Perera, A. v. Perera, A.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: October 1, 2025
• Docket: 2900 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A14018-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

APRIL RENEE PERERA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ASANGA PERERA : : Appellant : No. 2900 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered October 22, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Domestic Relations at No(s): 2019-DR-01682, PACSES: 197117816

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 1, 2025

Appellant, Asanga Perera (Father), appeals the trial court’s order

awarding a percentage of his annual bonus income in support payments to

Appellee, April Renee Perera (Mother). We affirm.

The parties are the parents of two minor children and entered into an

agreed support order in 2019. See Trial Ct. Op., 12/31/24, at 1. On October

31, 2022, Mother filed a petition to modify support. Therein, Mother noted

that, while her bonus was included in the support calculation, Father’s bonus

was not and she requested “that Father’s annual bonus . . .be included in his

income for the calculation of support.” Id. at 2. On April 24, 2023, at a

hearing before a support hearing officer (SHO), “Father argued that his annual

bonus should not be included in the calculation of his annual income, but ____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A14018-25

instead be treated separately as a lump sum payment to be divided by the

parties upon receipt each year.” Id. The SHO recommended including

“Father’s bonus as part of his monthly net income for support purposes.” Id.

at 3. Father filed an exception to this recommendation, arguing that “the

annual bonus amounts are ‘variable and not guaranteed[,]’” and that inclusion

of the bonus in his monthly net income would “create[] a cash flow issue” for

him and “introduce[] the need . . . to pursue annual support modifications[.]”

Id. Instead, Father requested that the trial court “establish a predetermined

support percentage amount that could be then applied . . . to calculate a lump

sum payment upon bonus receipt.” Id.

After reviewing the SHO’s recommendation and hearing argument on

Father’s exception, the trial court concluded that “paying support on bonuses

that are not yet received creates inequity” for Father and entered an order

directing that a “predetermined support percentage amount” of the bonus be

paid in a lump sum to Mother within seven days of Father’s receipt of the

bonus. Trial Ct. Op., 12/31/24, at 4 (citing Trial Ct. Mem. and Order, 8/31/23,

at 4). The trial court remanded the matter for the SHO to calculate the

predetermined support percentage and revise the support order to account for

this treatment of Father’s bonus income. See Trial Ct. Op., 12/31/24, at 5.

On September 15, 2023, the SHO submitted revised recommendations

which applied a formula to calculate the required predetermined percentage

and, applying this formula to the parties’ income and shared custody rights at

that time, identified 36% as the percentage of Father’s bonus to be paid in

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support to Mother. See SHO’s Recommendation, 9/15/23, at 2-3; see also

Father’s Brief at 11-13 (see description of SHO’s formula).

Father filed exceptions to the September 15, 2023 recommendation and

report, alleging that the SHO had “erred in establishing the predetermined

percent to be applied to Father’s net bonus.” Trial Ct. Op., 12/31/24, at 5.

On April 3, 2024, after considering Father’s arguments, the trial court entered

an order dismissing Father’s exceptions and adopting the SHO’s

recommendations. Id. Father moved for reconsideration, “alleging there was

an error in the [SHO’s] calculation[,]” which the trial court denied on April 22,

2024. Id.; see also Trial Ct. Order, 4/22/24.

On April 30, 2024, Father filed a petition to modify support in which he

alleged “a material change in circumstances, [in] that his income had changed

and [alimony pendente lite (APL)] had been terminated.” Trial Ct. Op.,

12/31/24, at 5; see also Father’s Pet. for Modification, 4/30/24, at 2. Mother

also filed a modification petition on May 3, 2024 in which she alleged “that

Father had not yet paid her the court-ordered percentage of his annual bonus

received in March 2024 . . . within seven days of receipt.” Trial Ct. Op.,

12/31/24, at 5-6; see also Mother’s Pet. for Modification, 5/3/24, at 2.

On June 10, 2024, the parties attended a support conference at which

they could not agree on how to treat Father’s bonus in calculating support,

during which Father requested that his bonus be “included in the guideline.”

Support Conf. Summary, 6/10/24, at 2-3. The parties subsequently attended

a hearing before the SHO on July 18, 2024, wherein “Father asked that his

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bonus be calculated into his monthly income for support purposes.” Trial Ct.

Op. at 6. On August 6, 2024, the SHO filed a recommendation that declined

to “change the method of addressing Father’s bonus, as it was already subject

to a previous order.” Id. (citing SHO’s Recommendation, 8/6/24).

Father filed exceptions to this recommendation, alleging that “the SHO

erred by not including his bonus in his monthly net income calculation[,]”

citing to the support guidelines, and asserting that whichever support method

is used – “monthly” or “lump sum” – should result in “the same amount of

child support” but that the SHO’s “lump sum method” resulted in “more than

$21,000 beyond what the PA child support guideline requires as bonus’ child

support.” Id. at 6-7 (citing Father’s Exceptions, 8/26/24). Mother also filed

an exception stating that, although Father had received his annual bonus in

March of 2024, he had not paid her the child support obligation from his bonus

payment within seven days as required by court order. Id. at 7; see also

Mother’s Exceptions, 8/26/24, at 2 (unpaginated).

The trial court heard argument on Father’s and Mother’s exceptions on

October 17, 2024. At the hearing, Father conceded that he could not point to

“any binding law anywhere that requires that [the formula to be applied to the

bonus] must be done in the way that [Father requested.]” See N.T.,

10/17/24, at 11. Father also conceded that he did not make a support

payment to Mother after he received his bonus in March of 2024 and

acknowledged that the payment was due within seven days of his receipt of

the bonus. Id. at 8-9. In response to the trial court’s questions about this

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overdue support payment, Father’s counsel stated that Father “filed a petition

to modify because there was a termination of alimony, which subsequently

changed the amount[.]” Id. at 8. Upon Father’s admission that he had not

yet made this support payment, the trial court asked: “Does [Father] have an

issue with paying interest for that amount, because [Mother] should have

gotten the . . . amount back [in] March . . . when it was paid, correct?” Id.

at 9.

On October 22, 2024, the trial court entered an order dismissing

Father’s exceptions, granting Mother’s exception, and directing Father to pay

Mother “$27,213.75 as per the [SHO’s] findings of fact[]” and “6% interest

for a total of $28,018.27[,]” because there was “a previous order directing

[Father] to make this payment[.]” Trial Ct. Order, 10/22/24. Father filed a

timely notice of appeal and a motion to stay. The trial court denied a stay on

November 4, 2024. Both Father and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925.

On appeal, Appellant raises the following claims:

1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its discretion in dismissing [Father’s] exceptions to the recommendation of the [SHO], whereby [Father] has been ordered to pay a child support amount in excess of the Pennsylvania support guidelines?

2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its discretion in granting [Mother’s] exceptions to the recommendation of the [SHO]?

3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its discretion in ordering [Father] to pay a 6% interest

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penalty/sanction for failure to pay a prior child support payment?

4. Did the trial court violate [Father’s] due process rights in ordering [Father] to pay a 6% interest penalty/sanction for failure to pay a prior child support payment without any pending contempt proceeding before the [trial] court?

Father’s Brief at 3-4 (some formatting altered).

In his first two issues, Father argues that the trial court erred and

abused its discretion by denying his exceptions, granting Mother’s exceptions,

and ordering Father to pay child support in excess of what is required by the

support guidelines. Id. at 8-27. Father notes that he “has no issue with the

monthly amount he was ordered to pay” based on his salary, and instead

challenges only the portion of the trial court’s order adopting the SHO’s

recommendation directing him to pay 36% of his net bonus in support to

Mother. Id. at 10-11, 11 n.3. Specifically, he argues that “the formula utilized

by the trial court results in [Father] paying approximately double the amount

that is required under the support guidelines (on an annualized basis after

considering the monthly amount and lump sum bonus payment), which is a

significant upward deviation from the support guidelines.” Id. at 13 (some

formatting altered and footnote omitted).

Additionally, Father contends that “the trier of fact is required to

consider all relevant factors and make a reasoned decision as to whether

consideration thereof suggests that there are special needs and/or

circumstances which render a deviation necessary” and argues that the trial

court entered the support order “without addressing a single deviation factor.”

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Id. at 13, 26-27 (citing Ball v. Minnick, 648 A.2d 1192 (Pa. 1994)).

Therefore, Father concludes that the trial court relied on an “entirely arbitrary”

formula when calculating the percentage of his bonus due to Mother as child

support. Id. at 14, 26. Finally, Father explains that he has identified “no case

law within Pennsylvania which directs our courts on how to properly calculate

a bonus percentage consistent with the Pennsylvania support guidelines,” but

nonetheless urges this Court to adopt an alternate formula, based on case law

from other states, in lieu of the formula employed by the trial court. Id. at

19-26.

We review support orders, including the imposition of interest, for an

abuse of discretion. See Hanrahan v. Bakker, 186 A.3d 958, 966 (Pa.

2018). An abuse of discretion occurs where a trial court

exercises judgment that is manifestly unreasonable or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will as shown by the evidence of record. . . . [W]e will not disturb a support order unless the trial court failed to consider properly the requirements of the rules governing support actions. Additionally, as [such] appeal[s] present[] questions of law, [] our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary[.]

Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, “[t]he amount

of a support order is largely within the discretion of the trial court[]” and an

abuse of discretion must be established “by clear and convincing evidence,

and the trial court will be upheld on any valid ground.” Isralsky v. Isralsky,

824 A.2d 1178, 1186 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted).

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Support Order

The determination of a party’s support obligations begins with the

support guidelines promulgated by our Supreme Court. See 23 Pa.C.S. §

4322(a). In calculating support, adherence to these guidelines creates a

“rebuttable presumption . . . that the amount of the award . . . is correct[.]”

Id. at § 4322(b). The guidelines provide that support obligations are to be

calculated “based on the parties’ monthly net incomes[,]” which are

determined by deducting certain items, such as taxes, from “at least a six-

month average of a party’s [monthly gross] income.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.16-

2(a)-(c). The guidelines specifically include bonuses as income to be included

in determining a party’s monthly gross income. See id. at 1910.16-2(a).

Section 4322(a) of the Domestic Relations Code (the Code) permits

deviation from the support guidelines in the event of “unusual needs,

extraordinary expenses and other factors, such as the parties’ assets, as

warrant special attention.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 4322(a). When entering an order

that deviates from the support guidelines, a trial court must provide a “written

finding or specific finding on the record that the application of the guideline

would be unjust or inappropriate . . . sufficient to rebut the presumption . . .

based upon [deviation] criteria established by the Supreme Court.” Id. at §

4322(b).

When deviating from the guidelines, the trier-of-fact shall specify on the

record or in writing:

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(i) the calculated basic child support, spousal support, or alimony pendente lite obligation;

(ii) the reason for the deviation;

(iii) the findings of fact justifying the deviation;

(iv) the deviation amount; and

(v) in a spousal support or an alimony pendente lite action, the obligation's duration.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.16-5(a). In contemplating a deviation, the trial court “shall

consider[,]” inter alia, “other household income” and “other relevant and

appropriate factors.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.16-5(b).

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court addressed Appellant’s claim

as follows:

In his exceptions, Father generates calculations in an attempt to demonstrate that excluding his bonus from his net monthly income causes him to overpay child support pursuant to the guidelines. However, this court maintains that [the April 24, 2023 order] requiring Father to pay Mother a percentage of the bonus upon receipt instead of in anticipation of the bonus, an order which has not been appealed, is, as Father himself argued before he reversed himself, within the discretion of the [trial] court and an acceptable method of calculating his child support. [N.T., 4/24/23, at 34-37.]

* * *

Further, simply because Father’s bonus was greater than he perhaps expected, which may have resulted in a different calculation of support, does not mean that the law was misapplied or overridden, or that the judgment was manifestly unreasonable or based on bias, ill will, prejudice or partiality.

Trial Ct. Op. at 13 (some formatting altered).

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The trial court thoroughly explained its reasons for adopting the SHO’s

formula, describing the procedural history of this issue from October of 2022,

when Mother first sought to include Father’s bonus income in the calculation

of support, to the date of entry of the order appealed from. See Trial Ct. Op.

at 2-8. While the reasons for the deviation that Father now complains of may

not appear in the support order of October 22, 2024, the trial court specified

these reasons in prior support orders, when it first determined how Father’s

bonus would be accounted for in calculating support. See Trial Ct. Orders,

8/31/23, 4/3/24; see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 4322(a); Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.16-5(a).

Following our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion in

the trial court’s decision to require Father to pay a portion of his bonus as a

lump sum toward his support obligation, nor in the formula to determine the

amount of the lump sum. See Hanrahan, 186 A.3d at 966; Isralsky, 824

A.2d at 1186. Accordingly, Father is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Interest Award

In his remaining issues, Father challenges the imposition of interest on

the support payment due to Mother from Father’s bonus, which he failed to

pay after he received his bonus in March of 2024. See Father’s Brief at 27-

29. Father claims that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing an

interest penalty where “there was no contempt proceeding against [Father,]”

arguing that “any interest penalty is limited to actions for contempt and/or

proceedings where a litigant is on notice of alleged willful misconduct.” Id. at

27-28 (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 4348). Father characterizes the trial court’s finding,

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that he had failed to make a support payment to Mother within seven days of

his receipt on his bonus, as an “assumed determination . . . without a

proceeding being properly scheduled (with notice given to [Father]) to address

this issue[]” and, therefore, a violation of his “most basic right to fundamental

due process.” Id. at 28-29.

Section 4302 of the Code specifically authorizes trial courts to impose

interest on support orders, which “may include related costs and fees, interest

and penalties, income withholding, attorneys’ fees and other relief.” 23

Pa.C.S. § 4302. Additionally, Section 4352 of the Code provides that the trial

court “shall . . . maintain jurisdiction of the matter for the purpose of

enforcement of the order and for the purpose of increasing, decreasing,

modifying or rescinding the order[.]” 23 Pa.C.S. § 4352(a).

With regard to overdue support payments, Section 4352 provides that,

“[o]n and after the date it is due, each and every support obligation shall

constitute a judgment against the obligor by operation of law . . . including

the ability to be enforced.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 4352(d). With regard to contempt

penalties in support matters, Section 4245 enumerates the penalties that may

be imposed on a “person who willfully fails to comply with [a support] order[,]”

namely, up to six months’ imprisonment, a fine of up to $1,000, and/or up to

a year of probation. 23 Pa.C.S. § 4345(a).

Here, the trial court issued an order stating that, “[t]here being a

previous order directing [Father] to make this payment, [Father] shall also

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pay 6% interest . . . and is reminded that this payment is due annually seven

days after receipt of his bonus.” Trial Ct. Order, 10/22/24 (footnote omitted).

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained:

[A]s Father suggested in his testimony, [the trial court] ordered Father in August 2023 to pay Mother a percentage of his bonus within seven days of receiving it. [N.T., 4/24/23, at 50.] Father states that he received a bonus in March 2024 in the amount of $88,250.00. Mother filed a petition for modification in May 2024 wherein she alleges that Father had still not paid her the court- ordered percentage of his annual bonus, and he has not denied this allegation. This court has the discretion to enter an order of support that includes interest for failure of the Obligor (“Father”) to pay. [23 Pa.C.S. §§ 4301, 4302.]

Father complains also that there were no contempt proceedings ongoing at the time, and so, the court cannot assess him with interest. This court did not hold Father in contempt, and there is no precondition that requires the court to hold Father in contempt before awarding Mother interest. The court, well within its discretion, ordered Father to pay Mother interest for his failing to pay her any percentage of his bonus as ordered, when due several months earlier.

Trial Ct. Op. at 13-14 (some formatting altered).

As noted by the trial court, Father failed to comply with a prior order

directing him to pay a portion of his bonus income to Mother as child support.

Following our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court acted

within its authority to impose interest on Father’s overdue support payment. 1

____________________________________________

1 We note that in his brief, Father describes the 6% interest as a contempt

penalty subject to Section 4348 of the Code, which permits the assessment of “a penalty of not more than 10% for any amount in arrears for 30 days or (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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See 43 Pa.C.S. §§ 4302, 4352(a), (d). Therefore, we discern no abuse of

discretion by the trial court in imposing interest on Father’s late support

payment. See Hanrahan, 186 A.3d at 966.

For these reasons, we conclude that Father is not entitled to relief on

any of his claims. Accordingly, we affirm.

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 10/1/2025

more if the . . . arrearage was willful.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 4348(c). However, as noted, the trial court did not hold Father in contempt or impose any of the enumerated contempt penalties permitted in the Code. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 4345(a). Therefore, this claim is meritless.

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