Perez v. New York City

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided April 28, 2021·No. 1:20-cv-11053·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DELAILAH PEREZ; SUSAN SUAREZ, Plaintiffs, -against- NEW YORK CITY; NYC ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN’S SERVICES (ACS); NYC HEALTH + 20 Civ. 11053 (LGS) HOSPITALS/BELLEVUE; NYC HEALTH + HOSPITALS/BELLEVUE LIABILITY ORDER OF SERVICE INSURANCE; NYC LIABILITY BOND; NYC HEALTH + HOSPITALS/BELLEVUE LIABILITY BONDS; DENNY REYNOLDS (MD); MORRIS FORTRE; SHAPIRO (PSYCHIATRIST); CONDICE (PSYCHIATRIST); KONDRACKY, et al. Defendants. LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge: Plaintiffs, appearing pro se, bring this action under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983, other federal statutory provisions and state law, alleging that Defendants violated their rights at Bellevue Hospital. By order dated March 31, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). STANDARD OF REVIEW A court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007); accord Medina v. United States, No. 21 Civ. 1427, 2021 WL 663711, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2021). A court must also dismiss a complaint when it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest claims that they suggest. See Costabile v. N.Y.C. Health and Hosp. Corp., 951 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2020). DISCUSSION A. Claims that Cannot Proceed Claims on behalf of Delailah Perez’s “unborn fetus newborn and her two minor children” The Court must dismiss any claims Plaintiffs seek to bring on behalf of Perez’s minor children. The provision governing appearances in federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1654, allows two types of representation: “[i]n all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as [permitted] by the rules of such courts, respectively.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654; see Pappas v. Philip Morris, Inc., 915 F.3d 889, 892-93 (2d Cir. 2019). Generally, a non-attorney parent cannot bring an action on behalf of his or her minor children in

federal court without counsel. Doe v. E. Lyme Bd. of Educ., 962 F.3d 649, 654 n.2 (2d Cir. 2020). Plaintiffs have alleged no facts suggesting that they are attorneys. They cannot assert any claims on behalf of other individuals, including Perez’s minor children. The Court, therefore, dismisses without prejudice any claims Plaintiffs are asserting on behalf of Perez’s children. Claims against New York City Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) The Court also dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against ACS. As an agency of the City of New York, ACS is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by

law.”); Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2011) (“It is well settled in this [c]ourt that, as a general matter, agencies of New York City are not suable entities in § 1983 actions.”); accord Bey v. La Casse, No. 20 Civ. 9171, 2021 WL 1143690, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2021). Claims against Bellevue Hospital Similarly, Bellevue Hospital, which is part of the New York City Health + Hospitals (“H+H”), is not a suable entity. See, e.g., McFadden v. City of New York, No. 19 Civ. 5508, 2019

WL 3034893, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2019) (“Bellevue Hospital, which is part of New York City Health + Hospitals (“H+H”), is not a suable entity.”); Nogbou v. Mayrose, No. 07 Civ. 3763, 2009 WL 3334805, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2009) (same), aff’d, 400 F. App’x 617 (2d Cir. 2010). And any claim against the hospital must be brought against H+H, which has the capacity to be sued under state law. See N.Y. Unconsol. L. § 7385(1). Plaintiffs’ claims against Bellevue Hospital are dismissed. Claims against insurance and bond entities Plaintiffs also name three additional defendants which do not appear to be actual legal entities – NYC Liability Bond, NYC Health + Hospitals/Bellevue Liability Insurance, NYC Health + Hospitals Liability Bonds. As Plaintiffs do not allege any facts about these entities, the

Court dismisses them as parties to this action without prejudice. If Plaintiffs can establish that these defendants are actual entities that can be sued, Plaintiffs may request leave to submit an amended complaint in which they allege facts with sufficient details to state a claim against these defendants. B. Service on the City of New York and H+H Because Plaintiffs have been granted permission to proceed IFP, they are entitled to rely on the Court and the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service. Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013); accord Nieves v. New York State Off. of Mental Health, No. 20 Civ. 9502, 2021 WL 982297, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2021); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process . . . in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (the court must order the Marshals Service to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP). Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires that summonses and the complaint be served within 90 days of the date the complaint is filed, Plaintiffs are proceeding

IFP and could not have served summonses and the complaint until the Court reviewed the complaint and ordered that summonses be issued. The Court, therefore, extends the time to serve until 90 days after the date summonses are issued. If the complaint is not served within that time, Plaintiffs should request an extension of time for service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to request an extension of time for service); accord Nieves, 2021 WL 982297, at *2, see also Murray v. Pataki, 378 F. App’x 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order) (“As long as the [plaintiff proceeding IFP] provides the information necessary to identify the defendant, the Marshals’ failure to effect service automatically constitutes ‘good cause’ for an extension of time within the meaning of Rule 4(m).”).

To allow Plaintiffs to effect service on Defendants City of New York and H+H through the U.S. Marshals Service, the Clerk of Court is instructed to fill out a U.S. Marshals Service Process Receipt and Return form (“USM-285 form”) for each of these defendants.

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