IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE
In the Matter of the Personal No. 86707-5-I Restraint of: consolidated with M.T.M.L., Petitioner,
No. 86715-6-I In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of: ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IN PART, R.A., WITHDRAWING OPINION, AND SUBSTITUTING OPINION Petitioner.
Petitioners M.T.M.L. and R.A. have moved for reconsideration of the
published opinion filed on August 25, 2025. Respondent Department of Children,
Youth and Families has filed an answer. The panel has considered the motion
pursuant to RAP 12.4 and has determined that the motion should be granted in
part, that the opinion should be withdrawn, and that a substitute opinion be filed.
Now, therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is granted in
part to reflect that M.T.M.L. is back at Green Hill School and to include additional
facts regarding the lack of bathroom access; it is further
ORDERED that the published opinion filed on August 25, 2025, is
withdrawn; and it is further No. 86707-5-I (consol. with No. 86715-6-I)/2
ORDERED that a substitute published opinion be filed. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Personal No. 86707-5-I Restraint of: consolidated with M.T.M.L., Petitioner,
No. 86715-6-I In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of: DIVISION ONE
R.A., PUBLISHED OPINION
Petitioner.
SMITH, J. — “It is the policy of this state that all county juvenile detention
facilities provide a humane, safe, and rehabilitative environment and that
unadjudicated youth remain in the community whenever possible, consistent with
public safety and the provisions of chapter 13.40 RCW.” RCW 13.40.038(1).
This is a consolidated case for two petitioners, M.T.M.L. and R.A., who
initiated personal restraint petitions (PRPs) seeking review by the Court of
Appeals. An order allowing expedited review was granted on June 20, 2024.
Petitioners were then residents at Green Hill School, a Department of Children,
Youth, and Families (DCYF)-operated juvenile facility. Petitioners allege the
conditions at Green Hill are in violation of the United States Constitution, the
Washington State Constitution, and Washington State law. Petitioners contend
the facility is overcrowded, they were commonly locked in their rooms all day, No. 86707-5-I (consol. with No. 86715-6-I)/2
and they lacked reasonable access to the bathroom. Petitioners ask to be
released into a community facility or, in the alternative, that DCYF remedy the
conditions immediately.
Subsequent to filing his PRP, R.A. transferred to a different facility. DCYF
moved to dismiss R.A.’s petition based on mootness. R.A. opposes this motion.
While R.A.’s petition is moot, we decline to dismiss it because it raises issues of
continuing and substantial public interest. The conditions at Green Hill violate
state law, and DCYF must remedy the conditions.
FACTS
Background
Green Hill School is a juvenile rehabilitation facility serving older juvenile
offenders and young adults between the ages of 18 and 25. Green Hill provides
academic and recreational activities for its residents. Between January 2023 and
June 2024, the population at Green Hill increased by over 60 percent, from 150
to 240 residents. As of May 2024, Green Hill had more residents than its funding
and staffing provided for and, in addition, was experiencing significant staffing
shortages. In response to the problems associated with increased residents and
staff shortages, Green Hill suspended intakes, required staff to provide additional
coverage during evenings and weekends, hired private security guards, and
modified programming.
2 No. 86707-5-I (consol. with No. 86715-6-I)/3
M.T.M.L. and R.A.1 were confined at Green Hill and were housed in the
Hawthorn unit. Hawthorn has four wings and accommodates approximately 60
residents per wing. Hawthorn is a general housing unit, which means residents
should spend the majority of any day outside of their cells for programming and
recreation time. Residents at Green Hill are provided a personalized treatment
plan, which typically consists of individual counseling, treatment groups, and
academic and vocational education.
In order for Hawthorn to offer full programming, six staff members are
needed. If staffing falls below six people, Hawthorn is put on split programming
or “Code Seven.” Split programming means that while some of the wings within
the unit allow residents out of their rooms for programming, the other residents
remain secured in their rooms. The units switch after a period of time so the
residents who were in their room are allowed out and those who were in
programming must return to their rooms. Depending on the number of staff
available, this switch may occur once or twice during any given shift. At least
four staff members are needed to facilitate split programming.
When less than four staff members are available, Hawthorn is forced into
a Code Seven. Code Seven means the entire campus is on an “institution
lockdown” and residents are confined to their rooms. Specifically, “lockdown”
means residents “who are not involved in an incident are placed on
1 M.T.M.L.’s and R.A.’s personal restraint petitions have been consolidated for this court’s consideration.
3 No. 86707-5-I (consol. with No. 86715-6-I)/4
administrative time[2] for fifteen minutes or longer while staff respond to an event.”
Depending on the amount of staff available, a Code Seven can be campus-wide
or unit specific and can last anywhere from one hour to multiple hours.
Hawthorn is a “dry” unit, meaning the cells do not contain a sink or toilet.
When residents are confined to their cell, they must make a verbal request of
staff to use the restroom. Residents are commonly required to wait to use the
restroom. This wait time may be exacerbated by residents’ behavior. For
example, during a Code Seven, when only one resident may use the bathroom at
any given time, if a resident refuses to return to their room after going to the
bathroom, it can “cause a three minute trip to the bathroom to turn into a forty-
five minute trip.” This delay has a trickle effect, such that the next person
requesting to use the restroom must wait even longer. As a precautionary
measure, residents are provided medical grade urine bottles to use when staff
cannot respond in time to a resident’s request to use the bathroom.
Petitioners
According to Petitioners, in the six weeks prior to filing their PRPs,3
Hawthorn had fewer than 10 days of full programming and were on a split
schedule for all or part of 28 days. When on a split schedule, Petitioners were
out of their room between one to four hours per day. During that same six-week
2 “Administrative time” is a term used when a resident is locked in their room for reasons other than their behavior. 3 Approximately from April 12, 2024 to May 24, 2024.
4 No. 86707-5-I (consol. with No. 86715-6-I)/5
period, Hawthorn had six Code Sevens, and Petitioners were in their rooms the
entire day. On those days, M.T.M.L. was not permitted to shower.
Petitioners commonly had to wait hours to use the restroom and, because
of the lengthy wait times, were instructed to use the plastic urinal jugs provided
by the facility. M.T.M.L. asserts he once had to urinate into a plastic bag
because staff could not get to him in time. M.T.M.L. also reported that two hours
after requesting to use the restroom, he was still waiting and had to defecate in a
bag. A staff member removed the bag from his cell 45 minutes later.
Additionally, M.T.M.L. did not have laundry soap in his unit for several months
and he went two weeks without being provided toothpaste.
M.T.M.L. states that because of staffing problems, he did not have a
counseling session for two months and, after that, he received only one session
in the span of 10 weeks. He contends his mental health suffered because of the
conditions at Green Hill and he did not receive adequate treatment.
DCYF
DCYF admits to staffing shortages and, as a result, modified
programming. Between May 28 and June 25, 2024, only 6 of the 35 shifts with
complete information had enough staff to run full programming.4 DCYF also
recognizes “there may have been some instances where staff did not transport
youth hourly to the bathroom or took longer than one hour to take a youth to the
bathroom.” DCYF admits providing residents with medical grade urine bottles is
4 Of the 220 shifts with some data, full programming was run 53 percent of the time.
5 No. 86707-5-I (consol. with No. 86715-6-I)/6
standard practice as a “precautionary measure.” DCYF does not explicitly
concede residents are not given access to daily showers but says, “Residents
are typically given an opportunity to shower daily.” In addition to staffing issues,
DCYF points to a “marked increase” in unsafe incidents, including assaults
among residents, to explain the increase in spilt programming and Code Sevens.
Additionally, DCYF highlights several incidents M.T.M.L. and R.A. were involved
in that disrupted programming and resulted in a “more volatile facility.”
While it admits to staff shortages and modified programming, DCYF
denies the extent to which these modifications affected Petitioners. DCYF notes
staff “found no evidence of residents being locked in their rooms for 22 hours at a
time.” DCYF staff reviewed nine randomly selected surveillance videos between
April 1, 2024 and May 23, 2024 covering the graveyard shift in the Hawthorn
unit.5 The footage reviewed included M.T.M.L.’s and R.A.’s doors. Six resident
indicator lights were turned on during this time. Of those six, staff responded to
five within 15 minutes and the sixth one within 61 minutes.
DCYF states that during split programming or a Code Seven, residents
remain in their room only as long as necessary to resolve the issue or behaviors
that caused the disruption. However, if the Code Seven is because of staffing
shortages, the duration is contingent on safe staffing levels. Code Sevens occur
about once a week, typically on Sundays. DCYF maintains room isolation is not
used as punishment.
5 The graveyard shift is from 11:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.
6 No. 86707-5-I (consol. with No. 86715-6-I)/7
With regard to M.T.M.L.’s mental health treatment, DCYF notes M.T.M.L.
received an individualized treatment plan, met with a psychiatrist seven times in
2024, and had six sessions with a counselor. DCYF also notes that M.T.M.L. did
not request additional services until May 2024 and then declined to engage when
staff responded to the request in June 2024.
Personal Restraint Petitions
Petitioners initiated PRPs, alleging Green Hill’s conditions of confinement
violate their due process rights and state law. The ACLU of Washington
Foundation, Columbia Legal Services, and TeamChild moved to submit an
amicus curiae in support of Petitioners’ PRPs.
After submitting his PRP, R.A. requested to be transferred from DCYF
custody to Department of Corrections (DOC). The board granted R.A.’s request
to transfer. On February 25, 2025, DCYF filed a supplemental appendix
indicating that M.T.M.L. was transferred to Oakridge Community Facility in
January 2025. Oakridge is a group care facility operated for the care of youth
committed to DCYF’s custody. On or around March 25, 2025, M.T.M.L. escaped
from Oakridge.
We heard oral arguments in this case on May 29, 2025, and issued an
opinion on August 25, 2025. On September 15, 2025, M.T.M.L. and R.A. moved
for reconsideration, contending our opinion omitted a critical fact6 and M.T.M.L.’s
PRP is no longer moot because he had returned to Green Hill prior to the
6The critical fact was that M.T.M.L. filed a complaint with Green Hill in July 2024 because he had to defecate in his cell after requesting to use the restroom and not receiving access for an hour.
7 No. 86707-5-I (consol. with No. 86715-6-I)/8
issuance of our opinion. DCYF agrees M.T.M.L.’s petition is no longer moot and
we should address the issues.
AMICUS CURIAE
Under RAP 10.6(a), “[t]he appellate court may on motion grant permission
to file an amicus curiae brief only if all parties consent, or if the filing of the brief
would assist the appellate court.”
Here, the ACLU of Washington Foundation, Columbia Legal Services and
TeamChild moved to file an amicus curiae memorandum in early February 2024
and suggested DCYF could have additional time to respond to avoid any
prejudice caused by the untimeliness of the motion. DCYF did not agree to the
late filing. Given the untimeliness of the request, the fact that the matter before
us is in a PRP, and the briefing does not provide much, if any, new information
not already provided by Petitioners, we deny the motion.
MOTION TO DISMISS
DCYF contends R.A.’s PRP is moot because this court can no longer
provide him effective relief. R.A. claims the court can still grant him relief
because he could be returned to Green Hill and, even if his PRP is moot, it falls
under an exception to mootness. We agree R.A.’s PRP is moot; however, we
deny DCYF’s motions to dismiss because R.A.’s PRP raises issues of continuing
and substantial public interest.
Generally, this court will not review a petition when the issue is moot. In
re Det. of M.K., 168 Wn. App. 621, 625, 279 P.3d 897 (2012). An issue is moot
when “this court can no longer provide effective relief.” M.K., 168 Wn. App.
8 No. 86707-5-I (consol. with No. 86715-6-I)/9
at 625. But, even when a petition is moot, this court may accept review if the
petition presents an issue of continuing and substantial public interest. In re
Marriage of Horner, 151 Wn.2d 884, 891, 93 P.3d 124 (2004). To determine
whether an issue is of continuing and substantial public interest, the court
considers three factors: “ ‘(1) whether the issue is of a public or private nature;
(2) whether an authoritative determination is desirable to provide future guidance
to public officers; and (3) whether the issue is likely to recur.’ ” Horner, 151
Wn.2d at 892 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Westerman v. Cary,
125 Wn.2d 277, 286-87, 892 P.2d 1067 (1994)).
Here, R.A. contends his petition is not moot because the court can provide
effective relief. To provide R.A. effective relief, he would need to be transferred
back to Green Hill. R.A. is correct that under RCW 13.40.230(6), he could
potentially be transferred back to Green Hill, but that is at the discretion of DCYF
and DOC. Unless and until R.A. is transferred back to Green Hill, his petition is
moot because this court cannot provide him effective relief.
Continuing and Substantial Public Importance
The conditions at Green Hill have received considerable news coverage
recently,7 and Green Hill’s efforts to address overcrowding was the subject of a
recent lawsuit. In July 2024, Green Hill transferred 43 adult-convicted individuals
7 See e.g., Lauren Girgis, Head of WA Juvenile Detention Talks about the Troubled System, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 17, 2024), https://www.seattletimes.com/ seattle-news/law-justice/head-of-wa-juvenile-detention-talks-about-the-troubled- system/ [https://perma.cc/P5C2-GB3W]; Ross Hunter, No Good Answers: Why I Moved 43 Men from Youth Lockup to Prison, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 2, 2024), https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/no-good-answers-why-i-moved-43-men- from-youth-lockup-to-prison/ [https://perma.cc/9TJA-XPVX].
9 No. 86707-5-I (consol. with No. 86715-6-I)/10
from Green Hill to DOC. The individuals challenged this action, and in response,
the court issued an injunction and ordered the individuals back to Green Hill,
noting the transfer violated state law. In spite of DCYF’s efforts to combat
overcrowding and understaffing, Green Hill’s population remains over capacity
and staffing continues to be a challenge.
We recognize, as Felice Upton, assistant secretary of juvenile
rehabilitation for DCYF, stated in her declaration dated July 13, 2024, “Green Hill
School’s mission is to provide a safe, structured, and secure environment where
residents can learn new skills, develop positive habits, and disengage from
activities that brought them to Green Hill.” The conditions at Green Hill raise an
issue of a public nature and concern, and are likely to recur without further
guidance. For these reasons, and because we will be addressing similar issues
regarding M.T.M.L, we deny DCYF’s motions to dismiss and accept review of
R.A.’s petition as well under the exception to mootness.
ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
This court will grant appropriate relief to a petitioner who is under
“restraint” where the restraint is unlawful. RAP 16.4(a). A petitioner is under
restraint if they are confined because of a court decision in a civil or criminal
proceeding. RAP 16.4(b). Restraint is unlawful when “[t]he conditions or manner
of the restraint of petitioner are in violation of the Constitution of the United
States or the Constitution or laws of the State of Washington.” RAP 16.4(c)(6).
10 No. 86707-5-I (consol. with No. 86715-6-I)/11
A petitioner initiating a PRP bears the burden of providing the facts on
which the claim rests and evidence sufficient to support those factual allegations.
RAP 16.7(a)(2). This requires that the petition state with particularity facts that, if
proved, would entitle the petitioner to relief. In re Pers. Restraint of Rice, 118
Wn.2d 876, 886, 828 P.2d 1086 (1992). Bald assertions and conclusory
allegations are not sufficient. Rice, 118 Wn.2d at 886.
To obtain relief from a personal restraint petition based on a constitutional
error, the petitioner must show “(1) a constitutional error occurred and (2) the
error resulted in actual and substantial prejudice.” In re Pers. Restraint of
Williams, 198 Wn.2d 342, 353, 496 P.3d 289 (2021). But where a petitioner
raises claims “for which there was ‘no previous opportunity for judicial review,’ ”
the petitioner is not required to make a threshold showing of prejudice. Williams,
198 Wn.2d at 353 (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Gentry, 170 Wn.2d 711, 714,
245 P.3d 766 (2010)).
Article I, Section 14 of the Washington State Constitution
Petitioners claim their confinements violated the Washington State
Constitution’s ban on cruel punishment. DCYF contends Petitioners’ restraints
were reasonably related to a legitimate government objective and, therefore,
constitutional. We agree with DCYF that the Petitioners’ confinements did not
violate either the Washington State Constitution or United State Constitution, but
for reasons other than those DCYF asserts.
Article I, section 14 of the Washington State Constitution prohibits cruel
punishment, including for conditions of confinement. See, e.g., Williams, 198
11 No. 86707-5-I (consol. with No. 86715-6-I)/12
Wn.2d at 353. The Washington State Constitution is “more protective of the
health and safety of prisoners than its federal counterpart.” Id. at 363. The State
has a nondelegable duty to provide for the health, safety, and well-being of its
prisoners, and a finding of unsuitable conditions of confinement “does not
depend on the subjective knowledge or intent of particular prison officials.” Id.
at 366.
Under the Washington State Constitution, cruel conditions of confinement
can arise from intentional acts by prison officials or institutional policies and
practices. Williams, 198 Wn.2d at 365. “Washington prisons may not cause ‘the
deprivation of human dignity by conditions primarily related to sanitation and
hygiene which are so base, inhumane and barbaric they offend the dignity of any
human being,’ ” whether intentionally or accidently. Id. at 361 (quoting Woods v.
Burton, 8 Wn. App. 13, 16-17, 503 P.2d 1079 (1972)).
To prevail on a PRP challenging conditions of confinement, the petitioner
must show “(1) those conditions create an objectively significant risk of serious
harm or otherwise deprive the petitioner of the basic necessities of human dignity
and (2) those conditions are not reasonably necessary to accomplish any
legitimate penological goal.” Williams, 198 Wn.2d at 363. When a petitioner
claims the conditions of their confinement violate both state and federal
constitutions, where feasible, this court will resolve the question under our own
state constitution before turning to federal law. Id. at 353.
Harsh conditions of confinement “may sometimes be justified by legitimate
penological interests, including the health and safety of the prison population as
12 No. 86707-5-I (consol. with No. 86715-6-I)/13
a whole.” Williams, 198 Wn.2d at 367. To withstand constitutional scrutiny, the
condition must be “reasonably necessary” to further a legitimate penological goal.
Id. at 367.
Penological goals of the juvenile justice system include retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. State v. Moretti, 193 Wn.2d 809,
826, 446 P.3d 609 (2019). Whereas the criminal justice system is punitive in
nature, the purpose of Washington’s juvenile justice system is rehabilitative.
State v. J.H., 96 Wn. App. 167, 172, 978 P.2d 1121 (1999). Some objectives of
juvenile justice are “[m]ak[ing] the juvenile offender accountable for his or her
criminal behavior; . . . [p]rovid[ing] for the rehabilitation and reintegration of
juvenile offenders; . . . [and p]rovid[ing] necessary treatment, supervision, and
custody for juvenile offenders.” RCW 13.40.010(2).
1. Deprivation of Human Dignity
Petitioners claim their conditions of confinement, specifically, being
confined to their rooms for extended periods of time, deprived of timely access to
the restroom, and forced to relieve themselves in their cells, deprived them of
“basic necessities of human dignity.”8 Williams, 198 Wn.2d at 363. Petitioners
rely primarily on Williams to support their claim.
In Williams, Robert Rufus Williams, a 78-year-old incarcerated individual,
challenged his conditions of confinement. 198 Wn.2d at 346. Williams used a
8 M.T.M.L. also contends he is not receiving adequate treatment as due process requires, but provides no argument for why the services he is receiving fall below the acceptable standard of care. Accordingly, we decline to reach this issue.
13 No. 86707-5-I (consol. with No. 86715-6-I)/14
wheelchair and relied on therapy aides to assist him with daily tasks, including
going to the restroom. Id. at 350. Williams was housed in a dry cell with three
other individuals and often waited long periods of time for assistance. Id. As a
result, he was forced to relieve himself into a bottle in his room and frequently
soiled himself. Id. The Washington State Supreme Court found these conditions
to be “objectively cruel.” Id. at 369. The court stated, “[T]he conditions of
Williams’ confinement exposed him to a significant risk of serious harm by
depriving him basic hygienic necessities.” Id. at 369. The court concluded these
conditions were not “reasonably necessary to accomplish a legitimate
penological goal” and, accordingly, held the conditions of Williams’ confinement
to be unconstitutionally cruel. Id. at 370.
Petitioners contend their circumstances were similar to Williams and,
therefore, their constitutional rights were violated. DCYF asserts Williams is not
analogous because Williams was 78 years old, suffered from multiple ailments,
and was completely dependent on aides to assist him with daily tasks. DCYF
claims the court in Williams found objectionably cruel conditions only in light of
Williams’ disabilities: Williams was unable to care for himself or keep himself
clean, whereas Petitioners were not exposed to a significant risk of harm.
While the conditions Petitioners were experiencing do raise serious
concerns about the treatment of juveniles in custody, they do not rise to the level
of a constitutional violation. As DCYF correctly points out, the conditions here
are not analogous to Williams. First, the Williams case arose during the height of
the COVID-19 pandemic, and Williams specifically argued “his confinement
14 No. 86707-5-I (consol. with No. 86715-6-I)/15
during the COVID-19 pandemic was cruel.” 198 Wn.2d at 351. While the
pandemic did not explicitly guide the court’s holding, it was a factor the court
considered when acknowledging the challenges faced by prison administrators.
Id. at 369.
Williams also suffered from ailments that exasperated his conditions of
confinement. Williams was 78 years old and had minimal use of one side of his
body. Id. at 350. He required assistance to use the restroom, and when wait
times were too long, he frequently soiled himself, resulting in “severely
unhygienic conditions.” Id. at 369. The court noted it was “in light of [Williams’]
physical disabilities” that his conditions of confinement exposed him to “a
significant risk of serious harm.” Id.
Indisputably, it was improper that Petitioners were sometimes forced to
urinate in plastic containers, and M.T.M.L. once had to defecate in a bag,
because bathroom wait times were too long. But the unhygienic conditions did
not expose them to a serious risk of harm like that faced by Williams. Neither
Petitioner suffered from a disability that required assistance when using the
restroom, and neither petitioner soiled themselves. The conditions of Petitioners’
confinement, while certainly unacceptable and requiring immediate resolution,
were not so inhumane or barbaric that they offend human dignity.
Because Petitioners’ conditions of confinement did not deprive them of the
basic necessitates of human dignity, we conclude the conditions were not
unconstitutional.
15 No. 86707-5-I (consol. with No. 86715-6-I)/16
2. Penological Interests
Even though we find no constitutional violation, we address DCYF’s
argument that Petitioners’ conditions of confinement were reasonably related to a
legitimate government interest. DCYF claims that, even if the conditions of
confinement deprived Petitioners of human dignity, they were still constitutional
because they were reasonably related to the legitimate government interest of
safety, order, and security. DCYF cites Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99
S. Ct 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979), in asserting juvenile facilities are given
wide-ranging deference “in the adoption and execution of policies and practices
that in their judgement are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and
to maintain institutional security.” While DCYF is correct that institutional safety
and security are legitimate penological interests and, sometimes, harsh
conditions are warranted to further these interests, overcrowding cannot be
allowed to continue unchecked, creating the exact harsh conditions that are then
labeled a legitimate interest.
DCYF admits overpopulation and staffing challenges contribute to an
increase in modified programming, which results in residents being confined to
their room for large portions of the day. DCYF also admits “[h]igher population
levels and double-capacity rooms increase incidences of violence amongst
residents. It also increases both residents’ and staff’s fear for safety, which
compounds issues regarding violence and staff turnover.” DCYF cannot
implement policies limiting the residents’ access to programming and claim it is
because of safety and security concerns when it is DCYF’s own inability to
16 No. 86707-5-I (consol. with No. 86715-6-I)/17
resolve the issues of overpopulation and understaffing that gave rise to those
concerns. The longer this continues, the less it becomes a legitimate
government interest and the more it becomes a constitutional concern.
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs the
conditions in which juveniles may be confined. Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d
1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987). Due process guarantees the “right to reasonable
safety and freedom from physical restraint,” Youngberg v. Romeo ex rel. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307, 319, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 73 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1982), as well as the right
to adequate treatment. State v. S.H., 75 Wn. App. 1, 19, 877 P.2d 205 (1994),
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Sledge, 83 Wn. App. 639, 922 P.2d 832
(1996). Furthermore, the nature and duration of a juvenile’s commitment must
“ ‘bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed.’ ” S.H., 75 Wn. App. at 19 (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715,
738, 92 S. Ct. 1845, 32 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1972)). A juvenile detainee’s due process
rights are violated if a particular condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate
government objective, such that it is “arbitrary or purposeless.” Bell, 441 U.S.
at 539.
For the same reasons we find Petitioners’ rights were not violated under
the Washington State Constitution, Petitioners’ rights were also not violated
under the United States Constitution.
17 No. 86707-5-I (consol. with No. 86715-6-I)/18
Washington State Law
Petitioners contend the conditions of their confinement violated
Washington State law because they were restricted to their rooms for extended
periods of time and not provided adequate care or supervision. DCYF admits
Petitioners did not receive the care or supervision required by law, but contends
it has taken steps to address the issue. DCYF admits it violated state law.9
DCYF must remedy the conditions at Green Hill immediately.
Under RCW 13.22.010, “room confinement” means “a juvenile is
separated from the youth population and placed in a room or cell that the juvenile
is assigned to for sleeping, other than during normal sleeping hours or interim
rest hours.” Room confinement may be utilized “when it is necessary to prevent
behavior that causes disruption of the detention facility or institution, but the
behavior does not rise to the level of imminent harm including, but not limited to,
behavior that may constitute a violation of law.” RCW 13.22.020(2)(g). The use
of room confinement should be as minimal as necessary, while still protecting
“the safety and security” of juveniles and staff. RCW 13.22.030(1)(b). Room
confinement must be limited to “no more than four hours in any twenty four hour
period,” unless specific requirements are met. RCW 13.22.020(2)(a)(i). If placed
in room confinement, the juvenile must be checked on at least every 15 minutes,
have access to a toilet and sink at least hourly, and have access to a bath or
shower daily. RCW 13.22.020(2)(b).
9 At oral argument on May 29, 2025, DCYF admitted it had not provided Petitioners with the level of care required by law.
18 No. 86707-5-I (consol. with No. 86715-6-I)/19
Here, DCYF does not deny Petitioners’ claims that they were subjected to
room confinement beyond what is allowed by statute. DCYF admits, “There has
been an overall increase in Code Sevens and modified programming within
Hawthorn and Willow Units over the past several months. Overpopulation,
increasing violence among the residents, and staffing shortages have all
contributed to this increase.” DCYF acknowledges there may be times that
residents do not have the opportunity to shower daily and also admits on “at least
one occasion a resident had to wait for approximately one hour” to use the
restroom.
DCYF claims it has taken substantial steps to improve the conditions at
Green Hill, but those efforts do not excuse it from the failure to comply with
RCW 13.22.020. Even though room isolation is not used as a punishment, it is
still being used as a means to address overpopulation and understaffing and in a
way unauthorized by Washington State law. Juveniles in room confinement,
including Petitioners, must have hourly access to the restroom and daily access
to a shower, and be in room confinement no more than 4 hours in any 24-hour
period, unless specific requirements are met. Petitioners have shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that DCYF did not meet these conditions;
therefore, the conditions of Petitioners’ confinement violated state law.
Relief
Petitioners request relief in the form of immediate release or an order for
DCYF to remedy the conditions. Immediate release is not an appropriate remedy
here, but DCYF must rectify the conditions at Green Hill that violate state law.
19 No. 86707-5-I (consol. with No. 86715-6-I)/20
In some circumstances, conditions of confinement can be so punitive as to
require immediate release. See In re Det. of Campbell, 139 Wn.2d 341, 349-50,
986 P.2d 771 (1999). But generally, “challenges to conditions of confinement
under article I, section 14 of Washington’s constitution . . . arise as PRPs,
seeking injunctive relief ordering prisons to remedy any unconstitutional
conditions.” Williams, 198 Wn.2d at 366. But this court “will only grant relief by a
personal restraint petition if other remedies which may be available to petitioner
are inadequate under the circumstances.” RAP 16.4(d).
Because Petitioners’ constitutional rights were not violated, they should
not be granted relief in the form of immediate release. But the conditions at
Green Hill, by DCYF’s own admission, do violate state law, and DCYF must
remedy the conditions and comply with state law.
In sum, we grant Petitioners’ PRPs in part as to the violation of state law
but deny as to the constitutional violations.
WE CONCUR: