traveling employee is injured after setting out on the business of his [or her]
employer, it is presumed that he [or she] was furthering the employer’s business at the
1 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-2710. time of the injury” unless the employer rebuts the presumption by showing that the
employee’s actions, at some point prior to the injury, “were so foreign to and removed
from his [or her] usual employment that they constitute an abandonment of that
employment.” Roman v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Dep’t of Envtl. Res.), 616 A.2d
128, 130 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992). The foregoing rebuttable presumption is sometimes
referred to as the traveling employee doctrine, the continuous coverage rule, or the
commercial traveler rule. This Court has never specifically addressed the traveling
employee doctrine; therefore, we granted review to consider the contours of a traveling
employee’s course of employment.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
At all times relevant to this appeal, Jonathan Peters (Claimant) was employed by
Cintas Corporation (Employer) as a uniform sales representative. In this position
Claimant worked half-days in Employer’s Allentown, Pennsylvania branch office on
Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays, and traveled the remainder of those days, as well
as Thursdays and Fridays, to meet with, and present products to, potential customers in
the region around Reading, Pennsylvania. Following his last sales appointment on
February 27, 2015, Claimant attended an Employer-sponsored event at a pub in
Allentown called the Tilted Kilt. After leaving the event Claimant was injured in a motor
vehicle accident. Alleging that the motor vehicle accident occurred during the course of
his employment with Employer, Claimant filed a claim petition seeking partial disability
benefits from February 28, 2015 to April 2, 2015, and total disability benefits from April 3,
2015 onwards. Employer responded by filing an answer, in which it specifically denied
that Claimant was in the course of his employment at the time of the motor vehicle
accident.
[J-71-2020] - 2 Claimant’s claim petition was assigned to a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ),
who, upon agreement of the parties, bifurcated the matter to initially determine whether
Claimant was in the course of his employment at the time of the motor vehicle incident,
such that the injuries are compensable under the Act, before examining the medical
component of the claim. The WCJ held hearings on the course of employment issue on
February 10, 2016, and April 1, 2016.
At the first hearing before the WCJ, Claimant testified in support of his claim
petition. Claimant testified that February 27, 2015, a Friday, was a full sales day for him
and that he met with customers in the northern portion of his sales territory that day.
WCJ’s Decision, Finding of Fact (FOF) ¶ 5. He stated that after his last sales appointment
that day he drove to Allentown to attend the event at the Tilted Kilt. Id. He indicated
during his testimony that he passed the highway exit to his home on his way to the Tilted
Kilt. Id.
By way of background, Claimant testified that his sales manager, Michael Cintron,
had invited the sales representatives to the event earlier that week. Id. During his
testimony Claimant described the event as a celebration to mark the end of a “sales blitz”
week. Id. According to Claimant, these types of events were held on prior occasions
during sales blitzes. Id. Claimant believed these events, including the one on February
27, 2015, to be “sort of” mandatory. Id.
With respect to the event itself, Claimant testified that after arriving at the Tilted Kilt
on February 27, 2015, there was a recap of the work performed during the sales blitz. Id.
He stated that appetizers and drinks, which were ultimately paid for by Employer, were
served. Id. Claimant testified that he left the Tilted Kilt at approximately 8:00 p.m. and
that the motor vehicle accident occurred on his way home from the Tilted Kilt. Id.
[J-71-2020] - 3 At the second hearing before the WCJ, Employer presented the testimony of
Theodore Smith, a sales representative with Employer, and Michael Cintron, a sales
manager with Employer, in defense of Claimant’s claim petition. Consistent with
Claimant’s testimony, Theodore Smith testified that Michael Cintron had invited the sales
representatives to the event at the Tilted Kilt and that the appetizers and drinks served
were ultimately paid for by Employer. Id. ¶ 6. Michael Cintron confirmed these facts
during his testimony, adding that these types of events were routinely held during sales
blitzes as a voluntary perk. Id. ¶ 7.
Contrary to Claimant’s testimony, both Theodore Smith and Michael Cintron
emphasized the voluntariness and social nature of the event during their testimony. Id.
¶¶ 6-7. Theodore Smith described the event as a chance for the sales representatives to
relax after the sales blitz. Id. ¶ 6. Both Theodore Smith and Michael Cintron rejected
Claimant’s representation that work performed during the sales blitz was recapped at the
event. Id. Theodore Smith specifically testified that work was not discussed during the
event, stating that the conversations at the event were general “chit chat.” Id.
With respect to the motor vehicle accident, Michael Cintron testified that he
received a call from Claimant sometime after 8:00 p.m. on February 27, 2015, reporting
that he had been in a motor vehicle accident. Id. ¶ 7. Michael Cintron further testified
that during the phone conversation Claimant stated that he was not on his way home from
the Tilted Kilt at the time of the motor vehicle accident, but from some other event. Id.
However, Michael Cintron indicated during his testimony that he could not recall
specifically where Claimant said he was coming from. Id.
Following the second hearing before the WCJ, Claimant submitted additional
testimony in support of his claim petition, which was given at a deposition on April 16,
2016. During his deposition, Claimant maintained that work was discussed at the event
[J-71-2020] - 4 at the Tilted Kilt and, in doing so, testified as to a specific conversation he had with Adam
Rehl, a production manager with Employer. Id. ¶ 9. In response, Employer submitted
the testimony of Adam Rehl, which was given at a deposition on May 18, 2016. He
testified, in relevant part, that he was at the Tilted Kilt on February 27, 2015, socially and
not as part of the event. Id. ¶ 8. During his testimony, Adam Rehl stated that he had no
recollection of seeing or interacting with Claimant at the Tilted Kilt on February 27, 2015.
Id.
In a decision circulated November 1, 2016, the WCJ denied and dismissed
Claimant’s claim petition. Therein, the WCJ explained that for his injuries to be
compensable under the Act, Claimant had the burden of demonstrating that he was in the
course of his employment with Employer at the time of the motor vehicle accident, which
required him to show that he was actually engaged in the furtherance of Employer’s
business or affairs at the time of the accident. Id., Conclusion of Law (COL) ¶ 2; see
Section 301(a), (c)(1) of the Act, 77 P.S. §§ 411(a), 431. In reviewing whether Claimant
met this burden, the WCJ, as set forth in relevant part above, summarized the testimony
presented by the parties. The WCJ credited in part and rejected in part Claimant’s
testimony and credited the testimonies of Theodore Smith, Michael Cintron, and Adam
Rehl. WCJ’s Decision, FOF ¶ 10. The WCJ did not specifically identify the portions of
Claimant’s testimony that he deemed credible. However, the WCJ specifically rejected
Claimant’s representations that the event at the Tilted Kilt was mandatory and that work
performed during the sales blitz was discussed at the event in light of the consistent
testimony of Theodore Smith and Michael Cintron indicating the opposite. Id. The WCJ
wrote that he did not doubt that work was discussed at the event but that work-related
discussions do “not transform every meeting into a business meeting.” Id.
[J-71-2020] - 5 Based upon the credited testimony, the WCJ concluded that Claimant failed to
demonstrate that he was acting in furtherance of Employer’s business or affairs at the
time of the motor vehicle accident. In doing so, the WCJ relied on Brown v. Workmen’s
Compensation Appeal Board (Liken Employment Nursing Services), 588 A.2d 1014 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1991), and Canning v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Pa. Senate), No.
985 C.D. 2014, 2015 WL 5121496 (Pa. Cmwlth. Jan. 9, 2015), neither of which involved
the traveling employee doctrine. The claimant in Brown, who was not a traveling
employee, was “struck by a motor vehicle while crossing a public roadway after leaving
[her e]mployer’s annual Christmas party held at [the e]mployer’s office.” Brown, 588 A.2d
at 1015. Thereafter, the claimant filed a claim petition “alleging that she was in the course
of her employment at the time of the automobile-pedestrian accident.” Id. After holding
several hearings, a referee determined the claimant was no longer in the course of her
employment at the time of the injury and the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
(WCAB) affirmed. The claimant then appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which
affirmed. Before the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that the WCAB erred by
failing to apply one of the exceptions to what is commonly referred to as the “going and
coming rule,” which provides that
injuries sustained by an employee traveling to and from work are generally not compensable under the Act unless[:] (1) the employment contract includes transportation; (2) the employee had no fixed place of employment; (3) the employee was on a special assignment; or (4) special circumstances indicate that the employee was furthering the business of the employer.
Id. at 1016. The court rejected the claimant’s argument, concluding that the going and
coming rule was not implicated in the case because the “[c]laimant was neither going to
nor coming from work when she was injured.” Id.
[J-71-2020] - 6 Notwithstanding the inapplicability of the going and coming rule, the
Commonwealth Court did not end its analysis there. The court examined whether the
claimant’s off-premises injury was sustained while she was engaged in the furtherance of
her employer’s business activities. The court ultimately concluded that even if the party
benefited the employer by “cultivating interpersonal relationships,” the claimant was not
furthering her “[e]mployer’s business at the time of her accident” because she was injured
“while returning from [the e]mployer’s party and not while attending the social event.” Id.
at 1017 (emphasis omitted). As such, the Commonwealth Court agreed with the WCJ
and the WCAB that the claimant was not in the course of her employment at the time of
the accident.
In Canning, the claimant, who was not a traveling employee, was injured when she
fell down a flight of stairs while leaving a party hosted by a friend of her employer. The
claimant filed a claim petition alleging that she was in her course of employment at the
time of the accident. In its review of the case the Commonwealth Court, relying on Brown,
concluded that regardless of whether the party was “designed to foster morale,” the
claimant was injured while leaving the party and not during the party itself. Canning, 2015
WL 5121496 at *5. Therefore, the Commonwealth Court determined that the claimant
was not in the course of her employment at the time of the accident.
Citing Brown and Canning, the WCJ concluded that even if the event at the Tilted
Kilt could be construed as furthering Employer’s business or affairs as a “relationship-
building or team-building activity,” Claimant could not be considered to have been
furthering his Employer’s business at the time of the motor vehicle accident because it
occurred after he left the event. WCJ’s Decision, COL ¶ 2.
The WCJ did not specifically identify or discuss the traveling employee doctrine in
his decision. However, the WCJ did acknowledge that Claimant “is considered a traveling
[J-71-2020] - 7 employee” and that “consideration is given to that presumption that he has no fixed place
of employment.” Id. Nonetheless, the WCJ concluded Claimant could not be considered
in his course of employment at any point beyond when he, admittedly, passed the
highway exit to his home to attend the event at the Tilted Kilt because the event was
voluntary and social in nature.2 Id. Accordingly, the WCJ determined that Claimant was
not in the course of his employment with Employer at the time of the motor vehicle
accident, and therefore, the injuries sustained by Claimant are not compensable under
the Act.3
Claimant appealed the WCJ’s decision to the WCAB. Without taking additional
evidence, the WCAB affirmed by opinion and order dated November 16, 2017. Claimant
then appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The Commonwealth Court, considering the
case en banc, affirmed in a published opinion and order authored by the Honorable Anne
E. Covey. See Peters v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Cintas Corp.), 214 A.3d 738 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2019).
The Commonwealth Court began by explaining that it “has analyzed course of
employment cases in two ways depending on whether the claimant is a traveling or
stationary employee” and that with respect to traveling employees it has applied the
presumption afforded by the traveling employee doctrine. Id. at 740 (quoting Rana, 170
A.3d at 128). The court examined whether Claimant was a traveling employee, such that
2 Based upon his use of the word “presumption,” this Court believes the WCJ considered
and rejected application of the presumption afforded by the traveling employee doctrine on the grounds that Claimant abandoned his employment at some point prior to the motor vehicle accident. 3 The WCJ found “as fact that Claimant was not within the course and scope of his
employment at the time of” the motor vehicle accident. WCJ’s Decision, FOF ¶ 10. However, despite the WCJ’s labeling of this conclusion as a finding of fact, the question of whether an employee was in the course of his or her employment at the time of injury is a question of law. Wachs v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Am. Off. Sys.), 884 A.2d 858, 862 (Pa. 2005).
[J-71-2020] - 8 he would be entitled to the presumption, and in doing so applied the following two part
test: (1) “[w]hether the claimant’s job duties involved travel” and (2) “whether the claimant
works on the employer’s premises or whether the claimant has no fixed place of work.”
Id. (quoting Holler v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Tri Wire Eng’g Solutions, Inc.), 104
A.3d 68, 71 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014)). Acknowledging that Claimant met the criteria of a
traveling employee, and that the facts of the case were sufficient to give rise to the
presumption that Claimant was within the course of his employment at the time of the
motor vehicle accident, the court turned to whether Employer rebutted the presumption.
In doing so, the Commonwealth Court reviewed and focused on the decisions in Maher
v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 218 A.2d 593 (Pa. Super. 1966) and Oakes v. Workmen’s
Compensation Appeal Board (Pennsylvania Electric Co.), 469 A.2d 723 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1984).
The underlying facts of Maher and Oakes are similar. Both cases involved
employees who were fatally injured on their way home from work-related travel. The
reviewing courts examined whether the employees were in the course of their
employment at the time of the fatal accidents and in doing so whether the presumption
afforded by the traveling employee doctrine continued to apply at the time of the
accidents. The courts ultimately concluded the respective employees were within their
course of employment at the time of the fatal accidents, reasoning that “[t]he homeward
trip [is] a necessary part of the business exclusion.” Maher, 218 A.2d at 596; Oakes, 669
A.2d at 726. In the absence of evidence that the employees had abandoned their
employment prior to the fatal accidents, the reviewing courts determined the employees
remained in their course of employment at the time of the fatal accidents as they had not
yet arrived home. Maher, 218 A.2d at 596 (setting forth that under the traveling employee
doctrine, a traveling employee’s “continuity of employment is not broken unless the
[J-71-2020] - 9 employe’s activity constitutes an abandonment of employment.”); Oakes, 669 A.2d at
726.
Applying Maher and Oakes to Claimant’s case, the Commonwealth Court
determined that Claimant’s homeward trip ended when he passed the highway exit to his
home. As such, the Commonwealth Court concluded that Claimant was not in the course
of employment beyond this point, specifically holding that Claimant’s “travel from the
Tilted Kilt to his home cannot be considered in the course of his employment.” Peters,
214 A.3d at 743. In reaching this decision, the Commonwealth Court rejected Claimant’s
argument that because the event at the Tilted Kilt was Employer-sponsored, he remained
in the course of his employment in his travel to the event, during the event, and on his
way home from the event. The court wrote that to accept Claimant’s argument it would
have to reverse the WCJ’s credibility determinations that the event was voluntary and
social in nature, an act which it is not permitted to do. Id. (citing Jacobs v. Unemployment
Comp. Bd. of Review (Bridgeview Partners), 137 A.3d 1260 (Pa. 2016) (per curiam order)
(reversing a decision for the Commonwealth Court because “it substituted its own
assessment of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses for that of the
Unemployment Compensation Review Board[].”)). Accordingly, the Commonwealth
Court upheld the denial of Claimant’s claim petition.
The Honorable Michael H. Wojcik authored a concurring opinion in which he
concurred with the result reached by the majority but “disagree[d] with its analysis insofar
as it emphasizes the location of the activity instead of whether the activity was
employment-related.” Id. at 748 (Wojcik, J., concurring). According to Judge Wojcik,
Claimant ceased to be in the course of his employment upon attending the event,
because, as the WCJ found, “the event was voluntary and not work-related.” Id. Based
[J-71-2020] - 10 upon this determination, Judge Wojcik concluded that “while [C]laimant may be a traveling
employee, he was not at the time of his injury.” Id.
The Honorable Reneé Cohn Jubelirer authored a dissenting opinion in which she
disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that Claimant was not within the course of his
employment at the time of the motor vehicle accident. She believed the presumption
afforded by the traveling employee doctrine continued to apply through the motor vehicle
accident, writing that she could not conclude “that driving by one’s exit home on a highway
to attend an event organized and paid for by one’s employer . . . to constitute
abandonment of one’s employment.” Id. at 747 (emphasis omitted) (Cohn Jubelirer, J.,
dissenting).
Judge Cohn Jubelirer did not agree with the majority’s emphasis on the location of
Claimant’s home in holding that Claimant was no longer in the course of his employment
after passing the highway exit to his home. She pointed out that “[p]resumably, had
Claimant’s home been located on the other side of the Tilted Kilt, or his travels taken him
back to town in a different direction, the [m]ajority would not have found that he
abandoned his employment.” Id. Instead, Judge Cohn Jubelirer focused on the nature
of the event at the Tilted Kilt.
Judge Cohn Jubelirer acknowledged in her dissenting opinion that the WCJ found
the event to be voluntary, but she did not consider that fact to be dispositive. In this
regard, she relied on Investors Diversified Services v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal
Board (Howard), 520 A.2d 958 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987). In that case, the claimant, a traveling
employee, attended a Christmas party hosted by his employer at the home of one of the
employer’s managers. The claimant was injured in a motor vehicle accident on his way
home from the party. In its consideration of the case, the Commonwealth Court reviewed
whether the claimant’s injury occurred during the course of his employment. The
[J-71-2020] - 11 claimant’s employer argued that the claimant’s injury was not sustained in the course of
employment as the party “was a purely social function unrelated to the employer’s
business affairs.” Id. at 959. The court disagreed, concluding that the party furthered the
employer’s business and affairs by “foster[ing] good relationships” between employees.
Id. The Commonwealth Court ultimately determined that the claimant was in the course
of his employment during and on his way home from the party.
Based upon Investors Diversified Services, Judge Cohn Jubelirer wrote that “[j]ust
because attendance was not required does not mean the event was not work related.”
Peters, 214 A.3d at 747(Cohn Jubelirer, J., dissenting). She stated that she could not
conclude that Claimant’s attendance of the event at the Tilted Kilt to be so foreign to and
removed from his usual employment as to constitute abandonment of employment in light
of the following: “(1) Claimant’s employer . . . invited him to the social event; (2) Employer
organized and paid for the social event; (3) Employer regularly held a social event during
sales blitzes; and (4) the social event occurred at the end of Claimant’s workday.” Id. at
744. Accordingly, Judge Cohn Jubelirer opined that she would have reversed the denial
of Claimant’s claim petition and remanded for the WCJ to consider the medical
component of the claim.
Claimant then initiated the instant appeal by the filing of a petition for allowance of
appeal, which we granted to consider the following two issues:
(1) A traveling employee is entitled to a presumption that he is in the course and scope of employment when traveling to or from work unless his actions at the time of [the] accident are so foreign and removed from his usual employment to constitute abandonment of employment. What constitutes an abandonment of employment such that a travelling employee is entitled to benefits under the . . . Act?
(2) A traveling employee is entitled to a presumption that he is in the course and scope of employment when traveling to or from work unless his actions at the time of the accident are so foreign and removed from his usual
[J-71-2020] - 12 employment to constitute abandonment of employment. Consequently, is an injury compensable under the . . . Act when an employee is injured while returning home after attending a work-sponsored social event?
Peters v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Cintas Corp.), 223 A.3d 238 (Table) (Pa. 2020)
(per curiam order).
II. Parties’ Arguments
As his framing of the issues reflects, Claimant advocates for application of the
traveling employee doctrine in this case. Claimant submits that he is a traveling employee
and, as such, is entitled to a presumption that he was in the course of his employment at
the time of the motor vehicle accident. He disagrees with the Commonwealth Court’s
determination that he ceased to be in the course of his employment after he passed the
highway exit to his home, stating that “this analysis ignores the fact that the event [he]
attended after driving past his home exit was [E]mployer-sponsored.” Claimant’s Brief
(Br.) at 32.
Claimant contends that we should adopt the rationale set forth in Judge Cohn
Jubelirer’s dissenting opinion, and hold that a traveling employee’s attendance of a work-
sponsored social event does not break the continuum of employment. As such, it is
Claimant’s position that he remained in the course of his employment during and on his
way home from the Tilted Kilt, including at the time of the motor vehicle accident.
Accordingly, Claimant requests we reverse the decision of the Commonwealth Court
upholding the denial of his claim petition.
Employer responds that application of the traveling employee doctrine in his case
is “unnecessary and a red herring.” Employer’s Br. at 12. Citing Brown, Employer
contends that “[t]he Commonwealth Court has held that injuries that occur while
commuting to or from [] a non-mandatory non work-related social event is not within the
[J-71-2020] - 13 course and scope of employment.” Id. at 5-6. As Claimant, like the claimant in Brown,
was injured while “allegedly driving home from a non-mandatory, non-business meeting,”
Employer argues Claimant was not in the course of his employment at the time of the
motor vehicle accident. Employer’s Br. at 15.
Furthermore, Employer contends that the traveling employee doctrine should not
apply in general claim cases such as this one. Employer submits that we should limit
application of the traveling employee doctrine to fatal claim cases. Employer argues that
there can be no presumption in favor of a claimant in a general injury claim case because
under the Act “the claimant has the burden of proof that he or she was injured in the
course and scope of employment and is alive to provide testimony to that end.” Id.
(emphasis omitted). In arguing that application of the doctrine should be limited to fatal
claim cases, Employer contends that fatal claim petitions are “unique from a [c]laim
[p]etition because the decedent, of course, does not have the opportunity to testify and
cannot provide specific testimony about the circumstances that led to the fatal claim.” Id.
at 26.
Alternatively, if we decide that the traveling employee doctrine does apply in this
case, Employer submits that Claimant abandoned his employment prior to the motor
vehicle accident. Employer contends that Claimant abandoned his employment when he
passed his home and proceeded to the Tilted Kilt because “[h]is attendance was not
mandatory for his employment” nor was the event “work-related.” Id. at 38. As such,
Employer argues Claimant was not in the course of his employment at the time of the
motor vehicle accident. Accordingly, Employer asks that we affirm the decision of the
Commonwealth Court.
[J-71-2020] - 14 III. Scope and Standard of Review
Preliminarily, before we turn to the merits of the parties’ arguments, we set forth
our scope and standard of review. This Court’s “standard of review of an agency decision
is limited to determining whether there has been a constitutional violation, an error of law,
or a violation of agency procedure, and whether necessary findings of fact are supported
by substantial evidence.” Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Hilton), 117
A.3d 232, 241 (Pa. 2015); see also Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2
Pa.C.S. § 704. The ultimate issue in this case is whether Claimant was in the course of
his employment with Employer at the time of the motor vehicle accident such that his
injuries are compensable under the Act. The issue of “whether an employee is acting
within the course of his employment at the time of his injury or death is a question of law
and is reviewable de novo.” Wachs v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Am. Off. Sys.), 884
A.2d 858, 862 (Pa. 2005). With our scope and standard of review in mind, we turn to the
merits of this appeal.
IV. The Act
As this appeal concerns whether Claimant’s injuries are compensable under the
Act, we begin our analysis of the merits by reviewing the relevant sections of the Act. In
reviewing the Act, we must be mindful that “the Act is remedial legislation” and, therefore,
“is subject to a liberal construction to effectuate the Act’s purpose of benefiting injured
workers and their dependents.” Gallie v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Fichtel & Sachs
Indus.), 859 A.2d 1286, 1291-92 (Pa. 2004); see also Section 1928 of the Statutory
Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928 (listing the classes of statutes that are to be
strictly construed and setting forth that all other statutes “shall be liberally construed to
effect their objects and to promote justice.”).
[J-71-2020] - 15 Pursuant to Section 301(a) of the Act, “[e]very employer shall be liable for
compensation for personal injury to, or for the death of each employe, by an injury in the
course of his employment.” 77 P.S. § 431. Thus, an injury is compensable under the Act
if it was sustained in the course of employment. Section 301(c)(1) of the Act defines the
terms “injury,” “personal injury,” and the phrase “injury arising in the course of
employment,” as follows:
The terms “injury” and “personal injury” as used in this [A]ct, shall be construed to mean an injury to an employe, regardless of physical condition, except as provided under subsection (f), arising in the course of his employment and related thereto . . . . The term “injury arising in the course of his employment” as used in this article, shall not include an injury caused by an act of a third person intended to injure the employe because the reasons personal to him, and not directed against him as an employe or because of his employment; nor shall it include injuries sustained while the employe is operating a motor vehicle provided by the employer if the employe is not otherwise in the course of employment at the time of injury; but shall include all other injuries sustained while the employe is actually engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer, whether upon the employer’s premises or elsewhere, and shall include all injuries caused by the condition of the premises or by the operation of the employer’s business or affairs thereon, sustained by the employe, who, though not so engaged, is injured upon the premises occupied by or under the control of the employer, or upon which the employer’s business or affairs are being carried on, the employe’s presence thereon being required by nature of his employment.
77 P.S. § 411(1).
As we previously recognized, the foregoing statutory language is “somewhat
unwieldy at first blush” but “distills to a few simple rules.” US Airways, Inc. v. Workers’
Comp. Appeal Bd. (Bockelman), 221 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. 2019). Broken down, the
foregoing statutory language reflects that an employee’s injury is considered to have
arisen in the course of employment in the following two circumstances:
[J-71-2020] - 16 The first is when an employee is injured on or off the employer’s premises while engaged in furtherance of the employer’s business or affairs. . . .
The second type of injury that arises in the course of employment occurs when an employee is not furthering [the] employer’s business or affairs but nonetheless: (1) “is on the premises occupied or under the control of the employer, or upon which the employer’s business or affairs are being carried on;” (2) “is required by the nature of his employment to be present on his employer’s premises;” and (3) “sustained injuries caused by the condition of the premises or by operation of the employer’s business or affairs thereon.”
Id. (quoting Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Slaugenhaupt), 376 A.2d
271, 273 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1977)). It is the injured claimant’s burden to demonstrate that his
or her injury was sustained in the course of employment. O’Rourke v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeal Bd. (Gartland), 125 A.3d 1184, 1189 (Pa. 2015).
In the present matter, Claimant was injured off Employer’s premises. Therefore,
pursuant to Section 301(c)(1) of the Act, Claimant must have been furthering Employer’s
business and affairs at the time of the motor vehicle accident for the accident to be
considered to have arisen in the course of his employment with Employer.
V. The Presumption
Before this Court, Claimant argues that he was in the course of his employment at
the time of the motor vehicle accident. In doing so, Claimant implicates the traveling
employee doctrine and contends that under the doctrine he is presumed to have been in
the course of his employment at the time of the motor vehicle accident. As indicated
above, this Court has never specifically addressed the traveling employee doctrine. In
light of this, we consider it necessary to examine the doctrine and its development in
Pennsylvania before considering its applicability in this case.
[J-71-2020] - 17 Although we have never specifically addressed the traveling employee doctrine,
its development in Pennsylvania can be traced to three early twentieth century course of
employment4 cases decided by this Court. The first of these cases is Haddock v.
Edgewater Steel Co., 106 A. 196 (Pa. 1919). In that case, Haddock was employed by a
steel company in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. In that position, Haddock was sent by his
employer to Lowellville, Ohio to examine the equipment of another steel company.
Haddock traveled to Lowellville by rail and after making the required examination,
returned to Pittsburgh the same day by rail. After returning to Pittsburgh, “while on the
way to his residence,” Haddock “was accidentally struck by an automobile, at a street
crossing, which causally resulted in his death.” Id. In our review, we considered whether
Haddock was in the course of his employment at the time of the fatal accident, ultimately
concluding that he was. In our decision, we noted that we must apply a liberal
construction to the phrase “course of employment” and in doing so concluded that we
would consider Haddock to be within the course of his employment at the time of the fatal
accident because there was no evidence that he “ceased to be active in the furtherance
of [his employer’s] business or affairs” before the accident. Id. at 197.
After Haddock, we decided Palko v. Taylor-McCoy Coal & Coke Co., 137 A. 625
(Pa. 1927). In that case, Palko was employed by a coal company. After finishing his
regular work, his employer instructed him to perform extra work. Palko left his employer’s
premises “for home to get something to eat, intending to return” after his meal to perform
the extra work. Id. at 626. On his way home, Palko was fatally injured in an accident on
the land of another coal company. In our review of whether Palko was in the course of
4 In considering the development of the traveling employee doctrine, we note that while
the Act has been revised several times since its enactment, the Act has always defined an injury arising in the course of employment as one sustained where the employee is “actually engaged in furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer.” See 77 P.S. § 411.
[J-71-2020] - 18 his employment at the time of the fatal accident, we examined Haddock and noted that
under that decision an employee injured while off premises must be “actually engaged in
the performance of some yet incompleted [sic] business of his employer.” Id. We
concluded that Palko was not in the course of his employment at the time of his fatal
accident because he was injured in the interval between his regular work and the extra
work he was to perform on his return to the employer’s premises. We explained that an
employee’s “‘course of employment’ does not cover all the time during the day” and
specifically noted that an employee’s course of employment “does not extend to intervals
of time between regular working hours, nor to the interval between regular working hours
and a new, additional, or different work to be undertaken at another period of time, in
which intervals the employee leaves the premises” as the employee is not engaged in the
furtherance of the employer’s business or affairs during these times. Id. at 626.
Following Palko, we decided Krapf v. Arthur, 146 A. 894 (Pa. 1929) (per curiam
opinion). In that case, Krapf was employed by a wholesale lumber business as a
bookkeeper and a traveling salesman. Krapf split his time equally between these two
roles. In his role as a traveling salesman, Krapf went on a two day selling trip. After
returning from the trip he spent the night at his house. The next morning Krapf took a
trolley from his house to his employer’s workplace and while on the trolley “he was
accidentally injured in a collision between two trolley cars.” Krapf v. Arthur, 95 Pa. Super.
468, 470 (1929). In its review of the case, the Superior Court considered whether Krapf
was in the course of his employment at the time of injury. In doing so, the court, citing
Palko, noted that while the “general rule is that an injury sustained by an ordinary
employee while going to and from work not on the employer’s premises[] is not
compensable” there are special circumstances where an employee’s time going to and
[J-71-2020] - 19 coming from his or her employer’s premises is within the course of employment.5 Id. at
471. In this regard, the Superior Court, relying on Haddock, wrote that “the responsibility
of the employer is extended” to cover injuries where an employee, “although [injured] off
the premises, is actually engaged in furtherance of the master’s business” at the time of
injury. Id.
The Superior Court ultimately concluded that there were special circumstances in
Krapf’s case to exempt him from the general rule that course of employment does not
include the time traveling to or from work. The court wrote that Krapf “was in the course
of his employment until he returned to [his employer’s] place of business . . . and reported
the results of his [sales] trip to his employer, unless in the meantime he temporarily
departed from his employer’s service.” Id. at 472. The court acknowledged that Krapf’s
course of employment “was suspended when he got to his home” but “immediately
resumed when he boarded the trolley car the next morning because his duty of reporting
the results of his trip to the defendant had not been performed.” Id. at 473. As Krapf was
injured while going to his employer’s premises to report the results of his sales trip, the
Superior Court concluded that he was furthering his employer’s affairs at the time of his
injury and, therefore, in the course of his employment at the time of injury. Upon review
of the Superior Court’s opinion, we affirmed. We reasoned that Krapf, “who had been on
a business trip, had not completed his mission at the time of the accident” as he was
injured while “on the way to his employer’s office . . . to report the results of his work.”
Krapf, 146 A. at 895.
While we did not refer to a “presumption” in Haddock, Palko, or Krapf, these cases,
when read together, reflect a rule quite similar to the traveling employee doctrine, in that
5 As set forth above, today, this rule is commonly referred to as the going and coming
rule. See Brown, 588 A.2d at 1016; see also Wachs, 884 A.2d at 861.
[J-71-2020] - 20 we held we consider an employee on work-related travel to be in the course of his or her
employment during the travels unless there was evidence that the employee ceased to
be acting in furtherance of his or her employer’s business and affairs.
The Superior Court issued the first appellate decision recognizing a presumption
in favor of traveling employees in Beaver v. George W. Boyd Co., 161 A. 900 (Pa. Super.
1932). In that case, Beaver was a traveling salesman employed by two different
companies, the George W. Boyd Company and the Tri State Butter Company. While on
a sales trip, Beaver suffered fatal injuries in a motor vehicle accident. His widow sought
compensation under the Act from the George W. Boyd Company. In defending the claim,
the company argued that in the absence of proof of where Beaver was driving to at the
time of the fatal accident, it was just as likely that he was on his way to see customers of
the Tri State Butter Company as customers of the George W. Boyd Company. The record
reflected that up until the time of the fatal accident Beaver had been exclusively calling
on customers of the George W. Boyd Company. As such, the specially presiding judge
reviewing the claim awarded benefits to the widow, writing “that the presumption of the
law is that, having shown [an employee] to have started out upon the business of the
employer, the presumption would be that he continued in that business until evidence
appears to show the contrary.” Id. at 901. In its review of the case, the Superior Court
affirmatively quoted the foregoing language in upholding the award of benefits.
The Superior Court considered the scope of employment of traveling employees
at length in Combs v. Cole Brothers Circus, 67 A.2d 791 (Pa. Super. 1949). In that case,
the Superior Court considered whether the employee of a traveling circus, who was fatally
injured while traveling from a performance in Greensburg, Pennsylvania to a performance
in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, was in the course of his employment at the time of a fatal
accident. Like we did in Haddock, the Superior Court determined that it must liberally
[J-71-2020] - 21 construe the phrase “course of employment.” Combs, 67 A.2d at 794. In doing so, the
Superior Court determined that “[t]he course of employment of a traveling worker is
necessarily broader than that of an ordinary employee” and, therefore, “[i]f the work of
[an] employe necessities travel, during such travel, the employe is in the course of his
employment” unless “the employe [] remove[s] himself from the course of employment or
abandon[s] his employment.” Id. The Superior Court ultimately concluded that because
his job required him to travel with the circus and because he was traveling with the circus
at the time of his fatal accident, the employee was in the course of his employment at the
time of the fatal accident.
After Combs, the Superior Court clarified what actions constitute abandonment.
In Spry v. Polt, 142 A.2d 484 (Pa. Super. 1958), the Superior Court held that
abandonment of employment occurs when an employee’s actions are “foreign to and
removed from his usual employment.” Id. at 486. In Mitchel v. Holland Furnace Co., 149
A.2d 662 (Pa. Super. 1959), the Superior Court determined a traveling employee’s “slight
and temporary departure from work and administering to [] personal comforts or
conveniences” such as procuring food, drink, or lodging, “does not break the course of
employment.” Id. at 665.
After its inception in 1968, the Commonwealth Court was charged with reviewing
appeals in workers’ compensation cases. In its review of course of employment cases
involving traveling employees, the Commonwealth Court has continued to apply the
presumption developed by the Superior Court. See, e.g., Total Assocs. v. Workers’ Comp
Appeal Bd. (Sternick), 814 A.2d 837 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003); Southland Cable Co. v. Workers’
Comp. Appeal Bd. (Emmett), 598 A.2d 329 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991); Port Auth. of Allegheny
Cty. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Stevens), 452 A.2d 902 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982) (non-
fatal claim case); Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. v. Borough of Plum, 340 A.2d 637 (Pa.
[J-71-2020] - 22 Cmwlth. 1975). As it stands developed today, the traveling employee doctrine provides
as follows:
When a traveling employee is injured after setting out on the business of his employer, it is presumed that he was furthering the employer’s business at the time of the injury. The employer bears the burden of rebutting the presumption. To meet its burden the employer must prove that the claimant’s actions were so foreign to and removed from his usual employment that they constitute an abandonment of that employment. Temporary departures from the work route for the purpose of administering to the comforts of an off-the-premises employee, including authorized breaks for lunch, will not interrupt the continuity of the employee’s course of employment.
Roman, 616 A.2d at 130-31 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The traveling employee doctrine is not unique to Pennsylvania. The Supreme
Court of Washington reviewed and applied the traveling employee doctrine for the first
time in Ball-Foster Glass Container Co. v. Giovanelli, 177 P.3d 692 (Wash. 2008). In
reviewing the traveling employee doctrine the court recognized that it is “the prevailing
rule throughout the United States.” Id. at 696 (citing Buczynski v. Indus. Comm’n of Utah,
934 P.2d 1169, 1173 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (examining course of employment decisions
across the country including Roman)). The Supreme Court of Washington set forth the
doctrine in similar terms as the Commonwealth Court did in Roman, writing that under the
doctrine “[a] traveling employee is generally considered to be in the course of employment
continuously during [an] entire [work-related] trip, except during a distinct departure on a
personal errand.” Id. The court explored the rationale behind the doctrine, explaining
that
[t]he rationale for th[e] extended coverage is that when travel is an essential part of employment, the risks associated with the necessity of eating, sleeping, and ministering to personal needs away from home are an incident of the employment even though the employee is not actually working at the time of injury.
[J-71-2020] - 23 Id. at 696-67. The court further explained that “[t]he rule recognizes that a traveling
employee is subject to hazards [he or she] would otherwise have the option of avoiding
and that hazards of travel become the hazards of the employment.” Id. at 697 (quoting
Chavez v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 27 P.3d 1011, 1014 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001)).
Upon review of the traveling employee doctrine, we adopt the doctrine as set forth
in Roman. We must liberally construe the phrase “course of employment” to effectuate
the humanitarian purpose of the Act. Gallie, 859 A.2d at 1291-92. For a traveling
employee, the act of travel is essential for carrying out the business of his or her employer.
A traveling salesman, for example, cannot carry out the business of his employer without
traveling to present products and solicit business. As such, the act of traveling, in and of
itself, furthers the business and affairs of a traveling employee’s employer. So too do the
activities incidental to travel such as lodging, refueling, and stopping for food and drink.
During their travels, traveling employees are subject to the risks associated with
travel that stationary employees are not. Therefore, the “hazards of travel become the
hazards of [] employment.” Ball-Foster Glass Container Co., 177 P.3d at 697 (citation
omitted). In light of this, we agree with the Superior Court’s conclusion in Combs that a
traveling employee must have a broader scope of employment than a stationary one.
Therefore, to effectuate the humanitarian purpose of the Act, a traveling employee must
be considered in the course of his or her course of employment during the entirety of
work-related travel unless the employee abandons his or her employment.
We decline to limit application of the traveling employee doctrine to fatal claim
cases as Employer suggests. In arguing that the traveling employee doctrine should only
apply to fatal claim cases, Employer contends that the presumption afforded by the
doctrine conflicts with a claimant’s burden in course of employment cases to demonstrate
that he or she was in the course of employment at the time of his or her injury. See
[J-71-2020] - 24 O’Rourke, 125 A.3d at 1189. However, as we have previously explained, “[w]ithin the
context of a fatal claim petition, the surviving family member bears the responsibility to
substantiate the elements necessary to merit the benefit award.” Gibson v. Workers’
Comp. Appeal Bd. (Armco Stainless & Alloy Prod.), 861 A.2d 928, 943 (Pa. 2004).
Therefore, if the presumption afforded to traveling employees under the traveling
employee doctrine somehow conflicts with the burden prescribed by the Act, the conflict
would be equally present in general injury cases as well as fatal claim cases. However,
we do not detect a conflict between the presumption and the burden prescribed by the
Act. Again, under the Act, the claimant bears the burden of demonstrating that he or she
was in the course of employment at the time of his or her injury. O’Rourke, 125 A.3d at
1189. To give rise to the presumption, a traveling employee must demonstrate that he or
she set out on the business of his or her employer. Roman, 616 A.2d at 130. Therefore,
the traveling employee doctrine does not eliminate the burden prescribed by the Act, it
merely provides a broader scope of employment for traveling employees than stationary
employees.
VI. Application of the Traveling Employee Doctrine
Having reviewed and adopted the traveling employee doctrine, we turn to the facts
of the present appeal to consider the doctrine’s applicability in this case. The doctrine,
again, provides for the following presumption: “[w]hen a traveling employee is injured
after setting out on the business of his [or her] employer, it is presumed that he [or she]
was furthering the employer’s business at the time of the injury.” Roman, 616 A.2d at
130. Thus, for the traveling employee doctrine to be implicated, Claimant must
demonstrate: (1) that he is a traveling employee and (2) that he set out on the day of the
accident on the business of Employer. The WCJ acknowledged that Claimant was a
[J-71-2020] - 25 traveling employee and that Claimant set out on the day of the accident to visit customers
in the northern portion of his sales territory. The record supports these findings, and the
Employer does not appear to dispute them.
However, the Employer argues the traveling employee doctrine is not implicated
in this case and in doing so contends that this case is akin to Brown. We disagree. The
employees in Brown and Canning, which were relied on by the WCJ in his decision, were
not traveling employees. Therefore, a different framework for determining whether
Claimant was in the course of his employment at the time of the motor vehicle accident
applies here than was applied in Brown and Canning, making the present matter more
akin to Investors Diversified Services, where the claimant was a traveling employee, than
either Brown or Canning.
As Claimant has established the criteria to give rise to the presumption that he was
in the course of his employment at the time of the motor vehicle accident, the burden then
shifts to Employer to demonstrate that Claimant abandoned his employment prior to the
accident. Roman, 616 A.2d at 130. Employer can demonstrate this by showing that
Claimant’s actions, at some point prior to the accident, “were so foreign to and removed
from his usual employment that they constitute an abandonment of that employment.”
Roman, 616 A.2d at 130. While Employer contends the traveling employee doctrine is
not implicated in this case, Employer argues, in the event this Court finds the doctrine
applicable here, Claimant abandoned his employment when he passed the highway exit
to his home and proceeded to the Tilted Kilt because “[h]is attendance was not mandatory
for his employment” nor was the event “work-related.” Employer’s Br. at 37-38.
We begin with the fact that Claimant, admittedly, passed the highway exit to his
home on the way to the Tilted Kilt. The Commonwealth Court essentially found this fact
to be dispositive, concluding that Claimant ceased to be in the course of his employment
[J-71-2020] - 26 at this moment because this is the moment where Claimant’s homeward trip ended.
Peters, 214 A.3d at 743. However, the Commonwealth Court’s attention to this fact was
far too narrow. An employee’s course of employment does not end simply because the
employee passed his or her home during the workday. For example, if Claimant had
passed his home while traveling from one customer to the next, he surely would not have
ceased to be in the course of his employment simply by passing his home.
Claimant contends that he passed the highway exit to his home to attend an
Employer-sponsored social event. While the location of Claimant’s home is certainly
relevant if his attendance of the event at the Tilted Kilt constituted abandonment, it is not
dispositive of whether Claimant’s course of employment continued through the event. As
such, we proceed to consider whether his attendance at the event constituted
abandonment of employment.
We agree with Judge Cohn Jubelirer’s dissenting opinion that Claimant did not
abandon his employment by attending the event at the Tilted Kilt. Claimant, who the WCJ
found credible in part, and Michael Cintron, who the WCJ found credible, both testified
that these types of events were regularly held during sales blitzes. WCJ’s Decision, FOF
¶¶ 5, 7. Therefore, it would be difficult for us to conclude that Claimant’s action in
attending a regularly held type of event constituted an act so foreign to and removed from
his regular employment to be considered abandonment of employment.
We acknowledge the WCJ found the event at the Tilted Kilt to be voluntary and
social in nature. Id. ¶ 10. However, those facts, do not mean the event was not work-
related. The record reflects that Employer hosted and sponsored the event. While work
may not have been discussed at the event, the event still benefited Employer by fostering
relationships and improving morale. See Investors Diversified Servs., 520 A.2d at 960.
The record reflects this to be true. Theodore Smith described the event as a chance for
[J-71-2020] - 27 the sales representatives to relax after the sales blitz. WCJ’s Decision, FOF ¶ 6. Michael
Cintron indicated during his testimony that these types of events were a perk for sales
representatives. Id. ¶ 7. Therefore, we cannot conclude that Claimant abandoned his
employment by attending the event. This, however, does not end our analysis as there
remains a question as to whether Claimant abandoned his employment sometime
between leaving the event at the Tilted Kilt and the occurrence of the motor vehicle
The record reflects conflicting testimony as to where Claimant was coming from at
the time of the motor vehicle accident. Claimant testified that he was traveling from the
Tilted Kilt to his home at the time of the motor vehicle accident. Id. ¶ 5. Michael Cintron,
on the other hand, testified that in his phone conversation with Claimant following the
motor vehicle accident, Claimant stated that he was on his way home from some other
event than the one at the Tilted Kilt at the time of the accident. Id. ¶ 7. That being said,
Michael Cintron candidly testified that he could not recall where Claimant said he was
coming from. Id.6 The WCJ did not explicitly resolve this conflicting testimony,
6 During his testimony regarding the phone conversation with Claimant following the
accident, Michael Cintron had the following exchange with Employer’s counsel during direct examination: Q. Did [Claimant] tell you what he was doing at the time [of the accident]? A. I can’t recall specifically. I do know the first question I asked him was, are you okay, of course, and about his well[-]being. We went over what he needed to do as far as police, calling the police, getting pictures and accident reports. He did state that he was on his way from an event. I’m not sure if it was --- had to do with his daughters. I don’t know exactly what it was because I know that his children were in after school events. But it definitely was not on his way from the Titled Kilt from what he told me. April 1, 2016 Hearing Transcript, Reproduced Record at 128a. Michael Cintron was asked again on cross-examination where Claimant stated he was coming from at the time of the motor vehicle accident, to which Michael Cintron testified that he could not “remember or recall.” Id. at 128a-29a.
[J-71-2020] - 28 presumably because the WCJ determined that Claimant abandoned his employment with
Employer when he passed the highway exit to his home and proceeded to the Tilted Kilt.
While the WCJ did credit the testimony of Michael Cintron, this credibility determination
does not resolve the conflicting testimony because the WCJ also credited in part the
testimony of Claimant without explaining which parts the WCJ deemed credible. Id. ¶ 10.
This leaves the conflicting testimony of Claimant and Michael Cintron unresolved, and
leaves open the question of whether Claimant took some action after leaving the Tilted
Kilt that could constitute abandonment of employment.
As “the WCJ is the ultimate finder of fact and the exclusive arbiter of credibility and
evidentiary weight,” we find it necessary to remand for the WCJ to resolve the conflicting
testimony between Claimant and Michael Cintron with respect to whether Claimant was
coming from the Tilted Kilt at the time of the accident or from some other unknown event.
Thompson v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (USF&G Co.), 781 A.2d 1146, 1150 (Pa. 2001).
If on remand the WCJ resolves the conflicting testimony in favor of Michael Cintron and
credits his testimony, the WCJ will then need to determine whether Claimant’s action in
attending an unknown event following the event at the Tilted Kilt was “so foreign to and
removed from his usual employment that [it] constitute[d] an abandonment” of his
employment. Roman, 616 A.2d at 130; see also Maher, 218 A.2d at 596 (setting forth
that under the traveling employee doctrine, a traveling employee’s “continuity of
employment is not broken unless the employe’s activity constitutes an abandonment of
employment.”).
VII. Conclusion
For the abovementioned reasons, we conclude Claimant remained in the course
of his employment with Employer through the event at the Tilted Kilt. However, as there
[J-71-2020] - 29 is conflicting testimony as to whether Claimant took some action after leaving the Tilted
Kilt that could be considered abandonment of employment, we vacate the order of the
Commonwealth Court affirming the denial of Claimant’s claim petition, and remand for the
Commonwealth Court to remand to the WCJ with specific instructions to make additional
findings and conclusions consistent with this Opinion.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Chief Justice Baer and Justices Saylor, Todd, Donohue, Dougherty and Wecht join the opinion.
[J-71-2020] - 30