JUSTICE CARTER
delivered the opinion of the court:
A jury found the defendant, Christ E. Walker, guilty of: (1) first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(a)(1) (West 2004)); (2) attempted murder (720 ILCS 5/8 — 4(a), 9 — 1(a)(1) (West 2004)); (3) aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24 — 1.2(a)(2) (West 2004)); and (4) aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24 — 1.6(a)(1) (West 2004)). The trial court sentenced the defendant to consecutive prison terms of 49 years for murder and 20 years for attempted murder. Additionally, the court imposed prison terms of 10 years for the discharge offense and 5 years for the unlawful use offense, to be served concurrently with the attempted murder sentence.
On appeal, the defendant initially argued that he was entitled to a new trial because of: (1) improper statements by the prosecutor during closing arguments; and (2) jury prejudice. However, on June 27, 2008, the defendant asked this court’s permission to withdraw his first issue. We hereby grant the defendant’s request to withdraw that question. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
As a preliminary matter, we note that a portion of the written sentencing order, issued by the trial court on April 4, 2006, does not comport with the court’s oral pronouncement at the sentencing hearing that same day. The written order incorrectly indicates that the sentences for both the discharge offense and the unlawful use offense are to be served consecutively to the murder sentence. The court orally stated that the sentences for these two offenses were to be served concurrently with the sentence for attempted murder.
When the oral pronouncement of a trial court conflicts with its written order, the oral pronouncement controls. People v. Jones, 376 Ill. App. 3d 372, 876 N.E.2d 15 (2007). In this case, we have indicated what the trial court orally stated the sentence to be, which prevails over the written sentencing order.
The State charged the defendant with having committed first degree murder on March 27, 2005, by shooting Dwayne Cooks in the head, causing his death. He was charged with the attempted murder of Eddie Perez, who was a responding police officer, by shooting at Perez. The State alleged that the defendant committed aggravated discharge of a firearm by knowingly discharging a firearm in the direction of another person or persons. He also was charged with aggravated unlawful use of a weapon by carrying a loaded, uncased, immediately available firearm in a vehicle. At trial, the State presented testimony and physical evidence concerning these allegations.
After a recess during the State’s case in chief, the court met with the parties and juror Jennifer Smith in chambers. The court said, “Now, Miss Smith, the reason I have convened everybody here is that the bailiff indicated to me *** that you wanted to talk to me. What is it you would like to communicate?” Smith said the following:
“I just had a concern on my safety and the safety of the other jurors when we exited the building because we have people that are sitting in the courtroom on the defense side.
When I was leaving yesterday!,] I was behind four individuals that were in the courtroom. When I was walking behind them!,] I heard one of them say something like shooting up the courtroom, and then another individual said I object. So hearing that — and I can’t tell you who said what because their mouths weren’t even directed at me because I was behind them. When I heard them say that they — and they were walking down the back steps, I took off in to the grass not running but just walking quickly to my car.
When I got into my car, which it was parked right behind the building to the left, you have to go this way in the parking lot, then turn around and come back up this way. By the time I got to this part to leave the parking lot[,] the four individuals were right there, and I felt that they purposely walked slow and I had to stop the car before I could go past them, each one of them made eye contact with me. I don’t — I felt intimidated. I don’t — I want to be fair. I don’t know if that was their intention but that’s how I felt.
So[,] I had mentioned that to the other jurors if they felt intimidated when they leave.”
Smith stated that some other jurors, “mostly the women,” said that they also felt intimidated when leaving the courthouse. In discussions among the jurors, they agreed to communicate the situation to the bailiff and to ask if they could obtain escorts to their cars.
The court reassured Smith that it would take measures to eliminate the possibility of such contact between jurors and the public in the future. The court then asked Smith whether her experience would affect her “ability to be a fair and impartial juror in this case.” Smith said, “I *** believe I can be fair and impartial, absolutely.” When the court asked Smith if she would “hold [her experience] against one side or the other,” Smith replied, “Not at all.”
After further discussions with Smith, the court released her to the jury room. The court and the parties then agreed that all of the jurors should be questioned because Smith had related her experience to them.
The court and the parties then questioned the other 11 jurors concerning Smith’s discussions with them. Four of these jurors noted that Smith identified the men who made the remarks as having sat on the same side of the courtroom as the defendant. When one of these four jurors was asked if the incident would influence her ability to carry out her duties as a juror, she said, “I don’t think so.” When asked if she could be objective, fair, and impartial, this juror answered, “I believe so.”
Another of these four jurors stated that because the men were sitting on the defendant’s side of the courtroom, she assumed they were supporters of the defendant. When this juror was asked whether the experience would influence her ability to decide the case based solely on the evidence, she replied, “I would say no.” When she was asked if she could focus on the evidence rather than the spectators’ gallery, she said, “I would hope that I can.”
One juror stated that all he knew was that Smith had said that “[s]omebody was walking behind her and made some comments.” This juror indicated that he was not paying attention when Smith described the comments. Neither the court nor the parties asked this juror whether Smith’s discussions would affect his ability to decide the case fairly and impartially. The remaining jurors, who were asked that question, stated that Smith’s experience would not affect their abilities to decide the case fairly and impartially.
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JUSTICE CARTER
delivered the opinion of the court:
A jury found the defendant, Christ E. Walker, guilty of: (1) first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(a)(1) (West 2004)); (2) attempted murder (720 ILCS 5/8 — 4(a), 9 — 1(a)(1) (West 2004)); (3) aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24 — 1.2(a)(2) (West 2004)); and (4) aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24 — 1.6(a)(1) (West 2004)). The trial court sentenced the defendant to consecutive prison terms of 49 years for murder and 20 years for attempted murder. Additionally, the court imposed prison terms of 10 years for the discharge offense and 5 years for the unlawful use offense, to be served concurrently with the attempted murder sentence.
On appeal, the defendant initially argued that he was entitled to a new trial because of: (1) improper statements by the prosecutor during closing arguments; and (2) jury prejudice. However, on June 27, 2008, the defendant asked this court’s permission to withdraw his first issue. We hereby grant the defendant’s request to withdraw that question. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
As a preliminary matter, we note that a portion of the written sentencing order, issued by the trial court on April 4, 2006, does not comport with the court’s oral pronouncement at the sentencing hearing that same day. The written order incorrectly indicates that the sentences for both the discharge offense and the unlawful use offense are to be served consecutively to the murder sentence. The court orally stated that the sentences for these two offenses were to be served concurrently with the sentence for attempted murder.
When the oral pronouncement of a trial court conflicts with its written order, the oral pronouncement controls. People v. Jones, 376 Ill. App. 3d 372, 876 N.E.2d 15 (2007). In this case, we have indicated what the trial court orally stated the sentence to be, which prevails over the written sentencing order.
The State charged the defendant with having committed first degree murder on March 27, 2005, by shooting Dwayne Cooks in the head, causing his death. He was charged with the attempted murder of Eddie Perez, who was a responding police officer, by shooting at Perez. The State alleged that the defendant committed aggravated discharge of a firearm by knowingly discharging a firearm in the direction of another person or persons. He also was charged with aggravated unlawful use of a weapon by carrying a loaded, uncased, immediately available firearm in a vehicle. At trial, the State presented testimony and physical evidence concerning these allegations.
After a recess during the State’s case in chief, the court met with the parties and juror Jennifer Smith in chambers. The court said, “Now, Miss Smith, the reason I have convened everybody here is that the bailiff indicated to me *** that you wanted to talk to me. What is it you would like to communicate?” Smith said the following:
“I just had a concern on my safety and the safety of the other jurors when we exited the building because we have people that are sitting in the courtroom on the defense side.
When I was leaving yesterday!,] I was behind four individuals that were in the courtroom. When I was walking behind them!,] I heard one of them say something like shooting up the courtroom, and then another individual said I object. So hearing that — and I can’t tell you who said what because their mouths weren’t even directed at me because I was behind them. When I heard them say that they — and they were walking down the back steps, I took off in to the grass not running but just walking quickly to my car.
When I got into my car, which it was parked right behind the building to the left, you have to go this way in the parking lot, then turn around and come back up this way. By the time I got to this part to leave the parking lot[,] the four individuals were right there, and I felt that they purposely walked slow and I had to stop the car before I could go past them, each one of them made eye contact with me. I don’t — I felt intimidated. I don’t — I want to be fair. I don’t know if that was their intention but that’s how I felt.
So[,] I had mentioned that to the other jurors if they felt intimidated when they leave.”
Smith stated that some other jurors, “mostly the women,” said that they also felt intimidated when leaving the courthouse. In discussions among the jurors, they agreed to communicate the situation to the bailiff and to ask if they could obtain escorts to their cars.
The court reassured Smith that it would take measures to eliminate the possibility of such contact between jurors and the public in the future. The court then asked Smith whether her experience would affect her “ability to be a fair and impartial juror in this case.” Smith said, “I *** believe I can be fair and impartial, absolutely.” When the court asked Smith if she would “hold [her experience] against one side or the other,” Smith replied, “Not at all.”
After further discussions with Smith, the court released her to the jury room. The court and the parties then agreed that all of the jurors should be questioned because Smith had related her experience to them.
The court and the parties then questioned the other 11 jurors concerning Smith’s discussions with them. Four of these jurors noted that Smith identified the men who made the remarks as having sat on the same side of the courtroom as the defendant. When one of these four jurors was asked if the incident would influence her ability to carry out her duties as a juror, she said, “I don’t think so.” When asked if she could be objective, fair, and impartial, this juror answered, “I believe so.”
Another of these four jurors stated that because the men were sitting on the defendant’s side of the courtroom, she assumed they were supporters of the defendant. When this juror was asked whether the experience would influence her ability to decide the case based solely on the evidence, she replied, “I would say no.” When she was asked if she could focus on the evidence rather than the spectators’ gallery, she said, “I would hope that I can.”
One juror stated that all he knew was that Smith had said that “[s]omebody was walking behind her and made some comments.” This juror indicated that he was not paying attention when Smith described the comments. Neither the court nor the parties asked this juror whether Smith’s discussions would affect his ability to decide the case fairly and impartially. The remaining jurors, who were asked that question, stated that Smith’s experience would not affect their abilities to decide the case fairly and impartially.
After the court and the parties concluded their questioning of the jurors, the defendant’s counsel moved for a mistrial. The attorney reasoned that because several of the jurors associated the men, who spoke of committing acts of violence in the courthouse, with the defendant, and because the case concerned allegations that the defendant had committed acts of violence, the jurors would tend to believe that the defendant had committed the violent crimes charged by the State. The court denied the motion for mistrial.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of the offenses. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial in which he again argued that the jury was prejudiced as a result of Smith’s discussions concerning the statements made by men who had been sitting on the defendant’s side of the courtroom. The court denied the motion for a new trial, and imposed sentence. The defendant appealed.
ANALYSIS
The defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial. Specifically, he submits that he is entitled to a new trial because the jury was prejudiced as a result of the experiences Smith described to the other jurors.
A criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to a fair trial by an impartial jury, as a matter of due process. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 13 L. Ed. 2d 424, 85 S. Ct. 546 (1965). We believe that the United States Supreme Court has elucidated this due process right well by saying:
“[D]ue process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation. *** [I]t is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote. Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 71 L. Ed. 2d 78, 86, 102 S. Ct. 940, 946 (1982).
To warrant reversal of a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial, it must reasonably appear that some of the jurors have been influenced or prejudiced such that they could not be fair and impartial. People v. Malmenato, 14 Ill. 2d 52, 150 N.E.2d 806 (1958); People v. Staten, 143 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 493 N.E.2d 1157 (1986). In making such a determination, a reviewing court should consider all of the facts and circumstances concerning the jury’s exposure to the alleged prejudicial event. People v. Hryciuk, 5 Ill. 2d 176, 125 N.E.2d 61 (1954); Staten, 143 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 493 N.E.2d 1157. The jurors’ oral assurances that they could disregard the event and decide the case solely on the evidence are to be given important but not conclusive consideration. Staten, 143 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 493 N.E.2d 1157. We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion. People v. Bishop, 218 Ill. 2d 232, 843 N.E.2d 365 (2006).
In Staten, the court ruled that the defendant was not entitled to a new trial where jurors heard a youth say that he would kill all of the jurors if he had a gun. Staten, 143 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 493 N.E.2d 1157. The court in People v. Hunley, 189 Ill. App. 3d 24, 545 N.E.2d 188 (1989), held that the defendant was not prejudiced by the burglary of deliberating jurors. In People v. Robinson, 68 Ill. App. 3d 747, 386 N.E.2d 559 (1979), the court ruled that the defendant was not entitled to a new trial when a juror was robbed during the trial. The court in People v. Novak, 94 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 419 N.E.2d 393 (1981), held that the defendant was not prejudiced when a juror’s purse was stolen while she was sequestered. In each of these cases, the trial court questioned all of the jurors about the incident, and none of the jurors stated that their abilities to decide the case fairly and impartially had been influenced.
In this case, we find that the facts and circumstances concerning the jury’s exposure to Smith’s experience did not prejudice the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury. Those jurors, who were asked, stated that they could decide the matter fairly and impartially. The only juror who was not asked indicated that he was not paying attention to Smith’s comments. Moreover, the incident that Smith described was substantially similar to the incidents described in Staten, Hunley, Robinson, and Novak. Therefore, taking into consideration all of the facts and circumstances concerning the jury’s exposure to the alleged prejudicial event, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.
Additionally, we find that statements from two jurors, such as “I don’t think so,” “I believe so,” “I would say no,” and “I would hope that I can,” did not represent uncertainty or equivocation by these jurors. To the contrary, we believe that these statements were merely the jurors’ colloquial manner of answering the court’s questions.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Kankakee County circuit court.
Affirmed.
O’BRIEN, J., concurs.