Peoples, Inc. v. DeVane

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Peoples, Inc. v. DeVane

152 S.E.2d 649, 114 Ga. App. 597, 1966 Ga. App. LEXIS 863

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedOctober 27, 1966

Docket42337

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 152 S.E.2d 649 (Peoples, Inc. v. DeVane) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Peoples, Inc. v. DeVane, 152 S.E.2d 649, 114 Ga. App. 597, 1966 Ga. App. LEXIS 863 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966).

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[599]*599Nichols, Presiding Judge.

Assuming as contended by the appellant that under the amendment to Section 40 of the Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act (Ga. L. 1961, pp. 68, 93; Ga. L. 1962, pp. 79, 90; Code Ann. § 68-438a), the sole method of perfecting a security interest in a pre-1963 model motor vehicle is by “delivery to the [State Revenue] Commissioner of a notice of a security interest in or lien against the vehicle in such form as the Commissioner may prescribe and the payment of the required fee,” yet the evidence as stipulated in the case sub judice did not authorize a finding that Peoples, Inc. had complied with such provision.

Judicial cognizance will not be taken of rules and regulations of the Revenue Commissioner. Bernstein v. Peters, 69 Ga. App. 525, 532 (26 SE2d 192); Turner v. Brunswick Distributing Co., 95 Ga. App. 651 (98 SE2d 591). See also Daniels v. Sanders, 114 Ga. App. 495 ( SE2d ), and the stipulation of fact does not disclose that it was stipulated or proved that the “T-3” form filed by the appellant was the form prescribed by the Commissioner of Revenue for the purpose of filing of a notice of a security interest in a motor vehicle not required to have a certificate of title until 1969.

There was no evidence of actual notice of the claimant’s security interest in the truck and, in the absence of a filing in the manner prescribed by the Commissioner of Revenue, no constructive notice.

The mechanic’s lien was asserted by retention of the truck and was superior to the security interest of which he did not have either actual or constructive notice. Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act, supra (Code Ann. § 68-423a). The cases cited by the appellant, exemplified by Manchester Motors, Inc. v. Farmers & Merchants Bank of Manchester, 91 Ga. App. 811 (87 SE2d 342), were decided prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act and must yield thereto. The judgment of the trial court was not error for any reason assigned.

Judgment affirmed.

Hall and Deen, JJ., concur.

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[599]*599Nichols, Presiding Judge.

Assuming as contended by the appellant that under the amendment to Section 40 of the Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act (Ga. L. 1961, pp. 68, 93; Ga. L. 1962, pp. 79, 90; Code Ann. § 68-438a), the sole method of perfecting a security interest in a pre-1963 model motor vehicle is by “delivery to the [State Revenue] Commissioner of a notice of a security interest in or lien against the vehicle in such form as the Commissioner may prescribe and the payment of the required fee,” yet the evidence as stipulated in the case sub judice did not authorize a finding that Peoples, Inc. had complied with such provision.

Judicial cognizance will not be taken of rules and regulations of the Revenue Commissioner. Bernstein v. Peters, 69 Ga. App. 525, 532 (26 SE2d 192); Turner v. Brunswick Distributing Co., 95 Ga. App. 651 (98 SE2d 591). See also Daniels v. Sanders, 114 Ga. App. 495 ( SE2d ), and the stipulation of fact does not disclose that it was stipulated or proved that the “T-3” form filed by the appellant was the form prescribed by the Commissioner of Revenue for the purpose of filing of a notice of a security interest in a motor vehicle not required to have a certificate of title until 1969.

There was no evidence of actual notice of the claimant’s security interest in the truck and, in the absence of a filing in the manner prescribed by the Commissioner of Revenue, no constructive notice.

The mechanic’s lien was asserted by retention of the truck and was superior to the security interest of which he did not have either actual or constructive notice. Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act, supra (Code Ann. § 68-423a). The cases cited by the appellant, exemplified by Manchester Motors, Inc. v. Farmers & Merchants Bank of Manchester, 91 Ga. App. 811 (87 SE2d 342), were decided prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act and must yield thereto. The judgment of the trial court was not error for any reason assigned.

Judgment affirmed.

Hall and Deen, JJ., concur.

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152 S.E.2d 649, 114 Ga. App. 597, 1966 Ga. App. LEXIS 863, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/peoples-inc-v-devane-gactapp-1966.

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