Perry v. County of Kern

District Court, E.D. California·Decided May 13, 2025·No. 1:17-cv-01097·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MELISSA PERRY, et al., No. 1:17-cv-01097-KES-CDB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER 13 v. 14 COUNTY OF KERN, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 On May 9, 2025, plaintiffs’ counsel Jeff Price filed a declaration. Doc. 319. For purposes 19 of this Order, the relevant parts of the declaration concern Exhibit 701 in the admitted exhibit 20 binder. In his declaration, Mr. Price accuses defendant Blakely’s counsel, Hugh Spackman, of 21 intentionally causing page 13 of Exhibit 701 (Ex. 701-13) to be placed out of page order in the 22 admitted exhibit binder prior to closing arguments and alleges that this was done to somehow 23 prejudice plaintiffs’ counsel. Doc. 319 ¶ 54. As the Court noted in court on May 9, 2025, and as 24 further addressed below, Mr. Price’s allegations are entirely unsupported and the Court finds 25 them to be meritless. 26 At the close of the evidence, the Court instructed counsel to review the Court’s admitted 27 exhibit binder to ensure that all admitted exhibits had been added to the binder. Doc. 320 ¶ 4. 28 Mr. Price reviewed the admitted exhibit binder with the courtroom deputy on May 7, 2025, after 1 the jury was excused, and he noted additional admitted exhibits to be added. Doc. 319 ¶¶ 3, 4. 2 These included Exhibit 701. Mr. Price estimates that this review process lasted approximately 3 one hour and “[a]t the end of that process Exhibit 701 was in the [admitted exhibits] binder 4 behind the tab.” Doc. 319 ¶¶ 4, 6. 5 On the following morning, May 8, 2025, counsel for defendant County of Kern, Kimberly 6 Marshall, and Blakely’s counsel’s paralegal, Romana Ramirez, reviewed the admitted exhibits 7 binder prior to the parties’ closing arguments. Doc. 322 ¶ 3. Ms. Marshall and Ms. Ramirez have 8 submitted declarations confirming that they did not remove or rearrange Ex. 701-13 or any other 9 exhibit in the binder. Docs. 321 ¶ 3; 322 ¶ 3. 10 The Court permitted Mr. Price to use exhibits from the Court’s admitted exhibit binder 11 during his rebuttal closing argument—although Mr. Price already had identical copies of all such 12 exhibits in plaintiff counsels’ set of exhibits. During his closing argument, Mr. Price removed 13 several exhibits from the admitted exhibit binder to show them to the jury, including Exhibit 701. 14 During his argument, Mr. Price stated that page 13 of Exhibit 701 (Ex. 701-13) was not in the 15 admitted exhibit binder. The Court noted that Exhibit 701-13 was in evidence, and Mr. Price 16 promptly obtained a copy from his co-counsel. Mr. Price then displayed and effectively used a 17 copy of Ex. 701-13 during his argument. It was later determined that Ex. 701-13 was in fact in 18 the admitted exhibit binder, but that the page was out of order by several pages. Doc. 319 ¶ 50. 19 In his declaration, Mr. Price states: 20 On the morning of May 8, 2025, before proceedings commenced, Romana Ramirez, who has been working for Hugh S. Spackman, of 21 Clinkenbeard, Spackman, Ramsey & Clark, LLP, throughout the trial in this case, since April 22, 2025, had the original court exhibit binder 22 at the defense counsel table and was reviewing the exhibit binder with the defense team. 23 Doc. 319 ¶ 7. Mr. Price then alleges: 24 I believe that Hugh Spackman caused page 701-13 to be removed 25 from its place between pages 701-12 and 701-14 in the Court’s original exhibit binder or was aware of this knowing that if I referred 26 to the page in closing argument I would find it missing and might indicate that to the jury and that this would bolster his argument that 27 the alleged Medical Instruction Sheet went missing from Ms. Scalia’s medical file. 28 1 Id. ¶ 54. Mr. Price did not provide any factual basis for his “belief” that Mr. Spackman caused 2 the exhibit page to be moved or that Mr. Spackman allegedly did so to prejudice Mr. Price, 3 purportedly “knowing” that Mr. Price might refer to the page in his closing argument. 4 On May 9, 2025, defense counsel filed several declarations in response to Mr. Price’s 5 May 9 declaration. Mr. Spackman’s declaration states that he “at no time obtained or reviewed” 6 the admitted exhibits binder, but rather, he asked his paralegal Ms. Ramirez to review the binder. 7 Doc. 320 ¶¶ 4, 5. Mr. Spackman did not remove or re-arrange Exhibit 701-13. Id. ¶ 5. 8 Ms. Ramirez’s declaration indicates that she worked with Ms. Marshall to review the admitted 9 exhibit binder. Doc. 322 ¶ 3. Ms. Ramirez confirms that neither she nor Ms. Marshall removed 10 Ex. 701-13 or any other exhibit from the admitted exhibits binder. Id. ¶ 3. Ms. Marshall’s 11 declaration confirms that they did not remove any exhibits from the admitted exhibit binder and 12 that any allegation that Ex. 701-13 was removed or rearranged is false. Doc. 321 ¶ 3. 13 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 when attorneys sign and file any “pleading, 14 written motion, or other paper,” they are certifying that “to the best of [their] knowledge, 15 information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,” 16 (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of 17 litigation; 18 (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, 19 or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; 20 (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable 21 opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 22 (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a 23 lack of information. 24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). 25 A court may impose sanctions for violations of Rule 11(b) in response to a party’s motion 26 or on its own initiative. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c). Before imposing sanctions, courts must 27 provide “notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). “Whether to 28 impose sanctions is determined by the reasonableness of inquiry into the law and facts, not the 1 good or bad faith of the signatory.” Moser v. Bret Harte Union High Sch. Dist., 366 F. Supp. 2d 2 944, 950 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (citing G.C. & K.B. Invs., Inc. v. Wilson, 326 F.3d 1096, 1109 (9th Cir. 3 2003)). “Sanctions under Rule 11 are not limited to instances in which a pleading as a whole is 4 frivolous, or of a harassing nature. Rather, sanctions may be imposed for improper or 5 unwarranted allegations even though at least one non-frivolous claim has been pled” if a 6 reasonable inquiry under the circumstances was not conducted. Id. 7 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, “[a]ny attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any 8 case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess 9 costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” 28 U.S.C. 10 § 1927. “Sanctions pursuant to section 1927 must be supported by a finding of subjective bad 11 faith.” New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1306 (9th Cir. 1989).

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Perry v. County of Kern, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

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