People v. Wright CA4/2

• Court: California Court of Appeal
• Decided: March 27, 2025
• Docket: E083910
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Filed 3/27/25 P. v. Wright CA4/2 See Concurring Opinion; see Dissenting Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E083910

v. (Super.Ct.No. FWV17001837)

PERRY WRIGHT, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ingrid Adamson

Uhler, Judge. (Retired Judge of the San Bernardino Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief

Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Reversed and remanded with

instructions.

James M. Kehoe, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

1 Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and

Genevieve Herbert, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant and appellant Perry Wright appeals from a postjudgment order denying

him relief under Penal Code1 section 1172.75. He argues the trial court erred in denying

him a full resentencing under section 1172.75. We agree that defendant is entitled to a

full resentencing hearing and reverse.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 17, 2017, a jury found defendant guilty of robbery (§ 211) and found

true that he personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court

found true the allegations that defendant was convicted of a prior serious felony (§ 667,

subd. (a)(1)) and a prior strike offense (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)),

and that he served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

On December 7, 2017, the trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of

11 years, consisting of two years for the robbery conviction, doubled for the prior strike

conviction, one year for the weapon enhancement, five years for the prior serious felony

enhancement, and one year for the prior prison term enhancement. In November 2018,

the court stayed the one-year sentence for defendant’s prior prison term enhancement and

resentenced him to 10 years in prison.

1 All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated.

2 The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)

subsequently identified defendant as an inmate who was serving a sentence that included

a prison prior enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b), which might no longer

be valid under section 1172.75.2

On April 19, 2024, the trial court held a hearing pursuant to section 1172.75.

Relying on this court’s decision in People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38

(Rhodius), review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283169, the trial court denied defendant

resentencing relief.3

DISCUSSION

The Court Erred in Finding Defendant Ineligible for Resentencing

Defendant argues that he is entitled to a full resentencing under section 1172.75,

although his prior prison enhancement was stayed. Citing Rhodius, supra, 97

Cal.App.5th 38, the People contend that he is not entitled to resentencing because his

2 By order dated February 10, 2025, this court, on our own motion, augmented the appellate record to include a superior court document entitled, “Stipulation/Hearing Request & Order Re: Resentencing Pursuant to [Penal Code section] 1171/[Penal Code section] 1171.1.” This document states the parties stipulated the following: “It appearing from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s list, provided as required by Penal Code §1171 and Penal Code §1171.1 that Defendant in the above- entitled case is eligible for resentencing pursuant to” section 1171.1. Section 1171.1 was renumbered as section 1172.75 and amended by Stats. 2022, chapter 58, section 12, effective June 30, 2022 (AB 200).

3 The court stated it had reviewed the court file and the abstract of judgment and noted that the prison prior was “previously stayed and/or stricken.” The court then stated, “So based on the Rhodius decision, the Court feels it lacks jurisdiction for any type of resentencing, so the petition for resentencing is denied.” It is unclear what the court meant, since the Rhodius decision does not discuss jurisdiction. In any event, the court did not resentence defendant.

3 prior prison enhancement was stayed, not executed. We conclude the court erred in

finding defendant ineligible for relief under section 1172.75. Thus, we reverse the denial

order and remand for a full resentencing hearing.

A. Standard of Review

“The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review de novo.”

(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961.) Our fundamental task in construing a

statute “is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s

purpose. [Citation.] We begin our inquiry by examining the statute’s words, giving them

a plain and commonsense meaning.” (People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 907.)

“[W]e look to ‘the entire substance of the statute . . . in order to determine the scope and

purpose of the provision . . . . [Citation.]’” (Id. at pp. 907-908.) “We must harmonize

‘the various parts of a statutory enactment . . . by considering the particular clause or

section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.’” (Id. at p. 908.)

B. Relevant Law

Prior to January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b), required a sentencing

court to impose a one-year sentencing enhancement “for each prior separate prison term”

served by the defendant, unless the defendant remained free of both the commission of an

offense resulting in a felony conviction and from prison custody for a period of five years

following release from prison. (Former § 667.5, subd. (b).) This sentencing

enhancement is commonly known as a prison prior enhancement.

4 Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) limited a

sentencing court’s ability to impose a prison prior enhancement only to those cases in

which the defendant’s past convictions were for certain specified sexually violent

offenses. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.)

In 2021, the Legislature approved Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) for

the stated purpose of “ensur[ing] equal justice and address[ing] systemic racial bias in

sentencing” by “retroactively apply[ing] . . . Senate Bill [No.] 136 . . . to all persons

currently serving a term of incarceration in jail or prison for [a] repealed [prison prior]

sentence enhancement[].” (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1.) To achieve this objective, Senate

Bill No. 483 added section 1171.1 to the Penal Code, a statutory provision that was

subsequently renumbered to section 1172.75 without substantive change. (Stats. 2021,

ch. 728, § 3; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.) For purposes of this opinion, we will refer to this

provision as section 1172.75.

Section 1172.75 prescribes the procedure for resentencing affected defendants.

Subdivision (a) states, “[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1,

2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed

for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense . . . is legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75,

subd. (a).) The Secretary of the CDCR and the county correctional administrator must

first identify individuals serving terms that include no-longer-valid enhancements and

then provide certain information about those individuals to the sentencing court that

imposed the enhancement. (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) Subdivision (c) instructs the court,

5 upon receipt of such information, to “review the judgment and verify that the current

judgment includes a sentencing enhancement described in [section 1172.75,]

subdivision (a). If the court determines that the current judgment includes an

enhancement described in subdivision (a), the court shall recall the sentence and

resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).)

Section 1172.75, subdivision (d), outlines the procedure applicable to the

resentencing proceeding. It states that “[r]esentencing . . . shall result in a lesser sentence

than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed

enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a

lesser sentence would endanger public safety. Resentencing . . . shall not result in a

longer sentence than the one originally imposed.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).)

Subdivision (d) requires the court to “apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council

and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial

discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of

sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) It also directs the court to “consider

postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of

rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age,

time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk

for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the

original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.”

(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).)

6 C. Defendant is Entitled to a Full Resentencing

The dispute here “centers around the meaning of the word ‘imposed’ as used in

section 1172.75, subdivision (a), and, more specifically, whether a sentence enhancement

pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b) that was imposed and stayed for a non-

sexually-violent offense prior to January 1, 2020, is ‘a sentencing enhancement described

in subdivision (a)’ of section 1172.75.” (People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th

300, 311 (Christianson), review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283189, italics omitted.) The

Courts of Appeal are divided on this question, and the issue is currently before the

Supreme Court. (Compare Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 300 [recall and

resentencing is available when prison prior enhancement is imposed and stayed]; People

v. Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270 (Saldana), review granted Mar. 12, 2024,

S283547 [same]; & People v. Renteria (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1276 [same], with

Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 38 [recall and resentencing is only available when prison

prior enhancement is imposed and executed].) We generally agree with the Christianson

decision, which in our view sets forth the correct statutory interpretation of

section 1172.75. (See Christianson, at pp. 311-315.)

Section 1172.75, subdivisions (a) and (c), provide that a defendant currently

serving time on a judgment which includes a section 667.5, subdivision (b)

enhancement imposed before January 1, 2020, is entitled to a full resentencing hearing.

The court in Christianson explicated that, “[o]n its face, the word ‘imposed,’ in this

context, is at least somewhat ambiguous. As our high court has explained, ‘it is

7 important to understand that the word “impose” applies to enhancements that are

“imposed and then executed” as well as those that are “imposed and then stayed.

However, as a practical matter, the word ‘impose’ is often employed as shorthand to refer

to the first situation, while the word ‘stay’ often refers to the latter.”’” (Christianson,

supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 311.) Despite this apparent ambiguity, the Christianson court

rejected the People’s claim that the Legislature intended the word “‘imposed,’” as used in

section 1172.75, to be limited to enhancements that were imposed and executed.

(Christianson, at p. 311.)

Further, as the court explained in Christianson, “[s]ection 1172.75 requires the

CDCR to identify all inmates ‘currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an

enhancement described in subdivision (a).’ [Citation.] A judgment may include a

sentence that has been imposed but suspended or stayed. [Citations.] Thus, by its plain

language, all that is required for the CDCR to identify an inmate under section 1172.75,

subdivision (b) is for the enhancement to be included in the abstract of judgment,

regardless of whether it is imposed or stayed. Had the Legislature intended for the

language in subdivision (b) to limit the identification to those inmates that would

necessarily be required to serve an additional term based on the enhancement, it certainly

could have done so.” (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 311-312.)

The court in Christianson noted that, “[t]he sentencing court must then

‘verify that the current judgment includes a sentencing enhancement described in

subdivision (a).’” (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 312; § 1172.75, subd. (c).)

8 The court continued as follows: “At this point, the incorporation of subdivision (a)

requires that the current judgment include a sentencing enhancement imposed pursuant to

section 667.5, subdivision (b). However, the use of the word ‘verify’ suggests that the

sentencing court is doing just that, verifying that the individual the CDCR identified is in

fact an individual described by the statute, not looking to see if the inmate meets an

additional requirement (i.e., that the enhancement is imposed and not stayed). It does not

follow logic or reason to read these two subdivisions together in a manner that would

require the CDCR to identify a larger class of inmates—all those serving time on a

judgment that include a now invalid enhancement—only for the trial courts to then look

at the same abstracts of judgment available to the CDCR to determine whether the

previous court imposed additional time for, or stayed, the relevant enhancements.”

(Christianson, at p. 312.)

Finally, Christianson observed that the overarching “statutory scheme at issue

here involves statutory amendments expressly aimed at reducing sentences by

retroactively eliminating a sentencing enhancement described as exacerbating ‘existing

racial and socio-economic disparities in our criminal justice system.’” (Christianson,

supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 314.) The court noted that the resentencing procedures set

forth in the statutory scheme promoted this legislative goal insofar as they “require that

the trial court conduct a full resentencing for those defendants impacted by the now

invalid enhancement in light of all associated sentencing reform.” (Ibid.) Given this

legislative objective, the Christianson court inferred that the Legislature presumably

9 “intended to provide broad relief to all defendants impacted by the now invalid

section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements.” (Ibid.)

We note that we respectfully disagree with one portion of Christianson.

Acknowledging that section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), requires a trial court to impose a

lesser sentence than originally imposed, Christianson rejected the notion that removing a

stayed term does not result in a lesser sentence. (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at

p. 312.) Rather, the court concluded that even a stayed term has potential consequences

to a sentence since the trial court “retains the ability to lift the stay and impose the term

under certain circumstance[s], such as if an alternately imposed term is invalidated.”

(Ibid.; accord, Saldana, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 1278 [stayed enhancement is part of

sentence and remains available if its execution becomes necessary].) We disagree with

this conclusion since a prison prior that was imposed before 2020, and was not for a

sexually violent offense, is now legally invalid under section 1172.75, subdivision (a);

thus, a court has no ability to lift a stay and impose such prison prior in the future.

In any event, in the instant case, there is no dispute defendant was serving time on

a judgment which included a section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement that was not for

a sexually violent offense. Section 1172.75 expressly provides that if a “current

judgment includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a), the court shall recall the

sentence and resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) Applying Christianson

here, defendant is entitled to a full resentencing under section 1172.75. (§ 1172.75,

subds. (a) & (c); see Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 314-315.) “By its plain

10 terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike

the newly ‘invalid’ enhancements.” (People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402;

see People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [“when part of a sentence is stricken on

review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so

the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed

circumstances’”].) At resentencing, the court shall “apply any other changes in law that

reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of

sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2)) and

“consider postconviction factors” militating against continued incarceration (§ 1172.75,

subd. (d)(3)).

The People ask us to follow Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 38, which held that

the express language in section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), requiring the resentencing to

“result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result [of] the elimination

of the repealed enhancement,” combined with the legislative history behind the

enactment of Senate Bill Nos. 136 and 483, require the conclusion that section 1172.75

does not invalidate prior prison term enhancements that were imposed but stayed.

(Rhodius, at pp. 43-49.) Rhodius reasoned as follows: “Section 1172.75

subdivision (d)(1)’s requirement that the resentencing shall result in a lesser sentence

than the one originally imposed necessitates the conclusion that the repealed

enhancement increased the length of the sentence. The only way for the repealed

enhancement to have increased the length of a sentence is for the enhancement to have

11 been imposed and executed. If the repealed enhancement was imposed and stayed, the

sentence would not have been increased, as was the case here.” (Id. at p. 44.)

Although Rhodius was thoughtfully decided, we respectfully disagree with it.

Rather, we agree with Christianson’s conclusion that section 1172.75 applies to cases in

which the inmate’s abstract of judgment includes a section 667.5, subdivision (b)

enhancement “regardless of whether it is imposed or stayed.” (Christianson, supra, 97

Cal.App.5th at pp. 305, 312; see People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188, 195-198

(Espino), review granted Oct. 23, 2024, S286987.)

Under Rhodius, the word “imposed” in section 1172.75, subdivision (a), means

“imposed and executed.” Thus, the “imposed and stayed” prior convictions in that case

were not “imposed” within the meaning of section 1172.75, subdivision (a). If that

interpretation is correct, then the prison prior convictions would not be legally invalid,

and the trial court should not have struck them. Yet, the trial court in Rhodius court did

strike them, strongly inferring their invalidity, and the Rhodius court affirmed the trial

court’s action. In our view, section 1172.75 either applies or does not apply. The

authority to strike the prior convictions comes only where section 1172.75 applies.

We also note that in Rhodius, the trial court “vacated the sentence for defendant’s

two section 667.5[, subdivision] (b) priors and ordered them stricken.” (Rhodius, supra,

97 Cal.App.5th at p. 41.) Thus, the only issue was whether the court was required to give

the defendant “a full resentencing hearing going beyond striking his two priors.” (Ibid.)

In contrast, the court here did not vacate defendant’s prison prior enhancement at the

12 resentencing hearing. Thus, the matter must be remanded for the court to vacate the

prison prior and fully resentence defendant pursuant to section 1172.75, subdivisions (c)

and (d).

Although the length of sentence does not change when a trial court vacates a now

invalid prior conviction which was previously stayed,4 the defendant, nevertheless,

receives a significant benefit. To the extent the abstract of judgment will no longer show

the prison prior conviction, the consequences of defendant’s conviction are reduced. As

a result of the court’s action, the case will no longer reflect the prior conviction if a court

assesses the appropriate disposition in any future case or on a violation of parole in the

current case.

Finally, a careful review of section 1172.75 and its legislative history reveals that

they each contain language favorable to an interpretation consistent with that taken by

Rhodius, and they also each contain language favorable to an interpretation consistent

with that taken in Christianson. We agree with the court in Espino, supra, 104

Cal.App.5th at p. 198 that under the rule of lenity, where the Legislature’s intent cannot

be determined, courts must prefer the interpretation that is most favorable to defendants.5

4 This assumes the judgment was final as of January 1, 2020, as Senate Bill No. 136 on its own is not retroactive to final judgments.

5 In light of our conclusion under Christianson and Espino, we find it unnecessary to address defendant’s additional argument that the Legislature did not enact section 1172.75 “as a purely administrative adjustment to a defendant’s sentence.” (All caps omitted.)

13 In sum, we conclude the trial court erred in finding defendant ineligible for relief.

The CDCR properly identified him as a person in custody “currently serving a term for a

judgment that includes an enhancement described in [section 1172.75,] subdivision (a).”

(§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) He was therefore entitled to a recall of his sentence and a full

resentencing under the terms of section 1172.75, which would include the application of

“any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion”

(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2)) and consideration of “postconviction factors” militating against

continued incarceration (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3)).

DISPOSITION

The denial order is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court with

instructions to recall defendant’s sentence and conduct a full resentencing pursuant to

section 1172.75, subdivisions (c) and (d).

FIELDS J. I concur:

RAPHAEL J.

14 [People v. Wright, E083910]

RAPHAEL, J., concurring.

I agree with the majority opinion and join it in full except for its single paragraph

stating disagreement with a point in People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300.

(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 10.) Christianson is correct. Explaining its reasoning helps

explain why the People’s position is not what the Legislature intended.

Christianson correctly recognized: “When a punishment is stayed, as opposed to

stricken, the trial court retains the ability to lift the stay and impose the term under certain

circumstance[s], such as if an alternately imposed term is invalidated.” (Christianson,

supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 312.) This is the proper reason for a trial court to stay prison

time on an enhancement while still imposing it. As our division has explained, the stay

exists so if “one of the two punishments is invalidated, the defendant will still be subject

to the remaining one.” (People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 355, 365.) If the other

term is invalidated, we stated, the stayed punishment would be “ ‘revived by operation of

law.’ ” (Ibid.) A resentencing would not be essential; even on appeal, we could “impose

the correct alternative sentence ourselves.” (Ibid.; see People v. Alford (2010) 180

Cal.App.4th 1463, 1469 [“if the unstayed sentence is reversed, a valid sentence remains

extant”]; People v. Begnaud (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1548, 1553 [“When the principal

term was reversed, the stay was removed and the full middle term became the

sentence”].)

1 For one-year prison prior enhancements, trial courts properly stayed their

punishment when imposing punishment on another enhancement based on the same

conviction. If that other enhancement were invalidated, the stayed one-year sentence on

the prison prior could be executed as a replacement, with no resentencing necessary.

Here, the defendant’s enhancement was stayed for just this reason. He had a single

robbery conviction charged as both a five-year Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1)

enhancement and a one-year section 667.5, subdivision (b) prison prior enhancement.1

The operative judgment executed the five-year enhancement but imposed and stayed

punishment on the one-year prison prior. The sole function of imposing-and-staying the

latter punishment, instead of imposing-and-striking it (see section 1385,

subdivision (b)(1)) is to ensure that the punishment can be executed by lifting the stay.

Before the Legislature made its abolition of prison priors retroactive by enacting

section 1172.75, all prison priors imposed before 2020 remained valid components of a

judgment, whether the punishment was stayed or executed. Defendants would serve

prison time on executed enhancements. And, at that time, it would not seem incongruous

for punishment to be executed by lifting the stay on a one-year enhancement if, for

instance, a five-year enhancement on the same conviction were invalidated.

Once the Legislature enacted section 1172.75, any defendant with a prison prior

invalidated by section 1172.75, subdivision (a), qualifies for resentencing. In the

majority’s view (and Christianson’s, and mine), all prison priors “imposed” in the

1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

2 judgment are covered by section 1172.75, subdivision (a), whether the punishment on

those enhancements was executed or stayed. For defendants with such an enhancement,

courts must follow the terms of section 1172.75 and recall the defendant’s sentence and

resentence the defendant. The resentencing is to be under current law (see § 1172.75,

subd. (d)(2)), so no prison prior can be imposed at the resentencing. With

section 1172.75 enacted, it would be incongruous if (as earlier) punishment could be

executed on a prison prior by removing a stay, as the same punishment would not be

served if it originally had been executed. Under our view, then, Christianson also

correctly stated that a defendant who was resentenced by “removing the stayed term from

the abstract of judgment” would now have a “lesser” sentence than the one originally

imposed. (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal. App.5th at p. 312.)

The majority opinion states that it disagrees with Christianson because a prison

prior enhancement imposed before 2020, not for a sexually violent offense, “is now

legally invalid under section 1172.75, subdivision (a); thus, a court has no ability to lift a

stay and impose such prison prior in the future.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 10.) It is correct

that a court cannot do this, and I do not read Christianson to disagree. Prison priors

cannot be imposed “in the future” (or now) because they were invalidated prospectively

even before section 1172.75. For any prison prior covered by section 1172.75,

subdivision (a), the defendant’s sentence is recalled and the defendant is resentenced.

The prison prior cannot be imposed at that resentencing. This is section 1172.75’s

3 procedure: any enhancement declared “legally invalid” by section 1172.75,

subdivision (a), is removed through a full resentencing where it cannot be re-imposed.

Our disagreement is with the People’s view that the stayed-punishment

enhancements are not rendered legally invalid by section 1172.75, subdivision (a). If the

People are correct, there would be no resentencing of the defendant. Those

enhancements would remain in the judgment just as before section 1172.75 was enacted.

The defendant would not qualify for a resentencing, and section 1172.75 provides no

other type of relief. It would be just as if the Legislature declared expressly in

section 1172.75 that prison prior enhancements with stayed sentences remain valid. In

that situation, as before section 1172.75, the stayed one-year prison prior sentence could

become executed “ ‘by operation of law’ ” if an unstayed component of the sentence

were invalidated. (People v. Lopez, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 365.)

I do not think the Legislature intended this, and neither does the majority opinion

or Christianson. We construe section 1172.75, subdivision (a), as invalidating these

enhancements. This conclusion is compelling enough that the People have, in some

cases, suggested “partially applying section 1172.75” by conceding that stayed-

punishment enhancements are legally invalid under subdivision (a), but arguing that the

defendants still do not merit the resentencing that the statute requires. (See People v.

Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270, 1275.) This, I think, simply shows the cogency of

4 the conclusion that all prison priors in the judgment are invalidated under

section 1172.75, subdivision (a). That means a resentencing. Christianson is correct.

5 [People v. Wright, E083910]

McKINSTER, Acting P. J., dissenting:

I continue to adhere to our decision in People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th

38, review granted February 21, 2024, S283169. Christianson’s reasoning is, as the

majority concede, at least in some degree flawed; Christianson erroneously asserts that a

court could impose punishment on a prior prison term enhancement at some point in the

future. (People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300, review granted Feb. 21,

2024, S283189.)

Contrary to Christianson’s implication, punishment on the enhancement here

could never subsequently be imposed because the law has invalidated such enhancements

unless they are for qualifying sexually violent offenses, which is inapplicable here.

(People v. Mayberry (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 665, 676, review granted Aug. 14, 2024,

S285853.) Thus, defendant was not entitled to a full resentencing hearing because he was

not serving time for a Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement, time on

the enhancement could now never be imposed, and striking the enhancement would not

result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed.

To interpret the law to permit relief to a person who was “lucky” enough to only

have punishment on his enhancement stayed but not to someone who was “unfortunate”

enough to have his enhancement completely stricken strains credulity. Therefore, I would

affirm the order denying defendant a full resentencing hearing.

McKINSTER Acting P. J. 1