People v. Williams

2023 IL App (5th) 210319-U

Opinion

2023 IL App (5th) 210319-U NOTICE NOTICE Decision filed 02/28/23. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-21-0319 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the

Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Alexander County. ) v. ) No. 08-CF-6 ) CURTIS LEE WILLIAMS, ) Honorable ) Tyler R. Edmonds, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Moore and McHaney concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The circuit court did not err in denying leave to file a successive pro se postconviction petition where the defendant did not establish cause. Since any argument to the contrary would lack merit, his appointed appellate counsel is granted leave to withdraw, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

¶2 The defendant, Curtis Lee Williams, appeals from the circuit court’s order denying leave

to file a successive pro se petition for relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act)

(725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)). His appointed attorney, the Office of the State Appellate

Defender (OSAD), has concluded that this appeal lacks merit. On that basis, OSAD has filed with

this court a motion for leave to withdraw as counsel (see Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551

(1987)), along with a legal memorandum in support of the motion. OSAD served the defendant

with a copy of its Finley motion and memorandum. The defendant did not file a response. This

1 court has thoroughly examined OSAD’s Finley motion and memorandum, and the entire record

on appeal, and has concluded that OSAD’s assessment of the instant appeal is correct. Therefore,

we grant OSAD’s Finley motion to withdraw and affirm the order denying the defendant leave to

file a successive pro se postconviction petition.

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 On January 14, 2008, the defendant was charged by information with two counts of armed

robbery and four counts of aggravated battery. The State advised the court and the defendant of its

intent to seek an extended-term sentence.

¶5 On May 8, 2008, the defendant entered an open plea of guilty to one count of armed robbery

and two counts of aggravated battery in exchange for the State’s agreement not to seek an

extended-term sentence and to recommend concurrent prison terms. The other charges would be

dismissed “pursuant to the plea.”

¶6 During the plea hearing, the trial court inquired as to the defendant’s age, education, and

whether he understood English. The court explained the charges to which the defendant was

pleading guilty, and the possible penalties, as well the rights which he waived by entering a guilty

plea. The defendant stated that he understood. Upon questioning by the court, the defendant stated

that he spoke to counsel about the plea, understood the charges and maximum penalty, and no

threats or promises induced his plea. When asked by the trial court, the defendant stated that he

pleaded guilty to armed robbery and two counts of aggravated battery.

¶7 The record contains a document titled “Plea of Guilty,” which states that the defendant

“voluntarily, knowingly and understandably” pleaded guilty to armed robbery and aggravated

battery. The document also states:

2 “by pleading guilty, I am giving up my right to trial, including my right to a jury trial. I am

also giving up my right to confront witnesses and to subpoena witnesses on my behalf. I

understand the nature of the offense and the possible penalties. I understand that if I plead

guilty, the Court may sentence me up to the maximum penalty provided for this offense

without hearing witnesses or having a trial. No threats were made to get me to plead guilty.”

¶8 This document bears the defendant’s signature. The document also contains a certification

signed by plea counsel that counsel “fully explained and answered any questions of my client

concerning the foregoing Plea of Guilty and including its terms and ramifications.” The State

presented a factual basis for the plea, which the court accepted.

¶9 Following a hearing on June 20, 2008, the defendant was sentenced to 30 years in prison

for armed robbery to be served consecutively to the concurrent 5-year terms imposed on each

aggravated battery count.

¶ 10 On July 3, 2008, the court entered an order that the transcript of the sentencing hearing

should be prepared and delivered to the defendant and his attorney.

¶ 11 On April 12, 2010, the defendant filed a pro se motion to file a late notice of appeal in this

court.1 On July 13, 2010, we denied the defendant leave to file a late notice of appeal. See People

v. Williams, No. 5-10-0176 (2010) (dispositional order).

¶ 12 On March 25, 2011, the defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging that the

trial court erred when it failed to hold a preliminary hearing pursuant to Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.

103 (1975), and to admonish him regarding the “plea process,” and that he was denied effective

assistance when plea counsel failed to seek a Gerstein hearing and challenge the admonishments.

1 This document is not included in the record on appeal. 3 ¶ 13 On March 29, 2011, the circuit court summarily dismissed the petition as frivolous and

patently without merit. The defendant filed a notice of appeal in this court, rather than in the circuit

court. On May 4, 2011, we dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See People v. Williams,

No. 5-11-0180 (2011) (dispositional order).

¶ 14 On January 25, 2021, the defendant filed a pro se motion for reduction of sentence. On

April 7, 2021, the circuit court denied the motion as untimely.

¶ 15 On May 24, 2021, the defendant sought leave to file a pro se successive postconviction

petition alleging that his confession was obtained without a “valid waiver” of his rights pursuant

to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); that he was appointed counsel when he “never went

to court”; and that his plea was coerced. Additionally, the defendant alleged he was denied

effective assistance when plea counsel “used” his “faith” against him, telling him that if the

defendant “believe[d] in God then [the defendant] should take the open plea.” Further, plea counsel

did not give the defendant certain transcripts or act upon the defendant’s request for a new attorney.

The petition further alleged that the State failed to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant

and that his convictions were based upon statutes enacted after the offenses were committed. The

petition finally alleged that due to “pandemic quartine [sic]” and lockdown, the defendant had no

access to the prison law library and received only “failing assistance” from “jail house lawyers.”

¶ 16 On September 23, 2021, the circuit court denied the defendant leave to file the pro se

successive postconviction petition, finding, relevant here, that the defendant failed to allege or

identify any objective factor that prevented him from raising the claims in the successive pro se

postconviction petition in his initial postconviction petition.

4 ¶ 17 ANALYSIS

¶ 18 As mentioned, the defendant’s appointed appellate attorney, OSAD, has filed a Finley

motion to withdraw as counsel. OSAD contends that there is no meritorious argument that the

court erred by denying defendant leave to file the successive pro se petition when the petition

failed to meet the requirements of the cause and prejudice test. OSAD notes that the defendant

fails to identify any cause for the failure to raise the issues contained in the successive pro se

petition in his initial postconviction petition. We agree.

¶ 19 The Act “provides a procedural mechanism through which a criminal defendant can assert

that his federal or state constitutional rights were substantially violated in his original trial or

sentencing hearing.” People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 13; see also 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a) (West

2020). The Act contemplates the filing of only one petition without leave of court, and any claim

not presented in an original or amended petition is waived. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶¶ 13, 14; see

also 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2020) (“Any claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not

raised in the original or an amended petition is waived.”).

¶ 20 Leave to file a successive petition is granted when a defendant shows cause for his failure

to bring the claim in his initial postconviction petition and prejudice resulting from that failure.

725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020); People v. Evans, 2013 IL 113471, ¶ 10. To demonstrate cause,

a defendant “must show some objective factor external to the defense that impeded his ability to

raise the claim in his initial postconviction proceeding.” People v. Jackson, 2021 IL 124818, ¶ 30.

To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show that the claimed constitutional error so

infected his trial that the resulting conviction violated due process. Id. A defendant must satisfy

both elements of the cause and prejudice test in order to obtain leave to file a successive

postconviction petition. People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 464 (2002). The test is applied to

5 each individual claim rather than the petition in its entirety. Id. at 462. We review the denial of

leave to file a successive postconviction petition de novo. People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849,

¶ 39.

¶ 21 Here, the defendant claims that (1) he was not informed of his rights pursuant Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); (2) he was appointed counsel when he “never went to court”; (3) his

guilty plea was coerced; and (4) he was denied effective assistance when counsel told him to plead

guilty if he believed in God and did not act on the defendant’s request for new counsel. Although

these events occurred prior to the defendant’s 2008 guilty plea, he does not identify “an objective

factor” that impeded his ability to raise these claims in his initial postconviction petition filed in

2011. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020). Moreover, his claims are conclusory and unsupported

with assertions of fact, citations to the record, or legal argument regarding the facts of the case.

Consequently, the defendant has not established cause as to these claims.

¶ 22 The defendant further alleges that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83

(1963), by failing to disclose evidence favorable to the defense and that he was convicted based

on statutes enacted after his conviction. As with the other claims raised in the successive pro se

petition, the defendant does not explain why these claims, which are based on the 2008 plea

proceedings, were not raised in his initial postconviction petition. Additionally, the defendant does

not identify the evidence the State allegedly failed to disclose or the complained-of statutes. See

People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 425-26 (1999) (holding that “nonfactual and nonspecific assertions

which merely amount to conclusions are not sufficient to require a hearing under the Act”).

¶ 23 Finally, the defendant claims the Covid-19 pandemic prevented access to the prison law

library and he only received “failing” legal assistance from other inmates. Even accepting the

defendant’s identification of the pandemic as “cause,” we note that he entered his plea in 2008 and

6 filed his initial postconviction petition in 2011, long before the pandemic began in 2020. Moreover,

the defendant does not explain how his reliance on other inmates prevented him from raising the

claims contained in the successive petition in his initial postconviction proceeding.

¶ 24 Here, the defendant alleged no factors external to the defense that prohibited him from

raising the claims contained in the successive pro se postconviction petition in his initial

postconviction petition. Moreover, the claims contained in the successive petition are conclusory

and unsupported by facts. As the defendant failed to establish cause, he cannot meet the

requirements of the cause and prejudice test (Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 464), and the circuit court

properly denied him leave to file the successive pro se postconviction petition.

¶ 25 CONCLUSION

¶ 26 Accordingly, we agree with OSAD that this appeal presents no issue of arguable merit. We

therefore grant OSAD leave to withdraw and affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 27 Motion granted; judgment affirmed.