Performance Designed Products LLC v. OKYN HOLDINGS, INC., doing business as Nyko Technologies

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: April 27, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-01360
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 PERFORMANCE DESIGNED Case No.: 25-cv-01360-RBM-JLB PRODUCTS LLC, 9 TENTATIVE CLAIM Plaintiff, 10 CONSTRUCTION ORDER v. 11 OKYN HOLDINGS, INC., doing business 12 as Nyko Technologies, 13 Defendant. 14 15 16 The present action involves two consolidated patent cases. In one, Performance 17 Designed Products, LLC (“Plaintiff” or “PDP”) seeks a declaration of non-infringement. 18 (See Doc. 48 at 2.) In the other, OKYN Holdings, Inc. (“Defendant” or “Nyko”) asserts 19 claims of patent infringement. (See id. at 3.) Both concern the same four patents: U.S. 20 Patent Nos. 8,143,848 (“the ’848 Patent”); 8,536,832 (“the ’832 Patent”); 9,705,344 (“the 21 ’344 Patent”); and 9,174,121 (“the ’121 Patent”) (collectively, “the Asserted Patents”). 22 On December 15, 2025, the Parties filed their joint claim construction hearing 23 statement, chart, and worksheet pursuant to Patent Local Rule 4.2, identifying the disputed 24 claim terms from the Asserted Patents. (Doc. 35.)1 On January 26, 2026, the Parties each 25

26 27 1 Because the Asserted Patents “share [a] common specification,” the Parties “have cited solely to the specification of the ’848 Patent” for simplicity, except as otherwise noted. 28 1 filed their opening claim construction briefs. (Docs. 39, 40.) On February 9, 2026, the 2 Parties each filed their responsive claim construction briefs. (Docs. 43, 44.) A claim 3 construction hearing is scheduled for April 28, 2026 at 1:30 p.m. In anticipation of the 4 hearing, the Court issues the following tentative claim construction order. 5 I. BACKGROUND 6 Nyko is the owner of the Asserted Patents. (Doc 53 (“Nyko Compl.) ¶¶ 9–12.) Each 7 of the Asserted Patents “share[s]a common specification and [is] part of the same patent 8 family,” is titled “Video Game Controller Charging System Having a Docking Structure,” 9 and relates to “charging systems for consumer electronics devices, and more particularly 10 to charging systems for hand-held video game controllers.” (See Doc. 1-2 at 27.) The 11 Asserted Patents are “charging station[s] capable of charging multiple video game 12 controllers simultaneously.” NYKO Techs. v. Energizer Holdings Inc., Case No. CV 12- 13 3001 GAF (VBKx), 2013 WL 11232100, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2013). 14 PDP provides “third-party gaming peripherals, such as controllers, headsets, and 15 accessories,” and “is a preferred partner for each of the major gaming console providers, 16 including Nintendo (Switch), Microsoft (X-Box), and Sony (PlayStation).” (Doc. 1 (“PDP 17 Compl.”) ¶¶ 8–9.) Nyko alleges that PDP infringed certain claims of each of the Asserted 18 Patents through PDP’s “Ultra Slim Charge System for PlayStation 4,” which is a charging 19 dock for the PlayStation 4 gaming console. (Nyko Compl. ¶ 17.) 20 The Parties have agreed to constructions for six claim terms from the Asserted 21 Patents. (See Doc. 35-2 at 7–9.) The Parties request that the Court construe nine disputed 22 claim terms: “docking bay;” “a recess of a shape configured to mate with the adapter body;” 23 “plurality;” “adapter;” “electrical contact(s)” / “electrical lead(s);” “video game 24 controller;” “intervening portion;” “recess;” and “connector.” (Id. at 2–6; see Docs. 39, 25 40, 43, 44.) 26 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 27 Claim construction is an issue of law for the court to decide. Teva Pharms. USA, 28 Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 326 (2015); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 1 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). Although claim construction is ultimately a question of law, 2 “subsidiary factfinding is sometimes necessary.” Teva, 574 U.S. at 326. “The purpose of 3 claim construction is to ‘determin[e] the meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted 4 to be infringed.’” O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 5 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that the 6 ‘claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to 7 exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) 8 (citations omitted). 9 Claim terms “‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning[,]’” which 10 “is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question 11 at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1312–13. “In some cases, the ordinary meaning of 12 claim language as understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even 13 to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application 14 of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.” Id. at 1314. “However, 15 in many cases, the meaning of a claim term as understood by persons of skill in the art is 16 not readily apparent.” O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1360. In those cases, the court must look to 17 “those sources available to the public that show what a person of skill in the art would have 18 understood disputed claim language to mean,” including intrinsic and extrinsic evidence. 19 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. A court should begin with the intrinsic record, which consists 20 of the language of the claims, the patent specification, and, if in evidence, the prosecution 21 history of the asserted patent. Id.; Vederi, LLC v. Google, Inc., 744 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. 22 Cir. 2014) (“In construing claims, this court relies primarily on the claim language, the 23 specification, and the prosecution history.”). 24 In determining the proper construction of a claim, a court should first look to the 25 language of the claims. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 26 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also Comark Commc’ns v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed. 27 Cir. 1998) (“The appropriate starting point . . . is always with the language of the asserted 28 claim itself.”). The context in which a disputed term is used in the asserted claims may 1 provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of the term. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. 2 In addition, the context in which the disputed term is used in other claims, both asserted 3 and unasserted, may provide guidance because “the usage of a term in one claim can often 4 illuminate the meaning of the same term in other claims.” Id. A disputed term should be 5 construed “consistently with its appearance in other places in the same claim or in other 6 claims of the same patent.” Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. 7 Cir. 2001); accord Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., 520 F.3d 8 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Paragon Sols., LLC v. Timex Corp., 566 F.3d 1075, 9 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“We apply a presumption that the same terms appearing in different 10 portions of the claims should be given the same meaning.” (internal quotation marks 11 omitted)). Moreover, “‘[a] claim construction that gives meaning to all the terms of the 12 claim is preferred over one that does not do so.’” Vederi, 744 F.3d 1383. 13 A court must also read claims “in view of the specification, of which they are a part.” 14 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 997 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc); see 15 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly 16 pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor 17 regards as the invention.”). “‘Apart from the claim language itself, the specification is the 18 single best guide to the meaning of a claim term.’” Vederi, 744 F.3d at 1382 (quoting AIA 19 Eng’g Ltd. v. Magotteaux Int’l S/A, 657 F.3d 1264, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). For example, 20 “a claim construction that excludes [a] preferred embodiment [described in the 21 specification] is rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary 22 support.” Adams Respiratory Therapeutics, Inc. v. Perrigo Co., 616 F.3d 1283, 1290 (Fed. 23 Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 24 But “[t]he written description part of the specification does not delimit the right to 25 exclude. That is the function and purpose of claims.” Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. Therefore, 26 “it is improper to read limitations from a preferred embodiment described in the 27 specification—even if it is the only embodiment—into the claims absent a clear indication 28 in the intrinsic record that the patentee intended the claims to be so limited.” Dealertrack, 1 Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Kara Tech. Inc. v. 2 Stamps.com Inc., 582 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The patentee is entitled to the full 3 scope of his claims, and we will not limit him to his preferred embodiment or import a 4 limitation from the specification into the claims.”). 5 In addition to the claim language and the specification, the patent’s prosecution 6 history may be considered if it is in evidence. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. The prosecution 7 history “consists of the complete record of the proceedings before the [Patent and 8 Trademark Office (“PTO”)] and includes the prior art cited during the examination of the 9 patent.” Id. “Like the specification, the prosecution history provides evidence of how the 10 PTO and the inventor understood the patent.” Id. “Yet because the prosecution history 11 represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the applicant, rather than the final 12 product of that negotiation, it often lacks the clarity of the specification and thus is less 13 useful for claim construction purposes.” Id. 14 In most situations, analysis of the intrinsic evidence will resolve claim construction 15 disputes. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583; Teva, 574 U.S. at 331. However, “[w]here the 16 intrinsic record is ambiguous, and when necessary,” district courts may “rely on extrinsic 17 evidence, which ‘consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, 18 including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.’” Power 19 Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 20 2013) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317). A court must evaluate all extrinsic evidence in 21 light of the intrinsic evidence. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319. “Extrinsic evidence may not be 22 used ‘to contradict claim meaning that is unambiguous in light of the intrinsic evidence.’” 23 Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citation 24 omitted); see also Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Grp., Inc., 262 F.3d 25 1258, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[E]xtrinsic evidence . . . may not be used to vary, contradict, 26 expand, or limit the claim language from how it is defined, even by implication, in the 27 specification or file history.”). In cases where subsidiary facts contained in the extrinsic 28 evidence “are in dispute, courts will need to make subsidiary factual findings about that 1 extrinsic evidence.” Teva, 574 U.S. at 332. 2 “[D]istrict courts are not (and should not be) required to construe every limitation 3 present in a patent’s asserted claims.” O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1362. In certain situations, 4 it is appropriate for a court to determine that a claim term needs no construction and its 5 plain and ordinary meaning applies. See id.; Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. But “[a] 6 determination that a claim term ‘needs no construction’ or has the ‘plain and ordinary 7 meaning’ may be inadequate when a term has more than one ‘ordinary’ meaning or when 8 reliance on a term’s ‘ordinary’ meaning does not resolve the parties’ dispute.” O2 Micro, 9 521 F.3d at 1361. If the parties dispute the scope of a certain claim term, it is the court’s 10 duty to resolve the dispute. Id. at 1362; accord Eon Corp. IP Holdings v. Silver Spring 11 Networks, 815 F.3d 1314, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 12 III. DISCUSSION 13 Having considered the Parties’ claim construction briefs and supporting evidence, 14 the Court now tentatively construes the disputed claim terms as set forth below. 15 1. “docking bay” 16 PDP Construction Nyko Construction 17 “a physical component defining an opening “a structure that matches the shape of the for receiving and aligning controllers” adapter and configured to guide and align a 18 controller onto the base” 19 20 PDP argues that its proposed construction aligns with the Parties’ agreed-upon 21 constructions and is supported by the specification and the plain and ordinary meaning of 22 “bay.” (Doc. 39 at 7–10.) Nyko argues that its proposed construction finds support in the 23 claims and specification, and that PDP’s proposed construction should be rejected as overly 24 reliant on dictionary definitions inconsistent with the intrinsic evidence. (Doc. 40 at 21– 25 23.) The Court tentatively finds that “docking bay” should be construed somewhere in 26 between the Parties’ proposals. 27 The Parties agree on the construction for two terms related to “docking bay.” These 28 are “structure,” defined as “one or more physical components for receiving controllers,” 1 and “docking structure,” defined as “one or more physical components for receiving and 2 aligning controllers.” (Doc. 35 at 6–7.) Based on these agreements, it appears that 3 “docking” adds “aligning controllers” to the broader class of “structure.” A “docking bay,” 4 then, should include that capability. 5 The Court tentatively disagrees, though, with PDP’s construction to the extent 6 “docking bay” should be construed to be “defining an opening.” None of the claims recite 7 an “opening” related to “docking bay.” The specifications describe “[t]he docking bays 8 512, 514 . . . can have any suitable shapes that allow the electrical contacts of the docking 9 bays . . . to make contact with the electrical leads . . . . (Doc. 40-2 (“’848 Patent”) at 12:32– 10 35.) Docking bays thus need not have an opening through which the controller is placed. 11 PDP also argues that the specification’s phrasing that controllers may be “received 12 horizontally into one of the docking bays” demonstrates that a “docking bay” must have 13 an opening. (Doc. 39 at 9 (emphasis added).) But as Nyko notes, “[i]n all relevant 14 embodiments (‘adapter’ embodiments in FIGS 16–23), ‘docking bay’ is not shown to 15 include an opening,” and if “docking bay” were to be construed as having an opening, then 16 “a user would not be able to simply drop a controller onto the docking bay. The user would 17 need to precisely adjust or control the controller to put it into an opening/hole—a scenario 18 in which the preferred embodiment . . . would be excluded.” (Doc. 44 at 8–9.) “A claim 19 construction that excludes a preferred embodiment is ‘rarely, if ever, correct.’” Kaneka 20 Corp. v. Xiamen Kingdomway Grp. Co., 790 F.3d 1298, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citation 21 omitted). As such, the Court declines to construe “docking bay” as requiring an opening. 22 The Court also tentatively disagrees with Nyko’s construction to the extent a 23 “docking bay” should be construed to match the shape of the adapter. Nyko argues that 24 claim 15 of the ’344 Patent recites “docking bay defining a recess of a shape configured to 25 mate with the adapter body,” and the specification describes “[i]n other embodiments, the 26 adapters 516 and the docking bays 512, 514 have matching shapes, such as, for example, a 27 molded male and female matching shape.” (Doc. 40-3 (“’832 Patent”) at 17:18–20; ’848 28 Patent at 12:29–31.) Here, the specification is describing preferred “embodiments” of the 1 invention. (See also ’848 Patent at 11:49–50 (“Another exemplary embodiment of the 2 invention, shown in FIGS. 16–23 . . . .”).) “It is improper to read limitations from a 3 preferred embodiment described in the specification—even if it is the only embodiment— 4 into the claims absent a clear indication in the intrinsic record that the patentee intended 5 the claims to be so limited.” Dealertrack, Inc., 674 F.3d at 1327. Here, there is no language 6 in the specification providing a clear indication that the invention should be limited to these 7 embodiments. See Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1366–67 8 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Indeed, the language at issue implies that there are “other embodiments” 9 where the adapters and the docking bays do not have matching shapes. Second, Nyko’s 10 proposed construction would render the language of claim 15 superfluous. Substituting 11 Nyko’s proposed construction of “docking bay” into claim 15 yields the following 12 redundancy: “a structure that matches the shape of the adapter and configured to guide and 13 align a controller onto the base defining a recess of a shape configured to mate with the 14 adapter.” See SimpleAir, Inc. v. Sony Ericcson Mobile Commc’ns AB, 820 F.3d 419, 429 15 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[I]nterpretations that render some portion of the claim language 16 superfluous are disfavored”) (citation omitted). 17 Finally, Nyko argues that the descriptions PDP relies on “concern[ ] a ‘docking bay’ 18 in an embodiment that is not recited in the asserted claims.” (Doc. 44 at 8.) But the context 19 in which a disputed term is used in claims, both asserted and unasserted, provides guidance 20 because “the usage of a term in one claim can often illuminate the meaning of the same 21 term in other claims.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. Nyko argues that certain embodiments 22 include an “adapter” and others do not. But this does not overcome the Court’s obligation 23 to construe a disputed term “consistently with its appearance in other places in the same 24 claim or in other claims of the same patent.” Rexnord Corp., 274 F.3d at 1342. 25 Accordingly, the Court tentatively construes “docking bay” to mean: “a structure 26 configured to receive and align controllers.” 27 28 1 2. “recess” 2 PDP Construction Nyko Construction 3 No construction required. Alternatively, “a portion of the docking bay dimensioned “an indentation or set back” to receive the adapter and having a shape 4 that matches with the shape of the adapter” 5 6 PDP argues that Nyko’s proposal improperly narrows “recess,” as “[t]he 7 specification confirms that the ‘recess’ need not match the shape of the adapter.” (Doc. 39 8 at 17.) Nyko argues that the claims and specifications teach that the “recess” must have a 9 shape that matches with the shape of the adapter, and PDP’s argument does not consider 10 the specification in context. (Doc. 40 at 28; Doc. 44 at 10.) The Court tentatively finds 11 PDP’s proposal more appropriate. 12 First, the Court notes that it appears PDP did not address Nyko’s argument that the 13 “recess” is “a portion of the docking bay.” The claim recites the charging system 14 comprising a base that “comprises at least one structure defining a docking bay,” (’848 15 Patent at 17:15–16), and “[e]ach of the docking bays 512, 514 includes a recess 530 at the 16 bottom of the docking bay” (’832 Patent at 12:10–12). (See also id. at 15:58–59 (claim 17 reciting “the base has a recess formed therein . . .”).) The Court reads this language to 18 mean that the “docking bay” may contain the “recess,” but not necessarily that the “recess” 19 must always be part of the “docking bay.” The Parties shall be prepared to address this 20 issue at the hearing. 21 Second, the Court tentatively finds that the “recess” need not always be 22 “dimensioned to receive the adapter and hav[e] a shape that matches with the shape of the 23 adapter.” Not all the claims expressly recite as such. (See ’344 Patent at 18:28–30 (“at 24 least one adapter is of a shape that generally coincides with the shape of the recess”); ’848 25 Patent at 17:37–40 (“at least one recess comprises an angled corner dimensioned to match 26 the angled edges of the at least one external adapter and adapted to orient the at least one 27 external adapter with respect to the at least one recess”).) Additionally, there are claims 28 that discuss the “recess” without also discussing how the “recess” is dimensioned to receive 1 the adapter. (See ’848 Patent at 17:1–5 (“a base comprising at least one electrical contact, 2 the base further comprising . . .”).) Therefore, Nyko’s proposal would render the above 3 claims superfluous, which is disfavored. See SimpleAir, Inc., 820 F.3d at 429. 4 Accordingly, the Court tentatively construes “recess” to mean “an indentation or set back.” 5 3. “mate / mated” 6 PDP Construction Nyko Construction 7 “a recess of a shape configured to fit or “recess” and “adapter” should be construed interlock together with the adapter” / separately. The remaining phrases do not 8 “when the adapter body and recess are require construction. 9 fitted or interlocked with one another” / “the adapter is fitted or interlocked with the 10 recess” 11 12 PDP requests that the Court construe the term “mate / mated” in the context of 13 several of the claims. (Doc. 39 at 18.) The claim language at issue recites: “a recess of a 14 shape configured to mate with the adapter body” / “when the adapter body and recess are 15 mated with one another” / “the adapter is mated with the recess.” (Doc. 35-1 at 26.) PDP 16 appears to ask the Court to construe “mate / mated” to mean “fit or interlock.” (See id.) 17 Nyko argues that, aside from construing “recess” and “adapter” separately, which the Court 18 has tentatively done above, the remaining terms or phrases do not require construction. 19 (Doc. 40 at 27–28.) 20 The Court tentatively finds that the term “mate / mated” does not require any further 21 construction. “[M]erely rephrasing or paraphrasing the plain language of a claim by 22 substituting synonyms does not represent genuine claim construction. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. 23 U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Alltech, Inc. v. Cenzone Tech, 24 Inc., No. 06 CV 0153 JM (RBB), 2007 WL 5793393, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2007) 25 (declining to “construe ‘modified’ as simply ‘altered’” because “[t]his construction merely 26 substitutes one word for another without clarifying the disputed term’s meaning”). 27 28 1 4. “plurality” 2 PDP Construction Nyko Construction 3 “three or more” “two or more” 4 5 The Federal Circuit has “held that ‘plurality,’ when used in a claim, refers to two or 6 more items, absent some indication to the contrary.” Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total 7 Containment, Inc., 258 F.3d 1317, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing York Prods, Inc. v. 8 Cent. Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (”The term means, 9 simply, ‘the state of being plural.’”)). The Court tentatively finds no “indication to the 10 contrary” sufficient to overcome plurality’s well-accepted meaning here. 11 PDP argues that the specification “states that Figures 8, 9, and 10 show power 12 adapters having a ‘plurality’ of DC, USB, and/or FireWire Ports,” and that each Figure 13 shows three or more ports. (Doc. 39 at 25.) PDP argues further that Nyko has used the 14 specific language of “two” or “at least two” when it intended to claim “two or more,” and 15 as such has defined plurality to mean “three or more” by implication. (Id. at 25–26 16 (citations omitted).) Nyko argues that “plurality” is recited to modify the components 17 “adapter” and “docking bay,” and the specification describes an embodiment where there 18 are two “adapters” and “docking bays.” (Doc. 40 at 27.) 19 Claims 1 and 13 recite a “plurality of docking bays.” (See ’848 Patent at 15:44; 20 16:35–36.) Figures 16 and 17 are described as: “The docking bays 512, 514 are 21 dimensioned to accept adapters 516.” (’848 Patent at 11:57–59.) Therefore, contrary to 22 PDP’s argument, Nyko does use “plurality” to describe two things, i.e., the two docking 23 bays 512 and 514. The cases cited by PDP do not command otherwise. In Bell Atlantic, 24 the patentee used a claim term “in a manner consistent with only a single meaning.” 262 25 F.3d at 1271. And in Performance Business Forms, Inc. v. Reynolds and Reynolds Co., 26 the term “plurality” was used to describe “layered form blanks,” “sheets of copy-producing 27 medium,” “form blanks,” and “subajacent forms blanks.” No. 3:03-0931, 2005 WL 28 1868894, at *11 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 3, 2005). The specifications and patent drawings 1 referring to each of these items revealed at least three of each of these items, which led the 2 court to construe “plurality” as “more than two.” Id. For the reasons just stated above, that 3 is not the case here. The Court tentatively construes “plurality” to mean “two or more.” 4 5. “electrical contact(s) / electrical lead(s)” 5 PDP Construction Nyko Construction 6 “a portion that electrically connects [one Electrical lead: component to another] except for plug/port “a physical contact type structure, not a 7 style connections” or “a physical mechanical one as a connector would 8 component that permits current flow require, that allows for the flow of electric between conducting parts that are in current when physically contacted by the 9 physical contact, except for plug/port style electrical contact” 10 contacts Electrical contact: 11 “a physical contact type structure, not a 12 mechanical one as a connector would require, that allows for the flow of electric 13 current when physically contacted by the 14 electrical lead” 15 16 “The parties appear to agree that Nyko disclaimed the full scope of these terms,” and 17 “[t]he core of their dispute is the scope of that disclaimer—whether, as Nyko contends, it 18 disclaimed all mechanical contact type structures, or, as PDP contends, only plug/port style 19 connections.” (Doc. 39 at 26 (emphasis in original).) See Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic Ave, 20 Inc., 511 F.3d 1157, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[E]ven in the case of an unequivocal 21 disavowal of claim scope, the court must construe the claim ‘congruent with the scope of 22 the surrender.’”). PDP argues that “nowhere does Nyko disclaim every mechanical 23 connection,” which means that “the disclaimer of electrical leads/contacts must be limited 24 to plug and port style connections.” (Id. at 27 (emphasis in original).) PDP also argues 25 that construing these claims to cover all mechanical connections would broaden Nyko’s 26 disclaimer beyond what is clear from the prosecution history. The Court tentatively adopts 27 most of Nyko’s proposed construction. 28 1 The prosecution history aligns more closely with Nyko’s proposed construction. 2 (See, e.g., Doc. 40-10 at 5 (“the term ‘contact,’ in light of the specification, requires a 3 physical contact type structure for establishing continuity of the circuit and not a 4 mechanical one as a connector would require. . . . A ‘contact’ requires a physical contact 5 type structure.’ ‘Contacts’ and ‘leads’ do not include pin connections and ports.”); Doc. 6 40-11 at 9 (“as acknowledged in the previous reexamination as well as in the current 7 proceeding, ports and connectors were distinguished from contacts and leads”).) “Patent 8 examiners are presumed to be persons of ordinary skill in the art in the relevant technical 9 field,” Wi-Lan USA, Inc. v. Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc., No. 12-23568-CIV, 2013 WL 10 4811233, at *18 n.9 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2013) (citing In re Berg, 320 F.3d 1310, 1315 (Fed. 11 Cir. 2003)), and “[s]tatements made by the examiner relating to how he or she understands 12 a certain term are thus intrinsic evidence to which the court may refer when construing 13 terms.” Realtime Data, LLC v. Morgan Stanley, 875 F. Supp. 2d 276, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 14 The Court disagrees with PDP’s argument that the examiner’s opinion conflicts with 15 Nyko’s actual disclaimer. (Compare Doc. 39-7 at 9 (Nyko “disclaim[ed] . . . pin 16 connections from electrical leads and contacts.”) with Doc. 39-6 at 9 (“the claimed 17 ‘electrical leads/contacts’ exclude ports or connectors that fit together to make a male- 18 female connection”).) Nyko’s disclaimer reads: 19 the contact created by the ‘electrical leads’ and ‘electrical contacts’ does not involve ‘matching plugs or ports that fit together to make’ a male-female pin 20 connection. . . . Claim 25 does not . . . require any type of port or connector 21 to establish the claimed ‘contact’ between the ‘electrical leads’ and ‘electrical contacts.’ Thus, the claims themselves suggest that the ‘electrical 22 leads/contacts’ are not ports or connectors and that the contact between the 23 ‘electrical leads’ and ‘electrical contacts’ excludes a male-female pin connection. 24

25 (Doc. 39-6 at 9–10 (emphasis added).) 26 The Court interprets this language to be Nyko disclaiming both “pin connections” 27 and “ports or connectors.” Furthermore, the specification contains disparaging remarks 28 regarding the use of ports or connectors. See Poly-Am., L.P. v. API Indus., Inc., 839 F.3d 1 1131, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A]n inventor may disavow claims lacking a particular 2 feature when the specification distinguishes or disparages prior art based on the absence of 3 that feature.”). For example, “[t]his recharging process is fast and easy as the adapter 516 4 allows the controller 526 to be simply dropped into place, rather than carefully connected 5 to a fragile port or connector.” (’848 Patent at 13:18–19 (emphasis added).) And finally, 6 each of the “electrical leads” 522 located on the bottom side of the adapter 516 is 7 configured to physically contact the corresponding “electrical contact” 520 of the base 510. 8 (See ’848 Patent at Figure 16.) As Nyko explains, this physical contact “does not require 9 any pin connection, but only requires a physical contact to allow the flow of electric current 10 from ‘electrical contact’ to ‘electrical lead.’” (Doc. 40 at 12 (citing ’848 Patent at 11:59– 11 62) (emphasis in original).) 12 In light of the intrinsic evidence’s support of Nyko’s proposed construction, and the 13 fact that PDP cites to no intrinsic evidence in support of its proposed construction, the 14 Court tentatively construes “electrical lead” as “a physical contact type structure that 15 allows for the flow of electric current when physically contacted by the electrical contact, 16 but not including pin connections, connectors, or ports.” The Court tentatively construes 17 “electrical contact” as “a physical contact type structure that allows for the flow of electric 18 current when physically contacted by the electrical lead, but not including pin connections, 19 connectors, or ports.” 20 6. “adapter” 21 PDP Construction Nyko Construction 22 No construction necessary. Alternatively, “(a) a physical piece having a body that is “a device for connecting parts that configured to mount on the surface of a 23 otherwise would not connect” controller, (b) to not interfere with 24 controller operation during game play, and (c) to allow direct charging of controller 25 batteries when a controller is dropped on 26 the base” 27 28 Nyko argues that the three elements in its proposed construction “are essential to 1 defining the meaning of ‘adapter’” because the elements “make an ‘adapter’ suitable for 2 achieving its intended purpose (e.g., fast and easy charging of a controller).” (Doc. 40 at 3 17.) Nyko also argues that each of these elements are supported by the intrinsic evidence, 4 including language in the specification and Nyko’s arguments during the reexamination of 5 the Asserted Patents. (Id. at 18–21.) PDP argues that “adapter” needs no construction 6 because it is not ambiguous, uncommon, or highly technical, and proposes “a device for 7 connecting parts that otherwise would not connect” in the alternative. (Doc. 39 at 11.) 8 PDP also argues that Nyko’s proposed construction: (1) relies on mere descriptions of 9 exemplary embodiments; (2) ignores other parts of the specification, and other claims, that 10 use the term “adapter” in contexts inconsistent with the three proposed elements; and (3) 11 is not supported by the reexamination history. (Doc. 43 at 7–9; Doc. 39 at 12–14.) The 12 Court tentatively agrees with PDP and tentatively finds PDP’s alternative proposed 13 construction appropriate. 14 Nyko relies on several portions of the specification to support its proposed 15 construction for “adapter.” Specifically, it cites to figures 16–23 and portions of their 16 corresponding descriptions in the specification, which Nyko contends shows an “adapter” 17 that is configured to be physically mounted on the controller, that does not interfere with 18 the operation of a controller during game play, and that allows fast and easy charging when 19 a controller is dropped on the base. (Doc. 40 at 17–19.) But the specification makes clear 20 that these figures represent only embodiments of the invention. (See ’848 Patent at 11:49– 21 50 (“Another exemplary embodiment of the invention, shown in FIGS. 16-23 . . . .”; ’832 22 Patent at 5:57–60 (Figures 19C and 20, among others, are views of an “adapter” and 23 “charging station” “according to an exemplary embodiment of the invention”).) 24 And “it is improper to read limitations from a preferred embodiment described in 25 the specification—even if it is the only embodiment—into the claims absent a clear 26 indication in the intrinsic record that the patentee intended the claims to be so limited.” 27 Dealertrack, Inc., 674 F.3d at 1327. Here, there is no language in the specification 28 providing a clear indication that the invention should be limited to these embodiments. See 1 Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“To 2 constitute disclaimer, there must be a clear and unmistakable disclaimer.”); Abbott Labs. 3 v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“When consulting the specification 4 to clarify the meaning of claim terms, courts must take care not to import limitations into 5 the claims from the specification.”). 6 Nyko’s proposed construction would also render certain claim language superfluous. 7 For example, claim 25 of the ’848 Patent recites “the adapter is removably attachable on 8 the video game controller and configured to remain attached on the video game controller 9 when the video game controller is in use during operation of a video game.” (’848 Patent 10 at 18:23–26.) Claim 1 of the ’344 Patent recites “the adapter may remain attached to the 11 video game controller when the video game controller is in use during the operation of a 12 video game.” (’344 Patent at 16:15–18.) Calling out in the claim that the adapter is 13 configured to remain attached on the video game controller when the video game controller 14 is in use would be unnecessary if Nyko was correct that the “adapter” already encompasses 15 those requirements. Thus, the claim language already provides the specificity Nyko seeks, 16 and Nyko’s proposed construction would render that claim language superfluous. See 17 SimpleAir, Inc., 820 F.3d at 429. 18 Nyko also argues that the reexamination history supports its proposed construction. 19 (See, e.g., Doc. 40-18 at 18 (arguing that the Asserted Patents “disclose the adapter as being 20 ‘small and light weight’ such that it does not interfere with operation of the controller while 21 the adapter is attached on the controller”).) Through such arguments, Nyko sought to 22 distinguish the prior art adapter from the claimed adapter. But as PDP argues, this attempt 23 to distinguish prior art is based on “claim limitations regarding the adapter—not on the 24 definition of ‘adapter.’” (Doc. 43 at 8.) Therefore, the Court tentatively adopts PDP’s 25 proposed construction – “a device for connecting parts that otherwise would not connect.” 26 7. “video game controller” 27 PDP Construction Nyko Construction 28 1 No construction necessary. “video game A “video game controller” is not a required controller” is a limitation of the asserted component of the claimed invention, only a 2 claims. recitation of the intended environment with 3 which the claimed invention is to be used or the capabilities of the claimed invention. 4

5 The Parties agree that “video game controller” appears in both the preamble and the 6 claims: “[a] video game controller charging system for charging a video game controller 7 having a power input port, the video game controller charging system comprising: . . . an 8 adapter comprising a connector configured to couple to the power input port of the video 9 game controller . . . .” (’848 Patent at 18:13–24.) Although the Parties also dispute the 10 construction of “video game controller,” it appears that their primary dispute is whether 11 “video game controller” is a limitation of the claimed system or merely a description of the 12 claimed environment for the claimed system. (See Doc. 39 at 20; Doc. 40 at 25.) PDP 13 argues that “video game controller” “provides antecedent basis for that term through the 14 claims” and “define[s] the charging system ‘in a way that depends on [the] physical 15 characteristics’ of the video game controller,” therefore making “video game controller” a 16 limiting feature of the claims. (Doc. 39 at 20–22 (quoting Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 17 441 F.3d 945, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2006)) and citing Veeco Instruments Inc. v. SGL Carbon, 18 LLC, No. 17-CV-2217 (PKC), 2017 WL 5054711, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2017)).) PDP 19 also argues that Nyko advocated that “video game controller” was a limitation of the claims 20 during the reexamination of the Asserted Patents. (Id. at 23–24.) 21 Nyko argues that it “is not arguing that the preamble is not limiting here,” just that 22 “‘video game controller’ is not part of the claimed invention because it ‘limit[s] only the 23 claimed environment, not the claimed . . . system.’” (Doc. 40 at 24–25 (quoting Advanced 24 Software Design Corp. v. Fiserv, Inc., 641 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).) 25 Furthermore, Nyko argues that its statements during the reexamination of the Asserted 26 Patents do not amount to a clear and unmistakable disavowal of claim scope. (Id. at 7–8 27 and n.2.) The Court tentatively declines to construe “video game controller” and 28 tentatively finds that “video game controller” limits only the claimed environment, not the 1 claimed system. 2 There is no dispute that “video game controller” is limiting here. (See Doc. 40 at 25 3 (“Nyko is not arguing that the preamble is not limiting here.”).) See also Bio-Rad Labs., 4 Inc. v. 10X Genomics Inc., 967 F.3d 1353, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2020). But the Asserted 5 Patents describe a “video game controller charging system.” Although “video game 6 controller” may be part of the description of the environment in which the claimed 7 invention operates, it is not part of the claimed invention itself. See Fiserv, Inc., 641 F.3d 8 at 1373–75; Silicon Graphics, Inc. v. ATI Techs., Inc., 607 F.3d 784, 794–95 (Fed. Cir. 9 2010)). In Fiserv, the plaintiff held a patent on check security technology that decrypted 10 information that was printed on the surface of checks. 641 F.3d at 1371–72. The preamble 11 described the patent as “[a] process for validating a negotiable financial instrument” on 12 which information “is encrypted . . . to generate a control code which is printed on the 13 financial instrument.” Id. at 1373. The Federal Circuit determined that an infringer would 14 not need to encrypt or print financial instruments to infringe the patent because the 15 preamble language merely described the “environment in which an accused infringer must 16 act or . . . capabilities that an accused device must have.” Id. at 1374. Similarly here, the 17 claimed charging system must be capable of charging a “video game controller” in the 18 manner recited by the preamble and the claims, but the “video game controller” is not itself 19 part of the claimed charging system. Accord Info. Protection v. Symantec Corp., CIVIL 20 ACTION NO. 2:08-CV-484, 2011 WL 13136605, at *5–6 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2011). 21 Unlike in Fiserv, the disputed term, “video game controller,” appears not just in the 22 preamble, but also throughout the claims. For example, claim 25 recites: “video game 23 controller charging system comprising: . . . an adapter comprising a connector configured 24 to couple to the power input port of the video game controller . . . a docking structure 25 configured to receive the video game controller . . . .” (’848 Patent at 18:13–24.) Still, the 26 language of the claims supports the Court’s tentative finding. In analyzing similar claim 27 limitations, the Federal Circuit found that “[t]he language ‘configured to’ in the claims 28 indicates that the subsystem must be capable of using the claimed method,” not that the 1 claims “require performance of the method steps.” In re McFadden, 2025 WL 2553720, 2 at *4 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 5, 2025) (emphasis in original). Here, the claims recite that various 3 parts of the claimed invention shall be “configured to” the “video game controller.” Thus, 4 the adapters and docking structures of the charging system must be capable of coupling to 5 or receiving a video game controller, but the charging system does not itself include a video 6 game controller. 7 The language in the preamble and claims here is dissimilar to that found in Bicon or 8 Veeco. In Bicon, the Federal Circuit considered a claim covering a dental implant: 9 An emergence cuff member[,] for use in preserving the [subject’s gums] during the procedure of placing an abutment on a root member implanted in 10 the alveolar bone of a patient in which [a] the abutment has a frustro-spherical 11 basal surface portion and [b] a conical surface portion having a selected height therefrom[,] comprising . . . [various structural features, including] . . . [e] a 12 bore . . . having a taper generally matching that of the canonical surface 13 portion of the abutment. . . .

14 441 F.3d at 948. 15 The patent holder argued that the claimed invention was solely the “emergence 16 cuff,” and that the rest of the preamble did not limit the claim because it merely “set[ ] forth 17 the purpose or use of the emergence cuff.” Id. at 949–50. “The problem with [the patent 18 holder’s] argument is that, because claim 5 includes a detailed description of the 19 abutment’s physical characteristics and defines the emergence cuff in a way that depends 20 on those physical characteristics, the invention . . . can only be understood as being limited 21 by the abutment recited in the claim.” Id. at 950. “Despite the fact that the claim begins 22 with a reference to the emergence cuff alone, the full text of the claim, read in the context 23 of the entire patent, indicates that the claimed invention is the combination of the 24 emergence cuff and the abutment, operating together in the fashion recited in the claim and 25 described in the specification.” Id. at 952. Here, the charging system is not defined in a 26 way that relies on the physical characteristics of the “video game controller.” Id. at 950. 27 Indeed, there is no “description of the [video game controller’s] physical characteristics” 28 in the claims at all, much less a “detailed” one that would help define the charging system. 1 Id. Additionally, neither the claims nor the specification indicate that the invention is the 2 combination of the charging system and the video game controller. Cf. id. at 948, 951 3 (construing the invention as solely the emergence cuff would read out multiple detailed 4 limitations of the abutment and its characteristics from the claim). 5 PDP’s argument under Veeco does not fare better. There, the district court found 6 that a claimed invention was limited by the requirement of a “rotatable spindle.” Veeco, 7 2017 WL 5054711, at *18. Although the description of the invention did not “include a 8 detailed description” of the spindle’s physical characteristics, the court considered Bicon 9 controlling because the invention was limited by the physical characteristics of the spindle. 10 Id. (noting that the claim defines the invention as “having a central recess adapted for 11 detachably inserting an upper end of said rotatable spindle”). On first glance, this language 12 appears analogous to the language used to describe the charging system. As Nyko notes, 13 however, the specification in Veeco actually spoke of the invention “as having multiple 14 aspects,” one of which was “an apparatus . . . [that] includes a reaction chamber, a rotatable 15 spindle, a hearing means . . . .” Id. at 4 (emphasis added). Moreover, one of the claims in 16 Veeco recited: “[a]n apparatus for supporting and transporting at least one wafer in a CVD 17 reactor having a rotatable spindle, . . . .” Id. at *5 (emphasis added). Therefore, the court 18 in Veeco had evidence that the claimed invention was “the combination of” the apparatus 19 and the rotatable spindle. Bicon, Inc., 441 F.3d at 952. Such evidence is not present here. 20 Finally, PDP argues that Nyko argued that “video game controller” was a limitation 21 of the claimed invention during the reexamination of the Asserted Patents. PDP points to 22 the following language in the reexamination history: 23 In sum, using the [prior art] cellular phone as a video game controller would render [the prior art] inoperable for its intended purpose and change the 24 principle of operation of [the prior art] . . . . [The prior art] fails to teach or 25 suggest the claimed ‘video game controller,’ as recited in claim 25.

26 (Doc. 39-9 at 31.) 27 The limitation that the adapter is configured to remain attached on the video 28 game controller when the controller is in use is a substantive limitation and 1 not merely a statement of intended use.

2 (Doc. 39-8 at 7.) 3 “The public notice function of a patent and its prosecution history requires that a 4 patentee be held to what he declares during the prosecution of his patent.” Teva Pharms. 5 USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Courts 6 do not apply this prosecution disclaimer doctrine, though, “where the alleged disavowal of 7 claim scope is ambiguous” or “amenable to multiple reasonable interpretations.” Omega 8 Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 9 As discussed above, the Court tentatively finds that the claimed charging system 10 must involve a “video game controller” in the manner recited by the preamble and the 11 claims, but that “video game controller” is not part of the claimed charging system. The 12 language in the reexamination history does not compel a contrary conclusion. Nyko argued 13 that “[the prior art] is not intended to work with a video game controller,” which is 14 consistent with the Court’s tentative construction here. Additionally, the fact that the 15 adapter must be configured to remain attached on the video game controller is “a 16 substantive limitation,” but only of the adapter. In any event, Nyko’s arguments during 17 the reexamination cannot be considered an unequivocal disavowal of claim scope such that 18 prosecution disclaimer should be applied in the manner proposed by PDP. 19 In summary, the Court tentatively finds that “video game controller” is a limitation 20 of the claimed environment rather than the claimed invention. It also tentatively finds that 21 “video game controller” needs no construction, as it “is used in common parlance,” “has 22 no special meaning in the art,” and “the plain and ordinary meaning” is clear. Summit 6, 23 802 F.3d at 1291. 24 8. “intervening portion” 25 PDP Construction Nyko Construction 26 “a physical component separate from and No construction required. Alternatively, “a disposable between the base and the video physical component that includes the 27 game controller” adapter” 28 1 The Parties agree that evidence related to “intervening portion” is scarce. The term 2 does not appear in the specification and is not discussed substantively in the prosecution 3 history. It is only recited in claims 1, 3, 4, and 11 of the ’121 Patent: 4 each of the intervening portions comprises an adapter . . . .

5 DC ports are indirectly connectable to the base through the intervening 6 portions.

7 the intervening portions are removably connectable to the base.

8 each of the adapters comprises at least one electrical lead configured to contact and electrically connect the respective one of the DC ports to the at least one 9 electrical contact when the intervening portion is received in the respective 10 recess.

11 (Doc. 39-5 (“’121 Patent”) at 15:48–50, 62–64, 65–67; 17:8–10.) 12 The Court tentatively finds that “intervening portion” needs no further construction 13 because the phrase’s plain and ordinary meaning is discernible from the claims above. 14 Accord Microbes, Inc. v. Espoma Co., No. 2:09-CV-237-CE, 2011 WL 1375608, at *21 15 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2011) (“Neither proposed construction “will assist the jury in 16 evaluating the claim language—both constructions merely reorganize the claim 17 language.”). 18 9. “connector” 19 PDP Construction Nyko Construction 20 No construction necessary. Alternatively, “a plug or port (male or female) having pins “a structure for electrically and that mechanically fits together with a 21 mechanically joining one item to another” counterpart plug or port (male or female)” 22 23 Nyko argues that the claims and the specification “explicitly differentiate the 24 ‘connector’ from the ‘electrical leads/contacts’” and, as such, “connector” must not include 25 a physical contact type structure. (Doc. 40 at 14–15.) Nyko argues that the claims recite 26 that the “connector” is configured to couple to the power input port of the video game 27 controller, which requires that the “connector” itself be a port or plug having pins that is 28 configured to mechanically fit together with the port of the controller. (Id. at 15.) 1 Furthermore, Nyko argues, all the embodiments for the “connector” include a male-female 2 pin connector that is configured to mechanically fit together with a counterpart connector. 3 (Id. at 15–16.) PDP argues that “connector” need not be construed. (Doc. 39 at 27.) 4 Alternatively, because the claims recite that a “connector” is “configured to removably and 5 electrically couple the adapter to the power input port of the video game controller, thereby 6 mechanically mounting the body of the adapter to the video game controller,” PDP argues 7 that its proposal is correct. (Id. at 27–28 (emphasis in original).) Furthermore, PDP argues 8 that the specification describes several types of “connectors” that provide both mechanical 9 and electrical connections. (Id. at 28.) The Court will defer construing this term until after 10 the hearing, as it has concerns regarding both proposed constructions. 11 Nyko’s proposal finds significant support in the specification. For example, the 12 specification describes “a connector that is configured to connect to the power input port 13 of the accessory device to be charged. In one embodiment, the connector 542 is a male 14 mini-USB . . . connector adapted to connect to a female mini-USB connector on a hand- 15 held controller . . . .” (’848 Patent at 12:58–60.) And according to Nyko, “[i]n order to be 16 coupled to the power input port, the ‘connector’ itself must be a port or plug having pins 17 that is configured to mechanically fit together with the port of the controller.” (Doc. 40 at 18 15.) The specification also refers to “ports” or “plugs” when describing “connectors,” 19 which provides further support that a “connector” is a port or plug. (See, e.g., ’344 Patent 20 at 9:63–67 (“the DC ports 408 are male mini-USB (universal serial bus) connectors . . . .”).) 21 Extrinsic evidence also supports Nyko’s proposal. The Microsoft Computer Dictionary 22 entry for “connector” includes: “Most connector types are available in one of two 23 genders—male or female. A male connector is characterized by one or more exposed pins; 24 a female connector is characterized by one or more receptacles—sockets or jacks— 25 designed to accept the pins on the male connector.” (Doc. 40-14 at 5.) The Collins 26 Dictionary defines “connector” in electrical engineering as “the part on a cable or an 27 appliance that has female contact pins and is intended to be attached to the end of the 28 flexible cable remote from the supply.” (Doc. 40-15 at 3.) l However, claim 15 of the ’344 Patent recites “a connector fixed to the body and 2 || configured to removably and electrically couple the adapter to the power input port of the 3 || video game controller, thereby mechanically mounting the body of the adapter to the video 4 ||game controller.” (344 Patent at 18:9-11 (emphasis added).) Additionally, the 5 || specification describes “the DC ports 408 may be any electrical connectors suitable for 6 || coupling to a video game controller.” (7848 Patent at 39-42 (emphasis added).) Thus, it 7 ||appears that Nyko’s proposal, which only covers “mechanically fit[ting] together,” may 8 exclude a preferred embodiment. 9 At the same time, PDP’s construction, although it covers both “electrically and 10 |}mechanically joining,” appears both too narrow in light of the discussion above and too 11 broad in terms of what may be interpreted as “mechanically joining.” Accordingly, the 12 ||Court tentatively finds that neither proposal is a proper construction. The Court will 13 reconsider its position after the hearing. 14 Hl. CONCLUSION 15 The Court hereby tentatively adopts the constructions set forth above. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 ||DATE: April 27, 2026 Biter Maton: 19 ON. RUTH BERMGDEZ! MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 24