Filed 11/9/22 P. v. Williams CA4/2 Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E072975
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF088153)
CURTIS JOHN WILLIAMS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Kenneth H. Nordin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Julie L. Garland and Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorneys
General, Eric A. Swenson, Felicity Senoski and Alan L. Amann, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1 INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant Curtis John Williams filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to Penal Code former section 1170.95,1 which the trial court denied. Defendant
appealed, arguing that his petition was improperly denied since he made a prima facie
showing that the provisions of former section 1170.95 applied to him. By opinion filed
October 8, 2020, we affirmed.
On September 28, 2022, the California Supreme Court transferred the matter back to
us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th 698 and People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis). On October 3, 2022, we
ordered our decision vacated and set a briefing schedule.
Defendant now contends the trial court almost certainly based its denial of his
petition on the felony-murder special-circumstance findings. He argues that pursuant to
Strong, the court erred in determining the jury’s true findings on the special circumstance
allegations rendered prior to the decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks)
and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), made him ineligible for relief.
Defendant maintains he made the requisite prima facie showing, and the matter should be
remanded for an order to show cause (OSC) hearing. The People concede that the matter
1 Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 as section 1172.6, without substantive change. (See People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708, fn. 2 (Strong).) This opinion will use the statutory designation in effect at the time defendant filed his petition where appropriate and the new statutory designation for events occurring after the change in the law. All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 should be remanded for further proceedings. We reverse and remand the matter for a new
prima facie hearing.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A jury convicted defendant of second degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1), first
degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count 2), and rape by force in concert with another (§§ 261,
subd. (a)(2), 264.1, count 3). The jury also returned true findings on the special
circumstance allegations that the murder in count 2 was committed while defendant was
engaged in the commission of a kidnapping and a rape. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(B) & (C).)
(People v. Williams (Sept. 8, 2003, E031301) [nonpub. opn.].) The trial court sentenced
defendant to life without the possibility of parole on count 2, an indeterminate term of 15
years to life on count 1 to be served consecutively, and two years for the firearm
enhancements on counts 1 and 2 to be served consecutively. The court stayed the sentence
on count 3, pursuant to section 654.
In 2003, defendant appealed, and this court affirmed his convictions. (People v.
Williams, supra, E031301.)
On January 4, 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to former
section 1170.95.
The trial court held a hearing on April 19, 2019. Defendant was represented by
counsel and said he was unsure whether the People had filed a reply to the petition. The
People stated that no reply had been filed and added: “[T]his was also a special
circumstance case, . . . It required the jury to find that the defendant aided and abetted with
3 intent to kill or was a major participant with reckless indifference. The appellate opinion is
also—its attached to our response. And found sufficient evidence of a major participant and
reckless indifference.” The court then summarily denied the petition.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the court erred in denying his petition, and the matter should
be remanded for an OSC hearing. The People concede the matter should be remanded for
further proceedings. We reverse the court’s denial and remand the matter for a new prima
facie hearing.
“Senate Bill [No.] 1437 [(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)] significantly limited the scope of
the felony-murder rule to effectuate the Legislature’s declared intent ‘to ensure that murder
liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.’ ” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 707-708.) “Defendants who
were neither actual killers nor acted with the intent to kill can be held liable for murder only
if they were ‘major participant[s] in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of [Penal Code] Section 190.2’—
that is, the statute defining the felony-murder special circumstance.” (Id. at p. 708.)
“Senate Bill 1437 also created a special procedural mechanism for those convicted under the
former law to seek retroactive relief under the law as amended. [Citations.] Under newly
enacted section 1172.6, the process begins with the filing of a petition containing a
declaration that all requirements for eligibility are met [citations], including that ‘[t]he
4 petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes to . . . Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019,’ the effective date of
Senate Bill 1437 [citation].” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
“When the trial court receives a petition containing the necessary declaration and
other required information, the court must evaluate the petition ‘to determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’ [Citations.] If the petition and record in
the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may
dismiss the petition.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.)
“While the trial court may look at the record of conviction after the appointment of
counsel to determine whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for . . . relief, the
prima facie inquiry . . . is limited. Like the analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus
proceedings, ‘ “the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a
preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or
her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show cause.” ’
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Filed 11/9/22 P. v. Williams CA4/2 Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E072975
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF088153)
CURTIS JOHN WILLIAMS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Kenneth H. Nordin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Julie L. Garland and Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorneys
General, Eric A. Swenson, Felicity Senoski and Alan L. Amann, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1 INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant Curtis John Williams filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to Penal Code former section 1170.95,1 which the trial court denied. Defendant
appealed, arguing that his petition was improperly denied since he made a prima facie
showing that the provisions of former section 1170.95 applied to him. By opinion filed
October 8, 2020, we affirmed.
On September 28, 2022, the California Supreme Court transferred the matter back to
us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th 698 and People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis). On October 3, 2022, we
ordered our decision vacated and set a briefing schedule.
Defendant now contends the trial court almost certainly based its denial of his
petition on the felony-murder special-circumstance findings. He argues that pursuant to
Strong, the court erred in determining the jury’s true findings on the special circumstance
allegations rendered prior to the decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks)
and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), made him ineligible for relief.
Defendant maintains he made the requisite prima facie showing, and the matter should be
remanded for an order to show cause (OSC) hearing. The People concede that the matter
1 Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 as section 1172.6, without substantive change. (See People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708, fn. 2 (Strong).) This opinion will use the statutory designation in effect at the time defendant filed his petition where appropriate and the new statutory designation for events occurring after the change in the law. All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 should be remanded for further proceedings. We reverse and remand the matter for a new
prima facie hearing.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A jury convicted defendant of second degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1), first
degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count 2), and rape by force in concert with another (§§ 261,
subd. (a)(2), 264.1, count 3). The jury also returned true findings on the special
circumstance allegations that the murder in count 2 was committed while defendant was
engaged in the commission of a kidnapping and a rape. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(B) & (C).)
(People v. Williams (Sept. 8, 2003, E031301) [nonpub. opn.].) The trial court sentenced
defendant to life without the possibility of parole on count 2, an indeterminate term of 15
years to life on count 1 to be served consecutively, and two years for the firearm
enhancements on counts 1 and 2 to be served consecutively. The court stayed the sentence
on count 3, pursuant to section 654.
In 2003, defendant appealed, and this court affirmed his convictions. (People v.
Williams, supra, E031301.)
On January 4, 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to former
section 1170.95.
The trial court held a hearing on April 19, 2019. Defendant was represented by
counsel and said he was unsure whether the People had filed a reply to the petition. The
People stated that no reply had been filed and added: “[T]his was also a special
circumstance case, . . . It required the jury to find that the defendant aided and abetted with
3 intent to kill or was a major participant with reckless indifference. The appellate opinion is
also—its attached to our response. And found sufficient evidence of a major participant and
reckless indifference.” The court then summarily denied the petition.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the court erred in denying his petition, and the matter should
be remanded for an OSC hearing. The People concede the matter should be remanded for
further proceedings. We reverse the court’s denial and remand the matter for a new prima
facie hearing.
“Senate Bill [No.] 1437 [(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)] significantly limited the scope of
the felony-murder rule to effectuate the Legislature’s declared intent ‘to ensure that murder
liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.’ ” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 707-708.) “Defendants who
were neither actual killers nor acted with the intent to kill can be held liable for murder only
if they were ‘major participant[s] in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of [Penal Code] Section 190.2’—
that is, the statute defining the felony-murder special circumstance.” (Id. at p. 708.)
“Senate Bill 1437 also created a special procedural mechanism for those convicted under the
former law to seek retroactive relief under the law as amended. [Citations.] Under newly
enacted section 1172.6, the process begins with the filing of a petition containing a
declaration that all requirements for eligibility are met [citations], including that ‘[t]he
4 petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes to . . . Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019,’ the effective date of
Senate Bill 1437 [citation].” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
“When the trial court receives a petition containing the necessary declaration and
other required information, the court must evaluate the petition ‘to determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’ [Citations.] If the petition and record in
the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may
dismiss the petition.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.)
“While the trial court may look at the record of conviction after the appointment of
counsel to determine whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for . . . relief, the
prima facie inquiry . . . is limited. Like the analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus
proceedings, ‘ “the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a
preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or
her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show cause.” ’
[Citation.] ‘[A] court should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility
grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 971.) “In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a
trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion.’ ” (Id. at p. 972.) “[T]he ‘prima facie bar was intentionally and
correctly set very low.’ ” (Ibid.)
5 Where a defendant’s “case was tried before both Banks and Clark . . . special
circumstance findings do not preclude him from making out a prima facie case for
resentencing under section 1172.6.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 721.) A court “err[s] in
concluding otherwise.” (Ibid.)
If a defendant has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, “ ‘the court
shall issue an order to show cause.’ ” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) “[T]he court
must [then] hold an evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution bears the burden of
proving, ‘beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted
murder’ under state law as amended by Senate Bill 1437. [Citation.] ‘A finding that there
is substantial evidence to support a conviction for murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter is insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is
ineligible for resentencing.’ [Citation.] ‘If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of
proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to the
conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining
charges.’ ” (Id. at p. 709.)
“[E]ffective January 1, 2022, the Legislature limited use of prior appellate opinions,
allowing trial judges to [only] ‘consider the procedural history of the case recited.’
[Citation.] . . . [I]ts specificity indicates the Legislature has decided trial judges should not
rely on the factual summaries contained in prior appellate decisions when a section 1170.95
petition reaches the stage of a full-fledged evidentiary hearing.” (People v. Clements (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 276, 292.)
6 Here, the jury rendered the special murder circumstance findings before both Banks
and Clark were decided. With respect to those findings, “no judge or jury has ever found
the currently required degree of culpability . . . .” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 718,
italics added.) Thus, as we originally determined, the special murder circumstance findings
did not, alone, render defendant ineligible for relief. Therefore, the court below erred in
denying defendant’s petition on that basis.
However, we also determined, in reliance on this court’s prior opinion, that any error
was harmless since the record of conviction disclosed sufficient evidence to support a
finding that defendant was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to
human life under Banks and Clark. “Neither the jury’s pre-Banks and Clark findings nor a
court’s later sufficiency of the evidence review amounts to the determination section 1172.6
requires, and neither set of findings supplies a basis to reject an otherwise adequate prima
facie showing and deny issuance of an order to show cause.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 720.)
Since the felony-murder special-circumstance findings here were made before Banks
and Clark, those findings alone do not render defendant ineligible for resentencing.
Moreover, this court’s previous review for sufficiency of the evidence was also inadequate
to support denial of resentencing at the prima facie stage. Therefore, as the People concede,
we must reverse the court’s order summarily denying defendant’s petition and remand the
matter for a new prima facie hearing.
7 DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant's petition is reversed. The matter is remanded with
directions to hold a new prima facie hearing. We express no opinion on whether defendant
is entitled to relief following the hearing.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
RAPHAEL J.