People v. Wingeart

123 N.W.2d 731, 371 Mich. 264

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Decided: October 10, 1963
• Docket: Calendar 34, Docket 49,932
• Status: Published

Opinions

Carr, C. J.

Informations in 2 criminal cases were filed against defendant in the circuit court of Washtenaw county, one charging him with the crime of robbery armed and the other with rape. Both offenses were claimed by the people to have been committed within the county on July 9, 1961, and because they arose out of substantially the same factual situation they were tried together. Counsel for defendant filed notice of special defense of insanity. Thereafter defendant filed a written waiver of jury trial in each case. The court then requested that defendant be examined as to his capacity for the purposes of the trial, and an order was entered appointing 2 psychiatrists, residents of the county, to examine defendant. Such examination was held, with the result that defendant was found to be capable of comprehending the nature of the proceedings against him and of being able to assist counsel in a reasonable and rational manner. The cases then proceeded to trial before the circuit judge.

In accordance with the special notice of defense served by defendant’s attorney, it was claimed that at the time of the commission of the offenses with which defendant was charged he was insane. Testimony was introduced on behalf of the people with reference to the perpetration of the crimes charged and the conduct of defendant during such commission and thereafter. The testimony relating to such matters was not in dispute. There was no claim that defendant did not indulge in the conduct for which he was prosecuted. In his behalf testimony of relatives and friends, and also psychiatrists, was offered for the purpose of establishing the special defense pleaded.

At the conclusion of the trial the circuit judge filed a written opinion in which he analyzed carefully and at length the testimony received with reference to the issue involved. It was his conclusion that defendant was not insane at the time of the commission of the crimes charged. Accordingly defendant was found guilty in each case and sentences were imposed. Motion for a new trial was made and denied. Defendant has appealed asserting that nnder the proofs the finding that he was not insane at the time of the alleged robbery armed and rape was erroneous, and that the trial judge was in practical effect bound by the opinions of psychiatrists who testified in defendant’s behalf and who expressed opinions supporting the claim of insanity.

As indicated, the facts with reference to the commission of the alleged offenses were not in dispute. Shortly after midnight on July 9, 1961, the victim of the robbery, William Morrison, then 19 years of age, and the victim of the rape left the home of a friend where they had visited. The young woman was blind. While parked beside the highway Morrison noticed a car with a bent headlight slow down as it passed. Approximately 3 minutes later, according to the testimony, the car came back, pulled up in front of Morrison’s car, within 2 or 3 feet, and defendant got out with a gun in his hand. He ordered Morrison and his companion to get out of their car, stating* at the time that he had a gun. The order was obeyed. Thereupon Morrison was ordered to lie down on the ground, and when he hesitated the gun was discharged. The direction given was then complied with, and defendant tossed a piece of rope on the ground and ordered Morrison’s companion to tie him up. This she was unable to accomplish and defendant himself proceeded to tie Morrison’s arms behind his back and also to tie his lower limbs. The young* woman was then forced to lie down and her hands were tied behind her back. Defendant then inquired of Morrison where his wallet was, was told, and it was taken from the victim’s pocket. According to the testimony defendant inquired how much gasoline Morrison had in his car, and when he was told that the gasoline tank was nearly full he expressed satisfaction.

Having tied his victims, defendant then proceeded to drive his own car beside the road and move the Morrison car around to enable him to transfer articles from his own car to that of Morrison. Having accomplished this operation he got in and drove the Morrison car a short distance down the highway, then hacked up to a position right behind his victims. He picked up the young woman, who was screaming, threw her into the car, and then drove away.

- Morrison managed to free himself from the rope with which he had been tied and went to the car that defendant had left, with the idea of using it in going for help. However, there was no key in the ignition and Morrison ran down the road to a house where he was admitted and from which he called the sheriff’s department. In a short time 2 police officers from the sheriff’s department came, and then 2 State police troopers. Morrison explained what had happened.

While the officers and Morrison were at the scene the latter saw a car approach and stop about 100 feet away. He recognized it as his automobile, and so informed the officers. However the automobile backed up rapidly, turned around, and, before the officers could overtake it, it had disappeared from sight.

After defendant drove away with the young woman in his car, leaving Morrison tied and lying-on the ground, he went for some distance. During this time he impressed on the young woman that he had guns, pushing one against her person and telling her that he had 2 more like it. She asked' him to drive her to the hospital where she was employed, hut instead of that he stopped beside a gravel road where he tried to commit the crime of rape in the automobile. During this proceeding cars passed from time to time, and each time defendant shut the door of the car in which he was undertaking to commit the crime. Such action indicated that he sought to avoid discovery. Likewise, when he turned around and fled from the officers the conclusion is fully justified that he did so to avoid apprehension. During these events, as the trial judge indicated in his opinion, defendant proceeded deliberately, apparently with a plan in mind and knowing what he was doing and the possible results if he was detected.

After expressing concern because of the passing-automobiles, defendant drove away to a more secluded spot where he forced the young woman from the car and proceeded to commit the crime with which he was charged. According to the witness he threatened to shoot her. if she caused him trouble. After he committed the offense he tied her feet, her hands still being tied behind her back. He also told her not to leave the place until the next morning. He then got into the automobile and drove away. The young woman managed to free herself from her bonds and found her way to a highway where she was picked up by the driver of an automobile who took her to the Brighton police post.

Defendant went to Chicago and there contacted a friend with whom he left the guns that he had in the automobile that he had been driving. This friend was not a witness on the trial. However, he assisted defendant to get in touch with an attorney. Defendant then went to Niles, Michigan, where he left the Morrison car in an orchard and walked into the city. Counsel whom he consulted advised that he return to Ann Arbor. Defendant indicated in testifying in his own behalf on the trial that he was advised by counsel not to make or sign any statement. On being interviewed by members of the sheriff’s department of Washtenaw county he told them that he had lost the guns that he had in the car, admitting in his testimony that he had falsified in that statement. It was his claim to the officers, after having consulted with the attorney, that he had no recollection of the events in the early morning hours of July 9th. It should be noted that the attorney first consulted by defendant did not represent him on the trial.

In preparation for the trial defendant was examined by psychiatrists who testified in his behalf with reference to his mental condition on the night in question. The testimony of these psychiatrists indicated that they had accepted as true defendant’s assertion that ho had no recollection of what had occurred at the time of the' commission of the offenses in question, and their answers to questions pro-' pounded to them indicated that their opinions were influenced in large part by their belief that defendant was telling the truth with reference to his inability to recall his acts during the period here involved.

The trial judge, emphasizing the conduct of the defendant at the time the offenses were committed,, his obvious efforts to intimidate and frighten his victims, and his attémpts to avoid detection, came to the conclusion that' defendant was not truthful in asserting a complete lack of memory. In consequence, the judge declined to accept the opinions of' the psychiatrists who testified in defendant’s behalf',, basing his conclusion on the undisputed testimony with reference to defendant’s conduct prior to the commission of the offenses for which he was prosecuted, and following. Several witnesses in defendant’s behalf who had known him for considerable periods of time testified in the case, as did his mother and his wife. It does not appear from the testimony of such witnesses that defendant had on any prior occasion evinced conduct indicating that he was possessed of a schizoid personality. It does not appear that he had had occasion to consult a psychiatrist at any time prior to July 9,1961, or that he had received psychiatric treatment. Likewise, following, said date there is no proof that he sought psychiatric treatment but, rather, that he went to the psychiatrists who testified in his behalf for the purpose of. obtaining assistance in the presentation of his defense on the trials.

As a witness in his own behalf defendant was ques-, tioned as to his activities during the evening of July 8th. His answers indicated that he had a rather spe-. cific recollection as to what he did and where he went.He testified that he and a friend went to a place, called the “German Park”, that on the way his-friend objected to his driving so fast, that when they reached the park they went in and bought tickets entitling them to purchase therewith food and liquid refreshments, ’ and that he remembered leaving the. place. He also recalled that after he left he was. involved in an accident in which his car was damaged. He left his friend at the German Park with the understanding that the latter would go home, with some other guest or guests present. This friend was a witness on the trial, stating that he was with defendant from about 8 o’clock in the evening until the departure of defendant from the German Park at about midnight. He referred to defendant’s, driving at a rapid rate of speed, and stated that when he asked him to drive slower defendant did so. This witness testified that, other than the matter of the driving, defendant’s actions were normal, and that when defendant left he said goodbye.

The commission of the offenses here involved occurred shortly after midnight. It is significant that up to the time he left the German Park defendant gave no indication that he was not in full possesr sion of all of his faculties. It is significant also that he left the place alone, and that he was carrying weapons in his automobile as well as a coil of rope. These articles were placed in the car earlier, at a time about which there is no question as to defendant’s sanity. He gave no explanation on the trial as to why he had them in his car, but it clearly appears from the undisputed testimony that he used both a gun and the rope in the commission of the offenses that he was charged with having committed.

We cannot agree with counsel for defendant that the trial judge was in error in failing to accept the opinions of the psychiatrists who testified in his behalf. It is somewhat significant that at least 1 psychiatrist whom he had consulted was not brought in as a witness, and another member of the same profession who had sat on the commission that found defendant competent to assist in his defense and to understand the nature of the proceedings against him testified on behalf of the prosecution to opinions that he had formed at variance with those of defendant’s psychiatrists.

It was the duty of the circuit judge as the trier of the facts to weigh the testimony in the case, to determine the factual issues presented in accordance therewith, and to render verdicts accordingly. That the judge did this in the instant cases is not open to question. His analysis of the testimony indicates that he gave full consideration thereto. As against the opinions of defendant’s psychiatrist witnesses he had undisputed proofs that were obviously at variance with such opinions. Said witnesses accepted as correct the statements to them by defendant. If such statements were not in accord with the truth, then clearly the opinions based thereon could not be accepted as having controlling weight.

The responsibility for determining the facts disclosed by the proofs rested with the circuit judge. In weighing the opinion testimony he was entitled to know, and necessarily to consider, the basis on which it rested. Raub v. Carpenter, 187 US 159 (23 , 47 L ed 119). The opinion of an expert must rest on a factual basis and if the facts given-to the expert for his consideration are without-proper support the trier of the facts cannot accept-it. The trial judge concluded, and the record fully supports him in this respect, that the proofs relating to defendant’s mental condition on July 9, 1961,- and prior thereto and thereafter, were of greater weight than defendant’s assertion that he could not-recall the details of his conduct during the commission of the offenses charged against him, which assertion it appears was accepted and given controlling significance by the psychiatrist witnesses produced in his behalf.

The consideration of the weight to be given expert testimony in particular cases and under varying circumstances has been repeatedly considered by this Court, and other courts as well. In McNally v. Col-well, 91 Mich 527, 536, 537 (30 Am St Rep 494), it was said:

“It is best to limit expert testimony to its proper uses, since it is not now held in the highest esteem; nor has it been found to be free from the infirmities and temptations that belong to human nature. And since a man’s opinion cannot be met and tested, as could his testimony to the existence of a fact, expert evidence, while useful in many cases, is dangerous in all, and should be restricted, for the purpose of accuracy in determining the truth, which is the aim of all judicial investigation, to those cases where its use is well nigh indispensable because of questions of science or skill being involved, in which a special and peculiar knowledge is desired in order to arrive at the truth.”

In People v. Hannum, 362 Mich 660, it was recognized that opinion evidence by 'members of the medi-. cal profession might have béen found by the trier-of the facts to be outweighed by factual testimony indicating sanity. In Vial v. Vial, 369 Mich 534, it was held that the trial judge was not bound to accept the opinions of defendant’s psychiatrist when inconsistent with facts established by the proofs. In connection with such holding it was said (p 536):

“When the trier of an issue such as was framed below receives opinion testimony of mental incapacity or illness on the one hand, as against lay testimony of facts indicating knowledge of right, or wrong, of capacity and of fair understanding of the result and impact of emotional attitudes and changes thereof, there is no legal obligation to accept the former over the latter.”

An interesting discussion of the weight to be given to expert testimony in itself, and in comparison with lay testimony, will be found in 86 ALR2d 1038, 1044, et seq.

The convictions and judgments are affirmed.

Dethmers, Kelly, and O’Hara, JJ., concurred with Carr, C. J. Black, Kavanagh, and Smith, JJ., concurred in the result.