People v. Williams

2023 IL App (4th) 220481-U

Opinion

NOTICE 2023 IL App (4th) 220481-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is June 22, 2023 NO. 4-22-0481 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Peoria County LaDERRIUS WILLIAMS, ) No. 20CF346 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Katherine S. Gorman, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice DeArmond and Justice Steigmann concurred in the judgment.

ORDER ¶1 Held: Because the police had probable cause to arrest defendant for fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer (625 ILCS 5/11-204(a) (West 2020)) and for reckless driving (id. § 11-503(a)(1)), the arrest was valid, as was the search incident to the arrest, and the denial of defendant’s motion for suppression of evidence was correct.

¶2 In a stipulated bench trial, the circuit court of Peoria County found defendant,

LaDerrius Williams, guilty of a single count of unlawfully possessing a controlled substance (720

ILCS 570/401(c) (West 2020)). The court sentenced him to probation for 30 months. He appeals,

contending that the court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 In the motion for suppression, which defendant filed on February 4, 2021, he

claimed that the police lacked probable cause to stop him or to arrest him. Therefore, he requested that the circuit court “suppress any and all evidence and statements obtained pursuant [to]” the

“stop, detention[,] and/or arrest.”

¶5 In the hearing on the motion for suppression, the evidence tended to show the

following. On June 20, 2020, around 1:45 a.m. or 2 a.m., Peoria police officers were investigating

a shots-fired incident. At the intersection of Laramie Street and Krause Avenue, they found a

wrecked car pierced with bullet holes.

¶6 A large crowd was at Laramie Liquors, across the street. A red Chevrolet pickup

truck bolted out of the parking lot of the liquor store, squealing its tires, and sped south on Laramie

Street. Peoria Police Officer Jonathan Irving got into his patrol car and pursued the truck, with the

overhead lights of his patrol car flashing. He intended to pull the truck over for squealing its tires

and for reckless driving. The truck turned east onto Montana Street and lengthened its lead,

traveling, by Irving’s estimate, at 50 miles per hour. From afar, Irving saw the truck pull into

Harrison Homes via the Montana Street entrance.

¶7 When Irving arrived at the Harrison Homes parking lot, he saw the truck parked on

the west side of the parking lot. The truck was idling, its headlights were on, and its doors were

unlocked, but nobody was in the truck. The Peoria police department had a policy of impounding

any vehicle that had been used to flee or elude the police. Accordingly, Irving and another Peoria

police officer, Chad Oberle, began an inventory search of the truck in preparation for impounding

it. As they were searching the truck, defendant approached.

¶8 To quote from Oberle’s testimony, defendant told the police “the truck was his and

[that] he wanted to get in the truck.” Oberle continued:

-2- “A. He asked if he could get in. I told him he could not. He continued to

walk towards the truck. I put my hand out in front of me on his chest. He continued

to try to push past me to get in the truck. At that point, we took him into custody.

Q. For what?

A. For obstructing police.”

¶9 At the time of his encounter with defendant, Oberle was wearing a body camera.

The video footage from the body camera is in the record and is broken up into two parts—neither

of which, however, has sound. In one part, Oberle appears to be driving in his patrol car toward

Harrison Homes. Upon arriving there, he gets out of his patrol car and approaches the red truck,

which is parked over one of the white parking lines. Oberle opens a door of the truck and looks in

the front and in the back. The truck is unoccupied. Then the footage appears to show Oberle

backing out of the truck and going around the truck. Other police officers are seen milling around,

and the emergency lights of several patrol cars are seen flashing.

¶ 10 In the other part of the video footage, police officers are opening the doors of the

truck and are shining flashlights into it. Another police officer is stooping down next to an open

door of the truck and is rummaging through some things on the rear passenger floorboard. Then

the camera swings to the left. An African American man in an orange T-shirt has come onto the

scene, and he is talking with a police officer. The camera comes closer to the man. While talking,

the man gestures in the direction of the truck with both hands and then gestures with a palm facing

upward. A police officer’s hand can be seen gesturing back. During this conversation, two other

police officers approach from the side, and one of the police officers shines his flashlight at the

man. Still talking, the man moves toward the truck. The moment he does so, police officers grab

-3- him and put him in handcuffs. After the man is handcuffed, one of the police officers stoops to the

ground next to him, and the man looks down at where the officer is stooping.

¶ 11 Although the videos in the record are silent films, the parties do not appear to

dispute one another’s accounts of what is said in the videos. According to the briefs, Irving tells

Oberle and other police officers that “ ‘all [he] saw was a black guy.’ ” As police officers search

the truck, defendant approaches and asks them what they are doing. One of the police officers asks

him if the truck is his, and defendant answers that it is. Oberle asks defendant why the truck is

parked illegally. Defendant answers that he knows nothing about that. A police officer asks him

who was driving. Defendant replies that he let someone use his truck to go to the store. Defendant

asks, “ ‘What’s up?’ ” The police officer requests that defendant provide identification. Defendant

answers that he has no identification with him. Oberle informs defendant that a tow truck is coming

for the pickup truck. Defendant says, “ ‘Alright, you got a tow truck coming for it, let me get my—

,’ ” and he moves toward the truck. Oberle grabs defendant’s arm, telling him, “ ‘[Y]ou’re not

going in it.’ ” Defendant says, “ ‘Why you grabbing me? I’m not resisting arrest or nothing.’ ”

Police officers then cuff defendant’s hands behind his back. A police officer accuses defendant of

obstructing justice, and he asks defendant for his name. As defendant identifies himself, a police

officer standing behind him bends down and exclaims, “ ‘Ah!’ ” Defendant looks down at the

ground, where the police officer apparently has found something. What the police officer says next

cannot be made out, but the parties appear to agree it presumably is, “You are under arrest,”

because defendant then asks, “ ‘[F]or what?’ ” The police officer answers, “ ‘[P]ossession.’ ”

Oberle says, “ ‘[Y]ep.’ ” The police officer who found the object on the ground tells other police

officers to “ ‘watch that evidence.’ ” The record does not appear to reveal what this object on the

ground was. A couple of police officers then pat down defendant and search his pockets. According

-4- to the stipulation in the bench trial, the 6.6 grams of cocaine that were the subject of the charge in

this case were found in defendant’s pocket. Shortly before leaving the scene, Irving tells Oberle

that he cannot identify defendant as the driver who fled from the liquor store but that, earlier in the

day, someone saw defendant in the truck.

¶ 12 In the suppression hearing, defense counsel asked Irving, “And the arrest was not

anything dealing with the vehicle driving, is that correct?” Irving answered, “Correct.”

Nevertheless, the circuit court found that the police had probable cause to “detain and search

[defendant,] given the fact that his truck *** had fled from an officer and then [defendant]

appeared.”

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14 The federal and state constitutions forbid unreasonable seizures of persons and their

possessions. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. A warrantless arrest is

unreasonable unless it is supported by probable cause. People v. Marcella, 2013 IL App (2d)

120585, ¶ 26. Evidence obtained through the exploitation of an illegal arrest is inadmissible. Wong

Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). Under section 114-12(a)(1) of the Code of Criminal

Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/114-12(a)(1) (West 2020)), “[a] defendant aggrieved by an

unlawful search and seizure may move the court for the return of property and to suppress as

evidence anything so obtained on the ground that *** [t]he search and seizure without a warrant

was illegal.”

¶ 15 The Illinois Supreme Court has held:

“Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence is subject

to a two-part standard of review: the trial court’s findings of historical fact are

reviewed for clear error and may be rejected only if they are against the manifest

-5- weight of the evidence, but the trial court’s ultimate ruling as to whether

suppression is warranted is reviewed de novo.” People v. Bass, 2021 IL 125434,

¶ 21.

The only findings of historical fact the circuit court made were that “[defendant’s] truck *** had

fled from an officer and then [defendant] appeared.” Because those facts appear to be undisputed,

we have no occasion to decide whether the court’s factual findings are against the manifest weight

of the evidence. Therefore, by default, we proceed to the remaining part of the two-part standard

of review that the supreme court prescribed: we decide de novo whether suppression is warranted.

See id.

¶ 16 If the police arrested defendant illegally, suppression might be warranted, for the

police would not have searched his pockets, and would not have found the cocaine, unless they

had arrested him. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488. The search of his pockets was incident to the

arrest. See People v. Bailey, 159 Ill. 2d 498, 503 (1994) (observing that “[i]t is reasonable,” under

the fourth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. IV), “for police to search the arrestee for weapons that

the arrestee could use to resist arrest or escape, or for evidence that the arrestee could conceal or

destroy” and adding that “[t]he search is restricted to the person of the arrestee and any area into

which the arrestee can reach”). If the warrantless arrest was unsupported by probable cause, the

arrest was invalid, and so was the search incident to the arrest. See People v. Grant, 2013 IL

112734, ¶ 11. On the other hand, if the warrantless arrest was supported by probable cause, “the

arrest is deemed lawful, and evidence obtained during a warrantless search incident to that arrest

is admissible to prove defendant’s guilt.” People v. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226, 237 (1984).

¶ 17 Whether there was probable cause for the arrest depends on the totality of the

circumstances at the time of the arrest. See Grant, 2013 IL 112734, ¶ 11. “Probable cause to arrest

-6- exists when the facts known to the officer at the time of the arrest are sufficient to lead a reasonably

cautious person to believe that the arrestee has committed a crime.” Id. “The probability of criminal

activity, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is the standard for determining whether

probable cause is present. [Citations.] Whether the necessary probability exists is governed not by

technical legal rules, but rather by common-sense considerations that are factual and practical.”

Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d at 236.

¶ 18 According to the United States Supreme Court, it is a “commonsense inference”

that the owner of the vehicle is likely the driver. Kansas v. Glover, _____ U.S. _____, _____, 140

S. Ct. 1183, 1188 (2020); see also Village of Lake in the Hills v. Lloyd, 227 Ill. App. 3d 351, 353

(1992) (concluding that, “[b]ased on such common sense, *** an officer may reasonably presume

that the owner of a vehicle is also the driver”); People v. Barnes, 152 Ill. App. 3d 1004, 1006

(1987) (saying it is a “reasonable inference” that “the owner is driving the vehicle,” for “[w]hile

other people may drive an owner’s vehicle, it is clear that the owner will do the vast amount of

driving”). In Glover, a police officer was on routine patrol when he ran a license-plate check on a

pickup truck. Glover, _____ U.S. at _____, 140 S. Ct. at 1187. The information came back that

the truck was registered to someone whose driver’s license had been revoked, namely, the

defendant. Id. The police officer did not attempt to identify the driver. Id. Instead, solely on the

basis of the information that the registered owner of the truck had a revoked driver’s license, the

police officer pulled the truck over. Id. The question before the Supreme Court was whether this

information was sufficient, under the fourth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. IV), to justify an

investigative traffic stop. Glover, _____ U.S. at _____, 140 S. Ct. at 1186. The Supreme Court

concluded that it was. Id. at _____, 140 S. Ct. at 1188. The Supreme Court held, “The inference

that the driver of a car is its registered owner *** is a reasonable inference made by ordinary people

-7- on a daily basis.” Id. at _____, 140 S. Ct. at 1189. The police officer “drew the commonsense

inference that [the defendant] was likely the driver of the vehicle, which provided more than

reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop.” Id. at _____, 140 S. Ct. at 1188.

¶ 19 To be sure, the reasonable suspicion required for a traffic stop is a less demanding

standard than the probable cause required for an arrest. See id. Glover, Barnes, and Lloyd were all

reasonable-suspicion cases, not probable-cause cases. Even so, according to the United States

Supreme Court in Glover, “the commonsense inference” that the registered owner of the vehicle

was “likely” the person driving the vehicle “provided more than reasonable suspicion.” (Emphasis

added.) Id. Thus, according to the Supreme Court, the facts in Glover exceeded the standard of

reasonable suspicion. Admittedly, the Supreme Court did not specifically hold in Glover that the

more demanding standard of probable cause was met. Likelihood, however, is likelihood, and

common sense is common sense, regardless of whether the question is reasonable suspicion to

initiate an investigatory traffic stop or probable cause to arrest a suspect involved in that stop. To

reiterate, the Illinois Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he probability of criminal activity ***

is the standard for determining whether probable cause is present” and that “[w]hether the

necessary probability exists is governed *** by common-sense considerations.” (Emphases

added.) Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d at 236. The Supreme Court has said it is common sense that the owner

of a vehicle is probably the individual who is driving it. Glover, ____ U.S. at ____, 140 S. Ct. at

1188. That statement would be just as true in the assessment of probable cause to arrest as in the

assessment of reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop—and as Tisler teaches, commonsense

considerations govern probable cause (Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d at 236). Because defendant admitted to

the police that the truck was his, common sense would suggest that he likely was the individual

who had driven the truck.

-8- ¶ 20 Even if we assumed, for the sake of argument, that the owner-driver inference in

Glover would fall short of probable cause, this inference would contribute to probable cause.

Whether the Peoria police had probable cause to arrest defendant depends on the totality of the

circumstances known to the Peoria police when they arrested him. See Grant, 2013 IL 112734,

¶ 11 (holding that “[p]robable cause to arrest exists when the facts known to the officer at the time

of the arrest are sufficient to lead a reasonably cautious person to believe that the arrestee has

committed a crime”). In addition to the commonsense inference that the owner of a vehicle is

usually its driver—an inference that a reasonably cautious person could regard as not dispelled by

defendant’s claim that an unnamed friend drove the truck—the totality of the circumstances

included defendant’s behavior at Harrison Homes. In the videos, defendant does not come across

as being an inhibited individual. A reasonably cautious person could regard it as significant that

when the police informed defendant that his truck was going to be towed, defendant never asked

why. Granted, before telling defendant that his truck would be towed, a police officer remarked to

him that the truck was improperly parked. Surely, however, defendant did not think that multiple

patrol cars had converged on his truck at 2 a.m. in a public-housing parking lot (as opposed to a

busy market thoroughfare) because a tire of his truck was over a parking line. Instead of asking

what would have otherwise been the obvious question of why his truck was being towed, defendant

said, “ ‘Alright, you got a tow truck coming for it, let me get my [things out of the truck].’ ” By

arguable inference, the reason that defendant never asked the police why they were towing his

truck was that he already knew why: because his truck had been used to flee the police. And he

already knew, it could be further inferred, because he was the individual who had led the police

on this chase.

-9- ¶ 21 In sum, then, in our de novo review, we find that the police had probable cause to

arrest defendant for fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer (625 ILCS 5/11-204(a) (West

2020)) and for reckless driving (id. § 11-503(a)(1)). Because “the arrest is deemed lawful, ***

evidence obtained during a warrantless search incident to that arrest is admissible to prove

defendant’s guilt.” Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d at 237.

¶ 22 It is true that, in the suppression hearing, Irving answered, “Correct,” when asked,

“And the arrest was not anything dealing with the vehicle driving, is that correct?” Nevertheless,

“[w]hether an officer has probable cause to arrest is an objective consideration, and the subjective

intent of the officer in initiating the encounter, including whether the officer planned to arrest the

individual, is irrelevant.” People v. White, 2021 IL App (1st) 191095, ¶ 23. If it is irrelevant

whether the police officer planned to arrest the individual, it is equally irrelevant whether the

officer planned to arrest the individual on certain grounds as opposed to other grounds. As we have

discussed, there were objective grounds for believing that defendant likely had committed two

Class A misdemeanors. See 625 ILCS 5/11-204(a), 11-503(b) (West 2020). Because the arrest was

supported by probable cause, the arrest was valid, as was the search incident to the arrest.

Therefore, we find no error in the denial of defendant’s motion for suppression of evidence.

¶ 23 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 24 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 25 Affirmed.

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