Spallone, J.
In this appeal1 from the denial of a motion to modify a dissolution judgment, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in finding that it lacked jurisdiction to open and modify the judgment on the issue of paternity.
The parties were married on August 7,1971. Difficulties arose over a period of time and the plaintiff moved out of the marital home in April of 1976. That summer, the plaintiff informed the defendant that she was pregnant and that he might not be the father. Because of the plaintiffs emotional instability and in an effort not to alarm her parents, the defendant acted as though the child were his. Shortly after the child was bom, the plaintiff brought an action for dissolution. The defendant did not contest the action in any way.
In rendering judgment on February 15,1978, the trial court ordered, inter alia, that the plaintiff would have custody of the child and that the defendant would pay child support of $30 per week. On May 23, 1980, the court ordered, on motion by the plaintiff, that the child support be increased to $40 per week. The issue of the paternity of the child was not denied by the defendant during the original dissolution action2 or raised in the subsequent modification proceeding.
On October 6,1981, the defendant filed a motion for modification alleging that he had been led to believe during his marriage to the plaintiff that he was the father of the child and that, subsequent to the judgment of dissolution, he was advised by the plaintiff that this was not so. He also claimed that in the spring of 1981 blood tests were conducted which indicated that the child was not his. He alleged that if he had known [324] this fact at the time of the dissolution, he would not have agreed to an uncontested finding that he was the father of the child. He thus requested that the court “reopen and modify” the judgment of dissolution and vacate all orders for the support of the child for which he was liable. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to open the judgment on the issue of paternity.
On appeal, the defendant argues that General Statutes §§ 46b-863 and 46b-1744 provide jurisdiction for the court to open the judgment, and relies on Stone v. Maher, 527 F. Sup. 10 (D. Conn. 1980), to support his position. He claims that he, like the plaintiff in Stone v. Maher, supra, never actually litigated the question of paternity and that the denial of his motion for modification consequently violated his due process rights.
In Stone v. Maher, supra, the plaintiff (hereinafter Stone) challenged the constitutionality of General Statutes § 46b-172, which provides a procedure by which paternity may be acknowledged by filing.5 The acknowl[325] edgment which Stone signed and filed was a printed form supplied by the Connecticut family relations office containing blank spaces for the names and addresses of the mother, child and acknowledging person. The form provided neither information regarding the acknowledging person’s right to counsel or to a hearing on the issue of paternity, nor any language expressing a waiver of such rights. When Stone signed the [326] form, he had no attorney present. The court found that General Statutes § 46b-172 was “fundamentally deficient because it fails to provide for informing a putative father of the legal ramifications of signing a written acknowledgement of paternity.” Id., 17. It thus permitted “the plaintiff and his class to contest, and litigate for the first time in a judicial proceeding, the issue of paternity by seeking a modification in state court of prior support orders or agreements”; id.; and, in such proceedings, “to assert his nonpaternity as a basis for modifying or vacating a prior support order or agreement . . . .” Id., 18.
The class to which the ruling of Stone v. Maher, supra, applies is clearly that of putative fathers who executed a written acknowledgment of paternity pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-172 and were never given an opportunity to litigate the issue of paternity.6 We therefore find that Stone v. Maher, supra, is inapplicable to this case, where the defendant, who was represented by counsel, appeared and participated in a judicial proceeding in which his status as father of the minor child was raised and adjudicated. He could have litigated the question of his paternity, but he chose not to. Since the defendant was represented by counsel and elected not to contest the issue of paternity, we may reasonably assume that he, unlike the plaintiff in Stone v. Maher, supra, was aware of the consequences of his decision. See Vogel v. Vogel, 178 Conn. 358, 363, 422 A.2d 271 (1979).
[327] “If the paternity of a child is placed in issue in an action for a divorce and is adjudicated, the matter is res judicata as between the husband and wife in any subsequent action or proceeding . . . .”24 Am. Jur. 2d 1084, Divorce and Separation § 1099. Whether the issue “was actually litigated is immaterial in view of the necessary conclusion that there was full opportunity to litigate it and that it was adjudicated by the decree.” Jackson v. Irving Trust Co., 311 U.S. 494, 503, 61 S. Ct. 326, 85 L. Ed. 297 (1941). The continuing jurisdiction of the superior court to set aside, alter or modify support orders pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-86 does not deprive the underlying adjudication of finality for purposes of res judicata. See 1 Restatement (Second), Judgments § 13.
The underlying adjudication that the child was the issue of the marriage between the parties triggered the application of General Statutes § 46b-84 (formerly Sec. 46-57), which authorizes the court to determine the parents’ obligation for maintenance of that child.7 It is the degree and extent of this obligation that may be modi[328] fied under the continuing jurisdiction of the court, not the factual finding that the child is the issue of the marriage. The trial court was correct in finding that the underlying issue of the defendant’s paternity fell beyond its continuing jurisdiction to modify orders of support.
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Spallone, J.
In this appeal1 from the denial of a motion to modify a dissolution judgment, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in finding that it lacked jurisdiction to open and modify the judgment on the issue of paternity.
The parties were married on August 7,1971. Difficulties arose over a period of time and the plaintiff moved out of the marital home in April of 1976. That summer, the plaintiff informed the defendant that she was pregnant and that he might not be the father. Because of the plaintiffs emotional instability and in an effort not to alarm her parents, the defendant acted as though the child were his. Shortly after the child was bom, the plaintiff brought an action for dissolution. The defendant did not contest the action in any way.
In rendering judgment on February 15,1978, the trial court ordered, inter alia, that the plaintiff would have custody of the child and that the defendant would pay child support of $30 per week. On May 23, 1980, the court ordered, on motion by the plaintiff, that the child support be increased to $40 per week. The issue of the paternity of the child was not denied by the defendant during the original dissolution action2 or raised in the subsequent modification proceeding.
On October 6,1981, the defendant filed a motion for modification alleging that he had been led to believe during his marriage to the plaintiff that he was the father of the child and that, subsequent to the judgment of dissolution, he was advised by the plaintiff that this was not so. He also claimed that in the spring of 1981 blood tests were conducted which indicated that the child was not his. He alleged that if he had known [324] this fact at the time of the dissolution, he would not have agreed to an uncontested finding that he was the father of the child. He thus requested that the court “reopen and modify” the judgment of dissolution and vacate all orders for the support of the child for which he was liable. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to open the judgment on the issue of paternity.
On appeal, the defendant argues that General Statutes §§ 46b-863 and 46b-1744 provide jurisdiction for the court to open the judgment, and relies on Stone v. Maher, 527 F. Sup. 10 (D. Conn. 1980), to support his position. He claims that he, like the plaintiff in Stone v. Maher, supra, never actually litigated the question of paternity and that the denial of his motion for modification consequently violated his due process rights.
In Stone v. Maher, supra, the plaintiff (hereinafter Stone) challenged the constitutionality of General Statutes § 46b-172, which provides a procedure by which paternity may be acknowledged by filing.5 The acknowl[325] edgment which Stone signed and filed was a printed form supplied by the Connecticut family relations office containing blank spaces for the names and addresses of the mother, child and acknowledging person. The form provided neither information regarding the acknowledging person’s right to counsel or to a hearing on the issue of paternity, nor any language expressing a waiver of such rights. When Stone signed the [326] form, he had no attorney present. The court found that General Statutes § 46b-172 was “fundamentally deficient because it fails to provide for informing a putative father of the legal ramifications of signing a written acknowledgement of paternity.” Id., 17. It thus permitted “the plaintiff and his class to contest, and litigate for the first time in a judicial proceeding, the issue of paternity by seeking a modification in state court of prior support orders or agreements”; id.; and, in such proceedings, “to assert his nonpaternity as a basis for modifying or vacating a prior support order or agreement . . . .” Id., 18.
The class to which the ruling of Stone v. Maher, supra, applies is clearly that of putative fathers who executed a written acknowledgment of paternity pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-172 and were never given an opportunity to litigate the issue of paternity.6 We therefore find that Stone v. Maher, supra, is inapplicable to this case, where the defendant, who was represented by counsel, appeared and participated in a judicial proceeding in which his status as father of the minor child was raised and adjudicated. He could have litigated the question of his paternity, but he chose not to. Since the defendant was represented by counsel and elected not to contest the issue of paternity, we may reasonably assume that he, unlike the plaintiff in Stone v. Maher, supra, was aware of the consequences of his decision. See Vogel v. Vogel, 178 Conn. 358, 363, 422 A.2d 271 (1979).
[327] “If the paternity of a child is placed in issue in an action for a divorce and is adjudicated, the matter is res judicata as between the husband and wife in any subsequent action or proceeding . . . .”24 Am. Jur. 2d 1084, Divorce and Separation § 1099. Whether the issue “was actually litigated is immaterial in view of the necessary conclusion that there was full opportunity to litigate it and that it was adjudicated by the decree.” Jackson v. Irving Trust Co., 311 U.S. 494, 503, 61 S. Ct. 326, 85 L. Ed. 297 (1941). The continuing jurisdiction of the superior court to set aside, alter or modify support orders pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-86 does not deprive the underlying adjudication of finality for purposes of res judicata. See 1 Restatement (Second), Judgments § 13.
The underlying adjudication that the child was the issue of the marriage between the parties triggered the application of General Statutes § 46b-84 (formerly Sec. 46-57), which authorizes the court to determine the parents’ obligation for maintenance of that child.7 It is the degree and extent of this obligation that may be modi[328] fied under the continuing jurisdiction of the court, not the factual finding that the child is the issue of the marriage. The trial court was correct in finding that the underlying issue of the defendant’s paternity fell beyond its continuing jurisdiction to modify orders of support.
We note that Practice Book § 326 provides that a civil judgment may be opened or set aside where a motion to do so is filed within four months from the date of its rendition, “[ujnless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction . . . .” Since the portion of the judgment which the defendant sought to alter was not one over which the court had continuing jurisdiction, the defendant’s motion was subject to the four month limitation for filing motions to open. Practice Book § 326; Bunche v. Bunche, 180 Conn. 285, 288, 249 A.2d 874 (1980).
“Under § 326, the parties may waive the time requirements or otherwise submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court. Absent waiver, consent or other submission to jurisdiction, however, a court is without jurisdiction to modify or correct a judgment, in other than clerical respects, after the expiration of the term of the court in which it was rendered; Snow v. Calise, 174 Conn. 567, 571, 392 A.2d 440 (1978); or the term provided in Practice Book, 1978, § 326.” Id. The defendant’s motion to modify was not filed within the applicable period for opening judgments and the parties did not submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court by waiver, consent or otherwise.8
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
“(b) At any time after the filing with the court of any acknowledgment of paternity, upon the application of any interested party, the court or any judge thereof shall cause a summons, signed by him or by the clerk or assistant clerk of said court, to be issued, requiring the putative father to appear in court at a time and place named therein, to show cause, if any he has, why the court should not enter judgment for support of the child by payment of a weekly sum until the child attains the age of eighteen years, together with provision for reimbursement for lying-in expense, accrued maintenance and reasonable expense of the action under this subsection on the acknowledgement of paternity previously filed with said court. The prior judgment as to paternity shall be res judicata as to that issue and shall not be reconsidered by the court. All such payments shall be made through the family relations office of the superior court.”
Subsection (b) of General Statutes § 46b-172 was subsequently amended to provide that “[t]he prior judgment as to paternity shall be res judicata as to that issue and shall not be reconsidered by the court, unless the person seeking review of the acknowledgment petitions the superior court for the geographical area having venue for a hearing on the issue of paternity within three years of such judgment or within three years of [October 1, 1982], whichever is later.” Public Acts 1982, No. 82-6.