Perez Crabbe v. National Self Service Storage

955 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2013 WL 3828702, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103980
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedJuly 25, 2013
DocketCivil Action No. 2012-1703
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 955 F. Supp. 2d 1 (Perez Crabbe v. National Self Service Storage) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Perez Crabbe v. National Self Service Storage, 955 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2013 WL 3828702, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103980 (D.D.C. 2013).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BARBARA JACOBS ROTHSTEIN, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on defendant’s Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice, or in the Alternative, for Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF No. 8]. For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this action for “Breach of Contract under False Preten[s]es” and “Fraudulent[ ] Charges,” Compl. at 1, against National Self Service Storage, “a company engaged in the business of renting personal storage units.” Mem. of Grounds & Auth. in Support of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, With Prejudice, or in the Alternative, J. on the Pleadings in Favor of the Def. (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 1. It appears that plaintiff rented a storage unit at defendant’s facility, that a dispute arose as to the timely payment of rental fees, that defendant assessed late fees and other costs, and that, ultimately, defendant denied plaintiff access to the storage unit and its contents. See generally Compl. As compensation for property and income allegedly lost as a result of defendant’s actions, plaintiff demands damages of $100,000.00. Id. at 1.

Defendant concurs, and describes this action as one “aris[ing] from allegations related to a storage unit licensed to the Plaintiff by the Defendant, and from which the Plaintiff was ‘locked out’ due to failure to pay monthly fees associated with *2 the unit.” Mot. to Dismiss With Prejudice, or in the Alternative, J. on the Pleadings in Favor of the Def. (“Mot. to Dismiss”) ¶ 1. Because plaintiff had “filed a virtually identical claim in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Case No. 2011 CA 004741 B[,] to the claim now before this Honorable Court, raising the same allegations arising from the same events,” id. ¶2, defendant moves to dismiss on the ground that plaintiffs claims are barred under the doctrine of res judicata. 1 See Def.’s Mem. at 5-7 (page numbers designated by ECF). 2

Exhibits submitted with defendant’s motion demonstrate that, on June 16, 2011, plaintiff filed a civil action against National Self Service Storage in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. See Def.’s Mem., Ex. 1 (Complaint, Crabbe v. National Self Service Storage, No. 2011 CA 004741 B (D.C.Super.Ct. June 16, 2011)). The complaint alleged that defendant charged her late fees improperly, denied her access to her property, refused to accept tendered rent payments, and threatened to dispose of her property if she failed to pay allegedly fraudulent charges. See id., Ex. 1. To her complaint she attached a two-page typewritten statement — a copy of which is attached to the complaint filed in this case — describing her interactions with staff at the storage facility. See id., Ex. 1. On November 5, 2012, after a bench trial on the merits, judgment was entered in defendant’s favor, and on defendant’s counter-claim “for breach of contract arising from unpaid rent and fees,” Mot. to Dismiss ¶ B, the Superior Court awarded judgment in defendant’s favor in the amount of $2,415.00, plus post judgment interest, Def.’s Mem., Ex. 2 (Judgment, Crabbe v. National Self Service Storage, No.2011 CA 004741 B (D.C.Super.Ct. Nov. 5, 2012)), arising from unpaid rent and fees for the storage units.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)

“After the pleadings are closed — but early enough not to delay trial — a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” 3 Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). “A Rule 12(c) motion is appropriately granted when no material issue of fact remains to be resolved, and the movant is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Montanans for Multiple Use v. Barbouletos, 542 F.Supp.2d 9, 13 (D.D.C.2008) (brackets and citations omitted), aff'd, 568 F.3d 225 (D.C.Cir.2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 926, 130 S.Ct. 3331, 176 L.Ed.2d 1222 (2010); see Bans v. Adduci Mastriani & Schaumberg, L.L.P., 786 F.Supp.2d 240, 265 (D.D.C.2011) (“Where the well-pleaded facts set forth in the complaint do not permit a court, drawing on its judicial experience and common sense, to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has not shown that the *3 pleader is entitled to relief.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The Court “employ[s] the same standard that governs a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Lans, 786 F.Supp.2d at 265 (citing Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 339 F.Supp.2d 26, 35-36 (D.D.C.2004)).

For a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it need only provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds on which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citation omitted). The complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and “the court must assume the truth of all well-pleaded allegations.” Warren v. Dist. of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C.Cir.2004). The Court’s consideration is limited to “only the facts alleged in the complaint [and] documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint,” EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C.Cir.1997), and matters such as records from court proceedings over which the Court may take judicial notice. Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 407 F.3d 1220, 1222 (D.C.Cir.2005).

B. Res Judicata

“Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the contest .... ” Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Ass’n, 283 U.S. 522, 525, 51 S.Ct. 517, 75 L.Ed. 1244 (1931). To this end, “the doctrine of res judicata holds that a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving identical parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.” Apotex, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 393 F.3d 210, 217 (D.C.Cir.2004) (citing Drake v.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
955 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2013 WL 3828702, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103980, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/perez-crabbe-v-national-self-service-storage-dcd-2013.