Persinger v. Extendicare Health Services, Inc.

539 F. Supp. 2d 995
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedJanuary 1, 2008
Docket2:06-cv-00758
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 539 F. Supp. 2d 995 (Persinger v. Extendicare Health Services, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Persinger v. Extendicare Health Services, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 995 (S.D. Ohio 2008).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

SARGUS, District Judge.

This is a wrongful death action brought by the estate of John Todd Per singer against defendants Extendieare Health Care Services, Inc. and Rocksprings Care, LLC. Subject matter jurisdiction is alleged under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. This matter is before the Court on defendants’ August 31, 2007 motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

John Todd Persinger suffered head trauma and other injuries in a September 22, 2005 motorcycle accident. At the time, he had been living for about four to six weeks at a friend’s trailer in Ohio, He was hospitalized in West Virginia. On November 4, 2005, he was transferred for rehabilitation to Rocksprings Care in Ohio.

Defendants contend that there is not complete diversity of citizenship because the decedent John Todd Persinger and co-defendant Rocksprings Care, LLC were both residents of the State of Ohio. Plaintiff counters that although decedent was a patient at Rocksprings Care when he died, he was a citizen of the State of West Virginia. Finding for the reasons set out below that John Todd Persinger was a West Virginia citizen at the time of his death, defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED.

Legal standard. It is well established that “[s]tate citizenship for purposes of the diversity requirement [of 28 U.S.C. § 1332] is equated with domicile.” Von Dunser v. Aronoff, 915 F.2d 1071, 1072(6th Cir.1990). In the eyes of the law, domicile is not synonymous with a person’s residence. See Kaiser v. Loomis, 391 F.2d 1007, 1009 (6th Cir.1968). Moreover, a person can only have one domicile at a time for purposes of diversity jurisdiction — “a previous domicile can not be lost until another is adequately established.” See Eastman v. Univ. of Michigan, 30 F.3d 670, 672-73 (6th Cir.1994); see also Von Dunser, 915 F.2d at 1072. To establish new domicile, an individual must both reside in the new domicile and intend to remain there. Von Dunser, 915 F.2d at 1072. Both of these factors must be met, “either without the other is insufficient.” *997 Kaiser, 391 F.2d at 1009. Mere absence from a fixed home, however long or continued, cannot in and of itself effect a change in domicile. Id. (quoting Mitchell v. United States, 21 Wall. 350, 88 U.S. 350, 22 L.Ed. 584 (1874)). The initial burden of proving citizenship rests with the party invoking the court’s jurisdiction. Once domicile is shown, however, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that domicile has changed by a preponderance of the evidence. Kaiser, 391 F.2d at 1010.

The determination of domicile presents a mixed question of fact and law. Bank One, Texas, N.A. v. Montle, 964 F.2d 48, 51 (1st Cir.1992). When reviewing diversity-jurisdiction claims, courts typically take into account a variety of factors indicating the extent of a particular party’s ties to the purported domicile. These include, but are not limited to:

[c]urrent residence; voting registration and voting practices; location of personal and real property; location of brokerage and bank accounts; membership in unions; fraternal organizations, churches, clubs and other associations; place of employment or business; driver licenses and other automobile registration; [and] payment of taxes.

13B Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3612 (2d ed.1984). No single one of these factors is dispositive, and the analysis does not focus simply on the number of contacts with the purported domicile, but also their substantive nature. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985).

Facts. Decedent’s parents are residents of West Virginia. Since at least 1995, decedent John Todd Persinger held a valid West Virginia license. He renewed that license five months before his death. (Doc. 22-2, Exhs. 2 and 3.) In July 2005, he purchased a motorcycle and registered it with the West Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles. (Id., Exhs. 4 and 5; Deposition of Alice Marlene Persinger, p. 32.) In his application, Persinger listed a Moundsville, West Virginia address as his permanent place of residence. (Id.) Additionally, when he sold his 1997 sport utility vehicle to a West Virginia Automobile dealer, he listed a Moundsville, West Virginia address as his permanent place of residence. (Id., Exh. 6.) Persinger maintained a bank account at the Moundsville, West Virginia branch of WesBanco; and his account statements indicated that he maintained a residence in Moundsville, West Virginia. (Id., Exh. 7.)

On September 22, 2005, John Todd Per-singer suffered head trauma, multiple fractures, bruising and other injuries in a motorcycle accident. (Dan E. Persinger’s Dep., pp. 50 and 56.) He was taken to Wetzel County, West Virginia Hospital (Doc. 22-2, Exh. 9), but then transferred to the West Virginia University Hospital in Morgantown. (Id., Exh. 10.) He remained there seven weeks. (Id., Exhs. 1 and 10.)

On September 27, 2005, just five days after the accident, John Todd Persinger’s parents cleared his belongings out of the Ohio trailer where he had been living. The trailer had either been sold or was being foreclosed on. (Alice Marlene Per-singer’s Dep., p. 36.) He had “made a deal with some guy to live in it for a couple of months.” (Dan E. Persinger’s Dep., 40.) It was not a permanent residence. (Id. at 40^11.) Decedent lived there alone. (Id. at 42.) Some of Persinger’s mail still came to his parents’ house. (Alice Marlene Per-singer’s Dep., p. 36.) Before living in the trailer, decedent lived for a couple of months in Mozart, West Virginia. (Dan E. Persinger’s Dep., 41.) Before Mozart, he lived outside Paden City, West Virginia. *998 (Id.) His parents believed their son was moving back home with them after he completed his hospitalization. (Id.; Dan E. Per-singer’s Dep., 21.) Persinger’s father did testify that before the accident he believed that his son “had plans to go to the southwest” to look for work. (Dan E. Persinger’s Dep., 41.)

Decedent did not chose Rocksprings Care for his rehabilitation. A social worker at the West Virginia Ruby Memorial Hospital chose the facility, telling the family that it was easier to get Medicaid in Ohio. (Dan E. Persinger’s Deposition, p.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
539 F. Supp. 2d 995, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/persinger-v-extendicare-health-services-inc-ohsd-2008.