Perrygo v. United States

2 F.2d 181, 55 App. D.C. 80, 1924 U.S. App. LEXIS 1997
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedNovember 3, 1924
DocketNo. 3954
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 2 F.2d 181 (Perrygo v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Perrygo v. United States, 2 F.2d 181, 55 App. D.C. 80, 1924 U.S. App. LEXIS 1997 (D.C. Cir. 1924).

Opinion

ROBB, Associate Justice.

Appeal from a verdict and judgment in the Supreme Court of the District, under which appellant was found guilty of murder and sentenced to suffer death.

Under the view we take of the case, the only assignment of error necessary to be noticed is that relating to the introduction by the government of the confession of the appellant, defendant below. The evidence, aside from the confession, tended to show that the defendant, then 17 years of age and of rather low mentality, was about to marry a girl one year younger, and, being without funds and believing that a Mrs. Faithful, an elderly lady whom he knew, kept quite a large sum of money on her person, went to her house and attempted forcibly to take the money from her. Finally, to accomplish his purpose, defendant struck down Mrs. Faithful with an iron bar, secured the money, and fled the premises; the woman dying soon after. This occurred about 1 o’clock in the afternoon, and within two or three hours defendant was arrested and taken to the Fifth Precinct police station in this city, where he was searched in the presence of four police officers. Fifty dollars in bills were found on his person. In response to questions as to where he had obtained this money, he asserted he had worked for it, and denied he had struck Mrs. Faithful. He then was taken to police headquarters, arriving at the office of Inspector Grant there at about 4:30. He then was questioned by the inspector and the other officers present, but adhered to his original statement.

A witness for the government, Detective Sergeant Hughlett, testified “that defendant was questioned for an hour and a half by all present before he made a statement. For the hour and a half he was questioned as to his movements on this day, first by the inspector, and then by the others present. * * * We questioned him about this money, and he still stuck to it that he had worked for it, with his father, and had got $5 a month; that he took this drink and became unconscious for several hours. Finally we sent out and got the girl in the ease [Mabel Hill], and brought her np. She was brought into the room, and after she wont out he said,. ‘I am going to tell the truth about this thing,’ and then ho started to relate just what had occurred.” This witness “did not recall” that after Mabel Hill had been brought into the room the defendant was told, “Come on, Perrygo; you had better toll the truth now.” On cross-examination, witness admitted that defendant had complained during the time of having headache. Over the objection and exception of the defendant, this witness was permitted to relate the oral confession of the defendant, and the government then was permitted to introduce in evidence the defendant’s written confession; his oral statement having been reduced to writing immediately after he made it.

Detective Sergeant Connors, who was present at both No. 5 preeinet and police [182]*182headquarters, on being subjected to a preliminary examination to determine the admissibility o£ his testimony as to the confession, stated that before the confession was obtained Mabel Hill was brought into the room and defendant was told: “ ‘Now, this girl is here; you might as well tell the straight story about this affair; it is probably best for you in the end, while whatever you might say here will be evidence in court; it will be offered as evidence in court;’ that no stenographer was present at this time; that this statement was made to defendant by Inspector Grant before the paper was signed, up to which time defendant had said that he did not remember anything about the occurrence; that it was after being confronted with the girl, Mabel Hill, and the statement made to him, ‘It will probably be best for you in the end,’ etc., that the defendant made the statement respecting the case.” Thereupon the court stated “that so far as confession was admitted and attempted to be proved by witness on the stand, if the recollection of witness was correct, he had testified to matters which would render the confession inadmissible so far as witness was concerned.”

Detective Lynn, who was present when the confession was obtained, remembered that when defendant “was first brought in there he did not say that his head ached, but some time a little later on he did complain of feeling bad; he said he had a headache and felt sick; that Mabel Hill was brought into the room where defendant was; that witness could not say that at the particular time the Hill girl was brought in that Inspector Grant was talking to the boy;' that the inspector was there with the other men from the time he was taken to headquarters, which was around 4 o’clock, up to the time the Hill girl was brought in. During that time the boy was being questioned by all of the members of the Metropolitan police department present in the room; that they were asking him questions from around 4 o’clock, when he was brought to headquarters, until about 7 o’clock, when he made a statement; that he made the statement after the Hill girl had been brought into the room; that Mr, Connors was there in the room all the time that witness was there; that witness does not remember whether or not Inspector Grant said to the defendant, just after Mabel Hill had been brought into the room, ‘Here is Mabel Hill, now; it will probably be best for you if you tell how this thing happened;’ that witness could not say whether he did or did not say those words to the defendant; that witness does not remember; that it was after Mabel Hill was brought in the room that the boy made the statement; that Inspector Grant was standing over at the desk, over by the girl, Mabel Hill, when he made the confession; * * * that from 4 o’clock, up to the time the girl was brought into the room, all the defendant would say was, ‘I don’t remember;’ '* * * that while in Inspector Grant’s office the girl had nothing to say to the defendant, nor he to her.”

Another government witness, Michael Raedy, a police sergeant at the time of the confession, testified “that defendant was continuously questioned at headquarters; that, so far as witness remembered, defendant did not leave Inspector Grant’s office from 4 o’clock until after the statement had been obtained; * * * that before the statement was signed witness, did hear Inspector Grant say to the defendant, ‘Now, this girl is here, and you might as well tell the straight story about this affair; it is probably best for you in the end; while whatever you might say here will be evidence in court, it will be offered as evidence in court.” Later this witness denied that he had heard Inspector Grant say to the defendant that he had better tell a straight story. Asked what he meant by his first statement, witness replied: “I meant then that that question had not been put to him, all of that question; in fact, it had never been put to him in my presence, or I didn’t hear it, but the part that I related a moment ago, before he started to make his statement, Inspector Grant said, ‘Whatever you might say now will be used for or against you.’ He told him that.”

Witness further testified that before Mabel Hill was brought into the room no statement could be obtained from the defendant, who would answer, “ ‘Don’t remember;’ that is about all we could get out of him. * * * qijjejj we Went for this girl, Mabel Hill.” It was the recollection of this witness that the defendant and the girl were permitted to converse in whispers, but his testimony on this point is flatly contradicted by the other police officers, and is inconsistent with the surrounding circumstances.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2 F.2d 181, 55 App. D.C. 80, 1924 U.S. App. LEXIS 1997, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/perrygo-v-united-states-cadc-1924.