Peppin v. KQC LLC

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided August 7, 2025·No. 3:24-cv-08175·Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8

Malesh ia Peppin, ) No. CV-24-08175-PCT-SPL ) 9 ) 10 Plaintiff, ) ORDER vs. ) ) 11 ) KQC LLC, et al., ) 12 ) 13 Defendants. ) ) 14 )

15 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (Doc. 16). 16 Defendants have not responded to the Motion or otherwise appeared in this action, and the 17 time to respond has passed. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s award 18 of fees and costs in a reduced amount of $9,136.50. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 On September 13, 2024, Plaintiff Maleshia Peppin filed a Complaint against 21 Defendants KQC LLC, d/b/a Bliss Nail Spa, and Quan Hoang Dang (“Defendants”) for 22 willful violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), violation of the Arizona Wage 23 Act (“AWA”), and violation of the Arizona Fair Wages and Healthy Families Act 24 (“AFWHFA”). (Doc. 1 at 1). The various Defendants were served on December 23, 2024. 25 (Docs. 8, 9). Defendants failed to answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint. On 26 January 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Application for Entry of Default against Defendants 27 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 55(a). (Doc. 10). The following day, 28 the Clerk of Court entered default against Defendants. (Doc. 11). On May 19, 2025, the 1 Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment and awarded her damages totaling 2 $59,610. (Doc. 14 at 9). Plaintiff now seeks an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of 3 $8,267.50 and costs in the amount of $2,000. (Doc. 16 at 10). 4 II. DISCUSSION 5 The FLSA, AWA, and AFWHFA each provide that a prevailing plaintiff “shall” be 6 awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); A.R.S. § 7 23-364(G). “While the FLSA mandates an award of attorneys’ fees to a successful plaintiff, 8 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), ‘the amount of the award is within the discretion of the court.’” 9 Rodriguez v. Pride Dealer Servs., No. CV-23-01955-PHX-ROS, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10 173216, at *4 (D. Ariz. Sep. 25, 2024) (quoting Houser v. Matson, 447 F.2d 860, 863 (9th 11 Cir. 1971)). A party seeking an award of attorneys’ fees must show it is eligible for and 12 entitled to an award, and that the amount sought is reasonable. LRCiv 54.2(c). “The moving 13 party must attach supporting documentation to any request for attorneys’ fees, including 14 (1) a statement of consultation, (2) a complete copy of any written fee agreement, (3) a 15 task-based itemized statement of time expended and expenses incurred, and (4) an affidavit 16 of moving counsel.” Rindlisbacher v. Steinway & Sons Inc., No. CV-18-01131-PHX-MTL, 17 2021 WL 2434207, at *2 (D. Ariz. May 26, 2021) (citing LRCiv 54.2(d)). Here, Plaintiff 18 has failed to attach a statement of consultation, but because Defendants have failed to 19 appear, the Court will nonetheless consider the Motion. See, e.g., Hinton v. Completely 20 Innocent LLC, No. CV-21-01019-PHX-SPL, 2022 WL 1265924, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 28, 21 2022) (“While [the plaintiffs] do not include an explicit statement of consultation, the Court 22 recognizes that Defendant’s failure to appear or otherwise respond in this matter makes 23 such consultation difficult if not impossible.”). 24 “[S]tatutory awards of attorneys’ fees are subject to ‘lodestar’ calculation 25 procedures . . . .” Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th 26 Cir. 1990). To determine the initial lodestar figure, courts multiply “the number of hours 27 reasonably expended on the litigation . . . by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckhart, 28 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The Court must also consider the additional factors that have 1 not been subsumed within the initial lodestar calculation to determine whether the award 2 is reasonable. See Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975), 3 abrogated on other grounds by City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992); see also, 4 e.g., Verduzco v. Value Dental Ctrs. Mesa W. AZ LLC, No. CV-20-02380-PHX-DJH, 2022 5 WL 2718163, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 12, 2022). These factors are: 6 (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the 7 legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary 8 fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the 9 amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the ‘undesirability’ 10 of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. 11 12 Kerr, 526 F.2d at 70. “Those Kerr factors that are not subsumed [by the initial analysis] 13 may support adjustments in rare cases, provided the district court states which factors it is 14 relying on and explains its reasoning.” Cunningham v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 15 487 (9th Cir. 1988). 16 Here, Plaintiff argues that $8,267.50 is a reasonable fee award based on a lodestar 17 of 37.5 hours of work at an hourly rate ranging from $125–$350. (Doc. 16 at 5). 18 a. Attorneys’ Fees 19 First, the Court must decide what a reasonable hourly rate is in this case. Plaintiff’s 20 counsel asks the Court to award hourly rates ranging from $350 for partners, $200–$245 21 for associates, $150 for paralegals, and $125 for legal assistants. (Id.). In FLSA cases, 22 courts in this District routinely award hourly rates within this range. See, e.g., Salazar v. 23 Driver Provider, No. CV-19-05760-PHX-SMB (D. Ariz. Feb. 6, 2025) (Doc. 847 at 12– 24 13) (finding hourly rates of $375–$600 for partners, $225–$350 for associates, and $130 25 for paralegals and law clerks reasonable in a FLSA case); Verduzco, 2022 WL 2718163, at 26 *2 (“Given this matter’s simplicity and the fact that Plaintiff quickly prevailed by default 27 judgment, a reasonable rate is $350.00 per hour.”). These rates reasonably account for the 28 attorneys’ experience and the undesirability of the case. See id. (noting the experience of 1 plaintiff’s counsel and the undesirability of a case with a small amount in controversy); 2 (Doc. 16 at 15 (counsel’s declaration noting the experience of the firm and the 3 undesirability of contingency-based FLSA cases)). They are also reasonable given that this 4 is a traditional FLSA and AFWHFA case for back wages and sick leave retaliation. See 5 Davis v. Shri Hari Hotels LLC, No. CV-22-00756-PHX-SPL (D. Ariz. Aug. 24, 2022) 6 (Doc. 18 at 3–4). Finally, this case did not pose any novel issues and was resolved by a 7 default judgment. (Id. at 4.) Having reviewed the range of hourly rates charged by counsel, 8 the Court finds that they are reasonable. 9 As to the reasonableness of the hours expended, the Court has reviewed the itemized 10 invoice for Plaintiff’s counsel’s services submitted as Exhibit C. (Doc. 16 at 24–31).

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