Peter J. Brennan, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor v. Prince William Hospital Corporation

503 F.2d 282, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 6746, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9687, 9 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 979
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 24, 1974
Docket73-2331
StatusPublished
Cited by81 cases

This text of 503 F.2d 282 (Peter J. Brennan, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor v. Prince William Hospital Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Peter J. Brennan, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor v. Prince William Hospital Corporation, 503 F.2d 282, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 6746, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9687, 9 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 979 (4th Cir. 1974).

Opinion

BUTZNER, Circuit Judge:

The Secretary of Labor appeals from the dismissal of an action against Prince *285 William Hospital to equalize pay of male hospital orderlies and female nurses’ aides in conformity with the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). 1 The district court noted that the facts were not in dispute and that the controversy centered on the inferences to be drawn from them. It found that although aides and orderlies do the same type of patient care work, the following differences exist between the jobs: the proportions of routine care tasks are not the same; aides do work which orderlies are neither required nor permitted to do; andj most important, orderlies do work, including extra tasks, which aides are neither required nor permitted to do. It concluded, therefore, that the Secretary had failed to establish that the aides and orderlies perform substantially equal work.

We believe that the district court gave undue significance to these differences because it misapprehended the statutory definition of equal work, which embraces the concepts of “skill, effort, and responsibility.” 2 Since it applied an improper legal standard to the relevant facts, we reverse and remand for the entry of judgment for the Secretary. See Piedmont Minerals Co. v. United States, 429 F.2d 560, 562 n. 4 (4th Cir. 1970); Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 267 (3rd Cir. 1969); 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2589 (1971).

I

In applying the Congressional mandate of equal pay for equal work on jobs which require equal skill, effort, and responsibility, there are two extremes of interpretation that must be avoided. Congress realized that the majority of job differentiations are made for genuine economic reasons unrelated to sex. It did not authorize the Secretary or the courts to engage in wholesale reevaluation of any employer’s pay structure in order to enforce their own conceptions of economic worth. See Hodgson v. Miller Brewing Co., 457 F.2d 221, 227 (7th Cir. 1972). But if courts defer to overly nice distinctions in job content, employers may evade the Act at will. Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041, 1049 (5th Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. Miller Brewing Co., 457 F.2d 221, 227 (7th Cir. 1972); Hodgson v. Fairmont Supply Co., 454 F.2d 490, 493 (4th Cir. 1972); Shultz v. American Can Co.— Dixie Products, 424 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir. 1970); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir. 1969). The response to this dilemma has been to require the Secretary to prove substantial equality of skill, effort, and responsibility as the jobs are actually performed. See Hodgson v. Fairmont Supply Co., supra; Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., supra.

One of the most common grounds for justifying different wages is the assertion that male employees perform extra tasks. These may support a wage differential if they create significant variations in skill, effort, and responsibility between otherwise equal jobs, see, e. g., Hodgson v. Golden Isles Convalescent Homes, Inc., 468 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1972). But the semblance of the valid job classification system may not be allowed to mask the existence of *286 wage discrimination based on sex. The Secretary may therefore show that the greater pay received by the male employees is not related to any extra tasks and thus is not justified by them. Higher pay is not related to extra duties when one or more of the following circumstances exists:

If Some male employees receive higher pay without doing the extra work. E. g., Shultz v. American Can Co.— Dixie Products, 424 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1970); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970).
If Female employees also perform extra duties of equal skill, effort, and responsibility. E. g., Hodgson v. Fair-mont Supply Co., 454 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1971).
|f Qualified female employees are not given the opportunity to do the extra work. E. g., Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1969).
|f The supposed extra duties do not in fact exist. E. g., Hodgson v. Security National Bank, 460 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1972).
|f The extra task consumes a minimal amount of time and is of peripheral importance. E. g., Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. Fairmont Supply Co., 454 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1972); Shultz v. American Can Co.—Dixie Products, 424 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1970).
If Third persons who do the extra task as their primary job are paid less than the male employees in question. E. g., Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1969).

In all of these cases the basic jobs were substantially equal. Despite claims to the contrary, the extra tasks were found to be makeweights. This left sex-— which in this context refers to the availability of women at lower wages than men — as the one discernible reason for the wage differential. That, however, is precisely the criterion for setting wages that the Act prohibits. See Brennan v.

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503 F.2d 282, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 6746, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9687, 9 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 979, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/peter-j-brennan-secretary-of-labor-united-states-department-of-labor-v-ca4-1974.