Glass, J.,
This is an appeal by the defendant freedom of information commission (FOIC) from a judgment sustaining an appeal by the plaintiff, the personnel director of the department of income maintenance (director), from a decision of the FOIC. We find no error.
[314]*314The facts are essentially undisputed. Daniel Sorensen, the complainant, who was an employee of the department of income maintenance (DIM), together with twenty-nine other persons, took a merit examination for the position of program supervisor within the DIM. Sorensen was unsuccessful in obtaining the position, and because he was concerned that he had been denied fair and impartial consideration for the position, requested, by a letter1 dated March 25,1987, that the director provide him with copies of all instructional material and criteria used by the grading panel to evaluate material submitted by the applicants, all material submitted by the applicants, and the official personnel records of each applicant. Sorensen later modified his request to include only the most recent evaluation of each applicant contained in their respective personnel files. The director notified Sorensen that she was sending him copies of the following documents:
“Job Specification — Program Supervisor
“Position Analysis — Merit Promotion Plan (MPS-2)
“Promotional Announcement — Merit Promotion Plan (MPS-21A)
“Program Supervisor — (Public Assistance) Factors and Rating Criteria
“Rating Conversion Guidelines
[315]*315“Examination Certification List — Merit Promotion Plan (MPS-4)
“Rate Participants (MPS-5).”
In addition, the director sent Sorensen a copy of his complete examination package. At the hearing on the complaint conducted by FOIC commissioner E. Bartlett Barnes, Sorensen acknowledged that he had received all of these documents. Therefore, at the time of the FOIC hearing, the only requested records at issue were the personnel records of the other applicants. As a result of the hearing, the commissioner issued a report that was subsequently adopted by the FOIC as its final decision.
In that decision, the FOIC found that General Statutes § 5-2252 does not explicitly or implicitly prohibit the public from exercising its rights under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to request copies of a candidate’s papers, markings and other such documents. The FOIC also found that an agency cannot by regulation supersede the mandate of the disclosure provisions of the FOIA, and, therefore, § 5-225-13 of the [316]*316Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies can exempt the examination materials only to the extent that that regulation does not conflict with §§ 1-15 and 1-19 (a)4 [317]*317of the General Statutes. The FOIC found further that the records compiled by the director as part of the program supervisor merit promotional examination were recorded data used to determine promotions of state employees, and that those records were public records as defined in General Statutes § l-18a (d).5 In addition, the FOIC found that each merit promotion examination file contained an evaluation of the candidate’s job experience, performance appraisals, educational history, previous employment, salary history, training, ratings supplied by an evaluator and a personality assessment of the candidate.
[318]*318The FOIC ordered the director to release to Sorensen the applications and evaluations of the other twenty-nine applicants for the position of program supervisor, deleting all references to medical information regarding each applicant or member of the applicant’s family. The practical effect of the FOIC’s order was to compel the director to release to Sorensen each of the twenty-nine applicants’ personnel files. The director appealed the FOIC’s order to the Superior Court, which held that the information contained in the requested personnel files fell within the exemption from disclosure provided by General Statutes § 1-19 (b) (2).6 The director’s appeal was, therefore, sustained. The FOIC appealed to the Appellate Court claiming: (1) that the trial court had exceeded the scope of its review in determining the applicability of General Statutes § 1-19 (b) (2) to the records at issue; and (2) that the trial court had erred in concluding that General Statutes §§ 5-225 and 5-2377 condition the public’s right of access to records in the custody of DIM. This court, pursuant to Practice Book § 4023, transferred the appeal to itself.
[319]*319We will consider the claims of the FOIC in the reverse order of that stated above. Accordingly, we first consider the FOIC’s claim that the trial court erred in concluding that General Statutes §§ 5-225 and 5-237 condition the public’s right of access to personnel records in the custody of DIM. The FOIC argues that the subject records constitute public records that are not exempt from disclosure under General Statutes § 1-19 (a) by virtue of §§ 5-225 and 5-237. Section 1-19 (a) provides in pertinent part that “[ejxcept as otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute, all records maintained or kept on file by any public agency . . . shall be public records and every person shall have the right to inspect such records . . . .”
The FOIC argues that §§ 5-225 and 5-237 “do not provide a bar to the disclosure of the subject records, and that the plaintiff [director] failed to prove that any information ordered disclosed is statutorily exempt from disclosure.” The director argues that §§ 5-225 and 5-237 are state statutes that trigger the application of the “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by . . . state statute” exception to § 1-19 (a), and therefore, the requested personnel files of applicants other than Sorensen fall outside the ambit of public records. Although the FOIC concedes that the two statutes [320]*320guarantee the rights of state employees to inspect promotional examination materials and service ratings, nonetheless, the FOIC argues that these two statutes do not condition in any way the public’s right of access to these same records.
Section § 5-237 provides classified service employees access to their “service ratings” at reasonable times during office hours. Section § 5-225, in pertinent part, unambiguously provides that “[t]he papers, markings and other items used in determining the final earned ratings, other than the questions and other materials constituting the test itself, shall be open to inspection by the candidate, subject to such regulations as may be issued by the commissioner of administrative services.” (Emphasis added.) The FOIC concedes that both §§ 5-225 and 5-237 are clear and unambiguous and, therefore, are not subject to statutory construction. “When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we need look no further for interpretive guidance because it is assumed that the language itself reflects the legislative intent. Rhodes v. Hartford, [201 Conn. 89, 513 A.2d 124 (1986)]; Johnson v. Manson, 196 Conn. 309, 316,
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Glass, J.,
This is an appeal by the defendant freedom of information commission (FOIC) from a judgment sustaining an appeal by the plaintiff, the personnel director of the department of income maintenance (director), from a decision of the FOIC. We find no error.
[314]*314The facts are essentially undisputed. Daniel Sorensen, the complainant, who was an employee of the department of income maintenance (DIM), together with twenty-nine other persons, took a merit examination for the position of program supervisor within the DIM. Sorensen was unsuccessful in obtaining the position, and because he was concerned that he had been denied fair and impartial consideration for the position, requested, by a letter1 dated March 25,1987, that the director provide him with copies of all instructional material and criteria used by the grading panel to evaluate material submitted by the applicants, all material submitted by the applicants, and the official personnel records of each applicant. Sorensen later modified his request to include only the most recent evaluation of each applicant contained in their respective personnel files. The director notified Sorensen that she was sending him copies of the following documents:
“Job Specification — Program Supervisor
“Position Analysis — Merit Promotion Plan (MPS-2)
“Promotional Announcement — Merit Promotion Plan (MPS-21A)
“Program Supervisor — (Public Assistance) Factors and Rating Criteria
“Rating Conversion Guidelines
[315]*315“Examination Certification List — Merit Promotion Plan (MPS-4)
“Rate Participants (MPS-5).”
In addition, the director sent Sorensen a copy of his complete examination package. At the hearing on the complaint conducted by FOIC commissioner E. Bartlett Barnes, Sorensen acknowledged that he had received all of these documents. Therefore, at the time of the FOIC hearing, the only requested records at issue were the personnel records of the other applicants. As a result of the hearing, the commissioner issued a report that was subsequently adopted by the FOIC as its final decision.
In that decision, the FOIC found that General Statutes § 5-2252 does not explicitly or implicitly prohibit the public from exercising its rights under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to request copies of a candidate’s papers, markings and other such documents. The FOIC also found that an agency cannot by regulation supersede the mandate of the disclosure provisions of the FOIA, and, therefore, § 5-225-13 of the [316]*316Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies can exempt the examination materials only to the extent that that regulation does not conflict with §§ 1-15 and 1-19 (a)4 [317]*317of the General Statutes. The FOIC found further that the records compiled by the director as part of the program supervisor merit promotional examination were recorded data used to determine promotions of state employees, and that those records were public records as defined in General Statutes § l-18a (d).5 In addition, the FOIC found that each merit promotion examination file contained an evaluation of the candidate’s job experience, performance appraisals, educational history, previous employment, salary history, training, ratings supplied by an evaluator and a personality assessment of the candidate.
[318]*318The FOIC ordered the director to release to Sorensen the applications and evaluations of the other twenty-nine applicants for the position of program supervisor, deleting all references to medical information regarding each applicant or member of the applicant’s family. The practical effect of the FOIC’s order was to compel the director to release to Sorensen each of the twenty-nine applicants’ personnel files. The director appealed the FOIC’s order to the Superior Court, which held that the information contained in the requested personnel files fell within the exemption from disclosure provided by General Statutes § 1-19 (b) (2).6 The director’s appeal was, therefore, sustained. The FOIC appealed to the Appellate Court claiming: (1) that the trial court had exceeded the scope of its review in determining the applicability of General Statutes § 1-19 (b) (2) to the records at issue; and (2) that the trial court had erred in concluding that General Statutes §§ 5-225 and 5-2377 condition the public’s right of access to records in the custody of DIM. This court, pursuant to Practice Book § 4023, transferred the appeal to itself.
[319]*319We will consider the claims of the FOIC in the reverse order of that stated above. Accordingly, we first consider the FOIC’s claim that the trial court erred in concluding that General Statutes §§ 5-225 and 5-237 condition the public’s right of access to personnel records in the custody of DIM. The FOIC argues that the subject records constitute public records that are not exempt from disclosure under General Statutes § 1-19 (a) by virtue of §§ 5-225 and 5-237. Section 1-19 (a) provides in pertinent part that “[ejxcept as otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute, all records maintained or kept on file by any public agency . . . shall be public records and every person shall have the right to inspect such records . . . .”
The FOIC argues that §§ 5-225 and 5-237 “do not provide a bar to the disclosure of the subject records, and that the plaintiff [director] failed to prove that any information ordered disclosed is statutorily exempt from disclosure.” The director argues that §§ 5-225 and 5-237 are state statutes that trigger the application of the “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by . . . state statute” exception to § 1-19 (a), and therefore, the requested personnel files of applicants other than Sorensen fall outside the ambit of public records. Although the FOIC concedes that the two statutes [320]*320guarantee the rights of state employees to inspect promotional examination materials and service ratings, nonetheless, the FOIC argues that these two statutes do not condition in any way the public’s right of access to these same records.
Section § 5-237 provides classified service employees access to their “service ratings” at reasonable times during office hours. Section § 5-225, in pertinent part, unambiguously provides that “[t]he papers, markings and other items used in determining the final earned ratings, other than the questions and other materials constituting the test itself, shall be open to inspection by the candidate, subject to such regulations as may be issued by the commissioner of administrative services.” (Emphasis added.) The FOIC concedes that both §§ 5-225 and 5-237 are clear and unambiguous and, therefore, are not subject to statutory construction. “When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we need look no further for interpretive guidance because it is assumed that the language itself reflects the legislative intent. Rhodes v. Hartford, [201 Conn. 89, 513 A.2d 124 (1986)]; Johnson v. Manson, 196 Conn. 309, 316, 493 A.2d 846 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063, 106 S. Ct. 813, 88 L. Ed. 2d 787, reh. denied, 475 U.S. 1061, 106 S. Ct. 1290, 89 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1986).” Commissioner v. Freedom of Information Commission, 204 Conn. 609, 620, 529 A.2d 692 (1987).
Thus, we are persuaded that the disclosure and inspection referred to under § 5-225 applies only to the candidate who has taken the examination. Otherwise, § 5-225 would be superfluous and useless legislation, since the public, including state employees, would be entitled to disclosure of a candidate’s promotional examination records under § 1-19 (a). Equally persuasive is the regulation, § 5-225-1, which clarifies § 5-225. [321]*321Section 5-225-1 of the regulations contains such references as: the “applicant” who has taken the examination; “he did not pass”; “inspect his papers”; “his [rJesuits of [ejxamination(s)’ ”; “his examination results”; “he disagrees”; and “his point of view.” All of these pronouns refer only to the person who has taken the examination.
In conclusion, § 1-19 (a) provides that all records kept on file by public agencies shall be public records “[ejxcept as otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute.” We hold that §§ 5-225 and 5-237 provide such an exception for the requested personnel files, which contained the promotional examination records of candidates for program supervisor other than the candidate’s own records.
Because of our determination that §§ 5-225 and 5-237 are statutory exceptions within the purview of § 1-19 (a), it is unnecessary to consider the FOIC’s claim that the trial court exceeded the scope of its review in determining the applicability of § 1-19 (b) (2) and the balancing test between disclosure and the invasion of privacy regarding the records at issue in this case.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.