F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 2 1999 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
CHARLES A. PERSONS; BILLY D. LINK; RICHARD K. MILNE; DAMION W. BENEDICT; RALPH DUNLAP; THEODORE DELCI, and all other persons similarly situated; No. 98-3090 (D.C. No. 96-CV-4089) Plaintiffs-Appellants, (D. Kan.)
v.
MARVIN RUNYON, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , EBEL , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiffs Charles A. Persons, Billy D. Link, Richard K. Milne, Damion W.
Benedict, Ralph Dunlap, and Theodore Delci (hereinafter designated as
“plaintiffs”) appeal from summary judgment granted in favor of defendant Marvin
Runyon, Postmaster General of the United States Post Office (hereinafter
designated as “the USPS”). Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and
we affirm.
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo , applying the legal
standards set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). See Roe v. Cheyenne
Mountain Conference Resort, Inc. , 124 F.3d 1221, 1234-35 (10th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiffs, in a class-action suit that has not been certified, allege that they
are victims of a nationwide scheme by the USPS to rid itself of veterans by
unlawfully discriminating against them. See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Complaint at ¶ 17. They claim to have been terminated or forced into resigning
or taking early retirement by the USPS’s discriminatory practices and illegal
reductions in force. See id. at ¶ 28, ¶ 40. Plaintiffs sought relief under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-16a; the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29
U.S.C. § 633a; the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974
-2- (VEVRA), 38 U.S.C. § 4214; the Veterans Preference Act (VPA), 5 U.S.C.
§ 2108; the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346; the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) & 1986; the Rehabilitation Act,
29 U.S.C. 701; the federal constitution; and numerous federal statutes and
regulations governing federal personnel administration and ethics, including the
Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135; the Federal Service
Labor-Management Relations Act (FSLMRA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 7114, 7116 & 7117;
and the Rules of Conduct for Postal Employees, 39 C.F.R. § 447.21. See
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint at ¶ ¶ 31-53. Plaintiffs alleged that Mr.
Persons, the “lead plaintiff,” had filed all of the required administrative actions,
but admitted that the other plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative
remedies because it was “futile and historically a waste of time and effort for
individuals in this Plaintiff Class.” Id. at ¶ 6.
The district court concluded that the USPS was entitled to summary
judgment because plaintiffs failed to state claims upon which relief could be
granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a and § 1983, see Order at 4 & 8; that they had
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as to the employment
discrimination claims based on Title VII, the ADEA, and the Rehabilitation Act,
see id. at 10; that the USPS is immune from plaintiffs’ suits for constitutional
torts, see id. ; that plaintiffs could not sue for breach of the collective bargaining
-3- agreement because they did not allege that their union breached its duty of fair
representation or that the USPS repudiated the agreement’s remedial procedures,
see id. at 11-12; that they had no private rights of action under the VPA or
VEVRA, see id. at 12; that they had failed to file the required administrative
claims to proceed under the FTCA, see id. at 13; that they were precluded under
the doctrine of sovereign immunity and Title VII from suing the USPS under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) & 1986, see id. at 14-15; and that their claims under the
CSRA, the FSLMRA, and the Rules of Conduct failed for lack of standing or for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, see id. at 15-16.
Critically, on appeal plaintiffs do not challenge the majority of the court’s
rulings. In regard to the court’s determination that plaintiffs’ various
discrimination claims are procedurally barred for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, they object on three general bases. First, they allege that the court
erred in not accepting Mr. Person’s 1993 filing of an Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claim and his 1995 untimely request for review
by the Merit Systems Protection Board (in which he challenged his 1993
retirement) as sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion of administrative remedies
requirement. Second, they argue that the doctrine of equitable estoppel as
described in Manzi v. United States , 198 Ct. Cl. 489, 1972 WL 20799 (Ct. Cl.
May 12, 1972) (No. 451-69), applies to excuse or toll Mr. Persons’ failure to
-4- exhaust his administrative remedies.
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 2 1999 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
CHARLES A. PERSONS; BILLY D. LINK; RICHARD K. MILNE; DAMION W. BENEDICT; RALPH DUNLAP; THEODORE DELCI, and all other persons similarly situated; No. 98-3090 (D.C. No. 96-CV-4089) Plaintiffs-Appellants, (D. Kan.)
v.
MARVIN RUNYON, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , EBEL , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiffs Charles A. Persons, Billy D. Link, Richard K. Milne, Damion W.
Benedict, Ralph Dunlap, and Theodore Delci (hereinafter designated as
“plaintiffs”) appeal from summary judgment granted in favor of defendant Marvin
Runyon, Postmaster General of the United States Post Office (hereinafter
designated as “the USPS”). Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and
we affirm.
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo , applying the legal
standards set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). See Roe v. Cheyenne
Mountain Conference Resort, Inc. , 124 F.3d 1221, 1234-35 (10th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiffs, in a class-action suit that has not been certified, allege that they
are victims of a nationwide scheme by the USPS to rid itself of veterans by
unlawfully discriminating against them. See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Complaint at ¶ 17. They claim to have been terminated or forced into resigning
or taking early retirement by the USPS’s discriminatory practices and illegal
reductions in force. See id. at ¶ 28, ¶ 40. Plaintiffs sought relief under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-16a; the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29
U.S.C. § 633a; the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974
-2- (VEVRA), 38 U.S.C. § 4214; the Veterans Preference Act (VPA), 5 U.S.C.
§ 2108; the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346; the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) & 1986; the Rehabilitation Act,
29 U.S.C. 701; the federal constitution; and numerous federal statutes and
regulations governing federal personnel administration and ethics, including the
Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135; the Federal Service
Labor-Management Relations Act (FSLMRA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 7114, 7116 & 7117;
and the Rules of Conduct for Postal Employees, 39 C.F.R. § 447.21. See
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint at ¶ ¶ 31-53. Plaintiffs alleged that Mr.
Persons, the “lead plaintiff,” had filed all of the required administrative actions,
but admitted that the other plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative
remedies because it was “futile and historically a waste of time and effort for
individuals in this Plaintiff Class.” Id. at ¶ 6.
The district court concluded that the USPS was entitled to summary
judgment because plaintiffs failed to state claims upon which relief could be
granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a and § 1983, see Order at 4 & 8; that they had
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as to the employment
discrimination claims based on Title VII, the ADEA, and the Rehabilitation Act,
see id. at 10; that the USPS is immune from plaintiffs’ suits for constitutional
torts, see id. ; that plaintiffs could not sue for breach of the collective bargaining
-3- agreement because they did not allege that their union breached its duty of fair
representation or that the USPS repudiated the agreement’s remedial procedures,
see id. at 11-12; that they had no private rights of action under the VPA or
VEVRA, see id. at 12; that they had failed to file the required administrative
claims to proceed under the FTCA, see id. at 13; that they were precluded under
the doctrine of sovereign immunity and Title VII from suing the USPS under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) & 1986, see id. at 14-15; and that their claims under the
CSRA, the FSLMRA, and the Rules of Conduct failed for lack of standing or for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, see id. at 15-16.
Critically, on appeal plaintiffs do not challenge the majority of the court’s
rulings. In regard to the court’s determination that plaintiffs’ various
discrimination claims are procedurally barred for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, they object on three general bases. First, they allege that the court
erred in not accepting Mr. Person’s 1993 filing of an Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claim and his 1995 untimely request for review
by the Merit Systems Protection Board (in which he challenged his 1993
retirement) as sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion of administrative remedies
requirement. Second, they argue that the doctrine of equitable estoppel as
described in Manzi v. United States , 198 Ct. Cl. 489, 1972 WL 20799 (Ct. Cl.
May 12, 1972) (No. 451-69), applies to excuse or toll Mr. Persons’ failure to
-4- exhaust his administrative remedies. For the reasons stated in the district court’s
March 6, 1998 Memorandum and Order, we hold that these arguments are without
merit. See Order at 5-10.
Plaintiffs raise a new argument on appeal, admitting that while, at the
time the class action suit was filed, none of the other plaintiffs had filed the
required administrative law actions, Billy D. Link has since fully exhausted his
remedies and should now be designated as lead plaintiff in this suit. We have
reviewed Mr. Link’s EEOC claim and the final agency decision finding no
discrimination. Mr. Link’s claim asserted five distinct acts of discriminatory
conduct in 1990-92 arising from suspensions or other disciplinary actions taken
by the USPS after Mr. Link had been absent from work. See Appellants’ Br. at
Attachment 7. He alleged that relatives of management had missed more time
than he had without being disciplined, and claimed that the reason he was
disciplined was because of his disabilities. See id. While he did state that
“[w]hat the postal service did to me and other veterans is wrong and it must stop,”
id. , he did not follow the procedure or allege any facts establishing a class
complaint as required by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.204. Since 1977, persons requesting
class action remedies have been required to follow these procedures, and we have
consistently held that “exhaustion of individual administrative remedies is
insufficient to commence a class action in federal court . . . one of the named
-5- plaintiffs must have exhausted class administrative remedies.” Gulley v. Orr , 905
F.2d 1383, 1385 (10th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added); accord , Belhomme v.
Widnall , 127 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied , 118. S. Ct. 1569
(1998). The district court properly held that no named plaintiffs have exhausted
class administrative remedies.
Plaintiffs’ argument that the USPS should be equitably estopped from
relying on the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies because it
was responsible for Mr. Persons’ alleged incapacitation was not raised before the
district court and thus will not be considered by this court. See Rademacher v.
Colorado Ass’n of Soil Conservation Dists. Med. Benefits Plan , 11 F.3d 1567,
1571 (10th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiffs’ next claim of error involves what they perceive as an erroneous
interpretation of the USPS’s responsibilities to disabled employees under the
Rehabilitation Act. Because plaintiffs’ claims under this act were foreclosed due
to their failure to exhaust administrative remedies, alleged substantive error will
not be reviewed by this court. See Khader v. Aspin , 1 F.3d 968, 971 & n.3 (10th
Cir. 1993) (stating that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional
prerequisite to instituting Title VII or Rehabilitation Act actions in federal court).
Plaintiffs claim that the trial court did not address their civil rights claims
of disparate treatment and disparate impact, and that the trial court improperly
-6- stayed discovery. They complain that because discovery was stayed until
resolution of defendant’s motion to dismiss, they were not able to gather evidence
to prove the existence of their disparate treatment claim. As mentioned above,
the court did address plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination, holding that they were
all barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Order at 5. Again,
plaintiffs disregard the impact of a procedural jurisdictional bar on any right to
proceed with suit in district court. The court properly dismissed plaintiffs’
discrimination claims and properly stayed discovery.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
David M. Ebel Circuit Judge
-7-