Persaud v. Rardin

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedFebruary 26, 2024
Docket2:23-cv-12374
StatusUnknown

This text of Persaud v. Rardin (Persaud v. Rardin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Persaud v. Rardin, (E.D. Mich. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

HAROLD PERSAUD,

Petitioner, Case No. 23-cv-12374 Hon. Linda V. Parker v.

E. RARDIN, WARDEN,

Respondent. _______________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

In this habeas case filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, FCI Milan inmate Harold Persaud (“Petitioner”) challenges the validity of his convictions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. I. Factual and Procedural Background In 2014, Petitioner was charged in the Northern District of Ohio with one count of health-care fraud, contrary to 8 U.S.C. § 1347; fourteen counts of making false statements relating to healthcare matters, contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 1035; and one count of money laundering, contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 1957. The Government alleged that Petitioner, a cardiologist, ordered unnecessary tests and overestimated the amount of arterial blockage in patients to justify costly interventional procedures. Petitioner was also accused of overreporting the complexity of his patients’ medical issues to maximize reimbursement from Medicare and private insurers. After a one-month trial, a jury convicted Petitioner

on all but one of the false-statement counts. The court sentenced Petitioner to twenty years of imprisonment and ordered over $5,000,000 in restitution. Petitioner filed a direct appeal, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. United States v.

Persaud, 866 F.3d 371 (6th Cir. 2017). Petitioner then filed a motion for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The district court denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit denied Petitioner’s motion for a

certificate of appealability. Persaud v. United States, No. 19-3041, 2019 WL 11880611 (6th Cir. Mar. 28, 2019); (ECF No. 1 at PageID. 4 ¶10(a)). Petitioner, thereafter, sought permission to file a second motion under §

2255, asserting another claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, but he was denied authorization by the Sixth Circuit. In re Persaud, No. 20-3422 (6th Cir. October 7, 2020); (ECF No. 1 at PageID. 4 ¶10(b)). Petitioner brings this action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming that he is

entitled to a new trial and other relief because he was denied the effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. (ECF No. 1, PageID.6-9.) Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to proceed under § 2241 on account of new evidence

demonstrating his innocence, and that his remedy under § 2255 is “inadequate or 2 ineffective” because he does not meet the standard for filing a successive § 2255 motion. (See ECF No. 1 at PageID. 2 ¶ 5, PageID. 10).

II. Applicable Law and Analysis At issue here is the availability of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a federal prisoner challenging his federal conviction when he is procedurally barred

from seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Section 2255 provides the primary mechanism for a federal prisoner to pursue post-conviction review of his federal conviction or sentence. See Wooten v. Cauley, 677 F.3d 303, 306 (6th Cir. 2012); Terrell v. United States, 564 F.3d 442,

447 (6th Cir. 2009); Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 755-56 (6th Cir. 1999). Motions under § 2255 are heard in the court of conviction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Several procedural limitations, however, limit the availability of § 2255

review. For example, a § 2255 motion is subject to a one-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Additionally, a defendant seeking to file a second or successive § 2255 motion must first obtain authorization from the Court of Appeals by showing that the claims are based on newly available evidence or on

a new retroactively applicable constitutional rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). Section 2241, on the other hand, generally concerns actions seeking habeas relief related to “‘the execution or manner in which the sentence is served’- those

things occurring within prison.” Taylor v. Owens, 990 F.3d 493, 495-96 (6th Cir. 3 2021) (quoting Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 755-56 (6th Cir. 1999)). Proceedings under this provision are heard in the district where the petitioner is

incarcerated. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). As a general rule then, a federal prisoner challenging his conviction must seek relief in the court of conviction under § 2255, and a federal prisoner

challenging something that happened at his prison seeks relief in the district where he is incarcerated under § 2241. See Hill v. Masters, 836 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2016). There is an exception. Section 2255(e) contains a “saving clause” that allows a federal prisoner to challenge his conviction or sentence in a § 2241 petition filed

in the district where he is incarcerated if he can demonstrate that his remedy under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective.” See Charles, 180 F.3d at 756. In this Circuit, until very recently, federal prisoners could demonstrate that

their remedy under § 2255 was “inadequate or ineffective” by pointing to some of the procedural limitations contained in § 2255 that prevented them from filing a motion under that section. For example, a federal prisoner was allowed to proceed under § 2241 where the challenge to his conviction or sentence was based on a new

retroactive rule of statutory interpretation, yet § 2255(f) or (h) (the statute of limitations and successive petition rules) prevented them from filing a § 2255 motion. See, e.g., McCormick v. Butler, 977 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2020); Hill, 836

4 F.3d at 599-600. A body of caselaw developed in this Circuit and others establishes the various requirements for this exception.

All that changed when the Supreme Court decided that § 2255(e)’s saving clause cannot be used as “end run” around the procedural limitations placed on post-conviction review by another provision of § 2255. See Jones v. Hendrix, 599

U.S. 465, 477 (2023).

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Related

Wooten v. Cauley
677 F.3d 303 (Sixth Circuit, 2012)
Witham v. United States
355 F.3d 501 (Sixth Circuit, 2004)
Terrell v. United States
564 F.3d 442 (Sixth Circuit, 2009)
Mark Hill v. Bart Masters
836 F.3d 591 (Sixth Circuit, 2016)
United States v. Harold Persaud
866 F.3d 371 (Sixth Circuit, 2017)
Derrick Taylor v. Angela Owens
990 F.3d 493 (Sixth Circuit, 2021)
Jones v. Hendrix
599 U.S. 465 (Supreme Court, 2023)

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Bluebook (online)
Persaud v. Rardin, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/persaud-v-rardin-mied-2024.