People v. Verdone

2026 IL App (1st) 252404-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 30, 2026
• Docket: 1-25-2404
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 252404-U FIRST DISTRICT, SIXTH DIVISION January 30, 2026

No. 1-25-2404B

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). _____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT _____________________________________________________________________________

) Appeal from the THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County, Illinois. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) v. ) No. 22 CR 1135401 ) JOSEPH VERDONE, ) Honorable ) Charles P. Burns, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. _____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE GAMRATH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Pucinski and Hyman concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Affirmed. Court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for relief.

¶2 In 2022, a verbal altercation outside a nightclub between two strangers, defendant Joseph

Verdone and the victim Enrique Martinez, led to Verdone pursuing and striking Martinez with his

vehicle and dragging him down the road until he was killed. Verdone was subsequently charged

with first degree murder and denied bail.

¶3 After enactment of the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act), Verdone sought pretrial release under

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). On September 22, 2025, the circuit court No. 1-25-2404B

denied Verdone’s motion for relief, ordering that he continue to be detained pretrial under article

110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110 (West 2022)), as amended by the

Act. See Pub. Acts 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023); 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023); Ill. S.

Ct. R. 604(h)(1) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting

effective date as September 18, 2023). Verdone now appeals, arguing the State failed to present

clear and convincing evidence that he committed first degree murder, that he posed a real and

present threat to the safety of the community, and that no less restrictive conditions could mitigate

that threat. For the following reasons, we affirm the order denying Verdone’s motion for relief.

¶4 BACKGROUND

¶5 Verdone was arrested on September 6, 2022, and subsequently charged with and indicted

on two counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (2) (West 2018)). Following a bond

hearing on September 9, 2022, Verdone was denied pretrial release and held without bail.

¶6 On February 7, 2024, Verdone filed a petition to grant pretrial release under the Act. A

week later, the State filed a verified petition for a pretrial detention hearing, alleging that Verdone

committed the eligible offense of first degree murder, poses a real and present threat to the safety

of any person or persons or the community, and no combination of conditions could mitigate the

threat. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(4) (West 2022)). The hearing was held the same day.

¶7 According to the State’s proffer, Verdone and Martinez had no connection to each other

but were both at Mine Music Hall in the early morning hours of September 4, 2022. A fight broke

out and security personnel kicked Verdone and his girlfriend out of the club. A few minutes later,

Verdone pulled up to the front of the club in a gray Toyota sedan, registered to Verdone. Verdone’s

girlfriend exited the car and went into the club to look for some things but was kicked out again.

Verdone got out of his car and ushered his girlfriend from the club back to the Toyota. Martinez

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and a companion were standing outside and Martinez made “some sort of remark” to Verdone’s

girlfriend. Verdone became upset and he and Martinez had a brief exchange of “heated words.”

¶8 Verdone and his girlfriend got back into the Toyota and pulled into the eastbound lanes of

Lake Street towards Ogden. At the same time, Martinez and his companion were walking east on

the Lake Street sidewalk then turned onto the Ogden sidewalk. Surveillance video shows

Verdone’s Toyota turning right on Ogden and slowly driving up onto the sidewalk, careful to avoid

trees, light poles, and buildings. Verdone centered his car on the sidewalk and accelerated “at a

high rate of speed” towards Martinez and his companion. Martinez’s companion moved out of the

way, but Verdone struck Martinez with the front left bumper of his car. The car dragged Martinez

for approximately 60 feet. Verdone briefly slowed down at a traffic light and then sped away,

leaving Martinez’s battered body on the ground.

¶9 According to the State, police located the Toyota at Verdone’s home. The vehicle showed

damage consistent with the collision, and a blood-like substance was recovered from its

undercarriage, even though it had been freshly washed. Verdone was identified in “high quality

color surveillance video” at the club, by the security’s ID card scanner, by a friend in subsequent

police interviews, and in photo arrays by security guards. Verdone had prior convictions for four

felony drug offenses and had been released from parole less than three months before this incident.

¶ 10 The State argued, “based upon the facts and circumstances of this incident, that the

defendant did not know the victim prior to this date, that he is a danger to the People of Cook

County” and requested the court “maintain his detention.” In response, Verdone’s counsel argued

the State’s petition was “vague as to the specific and articulable facts that make [Verdone], in the

State’s opinion, a danger to a person or persons or the community.” Counsel maintained that the

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various identifications merely placed Verdone at the club and that no witness testimony

corroborated “that there was an acceleration of this vehicle.”

¶ 11 The circuit court denied Verdone pretrial release, finding the “proof is evident and the

presumption is great” that Verdone committed first degree murder, that he “does, in fact, pose a

real and present threat to the safety or [sic] persons based on the articulable facts of the case,” and

that “no conditions or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the

safety of persons or the community.” Verdone then filed a motion for relief, arguing he was not an

aggressor. He contended the surveillance video depicting the supposed heated exchange of words

between Verdone and Martinez lacked audio and that Martinez could have been speaking to

someone else. He further asserted that the Toyota was not washed before detectives located it, that

a Vehicle Reconstruction Report from his retained expert indicated that the car was “not

accelerating to its full capability” at the time of the collision, and that the vehicle’s “CDR” did not

include data from the collision. Despite these arguments, the court determined the State met all

three detention prongs and denied Verdone’s motion for relief. Verdone appeals.

¶ 12 ANALYSIS

¶ 13 Verdone argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the

proof was evident or the presumption great that he committed first degree murder, that he posed a

real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community, and that no less restrictive

conditions could mitigate that threat or ensure his appearance at later hearings. We disagree.

¶ 14 For the State to obtain an initial detention order, the Act requires three showings by “clear

and convincing” evidence: (1) that the proof is evident or the presumption great that a defendant

has committed a qualifying offense (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1) (West 2022)); (2) that the

defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons

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or the community (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1)-(7), (e)(2) (West 2022)) or a likelihood of willful

flight to avoid prosecution (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(8), (e)(3) (West 2022)); and (3) that no

condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any

person or the community or prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution (725 ILCS

5/110-6.1(e)(3) (West 2022)). The “clear and convincing” standard of proof requires more than a

preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Clay, 361

Ill. App. 3d 310, 322 (2005). Where, as here, the State proceeds by proffer, our standard of review

is de novo. People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54.

¶ 15 First, Verdone argues the State failed to show it is evident or the presumption great that he

committed first degree murder, primarily because he was not acting violently or aggressively prior

to the incident. Not so. The State’s proffer shows that Verdone and Martinez exchanged heated

words and to exact revenge for this verbal slight, Verdone slowly maneuvered his vehicle onto the

sidewalk where Martinez was walking, carefully avoiding trees and light poles. He accelerated

until he struck Martinez and dragged him 60 feet down the road, slowing down only briefly at a

stoplight before speeding off and leaving Martinez’s body behind. These events were captured on

surveillance video and are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that Verdone

committed first degree murder. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 2018).

¶ 16 Second, Verdone argues the State failed to establish he posed a real and present threat to

the safety of the community and that no conditions could mitigate the real and present threat he

posed or prevent his flight. For this, Verdone points to his lack of prior violent convictions and 38

letters from family, friends, and community members supporting him.

¶ 17 “[T]he nature and circumstances of the offense charged is the prime consideration in

determining the conditions of release, if any ([725 ILCS 5/] §110-5(a)(1)), and in denying pretrial

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release (id. § 110-6.1(a)), including in making the dangerousness determination (id. § 110-

6.1(g)(1)).” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Carpenter, 2024 IL App (1st) 240037, ¶ 14.

Verdone’s actions on the night in question demonstrate a hair-trigger temper and willingness to

resort to devastating violence in reaction to heated words from a stranger. Rather than stay and

tend to Martinez after the supposed “accident,” Verdone left Martinez’s lifeless body in the street

and fled. He also cleaned the vehicle to remove any trace of the destruction he wrought that night.

It is abundantly clear from the proffered evidence that Verdone poses a real and present threat to

the safety of the community, and the State amply met its burden of proof.

¶ 18 Furthermore, we agree with the circuit court that no measures, including electronic home

monitoring, could adequately mitigate Verdone’s dangerousness. This was an intentional act,

purposely targeting the victim who was a stranger to Verdone. It also endangered a broader

population, as the manner of driving and fleeing the scene reflects a conscience disregard for the

safety of others. Verdone committed the offense while on parole, and there is “a serious risk” he

would not appear in court given that the charge is a non-probationable offense. He has already

demonstrated a willingness to flee the fatal scene, and electronic monitoring or curfew would not

ensure that he “stay in the place where [he is] supposed to be.” As explained in People v. Thomas,

2024 IL App (4th) 240248, “[k]nowing that electronic monitoring might detect a failure to comply

with conditions of release does not diminish concerns that a particular defendant appears to present

a greater risk of noncompliance.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 26. Based on our review of the

record, we find the circuit court correctly denied Verdone’s motion for relief.

¶ 19 CONCLUSION

¶ 20 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 21 Affirmed.

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