Perkins v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.

199 F. 712, 118 C.C.A. 150, 1912 U.S. App. LEXIS 1753
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedOctober 7, 1912
DocketNo. 2,081
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 199 F. 712 (Perkins v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Perkins v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 199 F. 712, 118 C.C.A. 150, 1912 U.S. App. LEXIS 1753 (9th Cir. 1912).

Opinion

ROSS, Circuit Judge

(after stating the facts as above). The record shows that upon the conclusion of the evidence for the plaintiff the defendant moved the court to take the case from the jury and dismiss it. In denying that motion the court said:

“1 think there is testimony in this case tending to show the deceased met his death by coining in contact with the upright of that bridge. There is also testimony to show that the company was guilty of negligence in constructing and maintaining that upright so near to passing trains. I do not believe the doctrine of a presumption upon a presumption or speculation has application here. The testimony shows that, when last seen, he was tightening the hand brake within a very few yards of tills bridge, and that his next duty would lie to look down and see whether the brakes were tight, and within 10 seconds — 10 or 15 seconds, at most — after he was last seen, he was struck by the bridge and killed.”

[714]*714The record further shows that upon the conclusion of the defendant’s evidence counsel for the defendant said:

“The defendant having rested, and the plaintiff having rested, and the taking of the testimony having closed, the defendant again challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain any verdict, and moves the court to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant.”

After argument and in response to the motion last mentioned, the court said:

“I will deny the motion provisionally, with permission to the defendant to renew it after the case has been submitted.”

And later:

“The Court: Then by agreement of counsel the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be made later.”

With its decision subsequently granting that motion, the court filed an opinion in which it said, among other things:

“For the purposes of this opinion, I will admit the sufficiency of the evidence to show that the air brakes on the tender were out of repair; that the bridge in question was too narrow; that the defendant was wanting in due care in both of these respects; and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover if either of these negligent acts was the direct or proximate cause of her husband’s death. Nor do I deem it necessary at this time to discuss the question of proximate cause. It is tangible proof of the primary cause that is lacking here; for while the complaint is explicit as to the- manner in which the deceased met his death, and as to the immediate cause of his death, there is no direct testimony tending to sustain these allegations. The brake wheel in question was located by the end of the tank, about the height of a man’s head above the floor of the gangway. The deceased was last seen alive by his fireman at the brake wheel, tightening the hand brake. At that time the engine was 100 or 150 yards distant from the bridge, running at the rate of 10 miles per hour. After passing the bridge the engine gained in speed, and in looking to ascertain the cause the fireman discovered that the engineer was gone. The train was backed up to the bridge, and, his dead body was found near the center of the bridge, outside of the rails, lying face downward, with the head turned under the left arm and the neck broken. When found there was a slight contusion on the right cheek. The tongue was out and blood was oozing from the mouth. A day or two later a witness for the plaintiff claims to have found 15 or 20 hairs on the upright of the bridge about six feet above the rails which resembled a lock of hair of the deceased submitted to him at the trial. This is all the direct testimony in the case.”

After making a quotation from the testimony of one of the witnesses, the trial judge proceeded to say in his opinion:

“Before accepting the plaintiff’s theory of the case, however, I must say that in my opinion her testimony shows that that theory is not only an improbable, but an impossible, one. According to the testimony offered on her behalf, the bridge in question is 14 feet 5 inches in the clear. The cab of the engine in passing through the bridge would come within less than a foot of the uprights. The tank is still wider than the engine, and the gangway is at least four or five feet above the rails. Making due allowance for the ordinary vibration or swaying of the engine while in motion, this would leave the cab and the tank at least twelve feet in width. The cab and the tank would therefore project almost four feet beyond the rails and the wheels, at a height of approximately three feet above the rails. This testimony demonstrates how utterly impossible it would be for a man to stand in the gangway of the engine and observe either the wheels or the brakes from the gangway. He could not even see the ends of the ties, much less the wheels or [715]*715ího brake siloes. This is shown clearly and conclusively by the blue print offered in evidence by the defendant, the correctness of which is not challenged by the plaintiff. The view of the engine as there given is even more favorable to the plaintiff than her own testimony, for it shows the engine almost two feet narrower. A person standing in the gangway could not see either the wheels or the brakes without extending his person several feet beyond the cab. Indeed, such an undertaking would be utterly impossible. To observe the wheels or the brakes at all, the engineer would be compelled to descend to the bottom step shown on the exhibit, and even there he would have to peer under the tank. It is not claimed that he did this, nor is it conceivable that any prudent man would do so. furthermore, it is strange, indeed, that a prudent and experienced railroad man would have to resort to such methods for the purpose of ascertaining whether his brakes were too tight or too loose. It would seem to the ordinary observer that he could and would determine that fact by the effect of the brakes on the momentum of his train. Again, if the upright of the bridge struck this man’s head while his train was running at the rate of 10 miles per hour, we would expect to find some more convincing proof of the contact on his person. The contusion found on his head was far more likely to result from his face coming in contact with the floor of the bridge than from coming in contact with the upright of the bridge as claimed. Moreover, it is extremely improbable that his body would be found in the position in which it was found had he been struck as claimed. Of course, it is impossible to say what effect such a blow would have on liis person, or in what position the body would be found after receiving the blow, but these matters are only referred to for the purpose of showing the inherent improbability that the theory of the case conceived by the plaintiff is the correct one. Giving to the plaintiff, however, the full benefit of all the testimony, there is no proof whatever that the deceased did in fact stand in the gangway or look out for the purpose of observing the condition of his brakes, or for any purpose whatsoever. The whole case rests upon conjecture, guesswork, and speculation, and the cause of death is a mystery which the verdict of the jury does not solve.”

[1] As will be readily seen, the court below rendered its final decision upon the ground that the manner in which Perkins came to his death was purely conjectural, and reached that conclusion by contrasting and weighing the evidence on behalf of the respective parties.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
199 F. 712, 118 C.C.A. 150, 1912 U.S. App. LEXIS 1753, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/perkins-v-northern-pac-ry-co-ca9-1912.