Perez v. United States

85 F. Supp. 2d 220, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21582, 1999 WL 1486277
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 11, 1999
Docket98 Civ 5756 SAS
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 85 F. Supp. 2d 220 (Perez v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Perez v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 2d 220, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21582, 1999 WL 1486277 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).

Opinion

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

SCHEINDLIN, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a medical malpractice action brought pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because the acts of negligence alleged in the complaint took place at the Manhattan Veteran’s Administration Medical Center (“VAMC”), which is located in the Southern District of New York.

Plaintiffs’ claims were tried to the Court without a jury in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2402. Plaintiffs’ claims consisted of Raul Perez’s (“Perez”) claim of negligent medical treatment (Count I of the complaint) and Mercedes Perez’s (“Mrs.Perez”) claim of loss of consortium (Count III of the complaint).

Because this case was tried without a jury, it is important to recall the standard that would govern a jury’s deliberations had one been called upon to reach a verdict. Under New York law, a jury would have been given the following instruction:

Malpractice is professional negligence and medical malpractice is the negligence of a doctor. Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care under'the circumstances, doing something that a reasonably prudent doctor would not do under the circumstances, or failing to do something that a reasonably prudent doctor would do under the circumstances, it is a deviation or departure from accepted [medical] practice.
A doctor who renders medical service to a patient is obligated to have that reasonable degree of knowledge and ability which is expected of doctors who perform that operation in the medical community' in which the doctor practices.
The law recognizes that there are differences in the abilities of doctors, just as there are differences in the abilities of people engaged in other activities. To practice medicine a doctor is not required to have the extraordinary knowledge and ability that belongs to a few doctors of exceptional ability. However every doctor is required to keep reasonably informed of new developments in his field and to practice medicine in accordance with approved methods and means of treatment in general use. The standard of knowledge and ability to which the doctor is held is measured by the degree of knowledge and ability of the average doctor in good *222 standing in the medical community in which the doctor practices.
In performing a medical service, the doctor is obligated to use his best judgment and to use reasonable care. By undertaking to perform a medical service, a doctor does not guarantee a good result. The fact that there was a bad result to the patient, by itself, does not make the doctor liable. The doctor is liable only if he was negligent. Whether the doctor was negligent is to be decided on the basis of the facts and conditions existing at the time of the claimed negligence.
A doctor is not liable for an error in judgment if he does what he decides is best after careful examination if it is a judgment that a reasonably prudent doctor could have made under the circumstances.
If the doctor is negligent, that is, lacks the skill or knowledge required of him in providing a medical service or fails to use reasonable care and judgment in providing the service, and such lack of skill or care or knowledge or the failure to use reasonable care or judgment is a substantial factor in causing harm to the patient, then the doctor is responsible for the injury or harm caused.

1A New York Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil 2:150 (3d ed.1998).

II. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Perez was born in 1931, and is presently 68 years old.

2. Mrs. Perez was born in 1931 and is presently 67 years old.

3. After being diagnosed with advanced local prostate cancer, Perez underwent surgery at the VAMC on August 20, 1993, for the purpose of removing the cancer.

4. This procedure is known as a “pros-tatectomy,” and the particular kind of prostatectomy that Perez underwent is known as a “radical perineal prostatecto-my.” The word radical simply means that the entire prostate is removed. A more common procedure is known as a “radical retropubic prostatectomy.” The difference between the two procedures is the approach taken by the surgeon. In the peri-neal approach, the incision is made between the scrotum and the rectum, which allows better visualization of the anastomo-sis, the joining of the urethra and the bladder. See Trial Transcript “Tr.” 715-16, 802-03 (Dr. Eli Lizza (“Dr. Lizza”), Government’s urology expert); Government’s Exhibit (“GX”) D. This approach has a higher incidence of impotence and rectal injury (11% of perineal approaches result in rectal injury compared to 1% of retropubic approaches, GX E), but is less bloody, resulting in a lower likelihood of blood transfusions. In the suprapubic approach, the incision is through the abdomen, below the belly button and above the pubic bone, and allows better visualization of the lymph nodes. There is no claim that the choice of the perineal approach was negligent.

5. During the surgery, a Foley catheter was inserted into Perez’s bladder, to allow him to urinate and to protect the anastomosis, so that it could properly heal. This is standard procedure. A Penrose drain was also inserted, to permit any urine leaking from the anastomosis to exit from the site of the surgical incision. The Penrose drain was removed on August 22, 1993. Tr. 184 (Dr. Pablo Torre (“Dr. Torre”), attending urologist in charge of Perez’s care at the VAMC). The Foley catheter was discontinued on August 30, 1993, the tenth post-operative day. Tr. 183 (Dr. Torre). It is noteworthy that Perez had a fever on that day. Tr. 188-89 (Dr. Torre); 758-59 (Dr. Lizza).

6. Perez did not have any cystograms, Methylene blue or charcoal tests between post-operative days one and ten.

7. There is some dispute as to the exact time the Foley catheter was removed. Based on all of the medical records and the trial testimony, I find that the catheter *223 was most likely removed between 11 p.m. and midnight on August 30. Tr. 189-94, 197-98 (Dr. Torre). This was likely done by a member of the house staff, without the aid of any visualization technique, such as a cystoscope (a flexible telescope inserted through the urethra to the bladder) or a cystogram (injecting an x-ray dye to allow surgeon to view the anastomosis).

8. Following the removal of his Foley catheter on August 30, 1993, Perez went into urinary retention. He was given Tylenol at approximately 5 a.m. on the morning of August 31. See One Time Medication Record, GX A, Bates 132; Tr. 525-26 (Dr. Michael S. Brodherson (“Dr. Bro-dherson”) Plaintiffs’ urology expert).

9.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

K.R. ex rel. Perez v. United States
843 F. Supp. 2d 343 (E.D. New York, 2012)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
85 F. Supp. 2d 220, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21582, 1999 WL 1486277, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/perez-v-united-states-nysd-1999.