People v. Williams CA4/2

Opinion

Filed 7/10/25 P. v. Williams CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E084440

v. (Super.Ct.No. FVA1001628)

MATTHEW BOEMAN WILLIAMS, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ingrid Adamson

Uhler, Judge. Affirmed.

Jennifer A. Gambale, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Matthew Boeman Williams appeals from the denial of his petition to vacate his

manslaughter conviction under section 1172.6 of the Penal Code. (Unlabeled statutory

citations refer to this code.) We affirm.

1 BACKGROUND

At a preliminary hearing held in 2011, the People called Detective Shawn Hare as

their only witness. Hare testified that Chelsea Buckley was fatally shot outside of a

graduation party in July 2010. Hare testified that when he interviewed Williams,

Williams said that he “fired a weapon, but that that was in response to firing coming at

him.” Williams told Hare that “he thought one of his bullets may have killed the girl.”

Hare also testified that Williams’s claim that he was fired upon first was inconsistent with

what other witnesses told Hare, and it was inconsistent with the evidence at the scene.

Hare testified that there were two other locations from which shots were fired. He

found .32-caliber casings north of where Williams fired and .40-caliber casings “just

north of the driveway.” He also found .45-caliber casings where Williams and two

witnesses “placed themselves.”

Hare believed that the .32-caliber bullets were fired at Williams and his

companions when they fled after Williams fired. Hare also testified that there were no

fired .40-caliber bullets recovered from the house, and the .40-caliber casings were found

in a location consistent with being fired at Williams and his companions as they fled.

“By information filed in 2011, the People alleged that Williams ‘did unlawfully,

and with malice aforethought murder [the victim].’ (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1.) The

information further alleged three counts of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated

murder. (§§ 187, 664, counts 2-4.) As to counts 1 and 4, the People alleged that

Williams personally used a firearm, that he personally and intentionally discharged a

2 firearm, and that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death or

great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (d)). As to counts 2 and 3, it was

alleged that he personally used and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm

(§ 12022.53, subds. (b) & (c)).

“Williams pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and admitted the personal use of

a firearm in the commission of that offense (§§ 12022.5, 192, subd. (a), count 5). He also

pled guilty to assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2), count 6). Williams was

sentenced to the agreed term of 21 years in state prison, including the upper term of 11

years for count 5 and the upper term of 10 years for the firearm use enhancement. A

concurrent three-year term was imposed for count 6. Pursuant to the parties’ agreement,

the remaining counts and allegations were dismissed.” (People v. Williams (Mar. 11,

2024, E079536) [nonpub. opn.].)

“In 2022, after enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate

Bill 1437), Williams filed a petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95. He

attested that (1) a charging document was filed against him that allowed the prosecution

to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable

consequences doctrine, (2) he accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which he could

have been convicted under one of those theories, and (3) he could not now be convicted

of murder because of the changes made to sections 188 and 189 by Senate Bill 1437.

Neither party filed a written brief regarding the petition.

3 “At the prima facie hearing, the trial court denied the petition without issuing an

order to show cause.” (People v. Williams, supra, E079536.)

Williams appealed, and we reversed the trial court’s order denying Williams’s

section 1172.6 petition and remanded to the trial court with directions to issue an order to

show cause under subdivision (c) of section 1172.6. (People v. Williams, supra,

E079536.)

On remand in August 2024, the court noted that it had considered Williams’s

original petition, the People’s response to the petition, the original plea agreement, and

“portions of the preliminary hearing transcript that were non-hearsay.” The court took

judicial notice of the court file, superior court case No. FVA1001628, which included the

felony complaint, the felony information, the plea form, the plea transcript, “and the

preliminary hearing transcript, which was stipulated to as a factual basis for the plea as

well as the police reports.”

The court asked defense counsel whether he wished to be heard, and defense

counsel responded, “No. Thank you.”

In announcing its ruling, the trial court stated: “After reviewing these documents,

I’m going to deny the defendant’s petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code

Section 1172.6 because the Court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the entire

theory of the prosecution, and the supporting evidence to support it, is that the defendant

was the actual shooter or killer and is therefore not entitled to relief.

4 “I base my opinion upon the fact that the felony complaint and Information only

charged this defendant with murder, attempted willful and deliberate murder of additional

victims, and the 12022.53 enhancement, although not admitted at the time of the plea due

to a plea bargain, indicated that the defendant personally and intentionally discharged a

firearm, causing the victim’s death.

“It was clear that the prosecution was proceeding upon a single basis of liability,

that the defendant was the actual killer, and not under any theory of felony murder,

natural and probable consequence, or aiding and abetting. Therefore, the defendant

obviously could be presently convicted of murder under the new enactments of SB 1437

and SB 755.

“Had this case gone to trial in 2024, the only instructions that would have been

given by the Court, based upon the non-hearsay evidence reviewed by the Court in the

preliminary hearing transcript, would have been first, second-degree murder, or voluntary

manslaughter based upon the evidence that the defendant was the actual shooter or killer.

“Detective Hare testified that the defendant admitted to firing a weapon but that it

was in response to the firing of bullets coming at him, which was contradicted by the

physical evidence found at the scene, and he thought that one of his bullets may have

killed the girl. Based upon where the defendant was standing and shooting, and where

the victim had been standing, along with the other victims, it was obvious that the

defendant did indeed shoot the victim. The location of the .45 caliber shell casing

supported this opinion as well.

5 “From further investigation, Detective Hare testified that the other .40 caliber and

casing in the house was a result of the NAW individuals running into the house and an

exchange of shots fired from the door of the home, and other .32 caliber rounds were

fired by the NAW gang members as the defendant and others were fleeing, and therefore,

could not be responsible for the shooting of the victim.

“In evaluating the case from the state of mind of Defense Counsel, the defense

was self-defense, not that the defendant was not the actual shooter or killer. The

voluntary manslaughter plea, obviously, was based factually on the theory of imperfect

self-defense.

“The petitioner, represented by Counsel, had the opportunity to file a reply to the

People’s response to the petition for resentencing, present argument at this hearing,

asserted no objection to the D.A.’s evidence, and offered no evidence or argument that

might have raised a factual issue as to the petitioner’s involvement to the victim’s death.

“So, again, based upon all this evidence before this Court, the prosecution did

establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner’s guilty of murder as the actual

killer. So the petition for resentencing is denied.”

DISCUSSION

We appointed counsel to represent Williams on appeal, and counsel filed a brief

raising no issues and asking that we independently review the record under People v.

Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). The appeal is from a postjudgment order, and the

Wende procedures therefore do not apply. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216,

6 226 (Delgadillo).) We gave Williams the opportunity to file a personal supplemental

brief, which he did. (Id. at pp. 231-232.)

Williams argues that (1) he was “deprived of his sixth amendment right to

effective assistance of counsel” at the evidentiary hearing on his section 1172.6 petition;

(2) he was deprived of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights “when the trial court

denied relief on the ground that he was the actual killer”; and (3) his Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights to due process and equal protection were violated because the court

failed to interpret “principal” in accordance with sections 31 and 971. The arguments are

meritless.

I. Ineffective assistance of counsel

Williams argues that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel

was violated because his counsel did not file a response to the People’s brief opposing his

section 1172.6 petition, object to the People’s evidence at the evidentiary hearing, or

“offer any evidence or argument that may have raised a factual issue as to his

involvement in the victim’s death.” The argument fails because “‘there is no

constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel’ in state postconviction

proceedings.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 226.)

II. Sufficiency of the evidence

Williams argues that he was deprived of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights when the court denied his petition on the basis that he was the actual killer.

Williams contends that the court’s reasoning “that the other .40 caliber and casing in the

7 house was a result of the NAW individuals running into the house and an exchange of

shots fired from the door of the home, and other .32 caliber rounds were fired by the

NAW gang members as the defendant and others were fleeing,” actually supports the

conclusion that other individuals “‘[c]ould be responsible for the shooting of the victim’”

and “the record lacks sufficient evidence to support the court’s findings.”

“‘The scope of our review for substantial evidence is well settled. The test is not

whether the People met their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that [a

defendant in a section 1172.6 proceeding] was ineligible for resentencing, but rather

“whether any rational trier of fact could have” made the same determination, namely that

“[t]he record . . . disclose[s] . . . evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value

—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find [as did the superior court].”’” (People v.

Cody (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 87, 111.) We do not reweigh the evidence. (People v. Scott

(1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 355.)

Williams’s argument fails because he is asking us to reweigh the evidence, which

we cannot do. Insofar as the argument is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, it

lacks merit. The record contains evidence from which the trial court could and did

reasonably infer that Williams was the actual killer. That evidence includes Williams’s

own statements, the physical evidence concerning the locations of the shell casings, and

the rest of Hare’s testimony. The trial court’s inference might not be the only possible

inference, but that is not the standard. Because the evidence supports a reasonable

8 inference that Williams was the actual killer, the trial court’s finding to that effect was

supported by substantial evidence.

III. The meaning of “principal”

Williams also argues that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due

process and equal protection were violated because the court failed to interpret

“principal” in accordance with sections 31 (defining “principal”) and 971 (abrogating the

distinction between “principals” and “accessories before the fact,” as well as the

distinction between principals in the first and second degrees). He again contends that

someone else was responsible for the killing and that malice was therefore “imputed,” so

he was convicted under a now-invalid theory.

Williams’s argument fails because the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that

Williams was the actual killer. The court therefore did not find him guilty on the basis of

a theory of imputed malice, and sections 31 and 971 are irrelevant. Regardless of the

definition of “principal” and the abrogation of the distinction between principals and

accessories before the fact (or the distinction between principals in the first and second

degrees), the finding that Williams was the actual killer, which is supported by

substantial evidence, makes him ineligible for relief under section 1172.6.

9 DISPOSITION

The order denying Williams’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MENETREZ J.

We concur:

MILLER Acting P. J.

RAPHAEL J.